A Simple Characterization of the Second‐best Two‐part and Block‐rate Tariffs Theory and Applications

The general necessary optimality conditions for second‐best discrete multipart tariffs are rather complex. In this paper, we derive a simplified characterization of these conditions for two‐part tariffs and for block‐rate tariffs for given thresholds of these tariffs. The simplified necessary optimality conditions are equivalent to the necessary conditions for a Ramsey‐optimum for goods with continuously variable individually demanded quantities. We demonstrate that this characterization of second‐best multipart tariffs can be helpful, when applying the usual regulatory mechanisms to these tariffs. In particular, we consider Vogelsang–Finsinger (1979) regulation as well as a particular form of price‐cap regulation which is related to the Laspeyres index of prices.     

THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*

Consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved. Since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous, this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers. Results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits. Furthermore, evidence suggests that a menu of optional two‐part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective.     

Microeconometric Analysis of Residential Water Demand

This paper develops a structural model for obtaining price elasticities and evaluating consumer’s response to changes in nonlinear tariffs when only panel data on household consumption are available. The model and the empirical strategy address problems implied by nonlinear tariffs, existence of a fixed cost, and use of limited data, giving rise to a random effects model with a nonlinear individual effect. Results show that the estimated model does well at fitting data and demand is inelastic, although elasticity varies by initial consumption block. Then, I estimate welfare consequences of implementing several demand policies.     

The Armington assumption and the size of optimal tariffs

There has been commentary on the seeming success of the world trading system in responding to the large shock of the 2008 financial crisis without an outbreak of retaliatory market closing. The threat of large retaliatory tariffs and fears of a 1930s style downturn in trade have been associated with numerical trade modelling, which projects post retaliation optimal tariffs in excesses of 100%. In the relevant numerical modelling, it is common to use the Armington assumption of product heterogeneity by country. Here, we argue and show by numerical calculation that the widespread use of this assumption gives a large upward bias to optimal tariffs, both first step and post retaliation, relative to alternative homogenous good models used in trade theory. The reason is that optimal tariffs equal the inverse of the foreign export supply elasticity and are negatively related to the elasticity of the foreign offer curve. The Armington assumption model has a much more bowed foreign offer curve, which generates unrealistic larger optimal tariffs.     

DISTRIBUTING THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION*

We argue that the incomplete information which the government has about domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal instrument to protect them from import competition. Using a model where agents have private information about their endowments, we solve for the optimal government policy subject to the political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the incentive compatibility constraint, and the government's budget constraint. We find that the optimal policy takes the form of nonlinear tariffs. These tariffs are never complete, in the sense of bringing prices back to their initial level, but always allow some individuals to be strictly better off than at the initial prices.     

Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans

In this paper, I study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents' uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique, mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two–part tariffs. Agents' uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types. In such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type, by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule. The theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by South Central Bell in two cities in Kentucky in 1986. The empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist, leading to different, nested, econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information. The empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes. All expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters.     

Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm

Determining the optimal selling strategy for a multiproduct firm facing consumers with unobservable tastes is a difficult task. This paper aims to show how almost optimal nonlinear tariffs can often be found when the number of products is large. Moreover, such tariffs take a simple form: (i) when taste parameters are independently distributed across products, the almost optimal tariff is a single cost-based two-part tariff which can extract virtually all consumer surplus; (ii) when tastes are correlated across products, perhaps because of income differences across consumers, the almost optimal tariff can be implemented as a menu of two-part tariffs each of which has prices proportional to marginal costs.     

Pricing of Transport Networks,Redistribution, and Optimal Taxation

The author studies optimal pricing of roads and public transport in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. Individuals are heterogeneous in unobservable earning ability. Optimal transport tariffs depend on time costs of travel and work schedule adjustments (days and hours worked per day) as a response to commuting costs. The author finds that discounts for low‐income individuals are optimal only if the time cost of a trip is small enough. Lower travel time costs facilitate screening; therefore, redistribution provides an additional motive for congestion pricing. Finally, the study investigates the desirability of means‐testing of transport tariffs.     

Competitive nonlinear tariffs

This paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs, i.e., those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased, to the case of a symmetric oligopoly. Competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a Cournot framework. Various equilibria are obtained, which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors' strategies. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff. The phenomena of buyer self-selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in Cournot models both appear in the results.     

Trade imbalance and the endogenous optimal tariff

Endogenous tariff literatures reveal empirically that trade imbalance is negatively related with import tariff, this article gives a theoretical evidence and explanation to support this finding with the methodology of multi-country numerical general equilibrium modelling and simulation. We explore how optimal tariff changes after trade imbalance is introduced, and find that optimal tariffs decrease substantially, either for surplus or deficit countries, when imbalance is considered. Specifically, when the imbalance is modelled in endogenous monetary and inside-money structures, the optimal tariffs decrease by 26% globally on average. Our results suggest that the deepening trade imbalance is beneficial to the global trade liberalization due to its driving tariffs down.     

Asymmetric trade protection leading not to productivity but to export share change

This article revisits a classical theme in economics, that is, the relationship between trade protection and economic performance, with an improved treatment of the endogeneity of tariffs and with consideration of alternative performance criteria. This paper also considers the effects of asymmetric protection, such as higher tariffs on consumer goods and lower tariffs on producer goods. Using sectoral data on Korean manufacturing during the period from 1967 to 1993, this study finds that the effect of trade protection by tariff tends to show up not in terms of total factor productivity but in terms of revealed comparative advantage and export shares of sectors. Such an effect tends to be greater in consumer goods, which are the main targets of promotion by higher tariffs. This study verifies the potentially positive role of tariffs under certain conditions, especially under discipline from world markets.     

Reforming Tariffs and Subsidies in International Trade

This paper analyzes unilateral and multilateral reform of ad valorem tariffs and subsidies. The paper shows that under substitutability, extensive subsidization of exports is required for an increase in the lowest tariff rate to raise economic welfare. The paper derives also conditions for when a radial reduction of ad valorem tariffs and subsidies may fail to raise economic welfare.     

Self-selecting tariffs under pure preferences among tariffs

The behavioral assumptions for welfare analysis of self-selecting tariffs are generalized to be consistent with those maintained in empirical models of tariff choice. When customers have pure preferences among tariffs, it is shown that the optimal self-selecting tariffs provide strictly greater welfare than mandatory marginal cost prices, contain marginal prices that do not equal marginal cost, and can Pareto dominate an existing tariff. As an illustration of the theoretical results, optimal self-selecting tariffs are calculated empirically for a local telephone company.     

VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.     

Tariffs versus quotas in the presence of imperfect competition and cross‐border externalities

Abstract.  We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government does not have full information on the foreign firm's production method and if cross‐border externalities exist, import quotas are in some cases preferable to tariffs. Otherwise, however, tariffs are preferable to quotas. JEL Classification: F13, F18     

碳关税壁垒对我国工业品出口的影响及对策研究

全球环境的恶化使人们越来越关注碳排放问题,发达国家正在考虑通过对不实施减排的国家征收碳关税。从碳关税提出的背景出发,阐述低碳经济背景下碳关税壁垒的相关特征,运用局部均衡法分析碳关税对我国整体的影响,同时也运用可计算的一般均衡模型测算不同的碳关税对我国工业品出口影响的程度。通过分析发现碳关税的征收将对我国经济和贸易产生重大影响,建议我国企业要顺应低碳经济发展趋势,加快研究和发展低碳经济。     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.     

A Stackelberg Game Model of Trade in Renewable Resources with Competitive Sellers*

We model international trade in renewable resources between a single buyer and competitive sellers as a Stackelberg differential game. The buyer uses unit and ad valorem tariffs to indirectly encourage conservation of the renewable resource under study. First, we show that the efficacy of these trade policy instruments in promoting conservation depends fundamentally on whether harvesting costs are stock dependent or independent. When harvesting costs are stock independent, the optimal open‐loop tariffs are dynamically consistent. In contrast, when harvesting costs are stock dependent, the optimal open‐loop tariffs are dynamically inconsistent. Secondly, we point out that whether the terminal value of the resource stock is higher with the stock independent or the stock dependent cost function cannot be resolved unambiguously. Thirdly, we show that it does not make sense for the buyer to use both tariffs simultaneously. Finally, we discuss the implications of these and other findings for renewable resource conservation in general.     

Tariff Uniformity and Growth

Theoretical ambiguity exists regarding the potential benefits of adopting a uniform tariff schedule. In this paper, we investigate the empirical evidence on this question. From cross-country growth regressions over the period 1988-97 we find a nonlinear relationship between a country's standard deviation of tariffs and its growth rate. Specifically, we find that countries with either a large degree of tariff uniformity or very little tariff uniformity tended to grow faster over this time period, controlling for other factors.