Is the variability of world wheat prices increasing?

Estimates are derived of the potential variability of world wheat prices and the sources of this variability. These indicate a sizable increase in the probability of large short-run fluctuations in price. The bulk of this variability is due to fluctuations in the domestic grain production of developing and centrally-planned economies. However, most market participants are unresponsive to short-run changes in world price, and transmit a substantial amount of domestic variability to the world market. The key factor in world price stability is the short-run responsiveness of wheat exports from the USA. It is likely that both the physical and policy factors that have contributed to increased variability will persist.     

市场化减排政策对我国钢铁行业的影响——基于偏均衡建模的分析

论文运用偏均衡建模的方法,分析了市场化减排政策对于我国钢铁行业竞争力的影响。论文采用基于减排技术组合的减排成本曲线,分析了不同的障碍情景下,引入市场化减排政策对于钢铁价格、进出口价格、进出口量、净出口、利润和排放等关键参数的影响。文章发现市场化减排政策尽管可以大幅度地降低CO2排放量,但是对钢铁行业的竞争力存在一定程度的负面影响,主要体现在净出口和利润的降低。而降低减排技术的采用障碍会弱化减排政策实施对钢铁行业的负面效果。此外,通过对两种边境调节措施的分析（出口补贴和进口品征税）发现,出口补贴政策对于行业净出口和利润的积极作用非常微弱,相较而言进口品征税政 策对于行业净出口和利润的提高作用更为明显,但同时二者均会轻微的削弱减排效果。     

The dynamics of wealth,profit, and sustainable advantage

This paper shows how idiosyncratic resources can drive sustained profitability and persistent heterogeneity under competitive conditions. Generic inputs purchased in the market become idiosyncratic resources as the result of firms' investments in customization. Analytically, we show how heterogeneous firms coexist in equilibrium as a function of customization costs. Computationally, we show that sustainable profits can emerge without ‘monopolistic’ imperfections. We consider how capability heterogeneity, resource customization cost, and ease of expansion interact to drive short-run and sustainable profits. Our results illustrate that sustainable profits may represent a small part of the total wealth created over time by a firm or industry, and that changes in factors shaping a sector's evolutionary trajectory may be more important than changes in factors that determine profits' ultimate sustainability. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information and two-sided platform profits

We study the effect of different levels of information on two-sided platform profits—under monopoly and competition. One side (developers) is always informed about all prices and therefore forms responsive expectations. In contrast, we allow the other side (users) to be uninformed about prices charged to developers and to hold passive expectations. We show that platforms with more market power (monopoly) prefer facing more informed users. In contrast, platforms with less market power (i.e., facing more intense competition) have the opposite preference: they derive higher profits when users are less informed. The main reason is that price information leads user expectations to be more responsive and therefore amplifies the effect of price reductions. Platforms with more market power benefit because higher responsiveness leads to demand increases, which they are able to capture fully. Competing platforms are affected negatively because more information intensifies price competition.     

FNMA Mortgage Purchase Commitments As Put Options: An Empirical Examination

The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) auctions commitments to purchase mortgages. An examination of the terms of the commitment contract shows that these commitments are actually put options on mortgages. The contract is unusual, however, in that the price of the commitment is a fixed percentage of the value of the mortgages. In the auction, the dealers effectively bid the exercise price at which they would be willing to pay the fixed commitment price.
In this paper, we study the economics of the FNMA auction. We use a two-state approximation to the American put pricing model for interest-dependent securities to examine the behavior of the auction results. We find that the model performs reasonably well for several years — giving results which are, on the average, correct — and then, quite abruptly, the performance of the model deteriorates. Some possible reasons for this result are then examined.     

Predatory intent under uncertainty

Current analyses of predatory behavior neglect uncertainty. Its presence complicates a firm's evaluation of profits and risks associated with various pricing strategies. Using a price leadership model (with the supply of the competitive fringe not known in advance), we show that a risk averse dominant firm will price lower than the price which maximizes expected profits. Such behavior could be misconstrued as being predatory if marginal and average variable cost rules are used for establishing the proof of predation.     

The dynamic provision of product diversity under duopoly

This paper builds a dynamic duopoly model to examine the provision of new varieties over time. Consumers experience temporary satiation, and hence higher consumption of the current variety lowers demand for future varieties. The equilibrium can be characterized by a combination of monopolistic pricing and nearly zero profits (competitive timing). In particular, if the cost of producing a new variety is not too low then firms tend to avoid head-to-head competition and set the short-run profit maximizing price. However, firms tend to introduce new varieties as soon as demand has grown sufficiently to cover costs. From a second best perspective, the equilibrium may exhibit excessive product diversity. However, if firms coordinate their frequency of new product introductions, then consumers are likely to be harmed. It is also shown that equilibrium prices are moderated by two factors. First, consumers’ option value of waiting reduces their willingness to pay. Second, competition reduces firms’ incentives to engage in intertemporal price discrimination.     

The leniency rule revisited: Experiments on cartel formation with open communication

The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge the communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.     

Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information*

Standards may create market power for the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs). To address these concerns, the literature advocates price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit to the maximum royalty they would charge were their technology included in the standard. We consider a setting in which a technology implementer holds private information about profitability. In this setting, price commitments increase efficiency not only by curbing SEP holders' market power, but also by alleviating distortions in the design of the royalty scheme. We derive conditions under which price commitments can be implemented using a simple royalty cap as used in practice.     

Strategic Behavior and International Benchmarking for Monopoly Price Regulation: The Case of Mexico

This paper looks into various models that address strategic behavior in the supply of gas by the Mexican monopoly Pemex. The paper has three very strong technical results. First, the netback pricing rule for the price of domestic natural gas (based on a Houston benchmark price) leads to discontinuities in Pemex’s revenue function. Second, having Pemex pay for the gas it uses and the gas it flares increases the value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the gas processing constraint. Third, if the gas processing constraint is binding, having Pemex pay for the gas it uses and flares does not change the short run optimal solution for the optimization problem, so it will have no impact on short-run behavior. These results imply three clear policy recommendations. The first is that the arbitrage point be fixed by the amount of gas Pemex has the potential to supply in the absence of processing and gathering constraints. The second is that Pemex be charged for the gas it uses in production and the gas it flares. The third is that investment in gas processing and pipeline should be in a separate account from other Pemex investment.     

Which one is more valuable in coordinating the online and offline distribution? Service support or online price coordination

Nowadays effective mechanisms to coordinate the online and offline distribution become increasingly important in the business market. In this research, we first propose two mechanisms (i.e. the offline service to the retailer and the online price coordination) for the manufacturer and the retailer to employ. Our results show that the online price coordination does help coordinate the online and offline distribution and bring higher profits to the manufacturer-retailer supply chain and thus both the manufacturer and the retailer, while the offline service to the retailer does not; comparing to the offline service to the retailer, the online price coordination is a better strategy to be utilized to alleviate the online to offline competition. Furthermore, we investigate if a novel coordination mechanism, which combines the offline service to the retailer with the online price coordination, can help coordinate the online and offline distribution better and becomes the optimal coordination mechanism. Surprisingly, our results show that compared to both the offline service to the retailer and the online price coordination, this combination coordination mechanism does show a dominant competitive advantage to bring highest profits to all parties.     

Urban Housing Markets Modelling: Short-Run Equilibrium Implications

This paper tests for the existence of short-run equilibrium in the urban housing market in Metropolitan Toronto. The alternative hypothesis is the housing market segmented with respect to locational and structural attributes. We found insignificant differences in attribute prices across hypothesized submarkets. This implies that an unstratified hedonic price regressions model, based on the assumption of short-run equilibrium, is equally efficient in the analysis of housing prices as a model based on a number of subsamples stratified along lines of segmentation.     

The Dominant Firm Model Revisited

This paper extends the standard Forchheimer dominant firm model by making more explicit shifts in the fringe supply when the market price set the dominant firm deviate from its limit price. It demonstrated how, when a dominant firm engages in short-run profit maximization, the market price it sets in the long run will equal its limit price and that, in certain situations, increased production cost for fringe lead to an increase in the number of fringe firms in the long run.     

Effects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel prices

In February 2015, Spain’s Competition Authority imposed € 32.4 million in fines on five of the country’s largest oil operators as sanctions for price collusion. This paper examines the effect of that antitrust action on retail fuel prices. Our analysis uses a novel data set with detailed information on more than 8000 gas stations throughout Spain. Prices were collected every day from 18 August 2014 to 15 June 2015 (almost 2 million price observations). First we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for wholesale costs and brand affiliation. Then we use a model of gas stations and time fixed effects while adopting a difference-in-differences approach to assessing the fines’ effect on retail fuel prices. Our results indicate that, after publication of the fine, sanctioned firms raise prices slightly, and the additional revenues far exceeded the amount of the fine. We also find substantial heterogeneity, depending on the size of the fine, in the magnitude of this price response. Hence the fine’s burden might well have been borne mainly by consumers, whose welfare was thereby reduced. Our study should be of interest to antitrust authorities as we show that sanctions may not be effective enough in deter price fixing practices, especially when sanctions are weak and the profits from colluding are sufficiently high.     

On two-part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly

We explore aspects of two-part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels. Competition in only one price component (the fee or the rate) may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms. Fixing one price component alters the nature of competition, indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation. Endogenous market segmentation emerges, with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm. When no price component can be negative, competition becomes softer, profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival.     

An experimental test of automatic mitigation of wholesale electricity prices

In several major deregulated electricity generation markets, the market operator uses an “automatic mitigation procedure” (AMP) to attempt to suppress the exercise of market power. A leading type of AMP compares the offer price from each generation unit with a recent historical average of accepted offer prices from that same unit during periods when there was no transmission-system congestion to impede competition. If one or more units' offer prices exceed the recent historical average by more than a specified margin, and if these offer prices raise the market-clearing price by more than a specified margin, the market operator replaces the offending offer prices with lower ones. In an experiment, we test an AMP of this type. We find that it keeps market prices close to marginal cost if generation owners have low market power in uncongested periods. However, with high market power in uncongested periods, a condition that may apply in many parts of the world, the generation owners are able to gradually raise the market price well above short-run marginal cost in spite of the AMP. We also test the effect of the AMP on the frequency with which high-variable-cost units are used, inefficiently, in place of low-variable-cost units.     

An oligopoly model of ocean liner shipping

In this paper I develop a simultaneous equations oligopoly model of the regulated international ocean liner shipping industry. The firms act as a cartel to determine price jointly and then set their own quality levels to maximize individual profits. The cartel does not attain monopoly profits, because each conference member myopically determines quality without regard for overall cartel profits. The results indicate that an increase in the number of firms in the cartel will increase both cartel price and quality level. An increase in price will also lead to an increase in quality level.I would like to thank Professors Alamarin Phillips, Robert Summers, and Bruce Allen for their helpful comments on earlier research for my dissertation in the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania on which this work is based. I am especially grateful to Professor Lawrence J. White for his encouragement and valuable suggestions at various stages of my work.     

The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment,Prices, and Profits of Retailers*

We study how introducing private-label brands (PLs) affects retail prices and profits, accounting for assortment adjustments of national brands (NBs). We employ an event-study framework and scanner data on the US beef market. When a PL is added to the low-priced market segment, we find that retail stores further differentiate NBs from the PL and remove same-segment NBs. When a PL is added to the high-priced segment, however, NB assortment changes are limited. PL introduction and PL-driven NB assortment changes impose small price effects on NB, but strongly cannibalize NB demand and steer consumers toward PLs, likely increasing store profits.     

Optimal dynamic volume-based price regulation

We consider a model of optimal price regulation in markets where demand is sluggish and asymmetric providers compete on quality. Using a spatial model, which is suitable to investigate the health care and education sector, we analyse within a dynamic set-up the scope for price premiums or penalties on volume. Under the assumption of symmetric cost information, we show that the socially optimal time path of quality provision off the steady state can be replicated by a simple dynamic pricing rule where the dynamic part of the rule is ex-ante non-discriminatory in the sense that the price premium or penalty on volume is common across providers, despite their differing production costs. Whether the price schedule involves a penalty or a premium on volume relates to two concerns regarding production costs and consumer benefits, which go in opposite directions. Price adjustments over time occur only through the price penalty or premium, not time directly, which highlights the simplicity and thus applicability of this regulation scheme.