Does corporate ownership structure affect its strategy towards diversification?

We claim that there is a link between corporate control structure and managers’ strategy towards unrelated mergers and risk diversification. Companies with greater ownership concentration are less diversified. Evidence also shows that corporate diversification generally results in value loss while focussing is value increasing. This highlights the potentially detrimental effect of agency problems on corporate strategy. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业的公司治理选择：一个理论框架

企业组织是一个非常异质性的组织,企业的不同治理选择潜在影响着企业的代理成本和管家态度。最终体现为能力和企业绩效上的重要区别。本文从代理理论与管家理论这两种不同公司治理视角,分析了家族企业公司治理的四个维度即家族所有与控制、家族领导能力、多个家族成员的广泛参与、以及家族传承计划与实际参与下的各自的代理成本和管家态度,以及对企业能力和绩效的影响。     

上市公司股权激励盈余管理及影响因素研究

自股权激励办法施行以来,股权激励作为一种降低代理成本的激励方式,被越来越多的上市公司所采用。然而实证发现,盈余管理会伴随股权激励发生,实行股权激励公司在业绩考核第一年存在显著的盈余管理现象,而业绩考核前一年并不存在。在影响盈余管理的因素上,公司选用考核范围更广的业绩指标能减少管理层进行盈余管理的动机,行权时长的增加会给管理层盈余管理造成一些困难,从而抑制管理层在后阶段盈余管理的行为。     

公司治理质量、债务期限与投资效率——来自中国上市公司的证据

信息不对称和代理问题是引起公司非效率性投资的主要扭曲因素。基于我国经济转型的治理环境,文章以我国A股上市公司的2012～2014年数据为样本,探讨了公司治理质量、债务期限对公司投资效率的监督机制。研究发现,公司治理质量、短期债务有效改善相关方信息不对称和代理问题,从而提高投资效率,进一步地,公司治理和债务期限对公司投资效率的监督在一定程度上是一种替代机制,在公司治理质量高的公司里,短期债务对投资效率的作用减弱。     

代理问题、公司治理与企业价值--以民营上市公司为例

本文运用代理理论对2002年在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的122家民营上市公司治理与企业价值进行理论分析与实证检验,发现民营上市公司治理包括在股权集中度、债务融资比重、金字塔式控股、控制权与现金流权偏离、流通股与非流通股价偏离等五个方向上存在着代理冲突,并指出引发民营上市公司代理冲突的首要原因是现行流通股与非流通股的股权割裂。     

Examining the performance effects of post spin‐off links to parent firms: should the apron strings be cut?

Little research has examined the performance implications of the parent‐child relationship post spin‐off. Although the parent provided oversight of the child prior to the spin‐off, effects of post spin‐off links to the child remain unclear. Applying transaction cost and agency theories, our study of 142 firms spun‐off between 1986 and 1997 examines how oversight and ownership by the parent firm influence stock market performance post spin‐off. We find that while child firms benefit from some links to the parent, having too many links is negatively related to performance. The findings suggest that there is a balance between having too much parental involvement and not enough. Our study extends understanding of post spin‐off child firm performance and provides valuable insights for both parent and child firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non‐shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non‐shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long‐term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short‐termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long‐term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short‐termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Variations in ownership behavior and propensity to diversify: a study of the Indian corporate context

The relationship between ownership and diversification has been the focus of renewed debate between financial economists and strategic management scholars. While financial economists hold that manager‐controlled firms tend to reflect higher levels of diversification, strategy researchers argue that ownership and diversification are not systematically related. In throwing light on this debate, this study uses a fine‐grained definition of ownership groups to explore how the different objectives and monitoring predispositions of distinct ownership groups might influence diversification strategy. The empirical examination is set in India to offer a striking contrast from the predominantly U.S.‐based studies that have shaped the ongoing debate. Findings show that diverse ownership groups adopt different postures in monitoring and/or influencing organizational diversification. While some ownership groups are closely associated with focused strategies, and some encourage diversification, others are quite indifferent. These results suggest that the context‐specific variation among ownership groups is germane to our understanding of diversification strategy. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.