THE RELATION AMONG DIVIDEND POLICY,FIRM SIZE,AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS

In this paper we investigate the role of dividends in explaining the size effect. The previous literature concludes that before the firm's earnings announcement, small firm stock prices impound less information than large firm stock prices. This size effect is evidenced by the greater market reaction to small firm earnings announcements than to large firm earnings announcements. We find that if the dividend announcement precedes the earnings announcement, no size effect exists. The implication is that the information conveyed by dividend announcements includes the information conveyed to investors in large firms by other information sources. However, if the firm does not pay dividends or if the firm's earnings announcement precedes its dividend announcement, the size effect exists. The implication is that dividends do not completely explain the size effect. That is, there are information sources other than dividends that are exclusively available to investors in large firms, and the information provided by these sources is reflected in the stock price of large firms before the earnings announcement.     

The Effects of Stock Repurchases on Rival Firms

This paper investigates the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry as firms announcing stock repurchase tender offers. Using a sample of 134 repurchase announcements, I find that rival firms on average realize insignificant announcement period abnormal returns. Negative rival stock price performance is detected over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period and for a subset of announcements which ex ante were identified as most likely to affect rivals. This evidence, however, is statistically weak and does little to alter the overall conclusion that the information in repurchase announcements is primarily firm-specific.     

Firm strategy and market reaction to earnings

We examine whether a firm's strategy affects the information content of the firm's earnings announcement. A cost leadership strategy is characterized by low sales margins coupled with large sales volumes, economies of scale and major investments in plant and physical assets, whereas a differentiation strategy involves high sales margins achieved through product quality and branding realized by investments in intangibles such as R&D and advertising. These characteristics of the strategies result in differential impact on investor reactions to new information that is revealed about firms. Our results show that firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy have earnings announcements that are more commonly interpreted and result in a greater change in the average belief about stock price. On the other hand, earnings announcements of firms pursuing a differentiation strategy result in more heterogeneous interpretation accompanied by a smaller change in the average belief about stock price. This paper advances our understanding of the cross-sectional variation in the market's reaction to earnings announcements. In addition, the paper demonstrates a predictable instance of divergence in the price reaction and trading volume reaction to an earnings announcement.     

New considerations in the announcement effects of privately placed debt

We examine the stock price reaction to announcements of privately placed debt. The results suggest no effect for firms with a public debt rating and offsetting effects for firms without a public debt rating. If the private placement appears to reduce monitoring for a firm without a debt rating, it produces a significantly negative price response. However, if it appears to increase financial flexibility and bargaining power, it produces a positive reaction. Overall, the evidence suggests that private placements of debt are more similar to public bond issues than bank loans in terms of the price reaction at the announcement.     

Does the response of competitors to privatization announcements reflect competitive or industry-wide information effects? International evidence

We examine the stock price reaction of rival firms to the announcement of the privatization of their industry counterparts to infer information about the intra-industry effects of privatization. We find that the rival firms reacted negatively to the privatization announcements, suggesting that the announcement effects reflect competitive rather than positive industry effects. The reaction is stronger for industry counterparts in low economic freedom countries than those in high economic freedom countries. Interestingly, we also find that full privatization announcements generate larger negative abnormal returns for rival firms than partial privatization announcements where the privatized firm gains only partial autonomy from the government. In this regard, we find that, as the proportion of government ownership reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcement elicits stronger market reaction from rival firms. The negative abnormal returns earned by shareholders of rival firms are not due to price pressure and portfolio rebalancing effects resulting from index composition changes. We conclude that the negative effects documented for the rival firms reflect investors' concern about the potential competitive effects resulting from privatization of the state enterprise.     

Corporate Dividends and Seasoned Equity Issues: An Empirical Investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to benefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking dividend and stock offering announcements.     

THE INTRA-INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF OPEN MARKET SHARE REPURCHASES: CONTAGION OR COMPETITIVE?

We examine the extent to which announcements of open market share repurchase programs affect the valuation of competing firms in the same industry. On average, although firms announcing open market share repurchase programs experience a significantly positive stock price reaction at announcement, portfolios of rival firms in the same industry experience a significant and contemporaneous negative stock price reaction. This suggests that perceived changes in the competitive positions of the repurchasing firms occur at the expense of rival firms and dominate any signals of favorable industry conditions. Thus, the competitive intra-industry effects of open market repurchases outweigh any contagion effects. In addition, cross-sectional tests indicate that these competitive effects are more pronounced in industries characterized by a lower degree of competition and less correlation between the stock returns of the repurchasing firm and its rivals.     

Effects of Preferred Stock Re-rating on Common Stock Prices: Further Evidence

This study examines the price reactions of common stocks to changes in preferred stock ratings, with focuses on firms with less information available in the market as well as on firms with a relatively larger proportion of preferred stock financing. Emphasis on differential information and the relative size of preferred stocks across firms provide a more powerful test of the effect of rating changes on stock prices. Contrary to previous studies that report no price effect on common stocks due to preferred stock re-ratings, these results show that for low-information firms and for firms with a larger proportion of preferred stocks in their capital structure, a preferred stock rating downgrade exerts significant negative price effect on common stocks during the two-day announcement period. Our findings also have implications for future studies of other firm-specific events such as security offerings, stock repurchases, and convertible calls.     

DO TRACKING STOCKS REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES? AN ANALYSIS OF LIQUIDITY AND ADVERSE SELECTION

A firm's announcement that it intends to restructure based on tracking stock is usually associated with a positive stock price reaction, at least in the short run. Typically, this reaction is attributed to expected reductions in a diversification discount, through reduced agency costs or information asymmetries. We reinvestigate this latter hypothesis by focusing on the liquidity provided by market makers before and after a firm issues a tracking stock. Our results suggest that such restructurings are not effective at reducing information asymmetries. Rather, firms that issue tracking stocks exhibit less liquidity and greater adverse selection than comparable control firms.     

Stock splits in a neutral transaction cost environment: Evidence from the Athens Stock Exchange

This paper investigates the value consequences of stock splits in a market where institutional characteristics minimize the effects of price realignment and signaling. We find that despite these market conditions, stock splits by Greek firms produce positive price reaction around the announcement day. Further, split factors are directly related to pre-split price levels and deviations from average market prices. Splitting firms also realize earnings improvement which is not reversed after the stock split. Consistent with these findings, market reaction is inversely related to the post-split target price and the size of firm. We interpret this as evidence in support, respectively, of the self-selection and “attention-gathering” hypotheses. As reported in other international studies, there is no evidence of liquidity improvement.     

Does board gender diversity improve the informativeness of stock prices?

We show that stock prices of firms with gender-diverse boards reflect more firm-specific information after controlling for corporate governance, earnings quality, institutional ownership and acquisition activity. Further, we show that the relationship is stronger for firms with weak corporate governance suggesting that gender-diverse boards could act as a substitute mechanism for corporate governance that would be otherwise weak. The results are robust to alternative specifications of informativeness and gender diversity and to sensitivity tests controlling for time-invariant firm characteristics and alternative measures of stock price informativeness. We also find that gender diversity improves stock price informativeness through the mechanism of increased public disclosure in large firms and by encouraging private information collection in small firms.     

The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock

We study the price elasticity of demand for the common stock of an individual corporation. Despite the prevelance of assumptions that demand is perfectly elastic, there is little if any direct evidence in the literature to either support or reject that contention. Consistent with the notion of finite price elasticities, we find that the announcement of primary stock offerings by regulated firms depresses their stock prices and little if any evidence that this decline is the result of adverse information about future cash flows. Attempts to relate offer announcement effects directly to possible determinants of price elasticities, however, are inconclusive.     

Do monetary policy announcements affect stock prices in emerging market countries? The case of Thailand

We examine the effect of monetary policy announcements in Thailand, which is one of emerging market countries in Asia, on stock prices at the firm level. We find that the expected change, rather than the unexpected change, in interest rates affects stock prices. The stock price response to the interest rate announcement is asymmetric. For instance, the relation between interest rate surprises and stock prices is conditional on the direction of the interest rate change. In general, macroeconomic conditions and firm characteristics cannot explain the stock price reaction to the announcement. In addition, stock prices of firms in different industries appear to react heterogeneously to the interest rate announcement.     

Anomalous security price behavior following management earnings forecasts

This study provides evidence that most of the stock price reactions to bad news management forecasts of annual earnings are reversed in the 60 days following the forecast. In addition, a significant amount of the price reaction to bad news forecasts of quarterly earnings is reversed in the market's reaction to the following quarterly earnings announcement. Unlike the previous overreaction evidence, this study is not subject to the criticisms of beta-shifts, cross-firm comparisons, or lengthy intertemporal comparisons. In addition, the results are robust to include many additional variables that could be hypothesized to affect the observed results.     

Earnings management, lawsuits, and stock-for-stock acquirers’ market performance

There is a positive association between stock-for-stock acquirers’ pre-merger abnormal accruals and post-merger announcement lawsuits. The market only partially anticipates the effects of post-merger announcement lawsuits at the merger announcement and the post-merger announcement long-term market underperformance is largely limited to litigated acquisitions. Overall, the evidence suggests that it is important that investors not only undo the direct stock price effects of earnings management but also factor the contingent legal costs associated with earnings management.     

Corporate goodness and profit warnings

Is a firm that is known for positively engaging stakeholders expected to voluntarily disclose bad financial news? If it makes the announcement, does its corporate goodness help to mitigate the stock price reaction? We examine these issues using a sample of profit warnings, and a sample of firms with negative earnings surprises that did not warn. Firms that have positive corporate social responsibility ratings are more likely to provide earnings warnings than other firms. When they do provide a profit warning, the event negative abnormal returns are of significantly smaller magnitude than the returns of other firms providing warnings. This effect does not occur for social firms that decide not to warn. They suffer the same negative stock price impact on the earnings announcement day as other firms.     

Accounting Earnings Announcements and Differential Predisclosure Information

Recent studies have detected an inverse association between a firm's size and the stock price reaction to the firm's accounting earnings announcements, which has been interpreted as evidence that larger firms have relatively richer information sets. This study expands on this work, using two firm-specific factors to capture both the time and flow-per-period elements of information production (period of listing and firm size respectively) and examines whether these variables are a better information proxy than is size alone. After controlling for firm size, a statistically significant inverse relationship between a firm's period of listing and the information content of its annual earnings announcement is detected. The findings have implications for standard-setters as well as for auditors'assessment of the risk associated with audits of newly listed firms.     

ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF WITHDRAWN SECURITY OFFERINGS: EVIDENCE ON THE WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION HYPOTHESIS

This paper employs the comparison period returns approach to examine issuance and withdrawal announcement effects for stock portfolios of firms announcing equity or debt issues that are subsequently withdrawn. In contrast to previous literature, which generally attributes financing announcement effects to capital structure changes, the conclusion of this paper is that security price changes at the time an issue is announced or withdrawn prevent wealth redistributions between insiders and outsiders. Empirical findings are inconsistent with the interpretation of announcement effects as capital structure effects.     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF VOLUNTARY SELLOFFS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DIVESTING AND ACQUIRING FIRMS

Previous research examining the wealth effects of voluntary selloffs has shown positive stock price movements around the announcement date for divesting firms. Shareholders realize positive economic gains from selloffs. One recent study indicates that shareholders of acquiring firms also realize economic gains. This study examines the division of economic gains between divesting and acquiring firms and the impact of the firm's financial condition and relative selloff size on the level of economic gains. Significant positive price movements are observed for divesting firms immediately prior to and on the announcement date. Some evidence of positive, although not significant, price movements is found for acquiring firms. These results suggest shareholders of divesting firms realize economic gains from selloffs while shareholders of acquiring firms neither gain nor lose. Also, as divesting firms sell off larger portions of their total assets, their shareholders realize greater economic gains; the division of economic gains becomes more one-sided (in favor of divesting firms) as the relative size of the selloff increases.     

U.S. takeovers in foreign markets: Do they impact emerging and developed markets differently?

We investigate the effect that U.S. acquisitions of targets in emerging and developed countries have on the targets' rivals by measuring their stock price reaction to the acquisition announcement. On average, emerging market rivals react positively to these acquisitions while the reaction in developed markets is insignificant. In developed markets, the main factors explaining the reaction of rival firms are individual rival characteristics such as rival size, efficiency, growth opportunities, and leverage. In contrast, in emerging markets, country, industry, and acquisition characteristics such as economic development, shareholder protection, and the target's public status, industry, and percent acquired, play a more important role.