Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland

This paper presents empirical evidence on individual income tax competition in Switzerland. Tax competition has some influence on the spread of people with high income over the cantons, and it is partly capitalised in dwelling rents. However, it neither leads to a collapse of public good supply nor makes redistribution by the fiscal authorities impossible. Thus, if tax competition works well in Switzerland there is no reason why it should have disastrous effects in a future European Union.     

Looking behind the curtain—effects from modernization of European Union competition policy

The European Commission issued a proposal for reform of some aspects of Communitary competition policy. In particular, proposes a shift from ex-ante control (notification system) to an ex-post control regime of agreements (or decisions) conflicting with Article 81 (Ex-Article 85).We highlight the expected effects of this shift on the type of agreements that firms will implement. The type of agreements has been taken as exogenous in most analysis of the reform proposal. We contend that significant economic effects may result from recognizing the endogeneity of agreements.We predict that the proposed reform will result, in general, in firms implementing less restrictive agreements.     

Out in the cold? Iceland's trade performance outside the European Union and European Monetary Union

Although entering currency (and customs) unions involve bothcosts and benefits, an increasing body of research is findingthat the benefits—in terms of international trade creation—areremarkably large. Focusing simply on the European Monetary Union(EMU) rather than the broad range of currency unions studiedby other authors, we find that the trade impact of EMU is smaller,but still substantial. Our findings suggest that the Iceland'strade could increase by about 60% and that the trade-to-GDPratio could rise by 12 percentage points should Iceland jointhe European Union and EMU.     

Lobbying and innovation in the European Union

Aside from anecdotal evidence, lobbying activities and the role of vested interests in the EU have not been scrutinized. This article attempts to cast focus on the relationship between lobbying and aspects of innovation in the EU. The modest performance of the EU compared to the innovation frontier has been attributed to an array of factors, one of which is the adverse effect of vested interests. The lack of new, innovative enterprises has been identified as a decisive factor behind the productivity stagnation and lobbying by incumbents poses as a credible culprit. In this article, I create a novel firm-level database through the cross-fertilization of data from the growing Transparency Register (EC and EP), AMADEUS (BvD), the OECD, Eurostat, and the European Commission in order to address the complex relationship between vested interests, innovation, and competition. The preliminary findings indicate that more R&D intensive firms tend to spend significantly larger amount of funds on lobbying, primarily competing for EU grants and government procurement. Using data for country-sector concentration, I find that the relationship is stronger in the presence of low competition. Despite the improvements required in the documentation of lobbying activities, these results provide preliminary tangible evidence on the effect of vested interests on innovation performance.     

Interdependency and adjustments in the European Union

Since the euro was launched, divergences in European economies'evolutions have been more significant than generally expected. The article, based on a multinational macroeconomic model describing the interdependence between 14 European countries, examines the role played by relative‐price adjustment mechanisms and difficulties inherent in asymmetric evolutions.

The efficiency of relative‐price adjustment mechanisms seems limited and, even in the most flexible countries, the return to equilibrium is slow and still incomplete after 10 years. Differences in relative‐price adjustment mechanisms remain a source of asymmetries between member countries. Extra‐European exchanges have a stabilizing role which is uneven on account of trade openness and price elasticities. A decrease of the world demand and a depreciation of the euro, still have an important impact with significant disparities between countries.

Several lessons can be drawn in terms of economic policy. A more restrictive European fiscal policy proves more costly in the long run in Germany and the Netherlands on account of the weakness of price compensation effects. On the contrary, thanks to their greater flexibility, the United Kingdom and Sweden can offset an initial negative shock more rapidly. The wage dimension in the definition of a good European policy mix has also to be examined.     

Regional mobility in the European Union

Regional mobility in the spatial distribution of per capita income in the European Union is examined over the period 1977 to 1999. The methodology used to investigate this issue combines a series of measures taken from the literature devoted to the dynamic study of personal income distribution with a non-parametric analysis. The results show limited mobility in the distribution considered, and a decline in mobility over time. The empirical evidence presented indicates, moreover, that mobility patterns vary as a function of regional development levels. Additionally, the analysis carried out investigates the role played in explaining intra-distribution mobility by variables such as per capita income, population density, per capita expenditure in investment, market potential, and the share in total employment of agriculture, advanced services and non-market services.     

The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretation of the fiscal criteria.     

Fiscal and regulatory federalism in the European Union

This contribution summarizes some quantitative results and presents relevant policy-oriented conclusions obtained from research program No. PBS91-0363. It is mainly supported by the Inter-ministerial Committee on Science and Technology of the Spanish government, which was carried out at the Public Finance and Public Sector Economics Research Unit of University of Valencia (Spain) to analyze, from a fiscal and regulatory point of view, the dynamic characteristics of federalism in the European Union. The research was performed in order to contribute to the establishment of the basis for the acceleration of the economic European integration and the future constitution of the United States of Europe.     

State Formation and Territoriality in the European Union

This article analyses the process of the expansion and integration of the EU from the perspective of a transformation to a competitive state formation. The recent construction of the EU is based on institutional arrangements which aim to combine different politics of scale with a general improvement of economic competitiveness and administrative efficiency. Recent theoretical advancement in state theory are applied in order to emphasise innovative aspects of European integration. After a concise overview about the history of the EU-territoriality and a discussion whether there is a spatial logic observable within the integration process the article outlines a political geography of the EU competition state and respective politics of scale. Finally the question of the future shape of the EU is re-addressed in light of strategic decisions to introduce a defensive or offensive flexibility.     

Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union

This paper studies the Treaty of Amsterdam's reform of the co-decision procedure in the European Union. The paper presents spatial models of the procedure, and examines whether the Treaty significantly alters it. The theory analyzes the implications of the Treaty for the equilibrium EU policies and the institutions' powers. It characterizes sets of policies the Commission can successfully propose under the old procedure, and sets of policies the Council and the Parliament can successfully propose as joint texts under the new procedure. The paper concludes that the new procedure does not lead to a further increase in the Parliament's powers, as intended by the drafters of the Treaty. Rather it finds that the Treaty eliminates the Commission's power under co-decision and may increase indecision.     

Migration and regional convergence in the European Union

We offer an empirical, econometric analysis of the impact of migration on the EU27’s NUTS2 regions in the period 2000–2007. We find that migration had no significant impact on regional unemployment in the EU, but affected both GDP per capita and productivity. A 1 percentage point increase in immigration to immigration regions increased GDP per capita by about 0.02?% and productivity by about 0.03?% on impact and by 0.44?% for GDP per capita and 0.20?% for productivity in the long run. For emigration regions an increase in the emigration rate leads to similar reductions of GDP per capita and productivity both on impact and in the long run. Since immigration regions are often regions with above average GDP, while emigration regions in Europe practically all have below average GDP, migration does not seem to promote convergence.     

Branching and competition in the European banking industry

In this study branching costs and competitiveness of European banks are measured by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a representative sample drawn from nine EEC banking industries in the period from 1990 to 1996. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically the size of their branching network anticipating the degree of competition faced on interest rates. From the structural equations of the model an econometric test is derived in order to measure branching costs and degree of competition in banking services. The empirical analysis captures their changing over time together with the impact of various European directives aiming at deregulating the banking industry. Furthermore the study shows persistence of segmentation acoss EEC banking industries.     

Ricardian fiscal regimes in the European Union

The prevalence of different fiscal regimes is important both for practical policy reasons and to assess fiscal sustainability, notably for European Union countries. The purpose of this article is to assess, with a panel data set, the empirical evidence concerning the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes in EU-15 countries. The results give support to the Ricardian fiscal regime hypothesis throughout the sample period, and for sub-samples accounting for the dates of the Maastricht Treaty and for the setting-up of the Stability and Growth Pact. Furthermore, electoral budget cycles also seem to play a relevant role in fiscal behaviour.

Business Cycle Correspondence in the European Union

This paper examines whether there exists a close correspondence in the business cycles of the EU economies. We focus on the timing and magnitude of business cycles and propose criteria for defining close correspondence. We suggest that any correspondence that does exist is confined to the EU core and that, contrary to some of the existing literature, there exists a clear core-periphery distinction. This makes us less optimistic about the prospects for EMU if it is not accompanied by institutional arrangements that take into account the differences between EU economies.     

Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: Evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union

Tax competition arguments suggest that governments that operate in an open economy (such as local governments) should not and will not rely on non-benefit taxes, such as the income tax. Yet we observe reliance on income taxes by local governments in many countries, and such reliance changes over time. Evidence from a panel data set of 13 OECD countries over the period 1975-1984 suggests that competition between levels of government (resulting in a vertical fiscal externality) and between governments at the same level (resulting in a horizontal fiscal externality) provide some economic rationale for these changes. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities interact. These results have some interesting implications for fiscal policy in the European Union, particularly as the EU continues to evolve. One implication for the EU is that enlargement that increases tax base disparities within the EU (and is not accompanied by an EU-level income tax) will tend to lower national income tax rates, although this must be qualified because it also depends on the mobility of the population. A second implication is that fiscal expansion of the EU to include an EU-level income tax may tend to lower the reliance of national governments on income taxes through the vertical externality, but may also tend to equalize tax bases across countries, and so increase reliance on national income taxes through the horizontal externality.     

The nonobserved economy in the European Union

To better understand the share of the nonobserved economy (NOE) in the European Union, especially on the PIIGS, we estimate, through the multiple indicators multiple causes model, the path between 1980 and 2013. The model includes (i) the tax burden (disaggregated into direct and indirect taxes), a proxy of regulation burden, the unemployment rate and self-employment as causes of the NOE economy; (ii) the GDP and the labour force participation ratio as indicators of the NOE economy. In particular, the estimated weight of NOE as a percentage of official GDP was always higher in the PIIGS group.     

Restrictive Macroeconomic Policies and Unemployment in the European Union

This paper looks at the impact the European integration process has had on the unemployment level of European Union member countries. While the persistence of relatively high unemployment in Europe is often attributed to supply-side factors, such as the rigidities of the labour market, this study contends that the major cause for the rise of unemployment in the EU has been the very macroeconomic policies of the EU itself. The paper argues that the continuous pursuit of deflationary policies and the macroeconomic constraint imposed first by the membership of the European Monetary System and, secondly, by the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, have been the real impediments to reducing unemployment.