Buyer confusion and market prices

We employ a price setting duopoly experiment to examine whether buyer confusion increases market prices. Each seller offers a good to buyers who have homogeneous preferences. Sellers decide on the number of attributes of their good and set prices. The number of attributes bears no cost to the sellers and does not affect the value of the good to the buyers but adds complexity to buyers’ evaluation of the goods. The experimental results indicate that the buyers make more suboptimal choices and that prices are higher when the number of attributes of the goods is higher. Moreover, prices and profits are higher than those in a benchmark treatment with perfectly rational (robot) buyers.     

An experimental test of automatic mitigation of wholesale electricity prices

In several major deregulated electricity generation markets, the market operator uses an “automatic mitigation procedure” (AMP) to attempt to suppress the exercise of market power. A leading type of AMP compares the offer price from each generation unit with a recent historical average of accepted offer prices from that same unit during periods when there was no transmission-system congestion to impede competition. If one or more units' offer prices exceed the recent historical average by more than a specified margin, and if these offer prices raise the market-clearing price by more than a specified margin, the market operator replaces the offending offer prices with lower ones. In an experiment, we test an AMP of this type. We find that it keeps market prices close to marginal cost if generation owners have low market power in uncongested periods. However, with high market power in uncongested periods, a condition that may apply in many parts of the world, the generation owners are able to gradually raise the market price well above short-run marginal cost in spite of the AMP. We also test the effect of the AMP on the frequency with which high-variable-cost units are used, inefficiently, in place of low-variable-cost units.     

Group identity in markets

We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of group identity—one's perceived membership in social groups—on market transactions in an oligopoly market with a few sellers and buyers. We artificially induce group identity using art preferences and college majors in different treatments, respectively. Subjects are randomly assigned into the roles of buyers and sellers and interact repeatedly. We find that the presence of groups influences both the selection of trading partners and the determination of prices. All else equal, sellers are more likely to make offers to ingroup buyers, and the buyers are more likely to accept offers from ingroup sellers. There are considerable intergroup price differentials with the outgroup sellers charging a lower price than the ingroup sellers.     

Outsourcing induced by strategic competition

We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the “outside” (that do not compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that “inside” firms, by accepting such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing competition to sell the final product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside.     

Search engines: Left side quality versus right side profits

Search engines face an interesting tradeoff in choosing the way to display their results. While providing high quality unpaid, or “left side” results attracts users, doing so can also cannibalize the revenue that comes from paid ads on the “right side”. This paper examines this tradeoff, focusing, in particular, on the role of users' post-search interaction with the websites whose links are displayed. In the model, high quality left side results boost demand from users, causing them to tolerate a search engine on which advertisers do not offer the lowest possible prices for the goods that they sell. However, because websites appearing on the left side still have an incentive to compete in the same market as advertisers, an increase in quality on the left side may reduce advertisers' equilibrium prices. I analyze the circumstances under which this will occur and discuss the model's potential implications for antitrust policy.     

Electronic transportation marketplaces: a transaction cost perspective

Electronic transportation marketplaces (ETMs) are Internet-based mechanisms that match buyers and sellers of transportation services. With claims of reducing the administrative costs of transportation procurement to virtually nothing, the allure of ETMs is considerable. Shippers (transportation buyers) must therefore determine whether to pursue the new-founded opportunity and buy transportation services through an Internet-based intermediary or to buy services in a traditional manner. To date, there has been little structured thought on the topic to guide managers. Transaction cost economics (TCE) provides a robust framework toward this end. The TCE framework is adapted to present the procurement decision as one of “make” versus “buy.” The analysis is designed to help firms navigate their own determination to use an ETM and, when considered, the most appropriate form of ETM. The merits and caveats of ETM adoption are presented in the article.     

The determinants of merger waves: An international perspective

One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves that are correlated with increases in share prices and price/earnings ratios. We use a natural way to discriminate between pure stock market influences on firm decisions and other influences by examining merger patterns for both listed and unlisted firms. If “real” changes in the economy drive merger waves, as some neoclassical theories of mergers predict, both listed and unlisted firms should experience waves. We find significant differences between listed and unlisted firms as predicted by behavioral theories of merger waves.     

Is targeted advertising always beneficial?

In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their “natural markets”, while they cross-advertise when this cost is high. Second, the outcome at equilibrium is compared with random advertising. Surprisingly, we prove that firms' equilibrium profits may be lower with targeted advertising relative to random advertising, while firms are given more options with targeted advertising.     

Chemical market research: Passive and dynamic functions

In this article Mr. A. L. Waddams, Chairman of the EVAF European Chemical Marketing Research Association, presents his thoughts on the different ways in which market research can be utilized to advance a complex project. Two main interactions, between market research and the project, are considered: the first where the findings of the market researchers are “fed-in” and the project then proceeds without further collaboration from the market research team; and a second where market researchers carry some responsibility for furthering a project, in the light of the understanding they have gained from carrying out the research. Mr. Waddams coins the phrases “passive function” and “dynamic function”, respectively, for these different rôles of market research.     

OK you are now an approved supplier—but you still do not get orders: Understanding the case of the P-Card

The purchase card (P-Card) was introduced in the 1990s as a payment mechanism for smaller value items so that purchase paperwork is reduced, itemized reporting and control become possible, and purchasing and payment are decentralized at the user level. Since the late 1990s, with E-procurement and B-to-B E-commerce, the possibilities of P-Card use have magnified exponentially. However, the adoption and success of P-Cards in organizations has been short of initial expectations.Using P-Cards with approved suppliers is an ideal situation for both buyers and sellers. In practice however, many P-Card users seem to buy many items from suppliers who are not on the approved supplier list. To make payments to these “new” suppliers, organizations need to make exceptions resulting in paperwork, costs, and loss of business for approved suppliers. However, there are many P-Card users who indeed follow the company-approved list and these users may be called “P-Card conforming users.”This article takes a knowledge-based approach and presents a model for conforming P-Card use (CPU). The model is tested in an organization, and results are used to derive managerial and research implications. While orientation training of P-Card users is important, both business marketers and purchasing departments need to reach out directly to the P-Card user to ensure that approved supplier lists work well in an electronic age.     

On the endogeneity of Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg competition in oligopolies

In many industries, firms pre-order input and forward sell output prior to the actual production period. It is known that forward buying input induces a “Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity” (both Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes may result in equilibrium) and forward selling output induces a convergence to the Bertrand solution. I analyze the generalized model where firms pre-order input and forward sell output. First, I consider oligopolists producing homogenous goods, generalize the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity to oligopoly, and show that it additionally includes Bertrand in the generalized model. This shows that the “mode of competition” between firms may be entirely endogenous. Second, I consider duopolies producing heterogenous goods. The set of equilibrium outcomes is characterized and shown not to contain the Bertrand solution anymore. Yet, forward sales increase welfare also in this case, notably even when goods are complements.     

Incentivizing R&D: Prize or subsidies?

This paper studies the optimal design of R&D contests. A “sponsor” (e.g. the US Department of Defense or the World Health Organization) wants to improve the quality of the winning products. To do so, it partitions its budget between two schemes: an inducement prize and efficiency-enhancing subsidies to the firms competing in the contest. Prizes and subsidies have different functions, and they provide complementary incentives. In the optimally designed contest, subsidies increase while the prize decreases, if the innovation process is more challenging. Further, sensible conditions are identified under which the optimal contest implements either a “handicapping” scheme (by preferentially subsidizing the “underdog”) or a “national champion” scheme (by favoring the “favorite”). Our analysis yields a number of useful implications and sheds light on an array of R&D incentive schemes, such as the DoD's design competitions and vaccine development incentives.     

Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance. Recently, a number of countries worldwide have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. This two-stage auction uses a core-selecting payment rule. The number of possible packages a bidder can submit grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. For larger auctions with dozens of licenses bidders cannot be expected to reveal all their valuations during such an auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices on efficiency and revenue: simple “compact” bid languages versus complex “fully expressive” bid languages and simple “pay-as-bid” payment rules versus complex “core-selecting” payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction?s efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction?s revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, achieves the lowest efficiency and revenue among all treatment combinations.     

Cheap Exclusion in Markets with Multiple Complements

We extend the theory of exclusive dealing in first-mover environments to settings where the incumbent seller’s product is used with multiple complements in a distribution chain and the incumbent can sign exclusive dealing contracts with more than one of them. The model is motivated by the market for biosimilar pharmaceuticals, where incumbent sellers that face a threat of entry can sign exclusionary contracts with both providers and insurance carriers prior to entry. We show that when the incumbent’s complementors are vertically related, it can be profitable for the incumbent to sign exclusive contracts with indirect buyers, who operate downstream from the direct buyers of the product. Under linear pricing, such exclusion is profitable if the pass-through rate is sufficiently low, and under nonlinear pricing and symmetric Nash bargaining, it is profitable for all pass-through rates. Complementors face a more severe coordination problem than independent buyers that can make anticompetitive exclusion more likely and especially cheap.     

Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study of company takeovers

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) of the good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong (“explosive”) effect of even small toeholds. While asymmetric toeholds do have an effect on bids and revenues in the lab, which gets stronger the larger the asymmetry, it is not nearly as strong as predicted. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions, which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies being relatively costless. This is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive equilibria, which makes them fail when human players are involved. Our analysis shows that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails. Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective in a takeover battle, the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring.     

Making the transition to collaborative buyer-seller relationships: An emerging framework

In recent years, many business-to-business marketers have been influenced by the concepts put forth in the area of relationship marketing, with its emphasis on long-term collaborative relationships among trading partners. However, buyers and sellers alike have found it difficult to make the transition from an arm's length, “invisible hand of the market” relationship to one of collaboration, for a variety of reasons. We propose a framework, still emerging, that captures the elements critical to the transition process. We do not advocate collaborative relationships in all buyer-seller relationships; however, where they make sense we demonstrate how to overcome barriers to collaboration. Explicitly recognizing the elements of the framework and their relationship to one another would help potential collaborators better manage the transition process and thereby increase the likelihood of reaping the benefits of a truly more collaborative relationship.     

“I think I can…I think I can”: The impact of perceived selling efficacy and deal disclosure on salesperson escalation of commitment

Salespeople have considerable autonomy in the choices they make with respect to both the types and amounts of resources they deploy in pursuing potential customer accounts and specific sales opportunities. Building from a prospect theory framework and also leveraging self-justification theory, this research reports the results of three experimental studies conducted on practicing salespeople. The experiments help shed light on several factors that might influence a critical form of salesperson resource allocation decision — the allocation of the salesperson's own ‘selling time’ which is devoted to a specific sales opportunity. Study 1 establishes that an escalation of commitment effect exists when salespeople pursue a new customer opportunity, and that “competitive intensity” is a key variable that attenuates the escalation of commitment effect. Study 2 demonstrates that a salesperson's “selling efficacy” – or their confidence in their abilities and decision-making in sales – has important, but mixed, effects on the salesperson's allocation of scarce resources. Finally, study 3 broadens this research by showing that environmental factors such as the extent to which the salesperson has ‘disclosed’ their pursuit of a new sales opportunity within their own organization can also influence the escalation of commitment effect on how they allocate resources in pursuit of that business. The article's broader contribution is that it offers an overdue and preliminary glimpse into the levers which shape and influence how, when, and why salespeople apply resources in the pursuit of new customers.     

Can real-effort investments inhibit the convergence of experimental markets?

Evidence shows that real-effort investments can affect bilateral bargaining outcomes. This paper investigates whether similar investments can inhibit equilibrium convergence of experimental markets. In one treatment, sellers' relative effort affects the allocation of production costs, but a random productivity shock ensures that the allocation is not necessarily equitable. In another treatment, sellers' effort increases the buyers' valuation of a good. We find that effort investments have a short-lived impact on trading behavior when sellers' effort benefits buyers, but no effect when effort determines cost allocation. Efficiency rates are high and do not differ across treatments.     

The organizational adoption of high-technology products “for use”: Effects of size, preferences, and radicalness of impact

This research reports the results of a study on organizational adoption of high-technology products “for use” in contrast to “for manufacture.” Additionally, the study examines high-technology adoptions which often have different issues that are important to the decision process relative when compared to the adoption of less-technical products. For example, the level of compatibility or the availability of complementary products (e.g., network externality considerations) are often important issues for high-technology adoptions. As such, this study provides additional information in the relatively underresearched organizational adoption literature, particularly as it relates to high-technology products. In order to maintain connectivity with past work, we look at the firm size versus adoption issue. At the same time, we add new information by also examining how organizational preferences for products, and the degree of radicalness of the products affect organizational adoption. We use a proportional-hazards model to test our hypotheses using panel data on 400 firms that are drawn from 14 industries. As part of the research effort we developed an improved scale for judging the radicalness of a product than has been used in prior research. Furthermore, we extended the Booz, Allen, & Hamilton New Product Categories (1982) approach to incorporate innovation impact. As expected, the results show that size “does matter,” but that it is modified by degree of product radicalness and organizational preference. Interestingly, we found that for high-technology products “for use,” organizations prefer radical impact products but adopt incremental impact products. Hence, preferences and purchase behaviors do not match.     

Is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two-sided markets?

This paper studies the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets. While formally showing that below-cost pricing on one market side can allow an incumbent firm to exclude a potential rival which does not have a customer base yet, the proposed model does not necessarily imply that below-cost pricing in such markets should be taken as anti-competitive conduct. Instead, I find that in sufficiently asymmetric two-sided markets, exclusion is always beneficial and if anything, there is too little of it in the sense that there are cases in which there is inefficient entry. Further, prohibiting below marginal cost pricing may destroy some socially efficient exclusion and worsen the problem of excessive (or inefficient) entry.