首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
损失补偿原则的规范功能具有"二元性",即禁止被保险人不当得利和充分填补被保险人的损失。但在传统保险法理论和实践中,为了达到防范道德风险的功能,损失补偿原则完全被禁止不当得利原则所取代。随着保险技术与保险观念的进步,传统理论下的保险制度难以满足被保险人充分补偿需求并容易造成保险合同效率的低下,因此损失补偿原则规范之重心应完成从"禁止得利"向"充分补偿"的转变。在制度设计及保险合同中,应恰当缩减合同条款对补偿金额的限制、重视发展重置成本保险、重复保险中应完成分摊中按份责任向连带责任之转变、优先实现被保险人的剩余损害赔偿请求权,以更全面保障被保险人的利益。  相似文献   

2.
This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. Although Wang et al. [2005] had examined this problem, their assumption implied that the insured is risk neutral. Consequently, this study extends Wang et al. [2005] and further considers a more realistic situation where the insured is risk averse. The study derives the optimal insurance contract as a single deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is redundant or as a double deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is binding. Finally, this study discusses the optimal coverage level from common forms of insurances, including deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance. JEL Classification G22  相似文献   

3.
We show that differences in market participants risk aversion can generate herd behavior in stock markets where assets are traded sequentially. This in turn prevents learning of market’s fundamentals. These results are obtained without introducing multidimensional uncertainty or transaction cost. JEL Classification G1 · G14 · C11 · D82  相似文献   

4.
This article examines the optimal indemnity contract in an insurance market, when the insurer has private information about the size of an insurable loss. Both parties know whether or not a loss occurred, but only the insurer knows the true value of the loss and/or to what extent the losses are covered under the policy. The insured may verify the insurer's loss estimate for a fixed auditing cost. The optimal contract reimburses the auditing costs in addition to full insurance for losses less than some endogenous limit. For losses exceeding this limit, the contract pays a fixed indemnity and requires no monitoring. The optimal contract is compared with the contracts obtained in cases where it is only the insured who can observe the loss size.
  相似文献   

5.
We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. JEL Code D72 · D78  相似文献   

6.
This paper discusses optimal insurance contract for irreplaceable commodities. To describe the dual impacts on individuals when a loss occurs to the insured irreplaceable commodities, we use a state-dependent and bivariate utility function, which includes both the monetary wealth and sentimental value as two arguments. We show that over (full, partial) insurance is optimal when a decrease in sentimental value will increase (not change, decrease, respectively) the marginal utility of monetary wealth. Moreover, a non-zero deductible exists even without administration costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a positive fixed reimbursement is optimal if (1) the premium is actuarially fair, (2) the monetary loss is a constant, and (3) the utility function is additively separable and the marginal utility of money is higher in the loss state than in the no-loss state. We also characterize comparative statics of fixed-reimbursement insurance under an additively separable preference assumption. JEL Classification G22 · D86 The author acknowledge funding from National Science Council in Taiwan (NSC93-2416-H-130-020).  相似文献   

7.
This paper studies the design of disability insurance scheme when agents differ in their privately known productivity. We extend the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) two period model to allow for agents differing ex-ante in their productivity and characterize the optimal nonlinear tax transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when per-period earnings and age are observable while individuals’ productivity and health status are not observable. We show that the induced tax/benefit scheme should exhibit a marginal income tax that decreases with age for some agents. A marginal subsidy on the young high productive income may be desirable. While the disability scheme always involves the old low productive agents to be indifferent between working and claiming disability benefits, this result is not always true for the old high productive agents. JEL Classification H55 · H23 · E62  相似文献   

8.
Under Yaari's dual theory of risk, we determine the equilibrium separating contracts for high and low risks in a competitive insurance market, in which risks are defined only by their expected losses, that is, a high risk is a risk that has a greater expected loss than a low risk. Also, we determine the pooling equilibrium contract when insurers are assumed non-myopic. Expected utility theory generally predicts that optimal insurance indemnity payments are nonlinear functions of the underlying loss due to the nonlinearity of agents' utility functions. Under Yaari's dual theory, we show that under mild technical conditions the indemnity payment is a piecewise linear function of the loss, a common property of insurance coverages.  相似文献   

9.
摘要:区域产量保险设计初衷,旨在应对以个体实际损失为理赔依据的传统型农业保险所面临的挑战,包括道德风险、逆向选择及管理成本偏高、服务效率偏低等问题。目前区域产量保险在美国和印度等国家得到广泛实践,其经验值得我国参考和借鉴。糖料蔗是广西最主要的经济作物,由于传统型农业保险的缺陷在广西糖料蔗表现尤为突出,导致糖料蔗种植保险推广面临较大阻力。区域产量保险应用于广西糖料蔗有一定的优势,但也面临挑战,且有赖于一系列限制条件的满足,需要科学制定风险区划、制定客观的理赔依据、营造良好的信用环境等。  相似文献   

10.
This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. JEL Code J64 · J65 · J68  相似文献   

11.
This paper studies the impact of public goods provision in an adverse selection environment. Public inputs used collectively by firms have indirect spillovers in imperfect credit markets by affecting the random returns of borrowers in this market. Public inputs change the nature of the binding incentive constraint and mitigate distortions in the credit market. The magnitude of such indirect benefits depends upon the ‘type’ of the public input being considered. Public inputs targeted to benefit the less-efficient borrowers in the economy have greater indirect benefits as compared to pure public inputs that benefit all. These additional efficiency gains, emerging out of information-asymmetries in the credit market, should be considered in the cost-benefit analysis of such public inputs. JEL Classification: H4 · D8 · O16  相似文献   

12.

We examine a problem of demand for insurance indemnification, when the insured is sensitive to ambiguity and behaves according to the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (J. Math. Econ. 18:141–153, 1989), whereas the insurer is a (risk-averse or risk-neutral) expected-utility maximiser. We characterise optimal indemnity functions both with and without the customary ex ante no-sabotage requirement on feasible indemnities, and for both concave and linear utility functions for the two agents. This allows us to provide a unifying framework in which we examine the effects of the no-sabotage condition, of marginal utility of wealth, of belief heterogeneity, as well as of ambiguity (multiplicity of priors) on the structure of optimal indemnity functions. In particular, we show how a singularity in beliefs leads to an optimal indemnity function that involves full insurance on an event to which the insurer assigns zero probability, while the decision maker assigns a positive probability. We examine several illustrative examples, and we provide numerical studies for the case of a Wasserstein and a Rényi ambiguity set.

  相似文献   

13.
This study designs an optimal insurance policy form endogenously, assuming the objective of the insured is to maximize expected final wealth under the Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. The optimal insurance policy can be replicated using three options, including a long call option with a small strike price, a short call option with a large strike price, and a short cash-or-nothing call option. Additionally, this study also calculates the optimal insurance levels for these models when we restrict the indemnity to be one of three common forms: a deductible policy, an upper-limit policy, or a policy with proportional coinsurance. JEL Classification No: G22  相似文献   

14.
This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of time-limited pension insurance, we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided sequentially or simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential contracts is an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals. JEL Classification D82 · D91 · G22  相似文献   

15.
The Enron Corporation went from a $65 billion dollar market capitalization to bankruptcy in just 16 months. Using statistical techniques for extracting the implied probability distributions built into option prices, I examine the market’s expectation of Enron’s risk of collapse. I find that the options market remained far too optimistic about the stock until just weeks before their bankruptcy filing. I thank Oded Palmon and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. JEL Classification G13 · G14  相似文献   

16.
We study underwriting relationships in the floating rate debt market, where many issuers have a large number of offerings. We find that frequent issuers maintain close relationship with only three to five underwriters and pay significantly less underwriting fees than infrequent issuers. The findings are consistent with the notion that starting an underwriting relationship requires expenses for information production. We also find that an issuer’s first underwriter has a cost advantage over later-comers in competing for the issuer’s business. As a result, the first underwriter wins a larger share of the issuer’s business. JEL Classification G21 · G24  相似文献   

17.
The paper studies the so-called individual risk model where both a policy of per-claim insurance and a policy of reinsurance are chosen jointly by the insurer in order to maximize his/her expected utility. The insurance and reinsurance premiums are defined by the expected value principle. The problem is solved under additional constraints on the reinsurer’s risk and the residual risk of the insured. It is shown that the solution to the problem is the following: The optimal reinsurance is a modification of stop-loss reinsurance policy, so-called stop-loss reinsurance with an upper limit; the optimal insurer’s indemnity is a combination of stop-loss- and deductible policies. The results are illustrated by a numerical example for the case of exponential utility function. The effects of changing model parameters on optimal insurance and reinsurance policies are considered.  相似文献   

18.
We investigate the influence of public policy on interprovincial migration in Canada using new aggregated migration data for 1974–1996, the longest period studied so far. We consider the consequences of regional variation in a variety of policies, and also investigate the effects of certain extraordinary events in Quebec and in the Atlantic provinces. The results indicate that while the changing bias in the unemployment insurance system may have induced some people to move to the relatively high unemployment Atlantic region, the resulting flows are likely too small to have altered regional unemployment rates. In contrast, political events in Quebec in the 1970's and the closing of the cod fishery in 1992 appear to be associated with large changes in migration patterns. JEL Classification H0 · H7 · J41 · J65 · R23 · R58  相似文献   

19.
Decisions by firms and individuals on the extent of their tax payments have generally been treated as separate choices. Empirically, a positive relationship between corporate and personal income tax evasion can be observed. The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that a manager's decision on the firm's behaviour will be independent of his personal preferences if the gain from reducing corporate tax payments is certain, as in the case of tax avoidance. If, however, the firm evades taxes so that the manager's income depends on whether the firm's activities are detected or not, corporate and personal income tax evasion choices cannot be separated. Jel Code H 24 · H 25 · H 26  相似文献   

20.
The reform of the German Insurance Contract Act (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, ?VVG“) also targets key aspects of third-party liability insurance. The changes go beyond the findings made by both the courts and legal authorities to date.Compulsory insurance aside, the law still provides that an injured third party has no standing to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor’s liability insurer. The tortfeasor may assign its indemnity claim against the insurer solely to the injured third party and may no longer be precluded from doing so under the General Insurance Conditions (AVB). Consequently, the tortfeasor’s indemnity claim against the insurer effectively becomes a pecuniary claim. This is criticised by the insurance industry particularly with regard to eliminating the prohibition against acknowledgment and satisfaction of claims.In the future, third parties will be able to assert claims directly against the tortfeasor’s insurer and this will be the case for compulsory insurance across the board. Provisions currently in effect in the motor vehicle liability insurance industry will be carried over to the entire compulsory insurance sector. Compulsory insurance does permit agreements involving self-deductibles. However, such agreements are generally effective only as between the insurer and the tortfeasor inter se, i.e. they are not effective as against third parties — in contrast to valid disclaimers of risk.Another change in compulsory insurance is the hierarchy of claims for compensatory damages and relief in the event the insured amount is inadequate. Specifically, the hierarchy gives preference to individual claims of injured parties which are not otherwise covered, such as claims for pain and suffering.The prohibition against the retroactive loss of provisional coverage for failure to pay the first premium, which had been criticised primarily by motor vehicle liability insurers, has been omitted in the Government bill.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号