How Does Fiscal Consolidation Impact on Income Inequality?

In this paper, we assess the impact of fiscal consolidation on income inequality. Using a panel of 18 industrialized countries from 1978 to 2009, we find that income inequality significantly rises during periods of fiscal consolidation. In addition, while fiscal policy that is driven by spending cuts seems to be detrimental for income distribution, tax hikes seem to have an equalizing effect. We also show that the size of the fiscal consolidation program (in percentage of GDP) has an impact on income inequality. In particular, when consolidation plans represent a small share of GDP, the income gap widens, suggesting that the burden associated with the effort affects disproportionately households at the bottom of the income distribution. Considering the linkages between banking crises and fiscal consolidation, we find that the effect on the income gap is amplified when fiscal adjustments take place after the resolution of such financial turmoil. Similarly, fiscal consolidation programs combined with inflation are likely to increase inequality and the effects of fiscal adjustments on inequality are amplified during periods of relatively low growth. Our results also provide support for a non‐linear relationship between inequality and income and corroborate the idea that trade can promote a more equal distribution of income.     

Decentralisation and income inequality in Central and Eastern European countries

This paper provides empirical evidence for the association between fiscal decentralisation and income distribution for a panel of 11 economies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during 1992–2016. We focus on three research topics: the effect of decentralisation on income inequality; the effects of the structure of subnational government finance on income inequality; and the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis. The main findings from the empirical exercise are as follows: first, we provide firm evidence on the presumed favourable effects of fiscal decentralisation on income distribution in the CEE countries; second, our empirical model suggests that the effects of fiscal decentralisation on income inequality are dependent on the source of finance of subnational governments, i.e. intergovernmental transfers may have a role in income equalisation; third, we cannot confirm the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis in CEE countries.     

Income Taxation and the Diversity of Consumer Goods: A Political Economy Approach*

After‐tax income inequality has risen since the mid‐1990s, as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution. We argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution. Within a probabilistic voting framework, we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income, then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate. Focusing on OECD countries, we find empirical support for both the model's micro‐political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes.     

Economic Integration,Growth and Income Distribution

This paper constructs a two‐sector growth model with heterogeneous labour, to explore the impact of the economic integration on growth and income distribution. There are two sectors in each country, including the consumption‐good sector and the R&D sector. We suppose that the R&D sector produces new blueprints or ideas for these innovations, and hence provides the engine of growth. Assume that the talent's distribution of workers is the uniform distribution. We show that the economic integration will stimulate the developing countries' economic growth and then decrease its income inequality. In addition, we also demonstrate that if the growth rate of the advanced country rises after the integration, then income inequality of that will increase, and vice versa.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

FISCAL CONSOLIDATION PROGRAMS AND INCOME INEQUALITY

We document a strong empirical relationship between higher income inequality and stronger recessive impacts of fiscal consolidation episodes across time and space. To explain this finding, we develop a life‐cycle economy with uninsurable income risk. We calibrate our model to match key characteristics of several European economies, including inequality and fiscal structures, and study the effects of fiscal consolidation programs. In our model, higher income risk induces precautionary savings behavior, which decreases the proportion of credit‐constrained agents in the economy. These agents have less elastic labor supply responses to fiscal consolidations, which explain the correlation with inequality in the data.     

Indexing Out of Poverty? Fiscal Drag and Benefit Erosion in Cross-National Perspective

We assess how tax-benefit policy developments in 2001–11 affected the household income distribution in seven EU countries. We use the standard microsimulation-based decomposition method, separating further the effect of structural policy changes and the uprating of monetary parameters, which allows us to measure the extent of fiscal drag and benefit erosion in practice. The results show that despite different fiscal effects, policies overall mostly reduced poverty and inequality and both types of policy developments had sizeable effects on the income distribution. We also find that the uprating of monetary parameters not only had a positive effect on household incomes, meaning fiscal drag and benefit erosion were avoided, but generally also contributed more to poverty and inequality reduction than structural policy reforms.     

Taylor rules: Consequences for wealth and income inequality

This paper compares the consequences of “active” vs. “passive” Taylor rules for wealth and income inequality. Since the distinction is operative only along transitional paths, we compare the implications for two forms of government expenditure that generate such transitions. Our results confirm that the contrasting effects obtained previously for the aggregate economy have significant distributional consequences. For an active Taylor rule, whether the government increases its expenditure on consumption, or productively, wealth inequality will increase. Expenditure on the two public goods yields divergent paths for income inequality. Government consumption expenditure raises income inequality; productive government expenditure reduces it. If the Taylor rule is passive, an increase in either form of government expenditure reduces wealth inequality initially and over time. Income inequality initially increases, but declines over time, although remaining above its previous steady-state level.     

Redistribution in the age of austerity: evidence from Europe 2006–2013

We examine the relationship between changes in a country’s public sector fiscal position on inequality at the top and bottom of the income distribution during the age of austerity from 2006 to 2013. We use a parametric Lorenz curve model and Gini-like indices of inequality as our measures to assess distributional changes. Based on Statistics of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and IMF data for 12 European countries, we find that more severe adjustments to the cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., more austerity) are associated with a more unequal distribution of income driven by rising inequality at the top. The data also weakly suggests a decrease in inequality at the bottom. The distributional impact of austerity measures reflects the reliance on regressive policies and likely produces increased incentives for rent-seeking while reducing incentives for workers to increase productivity.     

The composition effects of tax-based consolidation on income inequality

Many advanced economies have recently embarked on fiscal austerity. As this has come at a time of high and rising income disparities, policy-makers have fretted about the inequality effects of fiscal consolidations. We shed new light on this issue by empirically investigating the (composition) effects of tax-based consolidations on income inequality, output and labour market conditions for a sample of 16 OECD countries over the period 1978–2012. We find that tax-based consolidations reduce income inequality, but at the cost of weaker economic activity. However, tax composition does matter. Indirect taxes reduce income inequality by more than direct taxes, possibly due to the operation of a positive labour supply channel. Higher indirect taxes increase the price of the consumption basket and create incentives for agents to increase their labour supply. We find this effect to be stronger for middle-aged women. Looking at specific instruments, general consumption taxes and personal taxes are the most suited to reduce inequality while at the same time minimizing the equity-efficiency trade-off.     

代际流动约束下生育率与收入不平等关系的国际检验

收入不平等问题和人口生育率过低问题是当下中国面临的两大难题,但目前理论界关于人口因素与收入不平等关系的研究,很少从生育率视角来考察以及考虑代际收入流动在其中的作用.文章从理论与经验两个方面来考察生育率对收入不平等的影响,理论模型表明:在关于代际收入流动的假设下,一个经济体中生育率的提高会使穷人比重提高,进而拉大收入不平等.进一步地,文章利用1970-2011年76个国家(地区)面板数据的经验研究发现:(1)总和生育率的提高会拉大收入不平等,如果每个妇女平均多生育一个孩子,将会使基尼系数增加0.025;(2)以出生率作为总和生育率替代指标的实证结果与基准结果基本一致,这说明不同生育率测算指标高度相关且可相互替代;(3)对于代际收入流动弹性越高、收入水平越低或生育率越高的国家(地区),其生育率提高对收入不平等的拉大作用越大.文章关于生育率对收入不平等影响的作用机制和异质性特征的考察,对于我国如何在实施"全面二孩"政策下寻求应对严峻的收入分配问题之策提供了国际经验和启示.     

Do fiscal decentralization and income inequality affect the size of the shadow economy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

In this article, we study fiscal decentralization and inequality as driving forces of the shadow economy in advanced economies. Our empirical analysis suggests that a reduction in income inequality will contain the shadow economy, whereas expenditure and tax decentralization do not significantly impact it. As decentralization is generally believed to increase government efficiency, this result is indicative of already highly efficient public administrations. Our results further indicate that redistributive policies positively affect the size of the shadow economy, whereas the tax burden does not have any discernible effect on the shadow economy in our sample.     

Welfare-improving government behavior and inequality in a heterogeneous agents model

Government’s behavior is expected to be non-neutral in terms of impacts on both welfare and inequality. It is acknowledged in most literature that fiscal policy often involves trade-offs between economic growth and inequality.By applying an equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, capable of exploring the relationship between fiscal policy variables and the endogenous cross-section distribution of income, wealth, consumption and leisure, this paper aims at assessing (i) the optimal menu of government expenditures as well as of (ii) their inter-temporal financing. These are key issues in times of fiscal imbalances and their correction is dominating the current (European) policy agenda.     

Perceptions of inequality

Individual perceptions of (income or wealth) inequality have strong effects on their decisions as economic agents or voters. It is therefore important to know more about the relation between perceived and measured inequality. We present a novel formal framework that is based on the assumption that people typically do not observe the entire income (wealth) distribution and that their guesses about the extent of inequality are based on “self-centered” reference groups. This framework predicts that perceptions of inequality will change along positions in the income distribution and that for a specific position various dimensions of inequality perception are related to each other. First, low (high) income individuals overestimate (underestimate) their own position. Second, subjective estimates of average earnings increase with the own income position. Third, high or low income people have different perceptions about the skewness and the “shape” of the income distribution (e.g. pyramid or diamond). Fourth, the subjective perception of inequality is lower for high-income individuals. Survey data from 40 countries provide strong support for the framework.     

Positional concern and low demand for redistribution of the poor

The two observations that (1) some low-income citizens demand low redistribution and (2) as income inequality becomes more severe a larger proportion of citizens make less demand for redistribution (Kelly and Enns (2010)) are counter-intuitive because people oppose redistribution that could be beneficial to them. Understanding the main driving factor that leads to the economic conservatism of the poor is crucial: it guides how policymakers should design redistribution. I show that positional concern can be one of these main factors. When citizens care about their relative position on consumption and their labor productivity is slightly perturbed when a new tax policy is implemented, only middle-income citizens may vote for redistribution. Compared with the prospect of upward mobility hypothesis, I provide a testable prediction for the relationship between economic inequality and the economic conservatism of the poor. If positional concern is the main driving factor, policymakers should focus on increasing the low-income citizens’ standard of living to the middle class; and if the prospect of upward mobility is the main factor then they should focus on minimizing income gaps.     

The impact of education expansion on wage inequality

The findings on education expansion and income inequality have important implications for policymakers to implement effective policies to reduce income inequality. This study attempts to explain how education expansion affects income inequality by education distribution and the rate of return to education. We decompose the effect of education expansion on wage gaps into price effect and structure effect. We compare the income inequality from 2002 to 2013 using the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 2002 and CHIP2013 survey data and employ FFL decomposition method. Our findings suggest that income inequality increased in 2013 and that income inequality among the high-income groups increased even more significantly. The structure effect of education expansion on income inequality is negative, when average education increases one year, the income gap between 80th and 20th will decrease 1.2%, in other words, education expansion decreases income inequality by allowing a wide range of individuals to attend college. However, this effect is offset by the price effect, which is positive and much more significant in magnitude. One extra year of average education will increase income gap by 29% which means that the demand for high-skilled labour is increasing faster than the supply and thus lead to the increasing premium for higher education return.     

FINANCE,DISTRIBUTION AND THE ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE OF FINANCIAL COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS

This paper proposes a model where the structure rather than the size of the financial sector explains its influence on income distribution. Because of information asymmetries, a financial sector dominated solely by profit‐maximizing financial intermediaries will increase income and wealth inequality as it gives preferential access to credit for high‐income agents, whereas a diversified inclusive financial sector with alternative models of finance, like cooperatives, will reduce the inequality gap. No full convergence in income distribution can be realized through finance only and there is still a need for redistribution policies. Accordingly, an objective function for cooperative financial institutions should define a desired pricing behaviour that can increase the income of members at a rate higher than the average growth rate of the economy.     

转型社会中财政对收入分配的影响——基于我国不同发展阶段的理论实证

财政对收入分配的影响不仅限于再分配更在于初次分配环节。文章借助数理模型分析了我国不同阶段财政对收入分配的作用机制,研究表明:(1)财政制度安排影响要素分配和分配基本格局。初次分配格局确定后,再分配调节作用有限。长期中,财政将通过居民要素结构影响收入分配;(2)我国不同阶段的分配状况是财政体制和发展战略目标的必然结果;(3)构建和谐社会条件下,财政支出结构将有利于人力资本积累、提高收入水平、缩小收入差距。     

Excessive Government Fee Collection in China

There are several thousand administrative and operating fees, compared to 23 taxes in China. Excessive fee collections are largely targeted at business enterprises and farmers. The growth of fee collection resulted from the increase in the gap between government expenditures and revenues, the self-collection and self-utilization policy, and weak law enforcement. Excessive fee collection tends to reduce businesses'investment incentive, aggravate income inequality, breed corruption, and distort the fiscal system. Fee reduction is not possible if the government size and revenue shortage problems of local governments persist. Policy options such as cutting government size are recommended. (JEL H20 , H87 , P35 )     

Taxation and Tournaments

This paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labor supply and income distribution in the context of the rank‐order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non‐zero redistributive tax is always optimal if society's welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.