机会成本在物流企业决策中的应用

企业若想在激烈的市场竞争中生存,做出正确的决策是关键.而决策中不能忽视一个重要的因素,即机会成本,它是决策的相关成本.通过对机会成本在物流企业的投资、经营决策中的应用分析,有助于决策者做出正确的决策.     

论会计信息在商业银行信贷决策中的应用

信贷风险是银行风险的重要组成部分,信贷风险管理水平的高低在很大程度上决定了银行信贷资产质量的高低,而信贷资产质量是商业银行的命脉.因此,信贷决策工作在银行业务中处于核心地位,如何科学地进行信贷决策一直是银行研究的重要课题.从会计信息的研究背景和研究意义着手,通过分析它在商业银行信贷决策中运用的现状,找出利用它进行决策的局限性,针对局限采取适当措施予以克服,做到科学合理地进行信贷决策,尽量提高商业银行信贷决策的质量,减少商业银行信贷风险,提高商业银行信贷资产质量,促进商业银行健康稳健地发展.     

论企业财务报告的理性分析

通过财务报告分析，我们可以更好地评价企业过去的经营绩效、衡量目前的财务状况、预测未来的发展趋势。它已成为信息使用者进行决策的根本性支持系统。     

浅谈智能型会计专家决策系统

智能型会计专家决策系统是将会计决策系统与会计专家系统相结合,并在此基础上逐步发展起来的一种新型会计智能系统。该系统的显著特征是对决策模型的管理理论和专家数据库系统相结合而产生智能化统一管理。它不仅可以满足传统会计决策的需要,而且可以利用会计专家的丰富知识和经验,通过启发式推理,自动进行符号处理,向决策者提供某些认识型问题的决策思路及结果。     

正确处理决策与思想政治工作的关系

所谓决策 ,就是按照最优化的要求 ,从若干准备实施的方案中进行选择 ,然后通过实施既定方案以达到一定目标的领导活动。从广义上说 ,决策是一个过程 ,它包括作出抉择以前的准备活动和作出抉择后的实施活动。领导者在决策中起关键作用 ,但其职能不应仅仅是“拍板” ,而应该是决策全过程的组织者和指挥者 ,这里面包括要做大量的思想工作 ,以保证决策的正确与实施。所以 ,应当把领导决策的过程作为动员群众参与企业工作 ,集中群众正确意见的过程 ,从而使决策的过程成为思想教育、统一认识的过程 ,成为群众性思想政治工作的过程。一、决策正确是…     

广州软科学研究扫描

科学在推动社会发展的同时也推动了自身的发展。在当今新学科如潮的时代,软科学(SoftSciencens)异军突起,越来越受到人们关注。它以促进经济、科技、社会的协调发展为目标,覆盖了信息科学、决策科学、管理科学等等,通过对各级领导决策的影响,从宏观上对经济建设和社会发展作出了重要贡献。     

上市公司控制权特征对现金持有的影响研究——基于理财决策的传导机制

控制权是现代公司运营的核心权力之一,它通过影响公司的理财决策,进而决定着公司的现金持有水平。通过对2001至2004年正常交易的非金融类A股上市公司4 821个样本数据进行实证分析,表明以股权特征和董事会特征为衡量手段的控制权特征显著影响了公司的现金持有水平;其中,公司的理财决策是重要的传导机制。     

作为决策支持系统的Excel简述

管理领域中计算机的使用将知识工作者从繁杂乏味的事务中解脱出来,通过多方面应用计算机技术这一工具;之后计算机又要从工具的角色转向部分辅助管理者进行分析决策的角色,决策支持系统便以管理信息系统与模型辅助决策系统交融的角色诞生并辅助进行商业方面的决策.而作为决策支持系统中比较简单却十分重要的Microsoft Excel,它又将如何应用于决策支持系统中呢?     

宏观经济决策

指国家在整个经济活动中作出的带有全局性、长期性的重大决定。它主要包括两个内容 :(1 )经济规划决策。通过制定国民经济与社会发展的中长期计划 ,决定国民经济发展的总战略、经济发展速度、产业结构调整的目标、教育和科学发展水平、人民生活提高程度。同时确定国民经济的重大比例关系。 (2 )政策调节决策。主要包括财政政策、货币政策、产业政策、技术政策。根据不同时期的宏观经济发展所面临的主要问题 ,制定出张弛有序的财政和货币政策 ,调节国民经济运行。对于宏观经济决策而言 ,制定一个时期的产业政策与技术政策十分重要 ,它有利于…     

对房产营销策略的思考

一、影响自然人消费决策的因素 行为理论认为,家庭的消费决策建立在对商品特性的主观评价基础上;它不但受制于行为人的有限理性,还受到决策当时所处环境的影响。因此,消费决策在很大程度上带有主观任意性。日常生活中;影响消费者决策行为的因素主要有以下四个方面：     

自由现金流量与我国上市公司并购绩效关系的实证研究

目前解释公司并购失败的理论很多.本文认为,针对高自由现金流同时低成长性的公司来说,自由现金流所带来的代理成本对上市公司的并购绩效产生了显著的影响.利用我国上市公司2001-2003年436次并购事件进行实证分析的结果表明:高自由现金流低成长性的上市公司并购总体绩效为负,说明并购并没有给这类公司带来价值的提升.     

公司异质性、在职消费与机构投资者治理

文章实证检验了在代理成本不同的上市公司中,机构投资者持股与管理层在职消费之间的关系。研究发现,机构投资者持股能够有效降低管理层在职消费,而且这种抑制作用在代理成本较高的公司中更加明显;同时,管理层在职消费与公司绩效负相关,这一负相关关系同样在代理成本较高的公司中更加显著。研究结果表明,大力发展机构投资者有利于公司治理的改善,而且在代理成本不同的上市公司中机构投资者的治理作用存在显著差异。     

Research on equity adjustment,agency costs and commercial bank performance: experimental evidence from China

This article studies the impact of options to adjust the performance of commercial banks from agency costs. In the shareholding structure of the adjustment process, considering changes in agency costs, only in agency costs no more than the commercial banks when new results, the company will have to adjust agent the cost of power stealth measure more just by reflecting the size of the incremental results. In addition, equity restructuring costs are the basis of agency governance and ownership structure has an important impact on agency costs. Through a few selected China 14 listed commercial banks’ 2007–2012 data, we show that the impact of performance of commercial banks on the proportion of the company’s largest shareholders is generally more significant; however, the impact of equity restriction on commercial banks was not as significant, as seen from the application of balanced panel data model analysis and the test results. However, the agency costs of commercial bank performance were significant also in a general state, indicating that equity adjustment activities of commercial banks’ cost perspective agency under the commercial bank performance significant changes are not large.     

Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise

This article analyzes the effect of the cost that an agencymust incur to adopt a new regulation (the "enactment cost")on the agency's incentive to invest in expertise. The effectof the enactment cost on agency expertise depends on whetherthe agency would regulate if it fails to acquire additionalinformation about the regulation's effects. If an uninformedagency would regulate, increasing enactment costs increasesagency expertise; if an uninformed agency would retain the statusquo, increasing enactment costs decreases agency expertise.These results may influence the behavior of an uninformed overseer,such as a court or legislature, that can manipulate the agency'senactment costs. Such an overseer must balance its interestin influencing agency policy preferences against its interestin increasing agency expertise. The article discusses the implicationsof these results for various topics in institutional design,including judicial and executive review of agency regulations,structure-and-process theories of congressional oversight, nationalsecurity, criminal procedure, and constitutional law.     

企业债券期限结构研究——基于交易成本和代理成本视角

发行长期债券可以降低交易成本．但债券期限越长，代理成本就越高。企业在发行新债券时必须对交易成本和代理成本进行权衡．寻求最优债券期限结构。模型证明，发行企业债券时运用提前赎回条款、卖回条款、偿偾基金条款和转换权等债券契约条款可以同时达到降低发债总成本和延长企业债券融资期限的目的。     

股权激励与代理成本

传统以管理费用率作为代理成本的替代不能恰当地反映管理者在职消费和职务侵占的真实水平,本文用经过Jones模型纠正的费用率作为代理成本的替代,考察了所有权性质、总经理持股与否及持股比例对代理成本的影响。本文提供了私有制下总经理适当持股有利于降低代理成本的可靠证据,为中国上市公司即将展开的股权激励计划提供证据的支持。     

Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty

I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable.     

Family ownership,altruism and agency costs in Australian small- and medium-sized enterprises

Given the continuing uncertainty about whether family firms enjoy lower agency costs, this article hypothesizes that a combination of the effects of family ownership, altruism and self-control is instead at play. To begin with, family ownership can indeed reduce agency costs through better aligning the interests of owners and managers. This is a ‘determining’ effect in that it independently mitigates one source of agency problems. However, altruism combined with self-control problems arising from the highly concentrated ownership often found in family firms can also increase agency costs. This is an ‘embedding’ effect as it is rooted in the personal relationships within the family firm. Using the Business Longitudinal Database compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find that for larger SMEs (those with 20–200 employees), the gains in lower agency costs arising from family ownership are almost completely offset by the losses from altruism and the lack of self-control.     

An endogenous structural credit risk model incorporating with moral hazard and rollover risk

In this paper, we embed optimal contracting between the manager and equity holders into Leland-Toft endogenous structural credit risk model to study the impact of moral hazard on the firm's credit risk with rollover debts. Our model quantitatively shows that the agency costs induced by the moral hazard can endogenously have significant impacts on credit spreads, besides the costs of rolling over the maturing debts of the firm. It originates from the conflicts that these two costs should be covered by equity holders while both the manager and maturing debt holders are still paid in full. The numerical results show that the credit spread with the agency costs of moral hazard is larger than the one without the agency costs. Thus, the moral hazard could be used to explain “credit spread puzzle” as an endogenous factor. The explicit formulae of the equity value, the debt value, and the endogenous default boundary are also given.     

Developing an incentive program for home health nurses

After revamping agency operations, this agency was able to devise a voluntary incentive bonus program to address recruitment, retention, and quality concerns while controlling costs.