初探股票发行核准制与注册制

本文介绍了核准制与注册制的概念及基本特点,在此基础上针对两种股票发行制度的优势与劣势进行了分析,并对我国由核准制逐步过渡到注册制提出了相应的想法与建议。     

推行股票发行注册制仍存困难

近日,证监会就资本市场的发展提出了要求,其中包括加快发展多层次资本市场,推进股票发行制度改革,规范发展债券市场。值得一提的是,摊进股票发行注册制度也首次写进了工作报告。     

借鉴美国经验探寻我国股票发行注册制改革的投资者教育路径

第十二届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十八次会议审议通过的议案,明确授权国务院可以对注册制改革的具体制度做出专门安排,这意味着我国推进股票发行注册制改革具有了明确的法律依据。股票发行注册制度的改革不能一蹴而就,需要各方面的互相协调和稳步共进,其中的投资者教育问题是重中之重。美国金融市场是全球最为成熟发达的金融市场,作为注册制的典型代表,其投资者教育工作经历了长期的探索并具有较强的借鉴意义。本文通过梳理美国投资者教育的经验,结合我国股票发行注册制改革的现实情况和存在问题,探寻了投资者教育的有效路径。     

浅析股票发行注册制改革对创业板的影响

本文通过对股票发行注册制改革的相关政策方针的阐述来分析,研究与推导对创业板从估值,到发行,退市,并购监管等多方面产生的影响.进而得出有利于发展资本市场与创业板市场的措施与建议。     

我国推行股票发行注册制的路径选择与制度建设北大核心SSCI

近期证监会下发《国九条》明确提出要积极稳妥推进股票发行注册制改革,建立和完善以信息披露为中心的股票发行制度。注册制的核心是充分高效的信息披露,审核机构只进行形式审查,强调事后监管,这类发行制度的代表是美国和日本。当前我国股票市场正处于艰难困苦时期,推行股票发行注册制不可轻率、贸然实施,要充分认识到当前实施股票发行注册制的风险及其制度、法规的前提条件尚不成熟,探索出有"中国特色"股票发行注册制度,设计和选择"中国特色"注册制"混合并行"的具体路径;推进注册制改革,绝非新股发行制度本身修改完善就能实现,需要进行一系列的配套制度改革。     

证券发行制度向市场化迈进——评《股票发行审核委员会暂行办法》和《证券发行上市保荐制度暂行办法》出台

行制度作为证券市场各项制度设计中的一个重要组成部分,其合理与否,不仅直接关系到证券市场的稳定和可持续发展,而且还直接影响到投资者的信心。因此,在各个国家不同的市场发展阶段,发行制度都经历了一个不断探索与逐渐完善的过程。2003年12月中国证监会对发审委制度的重大改革和保荐人制度的颁布,就是要通过制度设定来加强证券市场的诚信建设,严把市场准入关,提高上市公司信息披露质量,从长远来看,为加强上市公司治理、恢复投资者信心和证券市场的健康发展打造了一个良好的基础,并将为股票发行制度向注册制过渡创造条件。发审委制度改革将…     

股票注册制改革对货币政策的影响

十八届三中全会提出,健全多层次资本市场体系,推进股票发行注册制改革。本文论述了我国股票发行注册制改革对央行货币政策的影响。     

股票注册制改革对货币政策的影响

十八届三中全会提出,健全多层次资本市场体系,推进股票发行注册制改革。本文论述了我国股票发行注册制改革对央行货币政策的影响。     

对我国股票发行向注册制过渡的思考

证监会明确提出我国股票公开发行审核制度的改革方向是实行注册制,本文指出了目前实行的核准制的一些缺陷,探讨了向注册制过渡的必要性,指出向注册制过渡,可以从创业板开始。     

对我国股票发行向注册制过渡的思考

证监会明确提出我国股票公开发行审核制度的改革方向是实行注册制,本文指出了目前实行的核准制的一些缺陷,探讨了向注册制过渡的必要性,指出向注册制过渡,可以从创业板开始。     

The Benefit of Excluding Institutional Investors from Fixed-Price IPOs: Evidence from Taiwan

A simple way to mitigate the winner's curse in initial public offerings (IPOs) is to reduce the number of informed investors in IPO markets. In Taiwan, institutional investors are not permitted to subscribe to fixed-price IPOs. Excluding institutional investors raises uninformed investors' allocation rates. We show that the winner's curse is still present in Taiwan's fixed-price IPO markets even without the participation of institutional investors, but that IPO underpricing is reduced by at least 4 percent due to alleviating the winner's curse, as institutional investors are excluded from the fixed-price offerings.     

Rationing in IPOs

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. Before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We demonstrate that this mitigates the winners curse, that is, the incentive of bidders to shade their bids. It leads to more aggressive bidding, to the extent that rationing can be revenue-enhancing. In a parametric example, we characterize bid and revenue functions, and the optimal degree of rationing. We show that, when investors information is diffuse, maximal rationing is optimal. Conversely, when their information is concentrated, the seller should not ration shares. We provide testable predictions on bid dispersion and the degree of rationing. Our model reconciles the documented anomaly that higher bidders in IPOs do not necessarily receive higher allocations.     

累计投标询价机制下的IPOs定价及实证分析

通过回顾累计投标询价机制下IPOs定价的相关文献,并对IPOs发行过程中发行公司与机构投资者、中小投资者三方在利益最大化之间进行博弈,求解发行公司的IPOs策略及价格确定过程,在此基础上,进行实证分析。结果表明:我国在累计投标询价机制下发行股票的发行价格除了反映了发行公司股票的内在价值外,还反应了二级市场实际供求关系等外部综合影响因素。     

Competitive IPOs

Competition between investment banks for lead underwriter mandates in IPOs is fierce, but having committed to a particular bank, the power of the issuer is greatly reduced. Although information revelation theories justify giving the underwriters influence over pricing and allocation, this creates the potential for conflicts of interest. In this clinical paper we analyse an interesting innovation that has been used in recent European IPOs whereby issuers separate the preparation and distribution roles of investment banks, and keep competitive pressure on the banks throughout the issue process. These 'competitive IPOs' allow the issuer greater control and facilitate more contingent fee structures that help to mitigate against 'bait and switch.' But unlike more radical departures from traditional bookbuilding – such as auctions – the competitive IPO is an incremental market-based response to potential conflicts of interest that retains many of the advantages of investment banks' active involvement in issues.     

The effects of R&D, venture capital, and technology on the underpricing of IPOs in Taiwan

Information asymmetry and value uncertainty causes high -research and development (R&D) or high-tech Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) to become underpriced. Venture capital can serve as a moderator to mitigate the information asymmetry and value uncertainty to reduce IPO underpricing. High-tech industries significantly contribute to Taiwan??s economic growth. With the unique Taiwan data, we find that venture-backed IPOs are less underpriced. More importantly, IPO underpricing due to technology decreases with the use of venture capital and decreases with the interaction between R&D expenditure and technology. Technology requirement reduces the underpricing of high-R&D IPOs. Accordingly, R&D spending reduces the underpricing of high-tech IPOs.     

Merger-Motivated IPOs

In this paper, we find support for initial public offerings (IPOs) motivated by subsequent acquisition activity. Over a third of newly public firms enter the market for corporate control as acquirers within three years of the IPO. We find that IPOs facilitate acquisitions in a number of ways. Newly public firms benefit from the cash raised in the IPO, from subsequent access to public financing, and from ability to pay with publicly traded stock for acquisitions. IPO firms also benefit by obtaining market feedback and by taking advantage of high post-IPO stock values in making stock-based acquisitions at favorable terms.     

Zero-revenue IPOs

Information-based models of the IPO decision suggest that going public before having generated revenues is inefficient. Still, 15% of firms going public in Europe have not reported revenues prior to the IPO. This paper investigates why these firms decide to conduct an IPO and examines whether the absence of revenues affects the outcomes of this decision. The evidence shows that zero-revenue firms go public to fund investments, mainly in the form of R&D. However, their shares are more underpriced at the IPO and develop less liquid and more volatile aftermarket trading than those of revenue-generating issuers. These effects are driven by firms whose revenue-less status is more persistent, as 18.6% still report no revenues at their three-year IPO anniversary. Also, zero-revenue issuers face a higher risk of being delisted shortly after the IPO. Overall, the evidence indicates that zero-revenue firms go public in an attempt to fund superior growth opportunities, but the high levels of information asymmetry and uncertainty increase the cost of raising capital and the risk of an early delisting.     

Extrapolation Errors in IPOs

We demonstrate that relatively high revenue growth prior to an initial public offering (IPO) is associated with high IPO prices and poor returns. In particular, low‐growth IPO returns, ?1% on a three‐year annualized basis compared to ?12% (equal‐weighted) or ?29% (value‐weighted) for high‐growth new issues. There is no evidence that the performance differentials reflect risk premia. Rather, low‐growth firms’ returns are more stable over time. Finally, while analysts’ forecasts are upwardly biased for all firms, the magnitude of this bias is greatest for firms with rapid pre‐IPO revenue growth. Overall, these results are consistent with the extrapolation errors model suggested by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994).     

论核准制下的新股竞价发行

我国新股发行已经由审批制转向核准制，核准制带来的一项主要变化是新股发行与定价方式的市场化，而竞价发行将成为核准制下新股发行与定价的主要方式之一。     

Penny Stock IPOs

We examine underpricing, long-run returns, lockup periods, and gross spreads for penny stock IPOs over the 1990–1998 period. We find that penny stock IPOs have higher initial returns than ordinary IPOs, but significantly worse long-run underperformance. We also find that penny stock IPOs have longer lockup periods and larger gross spreads. To explore the effect of potential market manipulation, we examine IPOs led by a group of underwriters that were the subject of SEC enforcement actions and/or other penalties. Penny stock issues led by these banks are particularly underpriced and underperform ordinary IPOs led by other underwriters.