Exchanging market access at the outsiders' expense: the case of customs unions

Abstract.  Under a customs union, countries can exchange preferential market access by coordinating external tariffs to shift profits from excluded countries. I show that the exporting rents resulting from this coordination can offset trade diversion losses produced by the union, even if its members are relatively small in world markets. Such gains come, however, at the expense of excluded countries. I show that small countries can use customs unions also to foster multilateral cooperation, by increasing the incentives of excluded countries to support global free trade.     

区域经济一体化对多边自由贸易体制的影响——一个简单的制度经济学解释

区域经济一体化组织的出现是否有利于推动多边自由贸易的实现,这一问题已经引起了学者们的广泛关注.从制度经济学的角度看,先走区域经济一体化的道路,然后再进行区域经济组织的自由贸易合作,从而最终实现全球贸易的自由化,能够比"一味地"等待世界所有国家同时实现贸易的自由化给各利益主体带来更大的现期净收益.因此,相比WTO所推行的多边贸易自由化而言,区域经济一体化具有更多的现实性和可行性,它将为世界自由贸易的实现做阶段性准备.当然在此过程中,还应该注意加强WTO对区域经济一体化组织的监督和协调,以引导它向更有利于提高世界福利和贸易自由化的方向发展.     

Regional versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization,Environmental Taxation,and Welfare

The paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets, and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff‐reducing countries, regionalism also reduces production in a non‐participating country and may decrease its consumption. Consequently, regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff‐reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for global pollution. When pollution is global, regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries.     

Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy

In this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization, permitted by Article XXIV of the GATT, on country׳s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade. We present a model, in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups. We show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization. On one hand, the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations. On the other hand, when countries share similar political preferences, multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization.     

Can regional blocs be a stepping stone to global free trade? a political economy analysis

With a new wave of regional blocs, there is a heightened worry that they may impede the process of global free trade. This paper demonstrates, contrary to the pessimistic views, regional blocs may work as a stepping stone to multilateral liberalization. In our model, global free trade is not politically feasible initially, because too many people think that they will lose from the liberalization. Regional blocs as an intermediate step could divide the original opposition force so that a sequence of liberalization now becomes feasible.     

The Future of East Asia’s Trade: A Call for Better Globalization

This paper is about how East Asia should respond to the challenges of the external environment. The first challenge is the current slowdown in trade, which has been due to cyclical and structural factors such as the decline in productivity and the maturation of global value chains. The rise in protectionism as measured by rising trade restrictiveness has not impacted on trade, but political and policy uncertainty regarding the direction of trade policy seems to have begun to impact on trade growth. The policy stance of increased protectionism and a retreat from the multilateral rules‐based trading system is linked to the pockets of the population who have not seen their incomes improve and who have blamed their plight and increased inequality on globalization. In fact, the issue is more about the lack of effective responses to manage the costs of trade liberalization. East Asian economies need to respond to these challenges by upholding the multilateral rules‐based trading system, continuing the various pathways to regional economic integration, and ensuring better globalization through effective capacity building and policies to address the negative effects of trade liberalization.     

Preferential Liberalization,Antidumping, and Safeguards: Stumbling Block Evidence from MERCOSUR

There is not yet consensus in the trade agreements literature as to whether preferential liberalization leads to more or less multilateral liberalization. However, research thus far has focused mostly on tariff measures of import protection. We develop more comprehensive measures of trade policy that include the temporary trade barrier (TTB) policies of antidumping and safeguards; studies in other contexts have also shown how these policies can erode some of the trade liberalization gains that arise when examining tariffs alone. We examine the experiences of Argentina and Brazil during the formation of the MERCOSUR over 1990–2001, and we find that an exclusive focus on applied tariffs may lead to a mischaracterization of the relationship between preferential liberalization and liberalization toward non‐member countries. First, any “building block” evidence that arises by focusing on tariffs during the period in which MERCOSUR was only a free trade area can disappear once we also include changes in import protection that arise through TTBs. Furthermore, there is also evidence of a “stumbling block” effect of preferential tariff liberalization for the period in which MERCOSUR became a customs union, and this result tends to strengthen upon inclusion of TTBs. Finally, we also provide a first empirical examination of whether market power motives can help explain the patterns of changes to import protection that are observed in these settings.     

On the emergence of an MFN club: equal treatment in an unequal world

Abstract .  Motivated by GATT, we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the MFN principle of non-discrimination. The underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade. While an MFN club does not alter average tariff levels across countries, it increases aggregate world welfare; makes non-members worse off; and can immiserize its high cost members. These results imply that (i) core WTO rules such as MFN are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and (ii) the distributional effects of MFN maybe one reason why developing countries have been granted Special and Differential treatment at the WTO.     

Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World

During the past half century, multilateral trade liberalization has reduced tariffs to historically low levels. The “Received Theory” of multilateral trade agreements, based solely on terms‐of‐trade externalities between national governments, offers an explanation that has become the conventional wisdom. But it is dramatically inconsistent with actual trade agreements. This paper offers an alternative explanation, based on intergovernmental political externalities, consistent with what we actually observe. With remarkably little necessary formal structure—in particular, no formal bargaining model—this framework (chosen to parallel actual experience) gives an immediate and transparent role to the basic characteristics of contemporary trade agreements: gradual liberalization, reciprocity, nondiscrimination, and multilateralism.     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

GATT,Preferential/Regional Trading Blocs and Agricultural Trade*

Agricultural trade impasses have again frustrated the GATT process. Interest in preferential/regional trading blocs is increasing. the paper probes the theoretical and empirical consequences of preferential arrangements instead of multilateral liberalization. It concludes that in a second-best world preferential arrangements could either improve or decrease global welfare. For agricultural trade, previous experience suggests that in regional groupings such as the EC trade diversion exceeded trade creation. This results from trade distorting domestic policies. Prospects for liberalization of agricultural trade under either GATT or preferential arrangements are limited. the consequences for small agricultural exporters are not positive.     

Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade

We studied how the pursuit of bilateral free‐trade agreements (FTAs) affects the likelihood of achieving multilateral free trade. We derive and compare the stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization: in the FTA game, each country can either form an FTA with one of its trading partners or both of them or none of them, whereas in the (restricted) No FTA game, purely bilateral FTAs are not permitted. The major result is that there exist circumstances under which the freedom to pursue (discriminatory) bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving multilateral free trade.     

Regionalism in standards: good or bad for trade?

Abstract.  Regional agreements on standards have been largely ignored by economists and blessed by multilateral trade rules. Using a constructed panel data that identifies the different types of agreements at the industry level, we find that such agreements increase the trade between participating countries but not necessarily with the rest of the world. Harmonization of standards may reduce the exports of excluded countries, especially in markets that have raised the stringency of standards. Mutual recognition agreements are more uniformly trade promoting unless they contain restrictive rules of origin, in which case intra-regional trade increases at the expense of imports from other countries.     

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION*

Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization? I address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly. The central result is that when countries are symmetric, a free trade agreement (FTA) undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union (CU) does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members. However, when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost, there exist circumstances where PTAs facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation.     

International trade and consumption network externalities

This paper studies the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of consumption network externalities. The framework is applicable to the choice of network products and sheds light on the debate on globalization and culture. In an extended Ricardian model of international trade the paper shows that: (i) trade is not Pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is unique; (ii) trade is not Pareto superior to autarky if both countries are diverse (network competition) under free trade, but can be if each country is homogenous (network monopoly); (iii) and when multiple free trade equilibria exist everybody in a country can lose from free trade if that country is homogenous under autarky. Consumers of imported network goods tend to gain, while consumers of exported network goods tend to lose from trade liberalization.     

FISCAL CONSTRAINTS, COLLECTION COSTS, AND TRADE POLICIES

The last two decades witnessed trade liberalization in many developing countries. What caused this trend, and why have trade barriers been so ubiquitous when economic theory overwhelmingly supports free trade? This paper proposes that governments' revenue needs are the driving force. Governments may rely disproportionately on trade taxes because they are inexpensive to collect. Trade liberalization is an integral part of a tax reform: a tax base expansion is necessary to allow governments to reduce tariff rates. This hypothesis is supported by a panel data analysis of 27 developing countries.     

Market access and technology adoption in the presence of FDI

This paper theoretically investigates whether improved access to the domestic market speeds up new technology adoption by foreign firms. Foreign firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) to serve the domestic market. If two firms compete in the domestic market, multilateral liberalization of FDI or the realization of multilateral free trade may deter or delay technology adoption, while they always promote and accelerate technology adoption if only a single firm serves the domestic market. Technology adoption can be quickest and consumer welfare greatest when the fixed cost of FDI and the trade costs are neither very high nor very low. Preferential liberalization of FDI promotes the technology adoption of the targeted firm but may not benefit consumers because it discourages technology adoption of the non-targeted firm.     

Conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries

Abstract We examine how trade liberalization by a large trading partner affects the ability of a small country’s government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism. Unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country’s dynamic incentives. Liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement, in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same, unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country. However, if capacity in the import‐competing sector can be reduced only gradually, a conditional, reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions, where the large country liberalizes before the small country does.     

REGULATORY COOPERATION, AID FOR TRADE AND THE GATS

Abstract.   This paper discusses what could be done to expand services trade and investment through a multilateral agreement in the WTO. A distinction is made between market access liberalization and the regulatory preconditions for benefiting from market opening. We argue that prospects for multilateral services liberalization would be enhanced by making national treatment the objective of WTO services negotiations. Moreover, if complemented by assistance to strengthen regulatory capacity in developing countries, the WTO could become more relevant in promoting not just services liberalization but, more importantly, domestic reforms of services policies.     

Trade policy in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods under nonhomothetic preferences

We study the effects of trade liberalization in a Ricardian trade model with a continuum of goods and nonhomothetic preferences. Goods are ordered according to priority, and higher-ranked goods are consumed only by richer households. South (North) has a comparative advantage in the lower- (higher-) ranked goods. South's terms-of-trade unambiguously deteriorate as a result of unilaterally reducing its tariffs. North, by contrast, may experience a terms-of-trade gain when liberalizing its trade. It appears that the redistribution of tariff revenue from rich to poor households within each country increases the burden of trade liberalization for poor households.