嵌入投资银行后的银行危机传导模型

基于Sujit模型,通过在支付清算系统内构建嵌入投资银行的危机传导模型,同时考虑中央银行的两种政策对防范少数银行危机蔓延至系统危机的作用,结果发现,少数银行引发系统危机的主要原因在于危机银行影响了与其有着支付清算关系的债权银行的收益和它们的预期信心,中央银行政策对控制危机传导是有效的.     

影像技术在银行结算票据清算中普遍应用的可行性分析

一、票据影像清算运行系统构想 本文所述票据影像清算,是指办理票据结算的银行利用特定的科技设施和核算系统,通过采集发送和接收审核票据影像及相关信息,清算应收、应付票据资金的联行核算方式.其具体运行过程是:结算票据的收款人将票据送存开户银行后,其收款银行采集票据影像,通过本行会计核算系统和联网的人民银行小额支付清算系统,将票据影像和票款清算信息发送至该票据的付款银行.票据付款银行审核确认票据影像和票款清算信息,在预定时限内,向收款银行反馈付款确认同执.银行间票据影像和资金清算信息均通过支付系统清算中心接转,支付系统清算中心依据付款银行的票款承付回执,为收、付双方银行清算资金.     

影像技术在银行结算票据清算中普遍应用的可行性分析

<正>一、票据影像清算运行系统构想本文所述票据影像清算,是指办理票据结算的银行利用特定的科技设施和核算系统,通过采集发送和接收审核票据影像及相关信息,清算应收、应付票据资金的联行核算方式。其具体运行过程是:结算票据的收款人将票据送存开户银行后,其收款银行采集票据影像,通过本行会计核算系统和联网的人民银行小额支付清算系统,将票据影像和票款清算信息发送至该票据的付款银行。票据付款银行审核确认票据影像和票款清算信息,在预定时限内,向收款银行反馈付款确认回执。银行间票据影像和资金清算信息均通过支付系统清算中心接转,支付系统清算中心依据付款银行的票款承付回执,为收、付双方银行清算资金。     

清算账户流动性管理存在的问题及建议

近年来,人民银行支付清算系统为全社会提供多元化的支付清算手段,随着支付系统业务种类日益丰富,其资金量日趋增大,银行机构对清算账户流动性监测和管理难度也逐渐加大。本文以江苏省银行机构为调查对象,分析支付系统现行清算账户管理模式下,银行机构对清算账户监测和管理中存在的问题,并提出相关建议,旨在进一步加强清算账户流动性管理,切实防范支付系统风险。     

数字货币在跨境支付清算中的应用分析

<正>随着经济全球化的日益深入,跨境支付清算体系已成为国际重要金融基础设施,影响着世界经济的健康发展。然而,美国凭借在纽约清算所银行同业支付系统和环球银行金融电信协会中的全球金融霸权地位,伺机对非同盟国实施金融制裁,传统跨境支付清算体系受到质疑,各国正在积极探索研发以数字货币为基础的跨境支付清算新方案。随着金融贸易全球化的发展,公众对跨境支付服务需求提升,以存款货币为基础的传统支付清算模式的不足凸显,如结算效率低、时效性差、费用高等。同时,近些年美国依靠在纽约清算所银行同业支付系统（Clearing House Interbank Payment System,简称CHIPS）和环球银行金融电信协会（Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication,简称SWIFT）管理的跨境通信系统中的全球金融霸权地位,伺机对非同盟国进行金融制裁,引发了其他国家对现有跨境支付清算体系的担忧,各国开始探索寻找新的跨境支付清算方式。     

要规避集中支付代理银行的资金风险

现阶段,财政集中支付的流程是:财政国库支付执行机构或预算单位的支付令,通过人工操作转到代理银行,代理银行通过现行银行清算系统向收款人付款,并与国库单一账户进行清算。应当肯定,几年来代理支付业务的商业银行,在办理财政资金支付与清算过程中,是发挥了应有作用的,但是也存在较多的风险隐患,需加以研究解决。一、代理银行存在的资金隐患(一)专用凭证的印制、管理和使用缺失安全机制。     

小额支付系统同城票据清算业务运行中的风险与防范

随着小额支付系统业务功能的不断拓展,银行机构业务运行中的各类风险也逐渐暴露。本文通过分析撤销同城清算系统后,运用小额支付系统处理同城清算业务中存在的风险隐患,提出相关措施、建议,旨在防范风险,更好地利用现代化支付系统,为社会提供优质、高效的支付清算服务。     

国库集中支付基本业务释要（六）——财政性资金银行支付清算业务

一、财政性资金银行支付清算的概念财政性资金银行支付清算包括资金支付和资金清算两个环节。资金支付是指代理银行根据财政部门和预算单位的支付指令,通过中国人民银行和商业银行资金汇划系统,将资金由国库单一账户体系划拨给收款人或用款单位账户的支付结算行为。资金清算是指国库单一账户体系中各账户之间的资金划拨行为,包括代理银行支付资金后向国库单一账户申请划款的资金清算行为(划款清算)和代理银行收到退款后将资金清算回国库单一账户的     

关于同城票据交换与现代支付系统市场走向与发展趋势的调查

为研究分析现代支付系统投入运行使银行结算渠道和清算方式发生了哪些变化,对原有的资金清算格局产生了怎样影响,特别是现代支付系统与同城清算系统的关系如何,怎样止确把握资金清算系统的发展方向,为社会提供优质高效的银行清算服务,我们成立煤题组,对同城票据交换与现代支付系统市场走向与发展趋势进行了调查分析。     

我国支付清算系统的发展及存在的问题

支付清算系统是银行乃至整个金融业的基石,目前我国已建成了功能较为完善的支付清算网络体系。本文从支付清算系统的概念入手介绍了其发展历史、现状,并根据我国的支付清算系统的实际情况提出发展面临的问题,并找出相应的对策和建议。     

A network model of systemic risk: stress testing the banking system1

Although there are many definitions of systemic risk, most agree that it manifests itself by an initial shock that results in the failure of one or more banks and then spreads out to the entire system by a contagion mechanism which can result in the failure of more banks in the system. Assuming that bank failures in the initial shock are randomly dependent on the failure probabilities of the individual banks and that the ensuing contagion process is deterministic, depending on interbank exposures, in this paper we propose a network model to analyse systemic risk in the banking system that, in contrast to other proposed models, seeks to obtain the probability distribution of losses for the financial system resulting from the shock/contagion process. Thus, calculating the probabilities of joint failures by simulation and assuming that the matrix of bilateral interbank exposures is known, we represent systemic risk in the financial system by means of a graph and use discrete modelling techniques to characterize the dynamics of contagion and corresponding losses within the network. The probability distribution of losses, risk profile for the Mexican banking system, is obtained through an efficient, complete enumeration procedure of all possible bank default events in the system. This, in turn, allows the use of the wide variety of well-established risk measures to describe the fragility of the financial system. Additionally, the model allows us to perform stress tests along both the bank default probabilities and the interbank exposures and is used to assess the risk of the Mexican banking system. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do contagion effects vary among bank failures?

Many of the previous studies on contagion effects in the banking industry focused on the failure of a large bank to determine whether the adverse effects spread to other banks. Yet, little is known whether other publicized bank failures cause contagion effects, and why the effects may vary among bank failures. Given the changes in the banking environment over time, contagion effects could be conditioned on the characteristics of the failing bank and of the banking environment at that time. We assess 99 publicized bank failures over the 1980–1996 period, and find that contagion effects exist in general for the surviving rivals of the failed bank. The degree of contagion effects varies over time (among bank failures), and is stronger when the failed bank is a multibank holding company, when the failed bank is publicly held, when the failed bank is relatively large, when the rivals are relatively small, and when the rivals have relatively low capital levels. The contagion effects are less pronounced in the period following the passage of FIRREA. Furthermore, the total risk-shifts of surviving rival banks in response to the announcement of a failed bank are inversely related to their capital level, and total risk-shifts of rival banks are less pronounced for failures occurring just after the passage of FIRREA. The results suggest that a bank’s exposure to possible contagion effects due to a bank failure can be partially controlled by a bank’s managerial policies and by regulatory policies.     

On the Contagion Effect in the US Banking Sector

By using the spatial econometrics methodology, this paper investigates the contagion of the risk taking by banks in the US banking sector during 2001 to 2012. In addition, the contagion signals up to the Subprime crisis in 2008 are analyzed and different channels of contagion are studied in order to identify fragile groups of banks. Our analysis reveals that there is no significant contagion transmitted to the whole banking system. However, we observe that the bank contagion is significantly spread locally and for the group of banks that share similar characteristics related to size and bank regulations.     

Financial contagion risk and the stochastic discount factor

I provide evidence that financial contagion risk is an important source of the equity risk premium. Banks’ contributions to aggregate financial contagion are estimated in a state space framework and linked to systemic risk. Greater bank connectedness today leads to increased systemic risk 3–12 months later. More contagious banks earn significantly greater risk-adjusted returns than less contagious ones and the tradable high contagion-minus-low contagion bank portfolio is priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Stocks that co-move more strongly with contagious banks have greater expected returns. These results are robust to factor model specification, test assets, and time period considered.     

商业银行流动性危机传染机理研究

银行危机传染往往给一个国家或地区的经济带来巨大的损失.不完全的银行间拆借市场中隐含了更大的银行危机传染的可能性;银行间的长期资产越多,银行间拆借的短期利率和银行间存款的长期利率越高,银行间拆借市场就越稳定,在遭受流动性冲击时,这一市场发生银行危机传染的可能性就越小.适量的银行存款对传染效应具有阻碍作用.为防范系统性风险,中国商业银行应逐步建立完备的银行间存款市场,减少政府干预,让市场约束力来强化商业银行的风险管理意识.     

The Evolution Of Bank Resolution Policies In Japan: Evidence From Market Equity Values

We examine the evidence in equity markets concerning bank regulatory policies in Japan from 1995 to 1999. Our results support the presence of information‐based contagion in Japanese equity markets. When the failure of a bank of certain regulatory status was announced, it adversely affected excess returns on banks with equal or lower levels of regulatory protection. Market participants therefore initially behaved as if only second regional and smaller banks would be allowed to fail. As the situation deteriorated, however, banks that traditionally enjoyed greater regulatory protection were also perceived to lose their too‐big‐to‐fail status.     

Information Contagion and Bank Herding

We show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit-maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks. When bank loan returns have a common systematic factor, the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor. The increase in a bank's cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality (in addition to the systematic risk factor). Hence, banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing. Competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives.     

Liquidation equilibrium with seniority and hidden CDO

The aim of our paper is to price credit derivatives written on a single name when this name is a bank. Indeed, due to the special structure of the balance sheet of a bank and to the interconnections with other institutions of the financial system, the standard pricing formulas do not apply and their use can imply severe mispricing. The pricing of credit derivatives written on a single bank name requires a joint analysis of the risks of all banks directly or indirectly interconnected with the bank of interest. Each name cannot be priced in isolation, but the banking system must be treated as a whole. It is necessary to analyze the contagion of losses among banks, especially the equilibrium of joint defaults and recovery rates at liquidation time. We show the existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium. Then the standard pricing formulas are modified by adding a premium to capture the contagion effects.     

基于共同冲击和异质风险叠加传导的风险传染研究——来自中国上市银行网络的传染模拟

本文将银行系统遭遇外部共同冲击作为研究起点,建立了一个共同冲击和异质风险交互传导与放大的简化模型,冲击的传导包括“原始冲击”、“增量冲击”和“违约冲击”三个风险传染阶段。基于2018年我国15家上市银行的股票收益率和年报数据、2006年至2018年的银行评级数据,本文构建了贝叶斯分层图模型和银行间拆借矩阵,并利用蒙特卡洛模拟测度不同触发银行所引发的系统性风险损失、单个银行的系统性风险杠杆能力(文中定义为“传染乘数”指标)以及政府监管介入的效果。模拟结果显示:共同冲击损失远大于异质风险损失;规模和网络关联性是决定传染乘数的重要因素,且当规模因素不突出时,网络关联性对传染乘数的决定作用相对更强,极容易出现小规模、高关联性银行具有较高的传染乘数;当银行风险资产损失率在10%至25%之间时,造成系统性风险损失的杠杆能力普遍增强;政府监管介入能较好地降低系统性风险。本研究的相关结论为系统性风险的监管设计提供经验证据和参考。