The Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Federal Systems: The Political Economy of NIMBY

This paper offers a new political economy explanation for thepervasive problem of siting hazardous waste treatment facilitiesin federal system. We first show that a decentralized systemyields the first-best waste treatment capacity level and that acentralized structure gives rise to free-riding behavior amonglocal jurisdictions. In our model, each community seeks toinfluence the central government through political contributions.This leads to suboptimal levels of treatment capacity. Thecapacity is increasing in the compensation level if the marginalbenefit of treatment capacity is sufficiently large, and in thegovernment's weight on aggregate social welfare relative tolobbying activities. The centralized system can replicate thedecentralized system with a sufficiently high compensation level.Since compensation has proved difficult, a centralized systemfaces greater obstacles than a decentralized system.     

Noxious Facilities, Environmental Damages, and Efficient Randomized Siting

This paper considers the efficient siting of a noxious facility that causes environmental damages (for example, increased pollution) in the host community. The analysis shows that there can be multiple efficient locations without transfers, and that an efficient location need not have the smallest WTA or WTP. In general, there exist randomized outcomes that are ex ante efficient and that Pareto dominate efficient outcomes. The analysis also shows that a community’s most preferred lottery never provides full insurance. Under some conditions, lotteries with no host compensation are Pareto superior to those with compensation.     

Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem

A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem here is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. We provide an axiomatic framework to analyze this problem and seek normatively desirable and practical decision rules. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. We show that this rule is a unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. We then establish the nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information.     

Do China's State-Owned Enterprises Maximize Profit?

China's state enterprise reform is often believed to have made profit the most important goal of SOEs. Nonetheless the poor performance of SOEs relative to other forms of enterprises remains puzzling. We offer an explanation based on the incentive aspect of the reform, which complements the theory based on a soft budget constraint. Under certainty, the incentives of enterprise managers to maximize their own compensation are consistent with profit maximization with or without a soft budget constraint. Under uncertainty, however, the managers' incentives generally deviate from expected profit maximization. This deviation is dampened by, but still exists even without a soft budget constraint.     

Optimal accident compensation schemes

This paper considers the way in which accident compensation is offered as insurance against personal injury due to accidents. We begin by setting up a simple microeconomic model in which accident compensation schemes can be studied. Using this model, the accident compensation scheme that maximizes the expected utility of the insured for a given expected outlay of the scheme (that is, for a budget constraint for the insurer) is characterized. We show that, in order for the optimal schedule of indemnities to be increasing (more severe accidents lead to greater compensation) then, contrary to what has been assumed in the literature, the marginal utility of wealth must be decreasing in health. In particular, if the marginal utility of wealth is non-decreasing in health, then an optimal indemnity schedule cannot provide full compensation, in the sense that utility in each state is a constant. Financial support from Secretaría de Estado de Universidades e Investigación del Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia is gratefully acknowledged by F. J. Vázquez.     

Demand-side factors in optimal land conservation choice

The dominant paradigm of conservation-reserve planning in economics is to optimize the provision of physical conservation benefits given a budget constraint, implicitly assuming the value of biodiversity and ecosystem function is not affected by human proximity to that natural capital. There is evidence, however, that human willingness to pay (WTP) for conservation declines with distance—a phenomenon we call “spatial value decay”. This paper begins a new strand of the conservation planning literature that takes demand-side factors – location of people in the landscape, the degree to which WTP for conservation depends on proximity – into account. We use theoretical models of linear abstract landscapes to explore the impact of demand-side factors on two facets of conservation choices: siting of a single reserve when conservation potential is greatest near a critical site, and siting of multiple reserves when fragmentation reduces physical conservation services produced. Our results show how planners should sometimes employ increased fragmentation to capture value when people's preferences are not very highly localized, and how optimal policy balances proximity to the ecologically critical site with proximity to people. In some scenarios, the payoff to using a reserve design approach that considers demand-side factors is large, but we find that spatial value decay reduces the benefits that can be gained from any conservation-planning approach.     

Patient selection in a mixed oligopoly market for health care: the role of the soft budget constraint

Competition in hospital care is often implemented through mixed markets where public and private hospitals compete for patients. The optimality of this market form has long been debated in the literature. In this paper, we investigate the role of soft budget constraint in affecting patient selection within a mixed market. Patient selection is the undesired effect of hospital competition when three conditions are met: asymmetry in hospitals’ objectives, presence of hospital’s private information and inability to enforce hard budget constraint. The paper shows that soft budget is a pre-condition for the existence of patient selection. Our paper adds an important dimension to the existing literature which considers asymmetry of information as the only cause for this market failure. The understanding of the mechanisms leading to patient selection makes it possible for the regulator to design measures to reduce such undesirable effect.     

The automatic reaction of the Italian government budget to fundamentals: an econometric analysis

The paper offers a new estimate of the sensitivity of Italy's primary budget balance to macroeconomic variables. The analysis has distinguishing features: detailed itemization of public finance aggregates; close attention to the statistical properties of the time series; and joint estimation of elasticities with respect to both real GDP and inflation. First, the economic variables driving the automatic component were chosen. Second, when possible, a macroeconomic base was associated with each public finance item. Third, each tax base was regressed on the driving economic variables. Fourth, each budget item that was supposed to include an automatic component was regressed either on its own base or directly on the economic variables affecting the automatic components. The effects on public budget are simulated to investigate the consequences of a change in nominal and real GDP.     

Pay for performance: motivating the chief nurse executive

A recent membership survey of the Association of Nurse Executives indicates that an increasing number of nurse executives are receiving bonus compensation based upon the criteria of budget performance, patient satisfaction, and relations with physicians and nurses.     

Budget Standards and the Poverty Line

This article reports some of the results from a recent study which, among other things, developed and costed low cost budgets for a range of Australian households. A budget standard represents what is needed, in terms of goods, services and activities, to achieve a particular standard of living and what that costs in a particular place and time. A low cost budget standard is one designed to meet basic needs at a frugal level while still allowing social and economic participation consistent with community expectations. The low cost budget standard estimates for households living in Sydney in February 1997 are somewhat higher than the Henderson poverty line, partly a reflection of the high cost of housing in Sydney, but also a consequence of the low cost standard itself being above a poverty standard. In spite of this, the budget standard relativities for different households provide an estimate of the relative needs of Australian households in the 1990s which could replace the current much-criticised equivalence scale.     

Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence

This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel [Ferejohn, J., Krehbiel, K., 1987. The budget process and the size of the budget, Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 31, 296–320] showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level.     

Assessing the Impact of US Macroeconomic Policies and Inflation Rates on the Australian Economy*

A three-equation system is specified with Australian monetary base growth, the domestic budget deficit and the domestic inflation rate as dependent variables Lagged values of these three variables and their US counterparts are entered as explanatory variables in each equation. Results for 1967-83 suggest a possible effect of lagged US monetary base growth on Australian monetary base growth plus a positive direct impact of US inflation on Australian inflation.     

A signaling approach to soft budgets

A new explanation for soft budget constraints is given. Projects of an agent are often the more profitable, the more confident the agent is in the principal's competence and/or supports. Principals can signal support and/or competence through a soft budget constraint.     

Electoral systems and immigration

Unexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where immigration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appropriates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed, the policymaker must distribute the compensation. With respect to proportional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a few decisive districts and leave after-compensation rents higher, therefore producing higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration than do voters. Finally, our model predicts that opposition to immigration is more geographically dispersed in plurality systems. Basic evidence supports this prediction.     

An empirical approach to distributive justice

This paper starts from the idea that it would be interesting to complement the deductive reasoning about economic justice with an empirical approach which tries to describe and interpret the actual value judgements held by the economic agents. We present results from a pilot study with 180 subjects. Factor analysis indicates that it makes sense to work with desert and compensation criteria, as most economists and philosophers do. We then illustrate that it is possible to operationalise equity judgements, estimating for each subject separately an equation describing his perception of the equitable compensatory income variation. We use the factor analysis results to construct a ‘compensation’ and a ‘desert’ index. All coefficients can be nicely interpreted and interesting patterns of interindividual variation emerge.     

Balanced‐budget rules and aggregate instability: The role of consumption taxes in a monetary economy

In a real macroeconomic model, it is well established that a balanced‐budget rule based on consumption tax can rule out indeterminacy. The present paper shows, both analytically and numerically, that such a balanced‐budget rule induces indeterminacy and, hence, aggregate instability in a standard one‐sector cash‐in‐advance economy. From a policy perspective, our results raise possible concerns that balanced‐budget rules with endogenous consumption tax could have destabilizing effects under the current over‐easy monetary environment.     

On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value,all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed.     

The effect of EPA enforcement funding on private-sector pollution-control investment

The paper estimates the effects of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement budget upon the demand for pollution-control equipment in the private sector. There are two possible effects. A direct effect occurs when the enforcement budget is used for inspections that result in enforced compliance requiring additional pollution control equipment. A second effect is anticipatory, and arises from the private sector's objective of minimizing expected costs due to fines imposed by the EPA for infractions of pollution-control requirements. This component of demand depends, in part, on the EPA enforcement budget. We find that increases in the EPA budget increase the demand for pollution-abatement equipment. This in turn implies that increases in the EPA enforcement budget have been effective in mitigating pollution.     

中国国有工业企业劳动力冗员问题研究

科尔奈发展的预算软约束理论提出了一个引人注目的关于国营企业冗员现象的解释。然而这类文献有时忽略这样一种现象,即政府、特别是转型经济中的政府往往会让国有企业(SOES)追求一些非经济目标,并通过补贴和政策性贷款来为此提供资助。通过对大约700家国有企业的研究,我们发现在不减轻企业社会负担的情况下,预算约束的硬化是直接导致九十年代初中国国企冗员上升的主要原因之一。     

A simulation-based welfare loss calculation for labor taxes with piecewise-linear budgets

Graduated income tax rates and transfer programs create piecewise-linear budget constraints that consist of budget segments and kink points. With any change in these tax rules, each individual may switch between a kink point and a budget segment, between two budget segments, or between two kink points. With errors in the estimated labor supply equation, the new choice is uncertain, and so the welfare effects of a tax change are uncertain. We propose a simulation-based method to compute expected welfare effects that is easy to implement and that fully accounts for uncertainties about choices around kink points. Our method also provides information about expected changes in working hours.