Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity

This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. Each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution. Parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform. We find that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less resources are spent on campaigning (on average). Thus, if parties are extreme, less information is supplied than if parties are moderate. We also show that if a public subsidy is introduced, we have policy convergence, given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy.     

Financial market lobbies and pension reform

We develop a model in which firms in the financial market lobby the government to lower compulsory contributions to the public pension system. Firms lobby in order to increase demand from households for their old-age savings products. We conclude with a comparison of two major pension reforms in Europe exemplifying the influence of financial market lobbies on pension policies.     

Simple measures of endogenous free-riding in protectionist lobbies

Even though there is a well-known empirical and theoretical link between lobby and the free-rider problem, the existing literature only attributes its findings to the free-rider rather than the measurement of its extent. We develop broader theoretical micro-foundations for measuring free-riding and investigate the determinants of tariff rates from the perspective of corporate lobbying and free-riding. Our estimation result shows that the degree of free-riding not only varies across industries but is particularly high in larger industries indicating the underutilization of lobbying. The tariff rates under monopoly are about 8 times higher than under perfect competition in most industries suggesting that stakeholders should maintain higher industry protection levels through lobbying.     

Informational externalities,strategic delay,and optimal investment subsidies

Abstract This paper examines optimal government policy when private investment generates information, but investors cannot internalize the informational value their actions have to others. Equilibrium exhibits inefficient delay, as investors adopt a wait‐and‐see approach. The government can alter incentives via an investment subsidy, but complications arise, since future subsidies may induce investors to disregard current policy initiatives. The paper shows that the government achieves its desired outcome only when the the investment subsidy is financed by a non‐distortionary, lump‐sum tax. When taxation is distortionary, the government faces a time inconsistency problem that may prevent effective policy.     

Strategic planning, strategic management, strategic foresight: The seminal work of H. Igor Ansoff

H. Igor Ansoff was the prominent reference in the corporate strategy field, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. His bestseller, Corporate Strategy, was the first to give a conceptual framework and a tool box to top managers, consultants and scholars. Recognized as the real pioneer of the field, he was seen by Henry Mintzberg as also the leader of the strategic planning school. The aim of this short article is to show that he was also the father of strategic management and a leader who gave an impressive set of concepts and ideas to promote an integrative and flexible view of strategic planning, strategic foresight, organizational structures and processes.     

The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games

We establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games. The results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities, and to apply theorems and results intended for rent-seeking games to other games, and vice versa. We conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Privatization, strategic foreign direct investment and host-country welfare

Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that there is a two-way causality between privatization and greenfield FDI. Privatization increases the incentive for FDI, which, in turn, increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms, and on the foreign firm's mode of entry.     

Competition,strategic delegation and delay in technology adoption

This paper examines how strategic managerial delegation affects firms' timing of adoption of a new technology under different modes of product market competition. It demonstrates that strategic delegation has differential impacts on adoption dates under Cournot and Bertrand competitions. Strategic delegation with ‘own-performance’-based incentive schemes always leads to early adoption in markets with Bertrand competition compared to that under no-delegation, but not necessarily so in markets with Cournot competition. It also shows that under strategic delegation with ‘own-performance’-based incentive schemes, adoption occurs earlier (later) in markets with Cournot competition than in markets with Bertrand competition, if the degree of product differentiation is high (low). In contrast, under strategic delegation with ‘relative-performance’-based incentive schemes, adoption dates do not differ across markets with different modes of competition. It also analyses implications of firms' choice over types of managerial incentive schemes on the speed of diffusion of new technology.     

Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market

Summary  The neoclassical model of labor market discrimination assumes the presence of either prejudiced preferences, biased assessments of worker productivity, or monopsony power. We show that when market agents control asymmetric information, strategic behavior can induce discriminatory hiring practices even when these market features are absent. Moreover, strategic interaction many distort public policies to the point of harming the segments of the work force they were designed to support. Received: January 3, 1996 revised version April 29, 1996     

Anti-herding and strategic consultation

In this paper I analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information provided by others. I find that decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public information such as the prior or others’ recommendations. I also find that some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult advisers although advice is costless. Moreover, advisers to the decision maker may not report their information truthfully. Even if the advisers care only about the outcome, they bias their recommendation since they anticipate inefficient anti-herding behavior by the decision maker.     

Simultaneity between strategic variables: Production,innovation, and product differentiation

This paper aims to analyze the existence of simultaneous effects among the variables production, product differentiation, and innovation. Microeconomic data from a sample of 2,160 firms are used as a base. Empirical results show that a positive correlation exists from innovation to product differentiation, thus showing that it is in the process of production itself, through technical improvements, where product differentiation is determined. On the other hand, no positive effect exists from product differentiation to innovation, i.e., once technical improvements have been established, firms exchange the barriers to entry created by brand image for the real barriers established by innovation itself. Lastly, the importance of the firm size in explaining the other endogenous variables analyzed is confirmed. This paper has received financial support from the Valencian Institut of Economic Research (IVIE). The study was carried out within the framework of research program SEC94-1357 of the Comisón Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología (CICYT).     

Self-confidence and strategic behavior

We suggest that overconfidence (conscious or unconscious) is motivated in part by strategic considerations, and test this experimentally. We find compelling supporting evidence in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have scored on an IQ test. In two-player tournaments where the higher score wins, a player is very likely to choose to compete when he knows that his own stated confidence is higher than the other player’s, but rarely when the reverse is true. Consistent with this behavior, stated confidence is inflated by males when deterrence is strategically optimal and is instead deflated (by males and females) when luring (encouraging entry) is strategically optimal. This behavior is consistent with the equilibrium of the corresponding signaling game. Overconfident statements are used in environments that seem familiar, and we present evidence that suggests that this can occur on an unconscious level.     

Information and strategic voting

We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting. Voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur and focus on how information about the preference distribution affects strategic behavior. We also vary the relative importance of the second preferred option. Quantal response equilibrium analysis is used to analyze the game and derive predictions. Our results indeed show that strategic voting arises. Its extent depends on (i) information availability; (ii) the relative importance of the intermediate candidate; (iii) the electorate’s relative support for one’s preferred candidate; (iv) the relative position of the plurality-supported candidate in one’s preference ordering. Our results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred candidate’s chances of winning.     

Quantile spillovers and dependence between Bitcoin,equities and strategic commodities

This paper has two aims. We first examine the dynamic spillovers between Bitcoin and 12 developed equities, gold, and crude oil for different market conditions using a Bayesian Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregressive (TVP-VAR) model with daily spot prices. Our econometric approach enables us to capture the left and right tails as well as the shoulders of the return distribution corresponding to volatility spillovers under the bear, normal, and bull market states among these financial assets. We quantify and trace the dependence and directional predictability from Bitcoin to other assets using the sample cross-quantilogram. Our key findings offer convincing evidence of time variation in the level of volatility. Spillovers between Bitcoin and other financial assets intensify during extreme global market conditions. Secondly, results from the cross-quantilogram indicate strong dependence and positive directional predictability between Bitcoin and most equities and crude oil when market returns are bullish. However, during the bearish market period, there is negative dependence and predictability from Bitcoin to stocks in Finland, the Netherlands, the U.S.A, and the crude oil market only. This implies that Bitcoin can act as a hedge to stocks in Finland, the Netherlands, the U.S.A, and the crude oil market. However, insignificant dependence and directional predictability from Bitcoin to the remaining assets indicate that Bitcoin may act as a safe-haven to these assets during bearish markets. Our findings hold important implications for both international investors and portfolio managers who consider Bitcoin as part of their portfolio diversification and other investment strategies.     

Technological innovation, organizational linkages and strategic degrees of freedom

This paper draws on case studies of seuen LK-based multinational companies to examine the relationship between different types of technological innovation, internal and external organizational linkages and technology strategy. A model of technological innovation is deueloped to help explore this relationship. The model consists of three dimensions—technology, component and product—linked by four modes of innovation—incremental, architectural, fusion and breakthrough. The findings support the contingency theory, where different organizational structures and processes are consistent with dgerent contingency theoy, where diffrent organizational structures and processes are consistent with development.     

Buying power and strategic interactions

Abstract.  This paper shows that buying power at the retail level can lead to a rise in wholesale price. As a result, retailers without buying power may increase their retail price. Nevertheless, total surplus is non‐decreasing in the degree of buying power possessed by the 'dominant' retailer. JEL classification: L13     

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.