Competition and the signaling role of prices

In a market where sellers are heterogeneous with respect to the quality of their good and are more informed than buyers, high quality sellers' chances to trade might depend on their ability to inform buyers about the quality of the goods they offer. We study how the strength of competition among sellers affects the ability of sellers of high quality goods to achieve communication by means of appropriate pricing decisions in the context of a market populated by a large number of strategic price-setting sellers and a large number of buyers. When competition among sellers is weak high quality sellers are able to use prices as a signaling device and this enables them to trade. By contrast, strong competition among sellers inhibits the role of prices as signals of high quality, and high quality sellers are driven out of the market.     

Price and quality discrimination in durable goods monopoly with resale trading

We examine a durable goods monopolist’s optimal dynamic price and product quality strategy when buyers are rational and can trade used durables among themselves. In contrast to the usual credibility problem of the durable goods monopolist, intertemporal quality discrimination introduces a time-inconsistency problem of not raising prices against high-valuation consumers who delay purchase for quality upgrades. Resale trading ameliorates this time-inconsistency problem and allows the monopolist to effectively price discriminate, especially when the buyers are patient. The monopolist’s optimal price and quality offers in the new good market exhibit complex dynamic patterns, and new good prices can fall as product quality improves even in the absence of entry threats or learning economies. Initial quality distortions are followed by steady-state quality allocations that are always efficient for the high-valuation buyers, but sometimes also for the marginal consumer-types. Both the resale trading frequency and the price discount for secondhand goods are driven by the pace of strategic quality obsolescence in the new good market.     

LISTING PRICES AS SIGNALS OF QUALITY IN MARKETS WITH NEGOTIATION*

We analyze markets where a buyer may pay the listing price or negotiate. We show that listing prices can signal quality to attract the right type of buyers. Prices are lower without quality uncertainty or without some of the lower qualities. In equilibrium, higher qualities/prices induce more bargaining, and thus more expensive goods are sold more often through bargaining.     

Group identity in markets

We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of group identity—one's perceived membership in social groups—on market transactions in an oligopoly market with a few sellers and buyers. We artificially induce group identity using art preferences and college majors in different treatments, respectively. Subjects are randomly assigned into the roles of buyers and sellers and interact repeatedly. We find that the presence of groups influences both the selection of trading partners and the determination of prices. All else equal, sellers are more likely to make offers to ingroup buyers, and the buyers are more likely to accept offers from ingroup sellers. There are considerable intergroup price differentials with the outgroup sellers charging a lower price than the ingroup sellers.     

Experimenting with purchase history based price discrimination

Many purchases of differentiated goods are repeated, giving sellers the opportunity to engage in price discrimination based upon the shopper's previous behavior by either offering loyalty discounts to repeat buyers or introductory rates to new customers. Recent theoretical work suggests that loyalty discounts can be profitable to sellers when customer preferences are not stationary and sellers can pre-commit to prices for repeat buyers, but otherwise returning customers can be expected to pay the same or more than new buyers. This paper reports behavior in controlled laboratory experiments designed to empirically test the impact of these factors on pricing strategies. The results generally support the comparative static predictions of the theoretical model. When customer preferences are fixed over time, sellers attempt to lure customers from their rival. Price pre-commitment for repeat shoppers when buyer preferences vary over time resulted in modest loyalty pricing, but the discounts are not as prevalent as predicted as sellers rarely price below cost. Behaviorally, price pre-commitment to loyal customers is found to reduce prices overall.     

Nonsequential search equilibrium with search cost heterogeneity

We generalize the model of Burdett and Judd (1983) to the case where an arbitrary finite number of firms sells a homogeneous good to buyers who have heterogeneous search costs. We show that a price dispersed symmetric Nash equilibrium always exists. Numerical results show that the behavior of prices and consumer surplus with respect to the number of firms hinges upon the nature of search cost dispersion: when search costs are relatively concentrated, entry of firms leads to lower average prices and greater consumer surplus; however, for relatively dispersed search costs, the mean price goes up and consumer surplus may decrease with the number of firms.     

Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*

A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e., within an implementability cone. The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information-collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed rewards respectively. This no longer holds when the seller has private information about costs as both problems interact. We study whether competition and the threat by buyers to switch sellers can substitute for regulation.     

On the incidence of commissions in auction markets

We analyze the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by intermediaries in auction markets. Commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers, and standard economics suggests that both sellers and buyers are made worse off by the tax. However, we show that when the buyers' participation constraint binds and when sellers set optimal reservation prices, the level of commissions correlates to participation and reservation prices in such a way that participating buyers strictly gain from higher commissions.     

Ethnicity in housing markets: Buyers,sellers and agents

This paper examines how ethnicity related to cultural differences arising from ethnic background affects housing market transactions in the Atlanta metro area. Using both the US Census and Wikipedia approaches to infer ethnicity from individuals' names, we find that the interplay of buyer, seller, and agent ethnicity composition affects interaction in the housing market. Sellers working with listing agents in the same ethnic group set higher listing prices and enjoy higher selling prices and quicker sales. Agents working with same ethnicity buyers yield higher prices and liquidity. Even though sellers only communicate with buyers through their agents, houses sold by sellers to buyers of same ethnicity have higher prices and sell faster. And while the ethnic mix of agents and their clients matter, the ethnic mix of agents in the transaction does not.     

Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market

Bargaining is common in markets for heterogeneous goods and differences in bargaining power between buyer and seller affect the negotiated transaction price. Previous research has found systematic evidence in the housing markets that weak buyers pay higher prices and weak sellers receive lower prices for their homes. Earlier work has modeled the bargaining effect as a parallel shift in the hedonic function, implicitly assuming that attribute shadow prices were unaffected by the bargaining process. In this paper, we use a sample of home sales where the seller's bargaining power is weakened by the fact that the home is vacant at the time of sale to test whether the effect of bargaining is best captured by a shift in the hedonic constant or whether the attribute shadow prices vary as well. The question is significant for property valuation where estimation of the marginal value of an attribute is commonly used to adjust comparable sales data. We find strong confirmation that bargaining power influences the negotiated price. We also find evidence that bargaining power alters attribute prices, although we do not find a consistent pattern across markets.     

Collusion through Coordination of Announcements

A theory is developed to explain how sellers can effectively collude by coordinating on list prices (or surcharges), while leaving sellers to set their final prices. List prices are interpreted to be cheap talk announcements about cost information unknown to buyers. Buyers use those announcements to decide whom to invite to their procurement auction and the reserve price to set. By coordinating on a high list price to signal high cost, sellers produce supracompetitive prices by inducing buyers to be less aggressive, as reflected in a higher reserve price. We show that collusion can raise social welfare.     

The Informational Role of Product Trade‐Ins for Pricing Durable Goods

This research theorizes that sellers of durable goods can utilize inferences about the buyer's willingness to pay based not only on her decision to trade in the old good but also on its characteristics. We find empirical support for this theory using transaction data for new car purchases. The results support the notion that dealers infer a higher willingness to pay and charge higher prices to consumers who trade in a used vehicle than to those who do not. We also find that dealers charge even higher prices to those consumers who trade in used cars that are similar to the new one.     

Optimal strategy of multi-product retailers with relative thinking and reference prices

Experimental evidence suggests that consumers are affected by reference prices and by relative price differences (“relative thinking”). A linear-city model of two retailers that sell two goods suggests how this consumer behavior affects firm strategy and market outcomes. A simple model analyzes the case in which all consumers want to buy both goods. An extended version adds consumers who want only one good. Relative thinking leads firms to increase the markup on the good with the higher reference price and decrease the markup on the other good, possibly to a negative markup. Stronger relative thinking increases the firms' profits.     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.     

Personalized pricing and price fairness

Mobile web technology enables discriminatory, or personalized, pricing for many more consumer good categories than has traditionally been the case. Setting prices according to individual valuations, however, generates adverse consumer reaction unless consumers are invited to participate in the price-formation process. Consumer perceptions of price fairness are key to the sustainability of any discriminatory pricing regime. Perceptions of price fairness, in turn, are hypothesized to be shaped by “self-interested inequity aversion” in which prices tend to be regarded as unfair, and purchase probabilities fall, if others are perceived to pay a lower price, while prices tend to be regarded as more fair, and consumers more likely to purchase, if inequity is in the buyers favor. Our experimental data also shows that the implications of inequity aversion for sellers can be at least partially reversed if consumers are allowed to participate in the price-formation process by negotiating the price they pay. The primary implication of our findings is that, in order to be viable, any system of discriminatory pricing for consumer goods should invite consumers to have a stake in the price they pay. Such participatory pricing may provide one way out of the current trap of Hi–Lo, or promotional, pricing that neither retailers nor manufacturers regard as sustainable.     

Experimental Evidence on Product Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities

The benefits accruing to a purchaser of a product due to the existing base of consumers of the same or compatible products are known as network externalities. This paper studies Katz and Shapiro's (1986) model of network externalities in an experimental setting. Two sellers choose prices for competing technologies sold to two groups of four buyers purchasing sequentially in two stages. The results are qualitatively consistent with Katz and Shapiro's equilibrium predictions. In certain sessions over three-quarters of first stage buyers purchase the more expensive technology anticipating that later arriving buyers will also buy this technology. In periods where a strong network has been established for a technology in the first stage, over 80 percent of second stage buyers buy that technology, even though in most cases it is priced higher. The data, however, differ from the point predictions of the model.     

Dynamic Informative Advertising of New Experience Goods

This paper analyzes the optimal advertising and price policies of a monopolist who sells a new experience good over time to a population of heterogeneous forward‐looking buyers. We consider advertising that can complement or substitute for learning‐by‐purchasing, and we show that the advertising intensity always peaks during the early stages when the price extracts surplus from the buyers who are yet to learn their valuation for the good. We also show that even though informative advertising may temporarily raise prices and slow down the learning process, an advertising ban can reduce welfare.     

INFORMATION REVELATION AND BUYER PROFITS IN REPEATED PROCUREMENT COMPETITION*

I investigate how procurement costs are affected by the information that buyers reveal about sellers' behavior, in a setting with two sequentially offered contracts for which a seller's privately known costs are identical. Expected prices are lowest when sellers learn nothing until all contracts are allocated, are higher when they learn all sellers' price offers as contracts are allocated, and typically are even higher when they learn only the winner's identity, or the winner's identity and price offer. The results suggest that buyers engaged in repeated procurement may pay less by revealing minimal or extensive information, rather than an intermediate amount.     

The Impact of LEED Neighborhood Certification on Condo Prices

The U.S. Green Building Council offers LEED certification for existing and new neighborhood developments that meet sustainable urban development standards. Features of sustainable urban development have been found to positively affect residential sales prices. We investigate whether the intangible labeling effects of LEED neighborhood certification add a premium to the sales prices of LEED and non‐LEED–certified condos. Using a quasi‐experiment, transaction data from Portland, Oregon, and a spatio‐temporal autoregressive (STAR) model, we find no evidence that the intangible labeling effects of LEED neighborhood certification directly or indirectly affect sales prices. Our results suggest that, contrary to LEED building certification, which we find adds a premium to condo sales prices, the LEED neighborhood label by itself fails to add value for condo buyers. Explanations for our findings include market acceptance, neighborhood delineation issues and the free rider problem as it relates to public goods.     

List Prices,Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets

Many goods are marketed after first stating a list price, with the expectation that the eventual sales price will differ. In this article, we first present a simple model of search behavior that includes the seller setting a list price. Holding constant the mean of the buyers’ distribution of potential offers for a good, we assume that the greater the list price, the slower the arrival rate of offers but the greater is the maximal offer. This trade‐off determines the optimal list price, which is set simultaneously with the seller's reservation price. Comparative statics are derived through a set of numerical sensitivity tests, where we show that the greater the variance of the distribution of buyers’ potential offers, the greater is the ratio of the list price to expected sales price. Thus, sellers of atypical goods will tend to set a relatively high list price compared with standard goods. We test this hypothesis using data from the Columbus, Ohio, housing market and find substantial support. We also find empirical support for another hypothesis of the model: atypical dwellings take longer to sell.