Optimal monetary policy for a small open economy

This paper focuses on the design of monetary policy rules for a small open economy. The model features optimizing behavior, general equilibrium and price stickiness. The real exchange rate is shown to affect the firm's real marginal cost, aggregate supply and aggregate demand. The welfare objective depends on the openness of the economy, and the optimal policy rule differs from that which obtains in a closed economy. The inflation versus output gap stabilization trade-off is caused by the real exchange rate. The implied optimal monetary policy regime is domestic inflation target coupled with controlled floating of the real exchange rate.     

Evaluating inflation targeting as a monetary policy objective for India

This study formulates a small open economy model for India with exchange rate as a prominent channel of monetary policy. The model is estimated using the Instrumental Variable-Generalized Methods of Moments (IV-GMM) estimator and evaluated through simulations. This study compares different cases of domestic and CPI inflation targeting, strict and flexible inflation targeting, and simple Taylor type rules. The analysis highlights the unsuitability of simple Taylor-type monetary rules in stabilizing the Indian economy and suggests that discretionary optimization works better in stabilizing this economy. There seems to be a trade-off between output gap stabilization and exchange rate stabilization in flexible domestic inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting respectively. However, flexible domestic inflation targeting seems a better alternative from an overall macro stabilization perspective in India where financial markets are still not sufficiently integrated to ensure quick transmission of interest rate impulses and existence of rigidities in the economy.     

Household's preferences and monetary policy inertia

Interest rates set by central banks puzzlingly move with a certain inertia. We show that household's preferences can be important determinants of the optimal interest rate inertia due to their impact on the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.     

A two-pillar DSGE monetary policy model for the euro area

The current financial crisis has revived the interest for monitoring both monetary and credit developments. Over the past two decades, consistent with the adoption of inflation targeting strategies by a growing number of central banks and the development of New Keynesian models for which monetary aggregates are largely irrelevant, money and credit have been progressively neglected in the conduct of monetary policy. A striking exception has been the Eurosystem, which has implemented a strategy known as the “two-pillar monetary policy strategy” giving a prominent role for money. In this paper, we develop a small optimizing model based on Ireland (2004), estimated on euro area data and featuring this two-pillar strategy. We evaluate an ECB-style cross-checking policy rule in a DSGE model with real balance effects of money. We find some evidence that indeed money plays a non-trivial role in explaining the euro area business cycle. This provides a rationale for the central bank to factor in monetary developments but also raises some issues regarding the reliability of M3 as an appropriate monetary indicator. We find some evidence that the ECB has systematically reacted to a filtered measure of money growth but weak evidence it has reacted more aggressively during excess money growth periods.     

Rule-of-thumb behaviour and monetary policy

We investigate the implications of rule-of-thumb behaviour by consumers or price setters for optimal monetary policy and simple interest rate rules. This behaviour leads to endogenous persistence in output and inflation and alters the policymaker's welfare objective. Our main finding is that highly inertial policy is optimal regardless of what fraction of agents occasionally follow a rule of thumb. We also find that a first-difference version of Taylor's (Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Ser. Public Policy 39 (1993) 195-214) rule generally has desirable properties. By contrast, the coefficients in other optimised simple rules tend to be extremely sensitive with respect to the fraction of rule-of-thumb behaviour.     

Optimal monetary policy and economic growth

A question at the center of many analyses of optimal monetary policy is, why do central banks never implement the Friedman rule? To the list of answers to this question, we add neoclassical production (specifically, the Tobin effect) as one possible explanation. To that end, we study an overlapping generations economy with capital where limited communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for fiat money. We assume a production function with a knowledge externality (Romer style) that nests economies with endogenous growth (AK form) and those with no long-run growth (the Diamond model). The Tobin effect is shown to be always operative. Under CRRA preferences, a mild degree of social increasing returns is sufficient (but not necessary) for some positive inflation to dominate zero inflation and for the Friedman rule to be sub-optimal, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion.     

Information acquisition, dissemination, and transparency of monetary policy

Abstract.  This paper examines the role of transparency in a benevolent monetary authority's policies. Each firm's payoff depends on unobservable macroeconomic conditions and firms may incur a cost to acquire private information about macroeconomic conditions. The policy authority attempts to infer the underlying macroeconomic conditions from a noisy measure of aggregate actions and makes a public announcement to inform firms of this inference. High-quality announcements provide firms the incentive not to gather private information and base actions solely on information contained in policy announcements. However, this makes the observed actions of firms less informative to the policy authority.     

Inflation, unemployment, and the time consistency of the US monetary policy

This paper verifies the performance of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model to explain the US inflation since the early 1950s. We divide the period from 1951:2 to 2010:2 according to each chairman of the Federal Reserve (FED). In addition, we consider aggregated periods, represented by pre-Volcker, Volcker-Greenspan, Greenspan-Bernanke, and whole sample. A genetic algorithm of stochastic search is applied to reduce the sensitivity of the maximum likelihood estimator to the initial parameter values. Surprisingly, our results show that the time consistency problem explains the US inflation during the Greenspan chairmanship at the FED.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky product prices. The theoretical framework is a stochastic production economy. The government finances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary income taxes, printing money, and issuing nominal non-state-contingent bonds. The main findings of the paper are: First, for a miniscule degree of price stickiness (i.e., many times below available empirical estimates) the optimal volatility of inflation is near zero. Second, small deviations from full price flexibility induce near random walk behavior in government debt and tax rates. Finally, price stickiness induces deviation from the Friedman rule.     

Transparency in monetary policy: A general equilibrium approach

We study a general equilibrium model with a central bank (CB) and two groups of agents, producers and workers. The CB maximizes a weighted average of utilities of the two groups. The CB has two possible types, one favoring workers and the other favoring producers. The CB's type is private information. We compare two possible monetary policy regimes, transparent and opaque. For realistic values of parameters, it is shown that workers are better off under the opaque regime, whereas producers are better off under the transparent regime. This result is shown to hold in two cases, when the range of possible monetary transfers is small and when the range of possible monetary transfers is large.     

The role of monetary policy credibility in explaining the decline in exchange rate pass-through in South Africa

This paper investigates the key factors that explain the documented decline in the exchange rate pass-through in South Africa over the past two decades. The paper finds that this outcome is largely due to improved monetary policy credibility. The South African Reserve Bank has become more credible since the adoption of the inflation target regime through improved communication, transparency, and independence. We show that credibility is enhanced through a gradual disinflation process and reduction of inflation volatility. As result, expectations of agents have become well-anchored at levels that are consistent with its objectives of keeping inflation within the official target range of 3–6 percent even in the presence of external shocks. This in turn reduces the exchange rate pass-through. This finding is important from a monetary policy perspective not only for South Africa but other emerging economies such as Turkey as it shows that improving monetary policy credibility is a key ingredient to reducing exchange rate pass-through.     

Market concentration, macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary policy

This paper studies the effect of market structure and macroeconomic uncertainty on the transmission of monetary policy. We motivate our analysis with a simple model which predicts that: (1) investment and production in more concentrated sectors are more affected by demand shocks and (2) high uncertainty makes investment and production more sensitive to demand shocks. The empirical analysis estimates the effect of monetary shocks on sectoral output for different sectors in the US using a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) approach. The results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions.     

Introduction to monetary policy and capital accumulation

The papers in this symposium address the issue of multiple equilibria that can be induced by monetary policy in models with capital accumulation. In particular they examine how the “Taylor Principle”, under which interest rates respond more than proportionately to increases in inflation, can generate multiple equilibria. They also explore the design of policies to avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and indeterminacy.     

Time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity

I characterize time consistent equilibrium in an economy with price rigidity and an optimizing monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency of price change, at a cost, in response to higher inflation. Previous studies, which assume a constant degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes, find two time consistent equilibria—one with low inflation, the other with high inflation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high inflation equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, time consistent equilibrium is unique. This result depends on two features of the analysis: (1) a plausible quantitative specification of the fixed cost of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inflation that is independent of price rigidity.     

The design of monetary and fiscal policy: A global perspective

We study the emergence of multiple equilibria in models with capital and bonds under various monetary and fiscal policies. We show that the presence of capital is indeed another independent source of local and global multiplicities, even under active policies that yield local determinacy. We also show how a very similar mechanism generates multiplicities in models with bonds and distortionary taxation. We then explore the design of monetary policies that avoid multiple equilibria. We show that interest rate policies that respond to the output gap, while potentially a source of significant inefficiencies, may be effective in preventing multiple equilibria and costly oscillatory equilibrium dynamics.     

A small estimated euro area model with rational expectations and nominal rigidities

We estimate a small model of the euro area to be used for evaluating alternative monetary policy strategies. Starting with the relationship between output and inflation we compare the fit of the nominal wage contracting model due to Taylor (J. Political Econom. 88 (1980) 1) and the relative real wage contracting model proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (The Manchester School 49 (1981) 211; reprinted in Buiter (Ed.), Macroeconomic Theory and Stabilization Policy, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989) and estimated with U.S. data by Fuhrer and Moore (Quart. J. Econom. 110 (1995) 127). While Fuhrer and Moore reject nominal contracts in favor of relative contracts, which induce more inflation persistence, we find that both specifications fit euro area data reasonably well. When considering France, Germany and Italy separately, however, we find that nominal contracts fit German data better, while the relative contracting model does well with respect to formerly high inflation countries such as France and Italy. We close the model by estimating an aggregate demand relationship and investigate the implications of nominal versus relative contracts for the inflation-output variability tradeoff when monetary policy follows Taylor's rule.     

Cross-country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates’ volatility

Volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models—designed to replicate the features of individual countries’ markets—cannot account for. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross-country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks’ practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as an exchange rate target.     

Unique monetary equilibria with interest rate rules: An extension

In a recent paper, Adão et al. (2011), using a cash-in-advance framework, derive an interest rate rule that results in a unique monetary equilibrium. The resulting interest rate rule is forward looking and the interest rate responds positively to forecasts of future real activity and to forecasts of the future price level. This paper extends their approach to a transactions cost environment. The resulting interest rate rule has the added feature that, in line with previous studies, the nominal interest rate responds positively to forecasts of future inflation.