An Interpretation of the Collapsing Process of the Bretton Woods System

This paper attempts to determine the environments that market confidence might play a significant role in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. We build a game-theoretic model of currency crises where a continuum of small speculators can decide their market confidence and trading positions. In the model, the convertibility of dollar is assumed to exhibit a long-term downtrend due to Triffin’s dilemma. The problem is analyzed on the grounds of both certainty and uncertainty. In the certainty case, we find that if the convertibility of dollar is low enough, a dollar crisis is inevitable, but if the convertibility is in an intermediate range with multiple equilibria, the Bretton Woods system is vulnerable to self-fulfilling speculation. In the uncertainty case, the incidence of the confidence crises will disproportionately increase as the convertibility of dollar falls. Lastly, this paper shows that the Federal Reserve Bank’s secrecy may extend the maximum lifespan of the Bretton Woods system.     

FORECASTING CURRENCY CRISES: WHICH METHODS SIGNALED THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRISIS OF JUNE 2006?

In this paper we test the ability of three of the most popular methods to forecast South African currency crises with a special emphasis on their out‐of‐sample performance. We choose the latest crisis of June 2006 to conduct an out‐of‐sample experiment. The results show that the signals approach was not able to forecast the out‐of‐sample crisis correctly; the probit approach was able to predict the crisis but only with models, that were based on raw data. The Markov‐regime‐switching approach predicts the out‐of‐sample crisis well. However, the results are not straightforward. In‐sample, the probit models performed remarkably well and were also able to detect, at least to some extent, out‐of‐sample currency crises before their occurrence. The recommendation is to not restrict the forecasting to only one approach.     

The Simple Analytics of Sudden Stops

Currency crises in emerging and developing countries have often been characterized by “sudden stops” of capital flows. A variety of mechanisms have been adduced to explain the emergence of this phenomenon. This paper integrates these mechanisms into a simple and transparent analytical model in which currency mismatches, large current account deficits, and large stocks of short-term debt interact with low reserve stocks to generate dual equilibria. In this context, the “panic” equilibrium is characterized by a currency crisis, a sudden stop, and an output collapse. The potential for various policies to avoid this outcome is explored, as are the implications of the analysis for reserve accumulation.     

MODELLING SOUTH AFRICAN CURRENCY CRISES AS STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE VOLATILITY OF THE RAND

This study tests the theory that currency crises are associated with sudden large changes in the structure of foreign exchange market volatility. Due to increases in market uncertainty, crisis periods exhibit abnormally high levels of volatility. By studying short-term changes in volatility dynamics, it is possible to identify the start and end dates of crisis periods with a high degree of precision. We use the iterative cumulative sum of squares algorithm to detect multiple shifts in the volatility of rand returns between January 1994 and March 2009. Dummy variables controlling for the detected shifts in variance are incorporated in a generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity modelling framework. The analysis indicates that previously identified crisis periods in the rand coincide with significant structural changes in market volatility.     

THE ARGENTINEAN CURRENCY CRISIS: A MARKOV‐SWITCHING MODEL ESTIMATION

In 2002, the Argentinean currency board came to a sudden and dramatic end. Although the country had been suffering from weak economic fundamentals for years, the timing and severity of the currency crisis surprised most observers. The present study analyzes the role of fundamentals and self‐fulfilling speculation in the Argentinean crisis. Arguing within a theoretical model of a fixed exchange rate system that allows for multiple equilibria, we show that the crisis, although associated with weak fundamentals, cannot be explained by these macroeconomic factors alone. Estimating a univariate Markov‐switching model, the current study shows that shifts in agents’ beliefs did indeed also play a crucial role.     

Why are currency crises contagious? A comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998

Why Are Currency Crises Contagious? A Comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998.—This paper analyzes three channels through which currency crises are transmitted between countries: contagion based on unsustainable economic fundamentals; contagion resulting from herding behaviour in financial markets; contagion induced by close trade integration. The presented model that links currency crises with these three types of contagion is employed to analyze the transmission of the Mexican crisis in 1994–1995 and the Thai crisis in 1997 to other emerging economies. The empirical results show that, first, the most important contagion channels were based on close financial and trade integration rather than on the weakness of macroeconomic fundamentals. Second, the vulnerability to capital flow reversals and weak financial sectors made countries particularly prone to a currency crisis, while external imbalances and currency misalignments were much less important. JEL no. F30, E60, E65, E44     

Twin Banking and Currency Crises and Monetary Policy

Currency crises are found to be strongly associated with banking crises. This paper constructs a twin banking and currency crisis model by introducing the banking sector into the currency crisis model and examining the case in which the exchange rate risk is located in the banking system. The model shows that an unanticipated shock caused by the shift of investors’ expectations and/or a negative productivity shock can trigger a twin banking and currency crisis. To achieve both financial stability and economic stability, the central bank uses multiple monetary policy instruments. In contrast to the conventional policy recommendation in response to a currency crisis, i.e., interest rate hike, we find that when the exchange rate risk is located in the banking sector, the monetary policy option to prevent a twin crisis is to lower the policy interest rate and the reserve requirement ratio and raise the interest rate on reserves. Our results show that the location of the exchange rate risk matters for the choice of an appropriate monetary policy response during a crisis.     

China's vulnerability to currency crisis: A KLR signals approach

In this paper we use the Kaminsky–Lizondo–Reinhart (KLR) [Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., Reinhart, C., 1998. Leading Indicators of Currency Crises. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45, 1–48.] approach to conduct an ex-post study of the probabilities of China suffering a currency crisis during the period of January 1991 to December 2004. Two high-probability periods are identified: July 1992–July 1993 and August 1998–May 1999. The first period correctly predicts China's 1994 devaluation. The second period predicts currency devaluation in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, which did not occur. The results of the model indicate that the fundamentals were weak enough for China to experience contagion of the Asian crisis, and raise the question of the possible role of China's institutional arrangements in preventing the crisis. The paper further analyzes the economic fundamentals of China that drive the high probability of crises, and provides some suggestions for further reform.     

Forecasting currency crises by fractal analysis techniques

New approaches to currency crisis prediction are considered on the basis of the intensity of currency index fluctuations estimated by fractal analysis techniques. The ranges of currency index fluctuations within which the market remains stable have been defined. The experimental validation of results is exemplified by currency crises in developing countries and transition economies.     

Currency Crises and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

The currency crisis literature has identified two possible types of crisis: fundamentals based crises and self-fulfilling crises. A fundamentals based crisis arises when some state variable, such as foreign exchange reserves, reaches a critical level and triggers the abandonment of the fixed rate. A self-fulfilling crisis is triggered by an autonomous change in the beliefs of speculators. This paper demonstrates how these two types of crises generate different behaviour in the term structure in the period before the crisis. JEL Classification Numbers: E43, F31     

Testing the Unstable Middle and Two Corners Hypotheses About Exchange Rate Regimes

The recent rash of international currency crises has generated considerable interest in the role that exchange rate regimes have played in contributing to these crises. Many economists have argued that efforts to operate adjustably pegged exchange rate regimes have been a major contributor to “the unstable middle” hypothesis and some have argued that this unstable middle is so broad that only the two corners of hard fixes or floating rates will be stable in a world of high capital mobility—the two corners or bipolar hypothesis. Two recent empirical studies by researchers at the International Monetary Fund reach opposing conclusions on these issues. We examine the issue further and show that conclusions can be quite sensitive to how exchange rate regimes are grouped into categories and the measures of currency crises that are used. In general we find that the dead center of the adjustable peg is by far the most crisis prone broad type of exchange rate regimes, but that countries need not go all the way to freely floating rates or hard fixes to substantially reduce the risks of currency crises.

CURRENCY CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS: THE CASE OF POST‐LIBERALIZATION TURKEY

This article investigates the determinants of currency crises in Turkey. It analyzes the two major currency crises of 1994 and 2000–2001 in the light of the existing theoretical models. The present study uses logit, probit, and limited dependent models to explain the currency crises in the post–capital account liberalization era. The results obtained from the three approaches are generally consistent and the coefficients obtained for the explanatory variables generally have the same sign. The findings suggest that the currency crises in Turkey are associated with global liquidity conditions, fiscal imbalances, capital outflows, and banking sector weaknesses.     

Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises with Borrowing Constraints and Domestic Currency Debt

This paper presents a model of self-fulfilling currency crises in economies that do not suffer from domestic liability dollarization but whose international borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint. The model shows that when the collateral is a non-traded asset the expectation of a real exchange rate depreciation may trigger the constraint and cause a crisis in which the capital outflow and the real depreciation reinforce each other. Since in the model debt is denominated in domestic currency this paper highlights that borrowing constraints can cause self-fulfilling currency crises even in the absence of foreign-currency debt.     

A simple macro model of Original Sin based on optimal price setting under incomplete information

This paper analyses the consequences of “original sin” (the fact that the currency of an emerging market economy usually cannot be used to borrow abroad) for macroeconomic stability. The approach is based on third-generation models of currency crises, but differs from alternative versions by explicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and there is incomplete information about the future exchange rate. It is shown that a small depreciation is beneficial, but a large one is detrimental.     

What we know,what we still need to know: the Asian currency crisis revisited

From the literature on currency crises, it is widely understood that weak economic fundamentals increase tremendously the probability of currency crises, especially in emerging markets. However, what was not known is that an accumulation of small problems interacting with each other can be equally damaging. Using a new technique, a combination of Classification and Regression Tree (CART) and Logit regression, this paper re‐examines the causes of the Asian currency crisis in 1997–98. The results indicate that although weak fundamentals were at the root of the crisis, only self‐fulfilling panic and herd behaviour can explain the severity of the crisis. Contrary to previous empirical research, our results indicate that the Asian crisis was caused by the accumulation of small fragilities rather than large deficiencies in the macroeconomic fundamentals. An important policy implication of such findings is the need for governments not to underestimate small problems, which, when they interact, can create chaos. Another novelty of this paper is the interpretation of the crisis in terms of the concepts of trigger and vulnerability, using an empirical model that captures the magnitude of the self‐fulfilling panic and its contribution to capital reversal and eventually to the collapse of the currencies.     

Two crises. A comparative analysis of the situations in 1998 and 2008–2009

The article compares the dynamics of the leading economic indicators characterizing the situation in Russian economy at the time of the 1998–1999 and 2008–2009 crises. On the basis of monthly and quarterly statistics over these periods, the authors, first, consider the possible application of qualitative and quantitative approaches to the analysis of the crisis phenomena and, second, make an attempt to identify the stages of the Russian economic crisis and assess the possible duration of the economic recession that started in the second half of 2008.     

Currency crisis and contagion: evidence from exchange rates and sectoral stock indices of the Philippines and Thailand

This paper analyzes empirically the recent Asian financial crisis by using high-frequency data of exchange rates and stock indices of the Philippines and Thailand. With time-series techniques, this study confirms that benchmark stock indices often fail to provide valuable insights into currency crises, but there is evidence that developments in some sectoral indices—including those of banking and financial sectors—seem to have caused upward pressure on exchange rates. Our evidence therefore confirms the importance of financial markets as a transmission channel during the currency crisis period.     

Foreign devaluation as a coordinating device of heterogeneous investors: A game‐theoretic analysis of financial contagion

This paper investigates financial contagion by extending the Morris–Shin (1998) model of financial crises. It is assumed that before a devaluation in a foreign country, home investors have only private information on the state of the home country. It is demonstrated that the occurrence of a currency crisis in the foreign country may trigger a similar crisis in the home country by coordinating heterogeneous beliefs of home investors. The model is designed to describe the Asian currency crisis of 1997.     

Banking Sector Fragility and the Transmission of Currency Crises

We assess whether, complementary to trade and financial linkages, banking sector fragility helps explain the transmission of currency crises. We attempt to strike a balance between the precision of measurement of banking sector fragility on the one hand and its consistent measurement across various crisis episodes on the other. We find that while the role of trade and financial linkages is robust over time, the independent role of banking sector fragility is rather weak and unstable across crisis episodes. Consequently it is difficult to extrapolate observed banking fragility transmission channels from one crisis to another. As a corollary we cannot conclude that during future crisis episodes economies characterized by fragile banking sectors are more prone to crisis transmission.