Is an unfunded social security system good or bad for growth? A theoretical analysis of social security systems financed by VAT

This study investigates how unfunded public pensions financed by value added tax (VAT), as discussed in Japan, affect economic growth and whether payroll tax (PT) or VAT is the more growth‐friendly tax structure for financing public pensions. We examine these issues using overlapping generations models with parental altruism and find that a public pension system financed by VAT may increase economic growth when bequests are operative. By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, public pensions hinder growth unless agents are sufficiently patient. Finally, public pensions financed by VAT are more growth‐friendly than those financed by PT.     

A SAVINGS SUBSIDISATION SYSTEM IN A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH: AN EXTENSION OF WIGGER (1999)

Population ageing is now an established demographic characteristic of many economies. Economists working in the endogenous growth theory tradition have sought to model the relationship between public pensions, financed on a 'Pay-As-You-Go' basis, and the growth in per capita incomes. The resultant intergenerational wealth redistribution from young to older people seems to decrease private savings, diminish capital accumulation, and lower the growth of per capita incomes. The underlying transmission mechanism appears to be a crowding out effect in private capital markets contingent upon the introduction of public pension systems. A growing literature exists on the interrelationships between public pension schemes, fertility rates and endogenous growth. Following Wigger's (1999) pioneering overlapping generations endogenous growth model, we extend this model to examine the effects of a savings subsidisation system on the rate of per capita income growth, fertility and voluntary intrafamily wealth transfers, where parents view children both as an insurance good and a consumption good. Moreover, children care about the consumption levels of their parents. An increase in contributions to a savings subsidised public pension scheme will crowd out private intergenerational transfers from the young to the old and thereby negate the usefulness of children as an insurance good.     

Social Security Systems,Human Capital,and Growth in a Small Open Economy

We consider a small open economy in which the level of public education funding is determined by popular vote. We show that growth can be enhanced by the introduction of pay‐as‐you‐go pensions even if the growth rate of aggregate wages falls short of the interest rate. The reason is that the pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) system allows future retirees to partially internalize positive externalities of public education due to the positive effect of higher future labor productivity on their pension benefits. The majority support for education funding will be especially strong when the PAYG benefit formula is flat, i.e., progressively redistributive. If a flat benefit PAYG pension system is in place then the economy will achieve the highest growth rate relative to the alternative pension system designs. While such PAYG pension system may be opposed by the majority of working individuals due to inferior returns to their pension contributions relative to a funded scheme, it is likely to be politically sustained by a coalition of older individuals and lower income workers.     

Social Security and Growth in an Altruistic Economy

This paper studies the macroeconomic impact of private and public intergenerational transfers in the presence of endogenous growth. It focuses on two-sided altruism implying that individuals have both a motive to make gifts to their parents and a motive to leave bequests to their children. The growth effects of social security depend on whether children are making gifts to their parents or parents are leaving bequests to their children. Which of the transfers is operative, in turn, depends on the size of social security benefits. Social security is legislated endogenously. The introduction of a social security program which definitely reduces per capita income growth and harms future generations is contemplated by altruistic individuals even if non-altruistic individuals disapprove it.     

Do private pensions increase national savings?

This paper discusses how private pension programs differ from public social security in their likely impact on aggregate saving. Although private pensions are likely to reduce direct saving by employees, this should be offset by the combination of companies' partial funding and the shareholders response to unfunded liabilities. In contrast to several earlier empirical studies that implied that social security does depress national saving, the current time series evidence suggests that the growth of private pensions has not had an adverse effect on saving and may have increased saving by a small amount.     

Life expectancy, human capital, social security and growth

We analyze the effects of changes in the mortality rate upon life expectancy, education, retirement age, human capital and growth in the presence of social security. We build a vintage growth, overlapping generations model in which individuals choose the length of education and the age of retirement, and where unfunded social security pensions depend on workers' past contributions. Social security has a positive effect on education, but pension benefits favor reductions in retirement age. The net effect is that starting from a benchmark case, higher life expectancies give rise to lower per capita GDP growth in the presence of social security as the share of the active population is reduced. In addition, higher social security contribution rates reduce the growth rate of per capita GDP.     

Public Pension Programs in Southeast Asia: An Assessment

This paper assesses public pension programs in select Southeast Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – henceforth referred to as the SEA6) and the key issues facing them. The criteria used in assessing pension systems are the philosophy of pension design, the extent of coverage, investment policies and performance, and administrative and compliance costs. The paper argues that three broad reform directions to strengthen public pensions merit consideration. The first direction is to enhance the professionalism of the existing provident and pension fund organizations, including their governance practices. The second direction is to strengthen the role of noncontributory budget‐financed pensions (e.g. social pensions). The third is to adopt a systemic perspective to pension reform that includes reforms in complementary areas (labor markets, public financial management practices, and the civil service); developing a financing‐mix of pensions; and lastly, improving effective coverage by exploring complementarities between health care and pension programs.     

Income Redistribution Effect Of Public Pensions Between Dynastic Families

This paper investigates income transfers between dynastic families caused by a public pension system. Using Japanese data, we present simulation results based on a model in which intergenerational altruism works, and income distribution exists between and within generations. The growth rates of income and population, as well as the formulation for the determination of the contribution rate and the payment rate, are crucial to determine both the qualitative and quantitative effects. Especially, under negative income growth over generations, pay–as–you–go public pensions can cause negative income redistribution.     

Designing social security - a portfolio choice approach

Public social security systems may provide diversification of risks to individuals’ life-time income. Capturing that a pay-as-you-go system (paygo) may be considered as a “quasi-asset”, we study the optimal size of the paygo system as well as the optimal split between funded and unfunded pension saving by means of a theoretical portfolio choice framework. A low-yielding paygo system can benefit individuals if it contributes to hedge other risks to their lifetime resources. Numerical calculations indicate that optimal social security systems should be at least partly paygo financed in many economies. The optimal magnitude of the paygo system depends on the specified risk concept as well as the stochastic properties of stock market returns and implicit paygo-returns.     

Ageing,fertility, and growth

This paper analyses the interaction between human capital accumulation, fertility, and labour participation of families in the presence of technology shocks. Altruistic families spend time on the education of their children to increase their level of human capital. Compensating transfers through negative bequests are blocked by an active bequest constraint. Productivity shocks increase the opportunity costs of children and may cause a drop in fertility, which results in population ageing. We investigate the effects of ageing on allocation and welfare in the presence of a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system.     

Expectations,uncertainty and institutions. An application to the analysis of social security reforms

The aging process that many developed economies will face in the medium-term is leading to reforms in the public pensions systems in order to solve the potential financial unsustainability generated by the foreseeable increase in the expenditure in pension benefits (assuming that the current social security contributions and the eligibility conditions will remain unchanged). Neoclassical economics defends a radical reform of these systems, substituting the current pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) systems by funded systems. In this paper, using the Post-Keynesian theory as a theoretical framework, we provide an alternative reflection to that proposed by the neoclassical economics about the choice between the alternative pension systems. The focus of the paper is the advantages of the PAYGO pension systems to stabilize the expectations of future income.     

Raising productivity with pension premium

We argue that parents underinvest in growing their own children's capability in the absence of property rights over their future income, and that causes economic waste. No amount of collaborative choice among contemporary adults for public education could eliminate it because they face a resource constraint set by their predecessors. Such intergenerational dependence requires an intergenerational contract instead. It involves rewarding parents with a pension premium tied to their own children's taxable income paired with a matching subsidy to parental expenditure. We show how it fully internalizes the intergenerational externality, related to parenting, to eliminate economic waste and, thereby, to raise labor productivity and economic welfare. Our quantitative analysis of a baseline economy reveals significant welfare gains in economies with population ageing coupled with a low degree of parental care for children's future welfare and high returns to parental expenditure on children.     

Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship

We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships.     

Corporate financial structure and the funding of private pension plans

One strand of the literature on the employment contract focuses on the role of the contract in the efficient sharing of risk between capitalists and workers. One way capitalists can shift risk to workers is to provide part of workers' remuneration in the form of an unfunded, deferred pension. Since bonds, in the event of bankruptcy or voluntary termination, are typically senior to unfunded pension liabilities, capitalists can also affect their risk by altering the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. These observations suggest that corporate financial structure and the employment contract are interdependent. The paper has two major goals. The first is to take a step towards integrating the theory of corporate financial structure with that of the employment contract. The second is to investigate possible consequences of legislation which regulates the funding of private pensions.     

Pay-as-you-go Social Security and the Distribution of Altruistic Transfers

This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of altruistic transfers in a framework where savings are due to both life cycle and random altruistic motivations. We show that the effect of social security on the distribution of these transfers depends crucially on the strength of the bequest motive in explaining savings behaviour. We measure this strength by the expected weight that individuals attach to the utility of future generations. On the one hand, if the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of altruism in motivating savings is sufficiently low, the increase in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security. Some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed.     

On myopia as rationale for social security

It has been argued that “paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retirement systems.” This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in dynamically efficient economies. If the competing asset is linear storage and myopic agents are allowed to borrow against future pension benefits, there is no welfare-rationale for PAYG pensions. Sufficiently strong myopia may justify such pensions only if agents cannot borrow against their future pension, but then they are at a zero-saving corner. With enough myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the return to saving declines with saving, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.     

Globalization,Neoliberalism and the attack on social security

Neoliberal political movements advocate privatization of public pension systems. Globalization imposes pressure on nations to conform to neoliberal policy views with respect to the design and structure of social insurance, including public pension systems. The paper begins with an investigation of the economic, ethical and ideological dimensions of the privatization debates in the U.S.; it argues that privatization advocates may be largely moved by ideology, since the other reasons advanced appear weak or unfounded. The second part discusses the history of Social Security, the purposes for its creation, and some of its economic effects. Differences between public and private pension systems are considered. A brief international comparison of some aspects of public pension system finance and benefit structures is presented. The final section considers the ethical, macroeconomic and distributional implications of privatization, prefunding and payroll tax funding, and argues for a pay as you go system financed with income taxes. In order to promote equity, economic security, community, and social cohesion, public pension systems should be universal in coverage. In order to reduce the inequality, income insecurity, and aged poverty generated by market economies, public pension systems ought to be progressive: benefit/contribution ratios should be inversely proportional to income, and progressive income taxes should finance the system. To promote economic growth, the systems should be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and should not be prefunded except for an emergency reserve. The fiscal policy recommendations partially depend upon the theory developed by Abba Lerner in the 1940s, and recently advanced by Wynne Godley and Randy Wray: Lerner's “principle of functional finance.”     

The Intergenerational State Education and Pensions

When credit markets to finance investment in human capital are missing, the competitive equilibrium allocation is inefficient. When generations overlap, this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements. We show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation. Neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones. In our mechanism, via the public education system, the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital. They pay back the debt via a social security tax, the proceedings of which finance pension payments. When the complete market allocation is achieved, the rate of return implicit in this borrowing–lending scheme should equal the market rate of return.     

Economic consequences of unfunded vested pension benefits

This paper examines the relationship between unfunded vested pension liabilities and the market value of a firm's shares. This relationship has important implications for the mechanism by which private pensions influence aggregate savings. Attention is paid to modeling the institutional determinants of this relation implied by the ERISA legislation. These considerations require a nonlinear regression model with very special properties that are developed and discussed. Estimation results suggest that ERISA has had an important effect on the relation between unfunded benefits and firm value that previous investigations have neglected.     

Like Father,Like Son: Inheriting and Bequeathing

This paper incorporates indirect reciprocal behavior in the context of bequeathing decisions into an otherwise standard OLG model. We provide conditions for the existence of a unique steady state with operative bequests. Contrary to standard OLG models, we show that taking into account such behavioral interactions allows one to rationalize both an increasing and U‐shaped pattern of the inheritance to GDP ratio over time, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Moreover, the model predicts a nonlinear (U‐shaped) relationship between the size of an unfunded social security program and the long‐run stock of per capita capital, which in turn provides a novel explanation of the inconclusive empirical findings on the relationship between social security, savings and long‐run growth. Ricardian equivalence is shown to hold in a special case of the model