共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 9 毫秒
1.
Xin-wang Wu Quan-tao Zhu Laixiang Sun 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2012,30(1):116-125
The existing literature dealing with the equivalence between the Kreps-Scheinkman (KS) game and Cournot competition has focused on the case of a concave demand function. This paper analyzes the equivalence possibilities under the much extended circumstances of strictly decreasing marginal (industrial) revenue, a twice differentiable demand function, and convex costs. It proves that in the extended context, the outcomes in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the KS game are those of Cournot equilibrium (CE) and that a CE is on the path of the SPNE of the KS game if the marginal cost of each firm in some special (borderline) cases is not too high. It further proves that for decreasing continuous demand and strictly increasing costs, the outcome in the SPNE of the KS game (if the SPNE exists) is that of CE. Based on these results, we argue that the KS game can serve as the basic form for studying “quantity competition” and for developing a T-stage game-theoretical framework to make competition form and timing endogenous. 相似文献
2.
Yves Breitmoser 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2012,30(1):16-29
In many industries, firms pre-order input and forward sell output prior to the actual production period. It is known that forward buying input induces a “Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity” (both Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes may result in equilibrium) and forward selling output induces a convergence to the Bertrand solution. I analyze the generalized model where firms pre-order input and forward sell output. First, I consider oligopolists producing homogenous goods, generalize the Cournot-Stackelberg endogeneity to oligopoly, and show that it additionally includes Bertrand in the generalized model. This shows that the “mode of competition” between firms may be entirely endogenous. Second, I consider duopolies producing heterogenous goods. The set of equilibrium outcomes is characterized and shown not to contain the Bertrand solution anymore. Yet, forward sales increase welfare also in this case, notably even when goods are complements. 相似文献
3.
Talat S. Genc 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(4):432-442
The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not fully considered the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform-price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform-price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output. 相似文献
4.
We analyze the market for online and offline media in a model of two-dimensional spatial competition where media outlets sell content and advertising space. Consumer preferences are distributed along the style and type of news coverage where the distance costs may vary across dimensions. For integrated provision of online and offline platforms we show that entering the online market reduces average profits and may even constitute a prisoner's dilemma. Specialized provision may yield polarization in the style and type dimensions. This is in contrast to the maximum–minimum differentiation result previously established in the literature on multidimensional horizontal competition. We show that maximal differentiation in both dimensions occurs due to the discrete nature of the type dimension and asymmetric advertising markets. 相似文献
5.
María-Ángeles de Frutos Natalia Fabra 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(4):399-411
We analyze the role of demand uncertainty in markets of fixed size, in which firms take long-run capacity decisions prior to competing in prices. We characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria under various assumptions regarding the nature and timing of demand uncertainty. In order to prove equilibrium existence, we identify a sufficient condition for the capacity choice game to be submodular. This condition resembles the standard downward-sloping marginal revenue condition used in Cournot games. A robust conclusion of the analysis is that equilibrium capacity choices are asymmetric, even when firms are ex-ante identical. Concerning the equivalence between the capacity-price game and the Cournot game, we find that with inelastic demands, the equilibria of the former belong to the equilibrium set of the latter. However, as compared to the Cournot game, the capacity-price game leads to lower prices and generates price dispersion. 相似文献
6.
We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the “outside” (that do not compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that “inside” firms, by accepting such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing competition to sell the final product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside. 相似文献
7.
An experimental study of exclusive contracts 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment based on exclusive contracts that may theoretically lead to inefficient “naked exclusion” of a potential rival. The data indicate that changes in the number of buyers in the market have no significant effect on exclusion rates but the likelihood of inefficient exclusion is decreased both when a larger fraction of signed buyers are needed to deter a rival's entry and when buyers engage in non-binding communication. These results have antitrust implications both in terms of helping to identify “at-risk” market characteristics and suggesting potential competition-enhancing strategies. A sub-game of the experiment where buyers make signing decisions can be illustrated as a coordination game with the unique feature that payoffs are affected by a separate but interested party (the incumbent seller). I find that the height of the potential function and relevant basin of attraction, especially when combined with quantal response estimation, have larger predictive power in this sub-game than several other equilibrium selection criteria. 相似文献
8.
Nathan E. Wilson 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2012,30(1):102-115
Using a dynamic model of capacity accumulation, I examine the relationship between uncertainty about the timing of a new Pigouvian tax and oligopolistic competition. I find that for some market structures uncertainty about the timing of the regulatory change leads firms to increase investment. These results stem from the nature of the uncertainty and its interaction with firms' strategic incentive to engage in capacity races. They dramatize the importance of accounting for initial conditions when forecasting firms' reactions to anticipated regulatory changes. In addition, I find that more protracted uncertainty leads to greater welfare costs. 相似文献
9.
Timothy J. Richards William J. AllenderStephen F. Hamilton 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2012,30(1):50-57
When commodity prices rise, wholesalers and retailers of products derived from basic commodities respond by passing along at least a portion of the price increase to consumers. In this paper we examine whether firms respond differently to positive commodity price shocks than to negative commodity price shocks; that is, whether commodity price volatility alters market power. We exploit recent volatility in food commodity prices over the period 2007-2010 to investigate how commodity price shocks translate into market power in two different vertically-structured food product industries: potatoes and fluid milk. For potatoes, we find both wholesale and retail market power decreases (increases) during periods of rising (falling) commodity prices. Moreover, price-cost margins widen a substantially greater degree in response to negative shocks than margins narrow in response to positive shocks, indicating that commodity price volatility increases market power. For fluid milk, we find that market power likewise declines during periods of rising commodity prices; however, market power does not significantly change during periods of falling commodity prices, suggesting that commodity price volatility decreases market power. 相似文献
10.
We consider a dynamic homogeneous oligopoly in which firms set prices repeatedly. Theory predicts that short-run price commitments increase profits and may lead to less price stability. The experiments that we conducted provide support for the first effect and against the second effect when a random ending rule is applied. When a fixed ending rule is applied, we find no significant impact of short-run price commitments on profits and price stability. 相似文献
11.
Rent-seeking contests between groups involve conflicts of interests at the levels of individuals, groups, and the society as a whole. We conduct a series of economic experiments to study the behavior of groups and individuals competing against each other in rent-seeking contests. We find substantial over-contribution to rent-seeking relative to the equilibrium predictions of standard models regardless whether individuals compete against other individuals, groups compete against other groups, or individuals compete against groups. 相似文献
12.
Bruno Jullien Patrick Rey Wilfried Sand-Zantman 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2013
We reconsider the question of the optimal level of termination fees between communication networks in the context of heterogeneous usage and elastic participation. The interaction between these two features yields new insights; in our model: i) The profit maximizing reciprocal termination fee is above marginal cost; ii) the welfare maximizing termination fee is also above cost; iii) the welfare-maximizing termination fee is below the profit-maximizing one in the absence of termination-based price discrimination, but can be above it otherwise. 相似文献
13.
Jidong Zhou 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(2):253-262
This paper presents an ordered search model in which consumers search both for price and product fitness. I construct an equilibrium in which there is price dispersion and prices rise in the order of search. The top firms in consumer search process, though charge lower prices, earn higher profits due to their larger market shares. Compared to random search, ordered search can induce all firms to charge higher prices and harm market efficiency. 相似文献
14.
Mobile telecommunication operators routinely charge subscribers lower prices for calls on their own network than for calls to other networks (on-net discounts). Studies on tariff-mediated network effects suggest this is due to large operators using on-net discounts to damage smaller rivals. Alternatively, research on strategic discounting suggests that small operators use on-net discounts to advertise with low on-net prices. We test the relative strength of these effects using data on tariff setting in German mobile telecommunications between 2001 and 2009. We find that large operators are more likely to offer tariffs with on-net discounts but there is no consistently significant difference in the magnitude of discounts. Our results suggest that tariff-mediated network effects are the main cause of on-net discounts. 相似文献
15.
Anna V. Yurko 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(4):493-503
The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer's willingness to pay depends on her income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model for a lognormal distribution of consumer incomes to investigate the effect of inequality on firms' entry, product quality, and pricing decisions. The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. More intense quality competition raises the average quality of products in the market as firms compete for the shrinking share of higher-income consumers. With zero costs of quality improvements and an upper bound on the top quality or when costs of quality are fixed and rise sufficiently fast, greater heterogeneity of consumer incomes also reduces firms' incentives to differentiate their products. Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market and charges a higher price. The conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare. 相似文献
16.
THIBAUD VERGÉ 《The Journal of industrial economics》2010,58(4):723-741
Competition authorities sometimes require that firms divest some of their assets to rivals in order to allow a merger to take place. This paper extends the results of Farrell and Shapiro [1990a] and shows that, in the absence of technological synergies, a merger is highly unlikely to benefit consumers, even if it is subjected to appropriate structural remedies. For instance, a merger may ultimately lead to a lower price only if at least two different firms acquire the divested assets, and if the merging parties had relatively important pre‐merger market shares. 相似文献
17.
18.
Arijit Mukherjee Enrico Pennings 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2011,29(2):232-241
We show the effects of the unionization structure (viz., decentralized and centralized unions) on a firm's incentive for technology licensing and innovation. The incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions. We identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. If the union's preference for employment is high, the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. However, if the union's preference for wage is high enough, the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex-post innovation. If the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms, the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases. We further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure, which occurs in our analysis when, e.g., licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation (with no licensing) occurs only under a centralized union. 相似文献
19.
This paper summarizes the results of in-depth case studies of international R&D management in four Swedish multinational corporations. The results suggest that foreign volumes and shares of R&D expenditures are rapidly increasing. Through a rapidly increasing number of foreign acquisitions, foreign R&D laboratories have been added. As part of international rationalization of production, foreign units have been given global product mandates with responsibility both for manufacturing and R&D. In maturing foreign subsidiaries, routine technical activities have often evolved into proper R&D. Tight labour market conditions for engineers in Sweden have made it increasingly necessary to exploit existing technical capacity, regardless of location.
Concurrently, companies face new pressures for international coordination and control of R&D. Coordination is required to reduce product differentiation, to facilitate technology transfer and to ensure the technical and market compatibility of products and components developed at different locations but sold as part of total systems. Drawing on the experience in the four investigated companies, the paper discusses how systems and procedures can be developed to meet the need for coordinated international R&D management. 相似文献
Concurrently, companies face new pressures for international coordination and control of R&D. Coordination is required to reduce product differentiation, to facilitate technology transfer and to ensure the technical and market compatibility of products and components developed at different locations but sold as part of total systems. Drawing on the experience in the four investigated companies, the paper discusses how systems and procedures can be developed to meet the need for coordinated international R&D management. 相似文献
20.
Louis Y.Y. Lu Author Vitae Chyan Yang Author Vitae 《Industrial Marketing Management》2004,33(7):593-605
This study extends the new product development (NPD) process research to a new environmental context (Taiwan's IT industry) and a new business type (original design manufacturing, ODM). Taiwan's IT industry has achieved a very outstanding performance during the last two decades. The island's experience is quite valuable for those emerging countries that are struggling to transform themselves from producing low-value goods to making high-technology products. After analyzing the data collected from 153 research and development (R&D) and marketing managers in Taiwanese IT firms, this study finds that the higher the perceived importance of R&D-marketing cooperation is, the higher the attained level of R&D-marketing cooperation will be. Consequently, a better NPD performance can be achieved. This study additionally reports that a firm that has adopted a Defender innovation strategy attains a lower level of R&D-marketing cooperation, and has a poorer NPD performance than those firms that adopted either Prospector or Analyzer innovation strategies. Finally, environmental uncertainty has no significant impacts on the perceived importance and the attained level of R&D-marketing cooperation. 相似文献