Assumptions–Central Forecast

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments rather than assuming 'unchanged' policies. In the central forecast we assume that the broad thrust of policy is unchanged, i.e. we have made the technical assumption that the present government is returned in the next General Election. But, because an election must be held within the next 15 months, we also consider the medium-term prospects under alternative economic policies. (For details see p. 19.) In the central forecast. e herefore. we assume that policy will continue to be guided-though not completely determined-by an extended Medium- Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). For 1983-4 the MTFS requires the PSBR to be 23/4% per cent of GDP at market prices. Given official inflation and output forecasts, the Chancellor is therefore aiming for a 1983-4 PSBR of £8bn (Autumn Statement, p. 13). In the central forecast. however, we have assumed that the Budget of 15 March will give greater weight to the political objectives of cutting income tax and maintaining the attack on inflation, even if this implies slippage from the MTFS targets. Specifcally we have assumed that the standard rate of income tax will be cut by lp. that personal tax allowances will be raised by 12 per cent and that indirect taxes will be raised by only half the amount required for full revalorisation. This amounts to a total tax giveaway (compared with unchangedpolicy) of £1 1/2 and results in a PSBR of just over £9bn. 3.1 per cent of GDPat market prices.     

Assumptions

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments rather than assuming 'unchanged' policies. In particular we assume that the Budget in the spring of 1983 will give greater weight to the political objective of cutting income tax than to maintaining the fiscal and monetary limits set by the Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). We therefore expect the PSBR, after falling below the planned level in the current financial year, to rise above the target jigure in the 1983-4 and 1984-5 financial years. We expect sterling M3 growth to mirror this and to be siightly below the upper end of its target range for the current financial year, slightly above in the following two financial years. The MTFS does not cover the period beyond 1984-5. We assume that the broad objective of reducing the PSBR is continued in 1985-6 and 1986-7. despite the expected overshooting of targets in earlier years.     

The MTFS or the EMS: Which Way for Credible Monetary Policy?

Since the latter part of 1988, the primary policy objective has been to head off a rise to double digit inflation. To this end, interest rates have been raised from 7112 per cent to 14per cent, while the public sector is running a large fiscal surplus. Despite this apparently very tight policy stance, policy is deficient in a crucial respect: it lacks credibility. The all too public divisions within government have weakened the efficacy of monetary policy, especially in financial markets. The ongoing uncertainty over who is in charge of the conduct of policy - No. 10 or No. 11 - further undermines confidence. The most urgent priority must be to reassert clear priorities and guidelines. In this Viewpoint, we consider how best to restore the credibility of monetary policy. There are two main possibilities: first, to reassert the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) in an appropriate form; or to join the (Exchange Rate Mechanism of the) European Monetary System (EMS). We argue that it will be very hard to derive credibility benefits from a reassertion of the MTFS: because of the inflation record of the past decade and the twists and turns of past versions of the MTFS, a mere restatement will not resolve the uncertainties that result from known differences within the government. In particular, any restatement will rely on discretion and judgement in its implementation and this will weaken its beneficial effects on expectations. Instead we argue that entry into the EMS offers a tougher and more credible commitment for monetary policy. The Chancellor has been pushed to rule out UK entry until the second half of 1990 at the earliest, but the government should make a virtue of this by announcing a firm dale for entry next year. In the interim, it should encourage a debate about the appropriate rate for entry, a debate which will increasingly guide the foreign exchange market. The government should make it clear that in choosing this rate it will do so with the commitment to low inflation very much in mind, favouring a high exchange rate. Once in the EMS, the government should rule out the possibility of devaluing the pound in an EMS realignment. This provides a firm non- discretionary anchor for both monetary policy and inflation expectations. With this commitment, the principal gain from EMS entry will be establishing a regime of low inflation for the next decade: in this, choice of the exchange rate will be less crucial than the fact of entry.     

THE 1981 BUDGET

In this Forecast Release we examine the short-term prospects for the UK economy in the light of the Budget and other developments. Compared with our February forecast the Budget has raised taxes by about £2 bn but it has also increased public expenditure by a similar amount The net effect on the PSBR, compared with our February forecast, is therefore small, especially if the Treasury's estimates for nationalised industry profits and/or public sector wages prove over-optimistic. We therefore believe that the outturn for the PSBR in 1981-82 could be close to the figure of £12 bn presented in our last forecast.
We also believe that the prospects for output and inflation are little changed The Budget by itself will have raised prices by about 1 per cent compared with our previous forecast but because we had probably over-estimated indirect tax receipts, the net effect on prices is small For output, the likely reduction in consumers' expenditure is more or less offset by higher public spending. We continue to expect a fall in output between 1980 and 1981 of 1–11/2 per cent, inflation during the year at about 10 per cent, a current account surplus of £3 bn, monetary growth of 8 to 9 per cent and a PSBR of £12 bn.     

Economic Viewpoint Bringing Counter-Inflation Policy Back on Course

There is no doubt that the monetary limit for the first year of the Government's Medium-Term Financial Strategy will be grossly exceeded, The reported figure for sterling M3 is likely to show a growth of 16 per cent to 18 per cent for the financial year compared with the upper limit of 11 per cent. This is a setback for the government's counter-inflationary policy but not a disaster. The likely overshoot can be largely (but not completely) explained by the removal of the Bank of England's Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme (the corset). Its significance is best understood if we re-examine monetary history since June 1978. (when the corset was imposed). A reasonable interpretation is that the money supply has effectively been growing at an annual rate of 15 to 16 per cent for the past three years (Details are shown in Table 4 on p. 12.) In retrospect it can be said that last year's monetary policy (but not that of the previous two years) was defensible in the light of the shock to prices caused by the oil price rise and the increase in VAT. We did in fact argue in Economic Outlook of June/July 1979 (“Price Shocks and the Economy”) that if the UK'S past record of monetary control had been better we would advocate a relaxation of monetary policy to accommodate these shocks. In the event monetary policy was relaxed (albeit unintentionally) and the squeeze on the real money supply was less severe than appeared at the time. However, there must be a steady reduction in monetary growth from now onwards if the government is to maintain its current progress in reducing inflation. We believe that such a policy is feasible and will be successful However the government must stick to the fiscal policy set out in the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). Our preliminary estimates suggest that, if Current public expenditure plans are fulfilled, there may be little or no scope for a reduction in personal taxation in 1981-82. Further ahead, the danger point, on past experience, will be 1983 when the economy should be on a strong path of recovery and inflation should be well below current rates. That is the point at which upward pressures on the money supply are likely to reappear and will have to be resisted     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy: A Progress Report

The recent changes in the value of the dollar and the talk of an interest rate ‘war’ demonstrate again that the world finds it difficult to cope with rapid exchange rate movements. In some ways the experience - and the reactions to it - are similar to the events of 1978. As now, the world was in a recession (though on a milder scale) and there were fears that exchange rate problems would obstruct economic recovery. The main difference is that in 1978 it was the strength of the Deutschmark which caused concern whereas this time the problems are associated with the rise in the value of the dollar. In a Briefing Paper in Economic Outlook, February 1978, ‘Monetary Targets and the World Economy’ we suggested that the problem arose from inconsistencies between national monetary policies and exchange rate objectives. In general, countries dislike exchange rate changes - in either direction - and there were problems because countries would not accept the exchange rate consequences of their own or other countries' monetary policies. We estimated the required monetary policies for stable exchange rates and suggested specific national monetary targets for 1978 which would at least move the world economy towards consistent monetary policies. In this Economic Viewpoint we return to those ideas. We consider what happened in 1978 and we also revise the underlying monetary rules. More recent experience suggests that although there has been some progress towards the convergence of monetary policies there will continue to be trend changes in exchange rates. It is also clear that there will be short-term fluctuations around these trends. We believe that greater convergence of monetary policies would be desirable but failing that it is important that countries should avoid abrupt changes in monetary policy. It is also important that countries should become accustomed to exchange rate changes. They should direct monetary policy towards their objectives for inflation and should not be diverted from it by temporary or permanent changes in their exchange rates.     

[2] Assumptions

We have attempted in this forecast to make our best guesses about the likely development of policy over the coming years rather than to assume 'unchanged policy'. We assume that, at least until 1984, the broad framework of policy will be that provided by the Mediwn-Term Financial Strategy, which provides a target for the growth of the money supply (ł M3) and a path for the PSBR.
The forecast suggests that one objective of the MTFS, which was to reduce the PSBR as a percentage of GDP at market prices, remains feasible. However, we do not now expect the 1983–4 PSBR guideline of 2 per cent to be achieved until 1984–5, and we expect the growth of sterling M3 to remain outside the target range right through the forecast period, even though real interest rates remain positive.     

通货膨胀目标制:加拿大银行的政策实践与启示

在加拿大的通货膨胀目标制政策框架下,中央银行定期向公众宣布政策通货膨胀目标,然后根据通货膨胀预测值与政策目标之间的差距来确定调控方向;在实践中,加拿大银行通过使用利率操作区间和公告操作,从而很好地实现了对市场流动性及短期利率目标的调控,进而影响到市场主体的经济决策,并最终成功实现了实际通货膨胀率稳定地波动在中央银行的目标范围内。基于此,我国有必要借鉴加拿大银行的做法,建立一个更为简单透明的政策操作框架,以保证货币政策操作的效果。     

THE AUTUMN STATEMENT

The Treasury's forecast, published with the Autumn Statement, has been widely heralded as showing a surprisingly cheerful picture for next year as far as both output and inflation are concerned. In fact it is close to the forecast which we produced in October. Here we compare the two forecasts and then consider how our forecast is affected when we adopt the Treasury assumptions on asset sales and the exchange rate. We find that the Treasury is more optimistic than we are on investment and that holding the exchange rate - which is needed to produce the official inflation forecast - requires rather higher interest rates than we assumed in October and this widens the gap between our forecast for GDP and the Treasury's forecast.
We also consider how the government should respond to lower North Sea oil revenues. Taking a permanent income approach, we suggest that the PSBR should be allowed to rise by £2bn on this basis. The same approach, however, suggests that an extra £71/2bn of asset sales should be used to cut the PSBR not taxes. On balance therefore this analysis indicates that next year's PSBR target should be lowered by £1/2bn from the £71/2 bn contained in the 1985 MTFS.     

POST-BUDGET ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF OIL PRICE CHANGES

In this Forecast Release we update our February forecast to take account of the Budget and other new information, particularly about oil prices and the exchange rate. This updated forecast is then used as the basis for a set of three simulations in which we explore the consequences of lower oil prices, a fall in the exchange rate and a tightening of fical and monetary policy. The main conclusions are first that the Budget (the contentr of which we broadly anticipated) has not significantly changed our assessment of the short-term prospects for output and inflation. However, a detailed examination of the Government's revenue and expenditure estimates suggests that fiscal policy in 1983-4, though broadly in line with the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, has been loosened compared with 1982-3 by rather more than appears from the PSBR projections. We ako believe that there is a risk that the PSBR will be significantly higher than officially forecast in 1983-4.
Our simulations show the size of the PSBR overshoot in the event of a further sharp fall in the oil price. I f this were accompanied by a fall in the exchange rate, inflation would quickly be back in double figures. Whether the exchange rate falls or not a lower oil price gives significant output gains. However, if the authorities reacted by tightening fiscal and monetary policy, inflation would be broadly the same as in the Post Budget forecast, but there would still be output gains from the lower oil price.     

UK Economic Prospects and Policy Dilemmas

Our current forecast, largely unchanged from that published in the October 1992 Economic Outlook, is for a gradual recovery in economic activity during 1993, gathering pace in the course of the year. Unemployment continues to rise through the year, and inflation remains subdued. The main risk to the forecast lies in the possibility that a continued decline in property values may check reviving confidence and lead the banks to restrict lending.
The principal policy dilemma lies in the very high level of public sector borrowing, likely to rise to around 7.5 per cent of GDP on unchanged policies. The Government will need to signal its willingness to act to cut the PSBR by higher taxes or reduced spending plans. This will allow interest rates to remain low for longer, and offers the best prospects of maintaining a competitive pound and reducing the burgeoning current account deficit. There is room for a further cut in interest rates in the Budget to boost confidence and recovery, but rates may need to rise towards the end of the year if the higher prices resulting from the sterling devaluation start to feed into wage claims.
The Government should also consider seriously the need for reform of the institutional framework for policy making, to help restore credibility weakened by the manner of sterling's departure from the ERM. These should include greater openness about official thinking on monetary policy, and greater autonomy, within a new framework of accountability, for the Bank of England.     

FOOLING ALL OF THE PEOPLE

The public's expectations about government policy are a key influence on the economy and can be more important than the policy itself. By allowing the public to know that it is considering reflation outside the Medium Term Financial Strategy, the government is reducing the credibility of the MTFS. This Forecast Release draws on some of the latest developments in economic theory, in the field of 'time inconsistency', to argue that the early years of the MTFS suffered from continuing but incorrect expectations that the policy would be abandoned. To avoid repeating this mistake, the government should promptly concede the current calls for reflation if it is unable to resist them, although a preferable outcome for unemployment and inflation can be achieved by re-affirming the MTFS. A worse outcome than either of these is obtained if the government continues with the MTFS while leaving open the possibility of a sudden reflation.     

Briefing Paper The Debate about Monetary Policy

The main implications from the discussion above are:

• 1. 

  If the PSBR affects the money supply it should also have a direct influence upon inflation.
• 2. 

  Our research indeed suggests that the PSBR is the root cause of inflation as well as the root cause of monetary growth.
• 3. 

  The government should therefore be less pre-occupied with M3 and lay even greater emphasis on the PSBR.
• 4. 

  It should avoid sinking its energies into money base control. At most some form of money base control is advisable as a precaution.
• 5. 

  To avoid any further money market disturbances the authorities should resort to a floating rate policy for MLR as was formerly the case.

     

信贷渠道在我国货币政策传导中的现状

根据货币政策传导理论,银行信贷渠道和资产负债表渠道是货币政策信贷传导的主要方式。从2003年开始,我国中央银行连续采取紧缩性的货币政策。文中介绍了此轮货币政策的信贷传导现状,指出现阶段我国货币政策的信贷传导仍然存在梗阻,应加以疏通。     

The new currency boards and discretion: empirical evidence from Bulgaria

In recent years, a number of countries have introduced currency boards (CBs). Gaining in swing and popularity, this new generation CB preserves, to varying degrees, the Central Bank’s ability to function as the lender of last resort (LOLR) and to intervene in case of systemic risk. Recently, Central Bank flexibility has been preserved in different forms in Hong Kong, Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. Macro- and microeconomic implications of such departures from orthodox CBs have not been thoroughly studied yet. Theoretically, the introduction of this second-generation CB provides an opportunity for conducting discretionary monetary policy (though certainly not in its typical form). Some major, ensuing questions require answers. What are the new channels of monetary policy? Does an orthodox self-regulating (automatic) mechanism work with second-generation CBs? How are monetary disequilibria in the economy adjusted? We define an automatic mechanism as “the presence of a positive cointegration relationship between the overall balance of payments (BOPs) and the reserve money, and the absence of discretionary variables in the model.” The theoretical hypothesis is checked empirically based on Bulgarian data.     

Coordination and non-coordination risks of monetary and macroprudential authorities: A robust welfare analysis

This study compares a central bank’s leaning against the wind approach with a mix of monetary and macroprudential policies under parameter uncertainty in an estimated DSGE model with two financial frictions. We show that uncertainty of the economic environment is an essential constituent in properly designing macroprudential policy. Although coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies minimizes the policymakers’ Bayesian risk, coordination and non-coordination risks threaten the goals of both authorities. The former describes the situation where the authorities partly resign from implementing the monetary policy objectives to stabilize macroprudential risk. The latter is when conducting a non-coordinated macroprudential policy induces higher total Bayesian risk than when only the central bank minimizes the expected total welfare loss. The robust Bayesian macroeconomic rules show that when financial shocks shrink the banks’ or entrepreneurial net worth, a contractionary macroprudential policy should be combined with an expansionary monetary policy. However, if capital adequacy ratio or risk shocks strike the economy, such a conflict in macroeconomics policy instruments disappears, thus synchronizing both policies.     

Do Euro Area Countries Respond Asymmetrically to the Common Monetary Policy?

We investigate the possible existence of asymmetries among Euro Area countries reactions to the European Central Bank monetary policy. Our analysis is based on a Structural Dynamic Factor model estimated on a large panel of Euro Area quarterly variables. Although the introduction of the euro has changed the monetary transmission mechanism in the individual countries towards a more homogeneous response, we find that differences still remain between North and South Europe in terms of prices and unemployment. These results are the consequence of country‐specific structures, rather than of European Central Bank policies.     

Sterling’s rise: A case of delayed overshooting?

In this article Francis Breedon discusses how sterling’s rise over the last 6 months can be explained in terms of a delayed overshooting reaction to past monetary policy. Although the timing is still hard to judge, it seems that this effect should now begin to wear off, allowing sterling to fall – particularly against the DM. As far as future monetary policy is concerned, this delayed overshoot is another argument for the Treasury and Bank of England undertaking a more activist exchange rate policy, perhaps following the example of another open economy on the fringes of EMU – Switzerland.     

TOWARDS SOUND MONETARY INSTITUTIONS

Most people see money and central banking as shrouded by an impenetrable veil of mystery, as matters that ought to be delegated to expert economists in central banks. Yet the actual performance of central banks has been less than stellar. And there are good reasons to expect unchecked, discretionary monetary policy by central bankers to produce less‐than‐perfect results. Not only do central bankers not have the right incentives and knowledge to make beneficial discretionary decisions, but the economy does not always behave in a predictable fashion, reacting as an automaton to discretionary policy shifts. A market‐based monetary arrangement – such as Friedrich von Hayek's free banking proposal – would be preferable to a national or supranational monopoly on the issue of money. If such an arrangement is not attainable, then it is desirable, at the very least, that the behaviour of central bankers is constrained by rules, such as nominal income growth targets.     

The macroeconomic impact of economic uncertainty and financial shocks under low and high financial stress

External financial frictions might increase the severity of economic uncertainty shocks. We analyze the impact of aggregate uncertainty and financial condition shocks using a threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model with stochastic volatility during distinct US financial stress regimes. We further examine the international spillover of the US financial shock. Our results show that the peak contraction in euro area industrial production due to uncertainty shocks during a financial crisis is nearly-four times larger than the peak contraction during normal times. The US financial shocks have an influential asymmetric spillover effect on the euro area. Furthermore, the estimates reveal that the European Central Bank (ECB) is more cautious in implementing a monetary policy against uncertainty shocks while adopting hawkish monetary policies against financial shocks. In contrast, the Fed adopts a more hawkish monetary policy during heightened uncertainty, whereas it acts more steadily when financial stress rises in the economy.