Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic

This paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far-sighted and myopic individuals. All individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short-term view (instant gratification) when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply. Consequently, they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions. Henceforth, when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving. We consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters: the payroll tax rate (that determines the size or generosity of the system) and the “Bismarckian factor” that determines its redistributiveness. Individuals vote sequentially. We examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system. Our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind (all far-sighted or all myopic), while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far-sighted agents. Furthermore, while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far-sighted counterparts, the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics.     

When are voluntary pensions indifferent?

The mandatory pension pillar is usually supplemented by a voluntary one. In our simple model, voluntary pensions partly replace mandatory ones without affecting the outcomes: the voluntary pensions are indifferent. This result may serve as benchmark.     

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare.     

The effects of the raising-the-official-pension-age policy in an overlapping generations economy

This paper studies how economic variables are affected by raising the official pension age. Although it is said that such a policy increases output, this paper shows that such a statement is not necessarily true. Moreover, the paper finds that the social security benefit can decrease, which implies that it might be impossible to sustain the same level of benefit only by such a policy.     

Time inconsistency and retirement planning

We quantify the welfare gains from better retirement planning using a model in which retirement planning is time inconsistent. A modest increase in a household’s planning horizon by just a few years generates large aggregate and individual welfare gains.     

Social security and risk sharing

In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic OLG economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the parameters of the economy. In our model financial markets are complete and competitive equilibria interim Pareto efficient. Therefore, a welfare improvement can only be obtained if agents? welfare is evaluated ex ante, and arises from an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing. We also examine the optimal size of a given social security system as well as its optimal reform.     

Inequality, cooperation, and growth: An experimental study

In a three player dynamic public goods experiment, social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow. In each period, players choose to sabotage, to cooperate, or to play best response. Sabotage harms social output and growth. Mutual cooperation maximises both. The property rights to social output are distributed unequally. Extent and skew of inequality are varied. We observe equilibrium play in most cases. There is also substantial cooperation, but little sabotage. Our exogenous variations of inequality are neutral to growth, neither negatively correlated to cooperation, nor positively correlated to sabotage. The neutrality result is shown to be sensitive to the dynamic nature of the employed game.     

THE CASE FOR PAY-AS-YOU-GO PENSIONS IN A SERVICE ECONOMY

The elderly consume more labour‐intensive services than young individuals. This makes them vulnerable to rising costs of services due to higher wages, which can be caused by increased capital accumulation. This paper shows that in a model with a service sector, the golden‐rule capital stock is lower and dynamic inefficiency is more likely to occur than in the conventional one‐sector model. This implies that in many cases, a positive Pay‐As‐You‐Go tax maximises long‐run welfare in a service economy. Calculations based on data from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands show that the long‐run optimal degree of funding coincides with the current situation in these countries.     

Children’s environmental health,education, and economic development

Abstract This article aims at investigating the interplay between environmental quality, health, and economic development in a unified OLG framework. Human capital accumulation depends on the environment through its impact on children’s health and workers’ productivity. In turn, environmental quality dynamics rely upon human capital that determines maintenance efforts. This two‐way relationship generates a co‐evolution of human capital and environmental quality in the long run. Along the transition path, the dynamic interactions between economic and environmental spheres allow for replicating two different trajectories: some economies experiment an Environmental Kuznets Curve while some others are caught into the environmental poverty trap.     

Income taxes, spending composition and long-run growth

The focus of this paper is threefold. First, it reexamines the impact on long-run growth of changes in flat-rate income taxes when a fraction of total government expenditures is used to provide public services that affect the productivity of privately held inputs. Second, for a given tax policy, this paper studies the impact of government expenditure composition on the rate of economic growth. Third, since demographics follow an overlapping generations structure and fiscal policy affects the economy's productivity, the paper features the role of productivity as a means of redistributing income across generations. The economy is analyzed numerically and policy experiments are carried out.     

Mortality risks,education and child labor

In this paper, we investigate the role of young adult mortality on child labor and educational decisions. We argue that mortality risks are a major source of risks in returns to education in developing countries. We show that, in the absence of appropriate insurance mechanisms, the level of child labor is inefficient, but it can be too high or too low. It is too high when parents are not very altruistic and anticipate positive transfers from their children in the future. Uncertain returns to education, endogenous mortality or imperfect capital markets unambiguously increase child labor. When the level of child labor is inefficiently high, we also show that a cash transfer conditional on child's schooling can always restore efficiency regarding child labor.