Do firms choose overcapacity or undercapacity in a vertical structure?

This study investigates capacity choice in a vertical structure in which each downstream firm makes its capacity decision, then a monopolistic upstream firm proposes the input price or two-part tariff contract. Finally, each downstream firm chooses its output (or price). Contrary to the conventional wisdom that both firms hold excess capacity in an Cournot competition, we find that each downstream firm always chooses undercapacity regardless of both the nature of goods and the competition modes. Second, we also show that capacity efficiency is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Third, even though there are double marginalization distortion and rent-extracting effect, we can achieve the monopoly equilibrium of the vertically integrated firm though two-part tariff contract.     

Quantity precommitment and price-matching

We study the effects of price-matching in a capacity-constrained duopoly setting. We show that no firm does worse at any pure equilibrium under price-matching relative to Bertrand, but as capacity increases, one or both firms do better relative to Bertrand. If the firms choose their capacities simultaneously before making pricing decisions, then the effect of price-matching varies with the cost of capacity. Specifically, when the cost is “high” price-matching either (i) has no effect on the market price, i.e., the market price associated with the pure SPEs is the Cournot one, or (ii) weakly decreases the market price relative to Cournot. Furthermore, when the cost is “low” price-matching leads to a set of (pure) SPE prices that includes the Cournot price in the interior. Therefore, price-matching does not necessarily benefit the firms when firms select their capacities before competing in price.     

Do Dominant Firms Provide More Training?

A canonical Cournot competition model shows that the profitability of training can increase as the number of competitors decreases. British establishment evidence from 1998, 2004, and 2011 confirms that firms in less competitive markets provide more formal training. This persists within three separate cross‐sections and in two separate panel estimates. It persists with alternative measures of training, with alternative measures of market competition and in estimates designed to account for endogeneity. These results suggest that a dominant product market position, indeed, increases the incentives to invest in training.     

Cournot outcomes under Bertrand–Edgeworth competition with demand uncertainty

We provide new results for two-stage games in which firms make capacity investments when demand is uncertain, then, when demand is realized, compete in prices. We consider games with demand rationing schemes ranging from efficient to proportional rationing. In all cases, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome coinciding with the outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty if and only if (i) the fluctuation in absolute market size is small relative to the cost of capacity, or (ii) uncertainty is such that with high probability the market demand is very large and with the remaining probability the market demand is extremely small. Otherwise, equilibria involve mixed strategies. Further, we show under efficient rationing that condition (i) is sufficient for the unique equilibrium outcome to be an equilibrium outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty.     

Rural-Urban Migration Rates and Development: A Quantitative Note

There have been two earlier efforts to estimate how rural outmigration rates evolve over the development process. In one the sample was too small and possibilities of a non-monotonic pattern were precluded. In the other inverted U-shaped migration rate patterns were estimated on the basis of an urbanization logistic curve. It is argued here that estimates based on such a curve would tend to be biased downward at very high per capita income levels. The reason is the relatively small rural populations of most industrialized countries. In such countries relatively high rates of rural outmigration could still be consistent with relatively slow rates of urbanization. Using more direct estimation techniques inverted U-shaped patterns were confirmed, but the turning points occurred much later in the development process and the migration rate estimates were sharply higher (up to five times at the highest per capita income levels) than those of the logistic estimates or even those estimated here on the basis of an LDC only sample. Finally, when the effects of income growth rates on migration rates were estimated directly, the high sensitivity levels found in the logistic study (where growth rates were treated simply as a shift parameter) could not be replicated.     

Cournot vs. Walras: A reappraisal through simulations

Best-reply behavior in Cournot oligopolies generally leads to Cournot-Nash equilibrium, but imitative behavior selects the Walrasian equilibrium as the unique stochastically stable state. Previous work (Alós-Ferrer, 2004) showed that in the presence of memory, imitative behavior leads to a non-trivial dynamics selecting all quantities between the Cournot and Walrasian outcomes. However, the scope of previous results was limited to specific assumptions on demand and cost functions, and did not provide information on the shape of the distribution of outcomes. We use computational simulations to address these limitations. We show that the selection result for non-trivial memory holds beyond the set of well-behaved Cournot games previously analyzed. Further, we find that, in Cournot games, the limit distribution of long-run outcomes is highly skewed towards the Walrasian quantity. Although longer memory increases the importance of the Cournot equilibrium, the competitive outcome remains the dominant prediction.     

OLIGOPOLY GAMES AND THE COURNOT–BERTRAND MODEL: A SURVEY

Traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable, output (Cournot) or price (Bertrand). Alternatively, a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price, also known as the Cournot–Bertrand model. When the choice of strategic variable is endogenous, the established dominant strategy is output competition. A growing body of work demonstrates, however, that the Cournot–Bertrand outcome can be a subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium in the presence of market asymmetries. Observations of real‐world markets consistent with Cournot–Bertrand behavior bolster justification for the model and have stimulated an impressive and evolving literature on advances and applications. We lay out the roots of the Cournot–Bertrand model and explore a number of model developments. We categorize 12 primary models in the literature based on alternative assumptions. In particular, some authors consider when the timing of play as well as the choice of strategic variable are endogenous. Altogether, this research identifies when Cournot–Bertrand behavior can emerge in a dynamic setting and under alternative market conditions. We also review the Cournot–Bertrand model applications in the fields of international economics, industrial organization, labor, and public economics. We expect the literature to continue to expand in the future.     

Efficiency loss in a Cournot oligopoly with convex market demand

We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market demand function is convex. We establish a lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand function, namely, the ratio of the slope of the inverse demand function at the Cournot equilibrium to the average slope of the inverse demand function between the Cournot equilibrium and a social optimum. Also, for the case of a single, monopolistic, profit maximizing supplier, or of multiple suppliers who collude to maximize their total profit, we establish a similar but tighter lower bound on the efficiency of the resulting output. Our results provide nontrivial quantitative bounds on the loss of social welfare for several convex inverse demand functions that appear in the economics literature.     

Hospital capacity in large urban areas: is there enough in times of need?

Excess capacity can be viewed as wasteful (an unnecessary cost) or as prudential (a ready source of supply). The role of excess capacity is an important issue at the individual firm level as well as at the community level. In this paper we explore hospital capacity for a sample hospitals operating in the 15 largest standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) in the U.S. during 2002. Using Johanson’s (1968, Production Functions and the Concept of Capacity, Namur, Belgium, Recherches Récentes sur le Fonction de Production (Collection, Economie Mathematique et Econometrie no. 2). [Reprinted in Finn R. Førsund (ed) (1987) The Collected Works of Leif Johanson, vol 1. Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp 350–282]) notion of capacity as the maximum rate of output possible from fixed inputs (i.e., without restrictions on variable inputs), we measure capacity in a frontier setting using directional distance functions. Rather than attempt to determine the “optimal” level of hospital capacity, we instead quantify capacity and capacity utilization rates at both the individual hospital and, by aggregating, the SMSA levels. After determining capacity and capacity utilization rates, we then introduce a model that calculates the changes in variable inputs that would be needed to utilize excess capacity. Finally, we introduce a simulation model that is used to examine whether each SMSA has enough “excess” hospital capacity to accommodate the loss of one of its five largest hospitals. The approach developed in this study should be of value to decision makers and planners in a variety of fields.     

A real‐option rationale for investing in excess capacity

Excess capacity is expensive, yet persistent excess capacity is widely observed in the corporate sector. Using a real‐option approach to capacity planning, this paper shows that under certain conditions it is optimal to invest in long‐term (even permanent) excess capacity. This results from the asymmetric nature of operating flexibility resulting from excess capacity—the ability to increase output under favorable demand shocks. The model is used to identify conditions under which excess capacity is more likely to be optimal. The implications are generally consistent with existing empirical evidence from studies on excess capacity and capacity utilization. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the convergence to the Cournot equilibrium in a productive asset oligopoly

We derive a feedback equilibrium of a dynamic Cournot game where production requires exploitation of a renewable asset. As in the classical Cournot model, quantity-setting firms compete in the same market for a given homogeneous good. We show that, when the asset stock grows sufficiently fast, the unique globally asymptotically stable steady state of the dynamic Cournot game corresponds to the static Cournot solution. Initial differences between firms’ production rates due to asymmetric allocations of asset stocks tend to disappear over time. When instead the asset stock grows slowly, the system does not converge to any stationary point. We also show that, within the class of linear feedback equilibrium strategies, besides the couple of strategies that stabilizes the states for every possible initial conditions, there exists another couple which is more efficient, in that it leads to higher stationary equilibrium profits for both firms, closer to the collusive outcome. Finally, we show that, as the discount rate approaches zero, there exist multiple linear feedback equilibrium strategies that induce a price trajectory that converges asymptotically to a price which is above the static Cournot equilibrium price.     

产业经济新见解

作者通过对产业经济产能过剩的研究,提出了产能过剩的判定方法,并在应对产能过剩方面提出应对办法,并对政府在应对产能过剩政策方面提出政府应在应对产能过剩中起主导作用,最后作者就产业经济方面提出新的见解。     

Foreign direct investment and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: A nonlinear analysis

Using the threshold regression model, we examine the effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and the mediating role of FDI absorptive capacity, on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find that the threshold level of FDI inflows per person is approximately US$ 44.67 per annum. For FDI to have an appreciable impact on economic growth, countries must have minimum capacity to absorb the growth-enhancing benefits of FDI. For instance, the technology gap between the hosted foreign enterprises and domestic enterprises should be no less than 0.6904. Thus, achieving the FDI threshold level is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for economic growth. Some countries use tax incentives to improve FDI inflows. We argue that such incentives may be counterproductive at low levels of FDI inflows: FDI coefficient estimates below the lowest threshold level are negative, implying that the higher costs of such incentives exceed the potential benefits availed by FDI’s direct contribution to economic output and spillovers.     

Endogenous vertical structure and trade policy in an import-competing market

We examine the endogenous determination of a vertical market in an import-competing market with import tariff. We show that if firms commit to vertical organization before the government's commitment to trade policy, the home and foreign firms choose vertical separation and vertical integration, respectively, at equilibrium under Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium entails both firms separating their retailers. Comparing profits between Bertrand competition to Cournot competition, we find that upstream manufacturer's profit can be higher under Bertrand competition with integration than under Cournot competition with separation when comparing foreign upstream manufacturer's profit.     

Price Stickiness in the US and Europe Revisited: Evidence from Internet Prices*

This paper compares price stickiness on the Internet and in traditional brick‐and‐mortar stores and examines differences across five countries: France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US. Contrary to conventional retail prices, we find that Internet prices change less often in the US than in EU countries. However, this does not hold for all product categories. Second, prices on the Internet are not necessarily more flexible than prices in brick‐and‐mortar stores. Third, our dataset reveals substantial heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes across Internet shops. Finally, panel logit estimates suggest that the likelihood of observing a price change is a function of both state‐dependent and time‐dependent factors.     

Technology choice in an evolutionary oligopoly game

In this paper, we propose and analyze a two-stage oligopoly game in which firms first simultaneously choose production technologies and in the second stage simultaneously choose production quantities. After characterizing the Nash equilibrium of the game, we cast our static model in a dynamic setting exploring the stability properties of the market equilibrium in two different cases: (i) exogenously distributed technologies and Cournot adjustments and (ii) endogenously distributed technologies in an infinite population game with Cournot–Nash equilibrium outputs. The main aim of the paper is that of extending the results about Cournot oligopoly stability in an evolutionary setting of heterogeneous decreasing returns-to-scale technologies. We show how the interplay between production decisions and R&D decisions can generate endogenous market fluctuations leading to complex dynamic phenomena.     

Horizontal shareholding interlocks

Horizontal shareholding interlocks induce Cournot industries to restrict production. The cartelizing effects of horizontal shareholding interlocks are greater if firms are mindful of indirect shareholding links than if only attentive to direct links. Indirect shareholding exists when a firm A holds stock in B and B holds stock in C. Several algebraic examples of Cournot industries with shareholding interlocks are explored.     

论创新型国家的五种能力

文章借用了牛顿力学的基本原理与概念,提出了创新型国家应具备的5种能力,即具有强大的获取与交换知识的能力、具有强大的将知识变为力量的能力、具备强大的将力量变为做功的能力、具备强大的将做功变为功率的能力、具备强大的将功率变为效率的能力。并围绕这5种能力,分析了我国与创新型国家的主要差距,提出必须建立和健全我国科技评价制度。     

Market Concentration and Multifaceted Productive Efficiency

Developing the analytical framework of the decision making process of a possible entrant, a reduced form system equations model is estimated in order to examine the market concentration – productive efficiency relationship in an endogeneity context. Technical and scale efficiency estimates are obtained from an inter-industry stochastic production frontier using a panel dataset regarding the seven most energy intensive manufacturing industries in Greece over the period 1980–96. Several new versions of the concentration – efficiency relationship, may be derived from the alternatives of the entrant considering the possible conduct character of incumbents’ technical efficiency and excess capacity, which is depicted on their scale efficiency, on market concentration.     

Unemployment,disequilibrium and the short run phillips curve: An econometric approach

The paper specifies a disequilibrium model for the aggregate labour market consisting of demand and supply functions for labour, an adjustment equation for wages as well as for prices, a transactions equation and, finally, an equation that relates measured unemployment to vacancies and to excess demand. The model has a more sophisticated treatment of dynamics than earlier disequilibrium models. The parameter estimates and the goodness-of-fit are satisfactory and the model's implications for the behaviour of several important variables are sensible. In particular, excess demand estimates computed in various ways are reasonable.