Strategic investments under competition for access provision

We examine competition for access provision when symmetric vertically integrated firms invest in infrastructure upgrades. Spillovers through access have two effects (a wholesale-profit effect and a retail-production effect) on infrastructure investment made by vertically integrated firms. When the vertically integrated firms freely set access charges, due to the dominance of the wholesale-profit effect, quality differentials endogenously occur between these firms (asymmetric equilibria). When access charges are regulated, symmetric equilibria occur with multiple equilibrium investments due to the retail-production effect. Because competition for access provision induces a strong incentive for infrastructure investment, it also achieves a higher social welfare than does access regulation.     

Do Article 22 exemptions adequately stimulate investments in European gas markets?

Stimulating investments whilst introducing competition is a major policy issue for European gas markets. The current Article 22 exemptions regime, which is an application to the gas market of the access holiday theory, is designed to address this issue. Though useful, the access holiday theory provides an incomplete picture. In order to adequately analyze the exemptions regime, this paper incorporates the real options theory of investments into the analysis. Combining both theories provides the properties of an exemptions regime that better stimulates investments in gas. The current exemptions regime has some shortcomings, in particular regarding its risk criterion. A better exemptions regime would grant less exemptions, but if it does, allows higher profits during the exemption. Revised version of a paper presented at the European Doctoral Seminar on Natural Gas, State University, Moscow, November 24, 2007. I would like to thank the participants, especially Martin Gilman and Franz Hubert, as well as Koen Caminada, Ben van Velthoven and a referee of this journal for their comments and suggestions.     

Investitionsanreize unter RPI-X-Regulierung und die angemessene Höhe von Kostendurchreichungen

In the classic view, the fundamental decision between a rate-of-return and price-cap regime depends upon the aim of regulatory action: a rate-of-return is considered to more likely induce infrastructure investment while a price-cap regime is expected to increase managerial effort in reducing costs. While an asset-based regulation may lead to the unwanted Averch-Johnson effect, efficiency-oriented regulation such as RPI-X may decrease the company’s incentive to invest. To avoid this behaviour, RPI-X-regimes do often exempt certain costs from regulation, e.g. by allowing for pass-throughs for capital expenditures. Starting with the finding that efficiency-based regulation may lead to postponement or abandonment of investment projects in a real options based model, a fair rate of capital cost pass through is derived to mitigate the negative effects on investment projects. This ‘regulation-adjusted’ cost-pass-through depends on the regulatory X the regulator imposes on the regulated industry. Given the valuation of the investment project and the efficiency-value, a cost-pass-through can be calculated which is less or equal than the risk free interest rate as long as the pass-through itself is risk-free.     

The impact on broadband access to the Internet of the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks

In Portugal, until recently, the telecommunications incumbent offered broadband access to the Internet, both through digital subscriber line and cable modem. We estimate the impact on broadband access to the Internet of the structural separation of these two businesses. Using a panel of consumer level data and a random effects mixed logit model, we estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of broadband access to the Internet. Based on these estimates, we simulate the effect of structural separation on prices and social welfare. Our estimates indicate that structural separation would cause a substantial welfare increase. These results raise questions about the policy of some countries of allowing the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks.     

The option to expand to a next generation access network infrastructure and the role of regulation in a discrete time setting: A real options approach

Serious concerns have been raised, especially across Europe, about the role of regulation in network infrastructure investments. More specifically, the installation of optical fiber closer to customer premises, the so-called next generation access networks, requires massive investments in the face of demand and regulatory uncertainty. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether specific regulatory scenarios (permanent regulation, regulatory forbearance, regulatory holidays and sunset clauses) alter the timing of the investment decision of an incumbent to expand to a new network infrastructure exploiting the binomial lattice approach from real options analysis.     

Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

We propose a two‐sided model with two competing Internet platforms, and a continuum of Content Providers (CP's). We study the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investments in the market for Internet access, and on innovation in the market for content. Under the alternative discriminatory regime, platforms charge a priority fee to those CP's which are willing to deliver their content on a fast lane. We find that under discrimination, investments in broadband capacity and content innovation are both higher than under net neutrality. Total welfare increases, though the discriminatory regime is not always beneficial to the platforms as it can intensify competition for subscribers. As platforms have a unilateral incentive to switch to the discriminatory regime, a prisoner's dilemma can arise. We also consider the possibility of sabotage, and show that it can only emerge, with adverse welfare effects, under discrimination.     

Telecommunication in the US: From Regulation to Competition (Almost)

Alfred E. Kahn was an observer and practitioner of telecommunications regulation as technology changed the industry from a natural monopoly to a platform-based oligopoly among telephone, cable, satellite, and wireless carriers. Regulation and legislation were slow to recognize these changes, and large welfare losses occurred, some of which could have been avoided if regulators, legislators and economists had followed Fred’s economic advice: Prices must be informed by costs; the relevant costs are actual incremental costs; costs and prices are an outcome of a Schumpeterian competitive process, not the starting point; excluding firms from markets is fundamentally anticompetitive; a reliance on imperfect markets subject to antitrust law is preferable to necessarily imperfect regulation; and a regulatory transition to deregulation entails propensities to micromanage the process to generate preferred outcomes, visible competitors, and expedient price reductions.     

The momentum for network separation: A guide for regulators

Next Generation Access Networks (NGAs) are a challenge to regulators and operators insofar as they require large investments, there is a significant uncertainty about the ability to recover costs, and the choice of the appropriate regulatory regime is far from consensual. Regulatory authorities might want to seize the moment and reconsider mandatory vertical separation of telecommunication firms, without jeopardizing incentives to innovation and investment. This paper discusses the main elements of a possible test for the adequacy of network separation as a regulatory remedy. A sequential decision tree procedure with three questions is proposed: (1) “Is there significant market power in the provision of access under NGAs?”; (2) “Are there little vertical complementarities between services along the supply chain?”; and (3) “Is network separation a better regulatory tool than any other alternative?”. A positive answer to all the questions implies that the regulator should consider network separation as a regulatory remedy.     

Access regulation and geographic deployment of a new generation infrastructure

This paper addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing technologies (the “old generation network” – OGN – and the “new” generation network – NGN). This framework allows us to show that the “regulation defining access charge in order to maximize infrastructure deployment” is strictly equivalent to the case in which “no regulation applies”. We also derive from the model that these two types of regulation induce higher social welfare, but lower numbers of NGN consumers, compared to the “ex post access prices” regulation. Finally, we show that the level of infrastructure deployment (as well as social welfare and number of NGN consumers) will be highest if both investment and access charge decisions are taken by the welfare maximizing regulator. This suggests that the social optimum will be achieved through a calls-for-tender process that includes deployment and access charge requirements.     

Uncertain regulatory timing and market dynamics

Using a dynamic model of capacity accumulation, I examine the relationship between uncertainty about the timing of a new Pigouvian tax and oligopolistic competition. I find that for some market structures uncertainty about the timing of the regulatory change leads firms to increase investment. These results stem from the nature of the uncertainty and its interaction with firms' strategic incentive to engage in capacity races. They dramatize the importance of accounting for initial conditions when forecasting firms' reactions to anticipated regulatory changes. In addition, I find that more protracted uncertainty leads to greater welfare costs.     

Access pricing: A comparison between full deregulation and two alternative instruments of access price regulation,cost-based and retail-minus

In this paper, two instruments of access price regulation, cost-based and retail-minus, are compared with the full deregulation hypothesis. For this purpose, a model that considers an upstream monopolist firm that sells a vital input to an independent firm and to a subsidiary firm in the downstream market is developed. The main conclusion of the paper is that retail-minus regulation avoids foreclosure and leads to better results than cost-based regulation in terms of investment level and consumer surplus. Moreover, retail-minus regulation allows a higher consumer surplus than deregulation of access price as long as the regulator carefully defines the retail-minus instrument.     

Interchange fee regulation and service investments

This paper analyzes the impact of interchange fee regulation on the investment incentives of a payment card platform in the presence of full merchant internalization. We distinguish between investment in consumer and retailer services. We find that the optimally regulated interchange fee can be above the privately optimal one to induce the platform to invest more in retailer services. We also demonstrate that the two prominent regulatory benchmarks of a zero interchange fee and regulation according to the “tourist test” tend to set too low investment incentives under a total welfare standard. Instead, “tourist test” regulation can be a reasonable approximation under a total user surplus standard.     

Competition,regulation, and broadband access to the internet

This paper reexamines the effect of the regulatory regime on both penetration and coverage of broadband access to the internet. The framework allows for an evaluation of policy initiatives, guidelines and measures to bridge the digital divide and to promote investment. A welfare analysis compares service-based with facilities-based competition and asks whether and how high-speed access to the internet should be subsidized. Using an approach similar to Valletti, Barros, and Hoernig (2002), the paper highlights the importance of population density for whether firms invest to provide internet access. The analysis reveals a trade-off between coverage and penetration.     

Consumer perceptions and the effects of country of origin labeling on purchasing decisions and welfare

The study develops a general analytical framework of heterogeneous consumer preferences to examine the effects of country of origin labeling (COOL) regulation on consumer purchasing decisions and welfare. We show that while differences in consumer perceptions about COOL information, namely, whether it is viewed as an attribute that differentiates products vertically or horizontally, do not alter the nature of the market and consumer welfare effects of mandatory COOL, the relative strength of consumer preferences for COOL are shown to be important in determining the magnitude of these effects. In addition, our results show that the benchmark used (a no COOL versus a voluntary COOL regime) is critical in evaluating the effects of the policy. We show that, under both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, a change from a no COOL to a mandatory COOL regime decreases (increases) the welfare of consumers with weak (strong) preference for COOL while a change from a voluntary to a mandatory COOL regime leads to an unambiguous loss in consumer welfare.     

Investments in next generation access infrastructures under regulatory uncertainty

This article studies the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. Thus, a regulatory non-commitment setting in which the regulator sets the access price after the deployment of the NGA network is used. In particular, it is assumed that the regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access with some probability and gives an access markup, which equals the average cost of the investments, with the complementary probability. It is found that when the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep in relation to the impact of investments on demand, the incumbent underinvests compared to the socially optimal investment level. On the contrary, in a more realistic case when the impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the slope of the marginal investment cost function, the incumbent may overinvest or underinvest depending on the probability of incorporating an access markup into the access price.     

Regulatory bias in the price structure of local telephone service

This article combines a discrete choice model of demand for residential local telephone access and an optimal price regulation model to estimate the welfare weights that state regulators implicitly place on consumers with different incomes and locations. I find no evidence of a bias towards rural consumers on average, but the relative weight on low income consumers in a geographic area can vary as a function of the proportions of rural and poor population and the political characteristics of the regulator. I also measure the welfare consequences of deviating from total consumer surplus maximization and disconnecting prices from costs.     

Broadband investment and regulation: A literature review

Investment in broadband communications and its infrastructures (the so-called Next Generation Networks) is receiving extraordinary attention from policy makers all over the world, due to the significant impact of high-speed Internet access on the whole economy and society. However, even before the recent financial crises, a dramatic downward trend in telecommunications investment has occurred, mainly due – at least according to incumbent operators – to excessively intrusive regulatory intervention. The typical conflict between regulation, competition and investment emerges. It is therefore important, for both future research and regulatory and practitioners’ references, to review the specialized but growing branch of the literature on this interesting and policy-relevant issue. The purpose of this paper is therefore to survey the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between regulation, at both retail and wholesale level, and investment in telecoms infrastructures. The picture that emerges is not conclusive, and further research is still needed, both theoretically and empirically, to better understand the real impact of regulatory incentives on investments.     

MODELLING REGULATORY DISTORTIONS WITH REAL OPTIONS

The introduction of uncertainty can make a significant difference in the valuation of a project. This manifests itself, inter alia, in the regulatory constraints that can affect the valuations of the firm's investment which, in turn has an adverse impact on consumers' welfare. In particular, the inability to exercise any or all of the delay, abandon, start/stop, and time-to-build options has an economic and social cost. With this view in mind, we specify and estimate a model where regulatory constraints impact on the firm's cash flow and on investment valuation with real options methods.

This paper uses real options analysis to address issues of regulation that have not been previously quantified. We show that regulatory constraints on cash flow have an impact on investment valuations in the telecommunications industry. Specifically, a model is developed to estimate the cost of regulation for broadband services. We show that the cash flow constraints and the inability to delay and abandon has a significant cost. Because some costs are not recognized in a static view of the world, this failure to recognize the operation and implications of non-flexibility by regulators (which can be modeled by real options methods) will lead to a reduction in company valuations which in turn will lead to a reduction in economics welfare.     

Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.