The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.     

Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of New Zealand Companies

New Zealand is currently experiencing a liberal and competitive economic environment which has led to a greater investment interest in corporate securities. Likewise, New Zealand firms are also developing strategies to attract investors, for example, through voluntary disclosure of information. Therefore, the level of information voluntarily disclosed by New Zealand companies is of interest to prospective investors. The purpose of this study is to examine empirically the relationship between five firm-specific characteristics and the general level of accounting information voluntarily disclosed by companies listed on New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE). In this study the a priori expectations are based on agency theory. The five firm-specific characteristics examined are: firm size, leverage, assets-in-place, type of auditor, and foreign listing status. The results obtained from cross-sectional regression show that firm size, foreign listing status and leverage are significantly related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. In contrast assets-in-place and type of auditor are not significant explanatory variables. A study of this type would be of particular relevance to accounting policy makers because, inter alia, it helps them in (a) understanding corporate disclosure behaviour, (b) explaining why firms adopt certain disclosure strategies, and (c) developing a coherent and acceptable set of mandatory disclosure requirements.     

Cannibalization risk and limited liability: implications for firm valuation and capital budgeting

When two firms combine, the negative cash flows of some projects can cannibalize the positive cash flows of other projects. This may at least partly explain recently documented observations that there is value loss from diversification, value gain from splitting up an existing firm, and that the value loss is higher in the case of diversification into unrelated industries. Also, this may explain why the value and riskiness of an identical project can be different for firms with different assets in place and why the value of a project as stand-alone may be irrelevant for a firm’s investment decisions.     

Strategic real options under asymmetric information

This paper studies the effect of private information on the capital allocation decisions of firms who operate under imperfect competition. I analyze two interactive firms, one with private information and the other without, who must decide when to undertake an irreversible and uncertain investment decision. Traditional non-strategic models of irreversible investment under uncertainty involve a single decision maker and result in an optimal period of delay before the investment is undertaken. In a strategic setting, firms must balance their desire to delay against competitive advantages from early investment. I find that an equilibrium may not exist within the standard continuous framework when the private information is over revenues. Moreover, when an equilibrium does exist the competitive pressures from the uninformed firm are weak. This is in contrast to existing models with asymmetric information over costs, where an equilibrium always exists and the competitive pressures remain strong (Hsu and Lambrecht, 2007). This work shows that the investment timing decision, and thus the value of the private information, is highly sensitive to the nature of incomplete information.     

Does corporate environmental responsibility engagement affect firm value? The mediating role of corporate innovation

This paper aims to construct a comprehensive corporate environmental responsibility (CER) engagement measurement to examine the relationship between CER engagement and firm value as well as explore the mediating effect of corporate innovation on this relationship based on a sample of 496 China's A‐share listed companies from 2008 to 2016. The results show that when firms start to adopt environmental regulations, CER would have a negative effect on firm value; however, at a specific level, CER would start to enhance firm value positively. In addition to this, corporate innovation plays a mediating role in the relationship between CER and firm value. Corporate innovation promotes firm value of firms with CER more than firms without CER. Overall, the findings of this paper are extremely relevant for the government, investors, and firm's managers and can be utilized for policy and investment decision making. Also, the findings encourage firms to enhance their sense of environmental responsibility in order to enhance their competitive advantages, enhance corporate innovation capabilities, and thus enhance firm value.     

R&D and Tobin's q in an emerging financial market: the case of the Athens Stock Exchange

This paper aims at providing further evidence on the consequences of R&D investment on Tobin's q for firms publicly traded in an emerging financial market. Panel data methodology is applied using data for the manufacturing and computer firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, a market classified as emerging by the major securities analysts, for the period 1996–2004. The empirical findings show first, that the Greek firms' R&D investment effect on the market value of a firm is consistent with other US and European studies. Second, the impact of the R&D investment on the market value is higher for small firms. The findings of this paper may have significant industrial and technological policy implications for other emerging markets sharing similar characteristics to Greece. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial advantage,outsourcing and FDI under wage uncertainty

This paper investigates outsourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions in North–South trade under conditions of wage uncertainty. The North has a financial advantage to raise capital, but the South has the advantage of low wages. If the expected outsourcing cost is lower than the in-house production cost, some outsourcing to a Southern firm is optimal. However, outsourcing to an FDI firm is superior to outsourcing to a Southern firm as well as in-house production. This finding is consistent with the rising foreign direct investment in China by Northern firms.     

Interactions between Preemptive Competition and a Financing Constraint

We develop an investment and financing model in which two identical firms compete for first‐mover advantage in an opportunity to invest. We investigate the interactions between preemptive competition and a financing constraint. We show that a medium‐intensity financing constraint can play a positive role in mitigating the preemptive competition and improving firm value in equilibrium. This positive effect is in sharp contrast with the conventional negative effects of the financing constraint. The positive effect is strong, especially for IT venture businesses because of the following characteristics: severe preemptive competition, a lack of internal funds, high uncertainty regarding future project value, and high bankruptcy costs.     

Contingent capital,capital structure and investment

We examine the interaction between investment and financing policies in a dynamic model for a firm with existing assets-in-place and a growth option, of which investment cost is financed with equity and contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). We attempt to clarify how CoCos impact on investment timing, capital structure and inefficiencies arising from debt overhang and asset substitution. We show that there is a conversion ratio (the fraction of equity allocated to CoCo holders upon conversion) to eliminate the inefficiencies. Our conclusions predict that debt leverage decreases with investment option payoff factor and the average appreciation rate of the cash flow. In contrast to traditional corporate finance theory saying that a firm's value decreases globally with business risk, our model indicates that it might first decrease and then increase with asset volatility.     

To lead or to wait? An application to internationalization strategies under demand uncertainty

We examine the exports versus foreign direct investment (FDI) decision under demand uncertainty for an asymmetric cost duopoly. One of the firms can lead entry before demand realization or retain flexibility enjoying an informational advantage. When the time value of information is small and for sufficiently low investment costs, follow‐the‐leader behavior in FDI arises. Relatively high investment (fixed) costs result in follow‐the‐leader exporting behavior. When the time value of information becomes significant, the potential leader will opt for a wait‐and‐see strategy. For intermediate values of investment costs, the efficient firm invests, while the rival chooses to export.     

Investment in Africa's Manufacturing Sector: A Four Country Panel Data Analysis

Firm level data for the manufacturing sector in Africa, presented in this paper, shows very low levels of investment. The importance of profit effects on investment is investigated using a flexible accelerator, a specification based on the Euler equation and a simple generalisation of these specificiations. There are controls for firm fixed effects. It is shown that the profit effect is very similar for both the accelerator and Euler equation specifications. A comparison with other studies shows that, for small firms, the effect is much smaller in Africa than for other countries. Reasons for the relative insensitivity of investment to profits in African firms are suggested. For the most general specification tested there are no significant differences in the size of the profit effect across the four countries in the study.     

Real Options in an Asymmetric Duopoly: Who Benefits from Your Competitive Disadvantage?

This paper analyzes the impact of investment cost asymmetry on the optimal real option exercise strategies and the value of firms in duopoly. Both firms have an opportunity to invest in a project enhancing ( ceteris paribus ) the profit flow. We show that three types of equilibrium strategies exist. Furthermore, we express the critical levels of cost asymmetry delineating the equilibrium regions as functions of basic economic variables. The presence of strategic interactions among the firms leads to counterintuitive results. First, for a certain range of the asymmetry level, a marginal increase in the investment cost of the firm with the cost disadvantage can enhance this firm's own value. Moreover, such a cost increase can reduce the value of the competitor. Finally, we discuss the welfare implications of the optimal exercise strategies and show that the presence of identical firms can result in a socially less desirable outcome than if one of the competitors has a significant cost (dis)advantage.     

Asymmetric effects of corporate sustainability strategy on value creation among global automotive firms: A dynamic panel quantile regression approach

This study explores the asymmetric effects of corporate sustainability strategy on firm value at different conditioning quantiles by performing a dynamic panel quantile regression analysis on global automotive firms from 2011 to 2017. Further, this study measures the distinct effects of positive and negative corporate sustainability strategies on firm value, which has remained unconsidered as yet. The findings suggest that low-value and midvalue firms respond more strongly to positive and negative corporate sustainability strategies than high-value firms. This implies that for low-value and midvalue corporations that are in a growth phase, an investment in positive corporate sustainability strategies is essential to increase firm value by enhancing public perception of their efforts. Therefore, positive corporate sustainability strategy contributes substantially to future growth. Conversely, positive corporate sustainability strategy may not be a priority in increasing firm value for high-value corporations, because these strategies do not enhance the public's discernment of their efforts in ethics management and hence do not contribute to a future increase in value. Meanwhile, engagement in negative corporate sustainability strategy worsens firm value in all quantiles, although the effect is somewhat weaker for high-value firms. Nevertheless, however high valued and well established a firm is, it is not immune to crisis.     

Investment in a New Technology as a Signal of Firm Value Under Regulatory Opportunism

We examine the question of whether a regulated firm that makes a long-term investment in infrastructure can credibly signal its private information regarding the future demand for its output to the capital market. We show that necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the magnitude of investment signals high future demand may include a low degree of managerial myopia, large variability of future demand, a lenient regulatory climate, and low sunk cost. Our model suggests that in estimating valuation models of regulated firms it is important to separate firms into two groups: firms for which a separating equilibrium is likely to obtain and firms for which the equilibrium is likely to be pooling. The market value of a firm in the first group is positively correlated with its level of investment, but uncorrelated with the level of actual demand, whereas for the second group the opposite holds.     

The Determinants of External Audit Costs in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

The contracting theory literature suggests that auditors' pricing decisions reflect the efficacy of contracting arrangements in firms. Drawing a framework from this literature, we test empirically the simultaneous effect of six firm-specific variables on external audit costs using 1988–1993 data drawn from New Zealand's (NZ) life insurance industry. These variables are: assets-in-place, reinsurance, internal governance, firm size, product-mix and organizational form. Consistent with expectations, our results indicate that audit fees are influenced by product-mix and firm size. However, the other variables are found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus provide mixed support for contracting theory.     

The R&D Investment–Uncertainty Relationship: Do Strategic Rivalry and Firm Size Matter?

This paper uses a real options perspective to augment a standard research and development (R&D) investment model and implement a firm‐level empirical analysis to assess the practical significance of market uncertainty and its interactions with strategic rivalry and firm size. We use a measure of firm‐relevant market uncertainty along with panel data and find that firms invest less in current R&D as uncertainty about market returns increases. The effect of firm‐specific uncertainty on R&D investment is smaller in markets where strategic rivalry is likely to be more intense. Furthermore, holding access to financing constant, the effect of uncertainty on R&D investment is attenuated for large firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Riskiness,endogenous productivity dispersion and business cycles

In the data, cross-sectional productivity dispersion is countercyclical at both the plant level and the firm level, see e.g. Bloom (2009). I incorporate a firm׳s choice of risk level into a model of firm dynamics with real business cycle features to explain this empirical finding both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the model, in every period, each firm chooses the investment amount and the risk level associated with a production project every period. All projects available to each firm have the same expected flow return, determined by the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to the firm׳s productivity, and differ from one another only in their risk. The endogenous option of exiting the market and the limited funding for new investment jointly play an important role in motivating firms׳ risk-taking behavior. The model predicts that, in each period, relatively small firms are more likely to take risk and hence exhibit a higher exit rate, and that the cross-sectional productivity dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of the realized individual component of productivity, is larger in recessions.     

Firm governance and duopoly: in weakness may lie strength

The paper proposes a model of firm governance when two firms compete in a duopoly. The paper assumes that a motivational asymmetry exists between owners and managers: owners wish to obtain maximum profits, managers wish to maximize sales. Managers perceive that salary, social status or future job prospects are more closely associated with firm size (i.e. sales) than with firm profits. The paper takes an agency view of the firm where owners only indirectly influence the behaviour of firms through the level of control they exert over managers. The paper demonstrates that a weakly governed firm, acting as a sales maximizer, can gain a competitive advantage over a strongly governed firm, acting as a profit maximizer. The paper examines the extent of this advantage under cost leadership and differentiation strategies. The paper also demonstrates that the objectives of profit maximization and maximization of competitive advantage are not necessarily congruent. The paper graphically represents the profit functions of the two firms illustrating the Nash equilibrium under Cournot and Stackelberg conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Real options game models of R&D competition between asymmetric firms with spillovers

Using real options game models, we consider the characterization of strategic equilibria associated with an asymmetric Research and Development (R&D) race between an incumbent firm and an entrant firm in the development of a new innovative product under market and technological uncertainties. The random arrival time of the discovery of the patent protected innovative product is modeled as a Poisson process. Input spillovers on the R&D effort are modeled by the change in the leader’s hazard rate of success of innovation upon the follower’s entry into the R&D race. Asymmetry between the two competing firms include sunk costs of investment, stochastic revenue flow rates generated from the product, and hazard rates of arrival of success of R&D efforts of the two firms. Under asymmetric duopoly, we obtain the complete characterization of the three types of Markov perfect equilibria (sequential leader–follower, preemption and simultaneous entry) of the firms’ optimal R&D entry decisions with respect to various sets of model parameters. Our model shows that under positive input spillover, preemptive equilibrium does not occur in the R&D race due to the presence of dominant second mover advantage. The two firms choose optimally to enter simultaneously if the sunk cost asymmetry is relatively small; otherwise, sequential equilibrium would occur. When the initial hazard rate is low relative to the level of input spillover, simultaneous entry would occur as an optimal decision, signifying another scenario of dominant second mover advantage. On the other hand, when the initial hazard rate is sufficiently high so that the first mover advantage becomes more significant, simultaneous equilibrium does not occur even under high level of positive input spillover.     

Economies of scale after deregulation in LTL trucking: a test case for the survivor technique

Early critics of motor carrier deregulation believed that the policy was unwise because strong economies of scale would lead to harmful market concentration, particularly in the industry's LTL segment. Using two methodologies, the survivor technique and the trans‐log cost function, this study finds that economies of scale do extend across the entire spectrum of firm sizes in LTL trucking. Long‐run average cost appears to decline mildly and at a diminishing rate with increases in firm size, however, such that any cost advantage for larger firms has been insufficient to eliminate new entry and competition from smaller rivals. As a result, after the first 20 years of deregulation, the corresponding increase in market concentration has also been mild. Moreover, the consistency of results from the two methodologies gives credibility to the survivor technique as an empirical method of identifying economies of scale. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.