Innovation in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two firms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we highlight positive and negative effects of litigation threats on innovation. We define an appropriate regulatory structure of infringement fees that will implement socially efficient R&D investments in the case of symmetric and asymmetric patent portfolios.     

Does international research and development increase patent output? An analysis of Japanese pharmaceutical firms

Internationalizing research and development is often advocated as a strategy for fostering the development of technological capabilities. Although firms conduct international R&D to tap into knowledge bases that reside in foreign countries, we argue that in order to benefit from international R&D investments firms must already possess research capabilities in underlying or complementary technologies. We examine the international R&D expansion activities, research capabilities, and patent output of 65 Japanese pharmaceutical firms from 1980 to 1991. We find that firms benefit from international R&D only when they possess existing research capabilities in the underlying technologies. In addition to refining our understanding of when international R&D enhances firm innovation, our results integrate asset‐seeking and asset‐based theories of foreign direct investment. Internationalizing R&D to tap into foreign knowledge bases is consistent with asset‐seeking theories of foreign direct investment, while the contingent nature by which firms benefit from international R&D is consistent with asset‐based theories of foreign direct investment and the notion of absorptive capacity. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Complementary assets,start-ups and incentives to innovate

We examine to what extent market conditions facilitating start-up formation affect firms' R&D investment and profits. We consider a model in which R&D efforts of an incumbent firm generate partly tacit technological know-how embodied in a key R&D employee, who might use it to form a start-up. The availability of complementary assets influences whether new firms are created and determine expected profits for start-up's founders. A large availability of complementary assets has the direct effect that the generation of start-ups is fostered. However, as a strategic effect, the incentives of incumbents to invest in R&D may be reduced because of the increased danger of knowledge loss occurring through start-up formation. We characterize the effects of an increase in the availability of complementary assets, showing that counter-intuitively there are cases in which it induces an increase in incumbents' R&D investment.     

Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect

The number of patent applications and “bad” patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Office and its consequences on the firms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which firms self-select in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often co-exist, which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy.     

Declared essential patents and average total R&D expenditures per patent family

The sharp increase in SEP declarations and declaring firms emphasizes the necessity for understanding firms’ innovation investment behavior in standardization. This paper empirically investigates whether declared standard-essential patents (SEPs) and the declaring firm’s business model (operationalized as a firm’s location in the value chain) are associated with a firm’s innovation investment behavior. To this end, we measure firms’ innovation investment behavior through average total research and development (R&D) expenditures per filed patent family for publicly listed firms from 1999 to 2018. Our sample mainly includes major SEP family declarants. We rely on a binary business model taxonomy differentiating upstream and downstream firms. Within that setting, total R&D expenditures rise with increasing fragmentation of declared SEP families, suggesting that firms adjust their R&D investments to declaration developments in standard-setting organizations (SSOs). We also show that upstream firms have significantly lower total R&D expenditures than downstream firms, which could indicate structural differences in their intellectual property (IP) and R&D management processes. Our results can help SSOs and regulators better understand firms’ innovation investment behavior.     

Strengthening intellectual property rights: Experience from the 1986 Taiwanese patent reforms

Do stronger intellectual property rights spur inventive activity and foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries? What are the characteristics of industries where strengthening patent rights has the most favorable impact? In an attempt to answer these questions, this paper uses the 1986 Taiwanese patent reforms to examine the effects of strengthening patent rights in a developing economy. I find that the reforms encouraged R&D effort across industries. In addition, industries that were highly R&D intensive witnessed a marked increase in their patenting in the United States. The reforms also induced additional FDI.     

Patent Protection and R&D with Endogenous Market Structure

In a model with endogenous number of innovating firms, we show that whether patent protection increases R&D investment is ambiguous, and depends on the market demand function and the cost of R&D. If the market size increases with number of firms, patent protection reduces R&D investment if the cost of R&D is sufficiently high, and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lower R&D investment under patent protection. If the market size does not increase with number of firms, patent protection never reduces R&D investment. We find that welfare is lower under patent protection than under no patent protection.     

Business R&;D and the Interplay of R&;D Subsidies and Product Market Uncertainty

This paper examines the effect of product market uncertainty and government research and development (R&D) subsidies on firm-level R&D investment. Using a sample of German manufacturing firms, we find that product market uncertainty reduces R&D investment and government R&D subsidies increase R&D investment. Moreover, our results indicate that R&D subsidies mitigate the effect of product market uncertainty on R&D investment. These findings suggest that public policies aimed at increasing business R&D investment can achieve this objective by reducing the degree of uncertainty in the product market.      

Knowledge capital and the private rate of return to R&D in Japanese manufacturing industries

This paper examines the relationship between R&D investment and the rate of increase of labor productivity in Japanese manufacturing industries, and derives the rate of return to such investment through a Cobb-Douglas production function which explicitly includes knowledge capital stock. It is argued that the rate of return to R&D investment has been much higher than those of alternative investments but has declined in recent years as the dependence on imported technologies has been diminishing after the last half of the 1970's.     

R&D-induced industry polarization and shake-outs

We consider the standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition with ex ante identical firms but depart from the literature in assuming that R&D is characterized by mildly, instead of strongly, decreasing returns to scale. We establish that only extreme R&D levels are possible at equilibrium, and that for a broad range of parameters, equilibria are asymmetric in R&D levels, possibly leading one firm to endogenously exit. This provides a simple link between returns to scale in R&D and industry polarization, including shake-outs. A novelty is that exit may be triggered by positive opportunities in a strategic setting. Given the original nature of our R&D equilibrium, a complete welfare analysis is conducted, including a possible role for R&D subsidies.     

Competition in Research and Development: A Theory for Contradictory Predictions

This paper develops reasons for the many seemingly contradictory findings in the literature about competition and research and development (R&D) investment. The theory of R&D competition implies that increases in competitive pressure may increase R&D investment, decrease it, increase it initially but decrease it over greater levels of competitive pressure (an inverted-U relation), decrease it initially but increase it over greater levels (a U relation), or have no effect at all.      

Private and social incentives to form R & D joint ventures

R & D patent pools induce individual firms to reduce investment in R & D, but are socially beneficial because they ensure greater competition in the post-innovation market. It is not usually optimal for all firms to combine in a single cooperative R & D venture. If R & D combinations are formed voluntarily by firms that seek to maximize their expected value, they will not, in general, adopt the socially optimal structure of R & D joint ventures.     

License to Be More Innovative

A patent holder may choose to give up its current leading position through patent licensing in order to increase its incentive to innovate further and thus avoid falling behind its rivals in future R&D races. We show that because of this “catching-up” effect, licensing may occur even when it reduces current industry profits. The overall effect of licensing is to slow down the pace of innovation, as it reduces the licensee's incentive to conduct R&D.     

Passing the food and agricultural R&D buck? The United States and China

The global geographical balance of food and agricultural R&D spending is shifting, characterized by a declining U.S. share and a rising middle-income-country share, propelled heavily by the rapid rise of spending in China. Based on our newly compiled data, we estimate that China now outspends the United States on both public and private food and agricultural research on a purchasing power parity basis. The public-private orientation of the research has also changed markedly, with the private sector now accounting for around two-thirds of the food and agricultural R&D spending total in both China and the United States. Our estimates indicate that China’s private sector tilts heavily towards post-farm R&D activities, whereas the U.S. private sector is split more evenly between on-farm and post-farm spending. While the intensity of Chinese investment in food and agricultural R&D (relative to agricultural GDP) is beginning to grow, it still lags well behind the food and agricultural R&D investment intensities of the United States and other higher-income Asian countries (e.g., Japan and South Korea). The development regularities we reveal in the longer-run trends are indicative of future R&D investment patterns with potentially profound long-run implications for the size, shape and accessibility of the global stocks of scientific knowledge that underpin food and agricultural sectors worldwide.     

R&D competition versus R&D cooperation in oligopolistic markets with evolving structure

This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to implement a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are product specific. It is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation by under-investing (if the new product is a substitute to the established product) and higher profits, and over-investing (in case of complements) and lower profits, compared to the corresponding standard capital accumulation game. This anticipation effect is stronger in the case of R&D cooperation. Furthermore, since due to R&D cooperation firms introduce the new product at the same time, this leads to intensified competition and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced. In addition, we show that under R&D competition the firm that innovates first, overshoots in new-product capacity buildup in order to exploit its temporary monopoly position. Taking into account all these effects, the result is that, if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of the established product, positive synergy effects in R&D cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than R&D competition.     

为研发而申请专利还是为专利申请而研发

在传统的“为研发而申请专利”的逻辑下,专利仅仅是研发活动的结果和表现．其战略重要性被明显低估。产业垂直分工和知识型企业的大量涌现表明,专利申请动机已明显地从防御性技术保护向进攻性价值创造转变：专利被视作有形化的知识商品从幕后走上前台成为企业和国家竞相争夺的焦点：对专利认识也正像市场营销理念那样从供应导向观向需求导向观转变。为此．本文提出以“为专利申请而研发”作为逻辑起点的新的专利战略概念框架。     

Convergence and unbundling of corporate R&D in telecommunications: is software taking the helm?

This paper presents a view of the changing structure of corporate R&D in telecommunications – one that is close to Adam Smith’s insightful and enduring idea of division of labor – that perhaps we are witnessing the beginnings of vertical disintegration and unbundling of important segments of the industry’s R&D activity. The paper maintains that the emergence of an independent software industry – aided by the convergence of computer, telecommunications and imaging technologies – and the rapid growth of technology-based alliances are at the heart of this trend. So extensive is the vertical disintegration of R&D that, in 1997, the top 10 independent software vendors in the US spent more on R&D than the combined spending by AT&T and Lucent whose sales were well over three times as large. It appears that the source of future innovation in the telecommunications industry lies not in its services segment but rather in telecommunications and Internet equipment firms and independent software firms. Increasingly, the fortunes of large service providers like AT&T will depend less on innovation and more on their ability to configure and market complete one-stop-shopping solutions to customers by combining internal resources with outsourced technologies, products and services.     

Environmental research joint ventures among manufactures

This paper explores the reasons that firms form research joint ventures by focusing on a particular type of venture — namely, ventures that are developing new processes to reduce toxic air emissions. The legislative expression of government concern and intent to develop regulations for toxic chemicals prompts firms to join forces in joint ventures that address the problems posed by the chemicals. The cooperative R&D ventures do not appear to be a way for companies to avoid Schumpeterian competitive pressures that stimulate R&D investment. New, primary data at the disaggregated level of a particular type of R&D for particular companies support the belief that cooperative R&D ventures among manufacturing companies may well promote economic efficiency.     

The propensity to patent

This paper analyzes the relationship between 1974 R&D expenditures and invention patenting by 4,274 narrowly-defined lines of business in 443 U.S. industrial corporations. The probability of non-zero patenting rose systematically with company-financed R&D outlays, as did the number of patents received. Within industries, patents tended most frequently to rise in proportion to R&D; among the exceptions, the tendency was toward diminishing returns. Variables measuring overseas sales, federal R&D support, diversification, scope of invention use, and invention type had only modest explanatory power. There was no significant evidence of disproportionate patent accumulation in the more highly concentrated industries.     

Does business group affiliation encourage R&D activities? Evidence from India

The decision to undertake investment in innovative activities is an important strategic choice made by firms. This study investigates the relationship between business group (BG) affiliation and research & development (R&D) activities of Indian firms. Using an empirical approach that accounts for endogeneity and selection bias, we observe that BG affiliation has significant positive influence on the sample firms’ R&D activities. Employing various proxies for institutional development, we show that the effect of BG affiliation on R&D declines with the improvements in institutional and regulatory mechanisms. Further, this study explores the linkages between diversification strategies at the group level and R&D investments by firms affiliated with BGs. Results show that degree of related diversification is positively associated with the affiliates’ innovation efforts.