Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment

We let subjects in a voluntary contribution experiment make non-binding numerical announcements about their “possible” contributions and, in some treatments, send written promises to contribute specific amounts. We find that announcements were responded to both by others’ announcements and by real play, for example announcements led to costly punishment when found to be misleading. We also find that adding pre-play announcements to treatments with punishment can increase efficiency by letting cost-free warnings substitute for costly punishment. The threat of punishing false announcements and promises helps reduce false signals, but only when promise statements can be sent is the effect sufficient for achieving greater efficiency.     

An empirical investigation of the effect of borrowing constraints on Spanish consumption

Abstract. This work analyses the relevance of borrowing constraints on the intertemporal behaviour of Spanish non-durable consumption. We estimate Euler equations with cohort data extracted from the “Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares” (ECPF) for the period 1985–1993. The results are robust to the use of different estimators to eliminate fixed individual effects, to different specifications of the model, to the effect of uncertainty and to the presence of habits in consumption. Our results allow us to conclude that non-durable consumption of a considerable fraction of the Spanish population is affected by borrowing constraints. At the same time, and in accordance with similar results for other countries, we confirm that borrowing constraints are especially important for the young. The author acknowledges the grant received from the Conselleria de Cultura, Educación y Ciencia de la Generalitat Valènciana, as part of its grant's programme for stays in foreign universities and the financial support by DGICYT grants SEC99-0820 and SEC 2002-00667. The author also acknowledges the hospitality of the Department of Economics at University College London (UCL) and of the Departamento de Análisis Económico de la Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia. This work has been presented in the XXV Simposio de Análisis Económico, held in Bellaterra (Spain) in December 2000. Finally, the author acknowledges comments by J. E. Boscá and two anonymous referees that have contributed to improving the final version of the paper.     

Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment

In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is a device that helps some groups to provide public goods.     

The existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time in life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint

In life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint, the consumer's wealth must be depleted before the maximum lifetime. This paper investigates the existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time. It is proved that the optimal terminal wealth depletion time, if such exists, must be unique. If the equation that determines the optimal terminal wealth depletion has multiple solutions, then the location of the optimal solution will depend on the configuration of the solutions. An optimality test is developed to verify whether a candidate solution for the terminal wealth depletion time is indeed optimal. The paper introduces a method new to economics, the Dubovitskii-Milyutin adjoint equation, to analyze the properties of the optimal control problem.     

Tax treatment of owner occupied housing and wealth inequality

We construct a quantitative general equilibrium lifecycle model with housing tenure decisions to investigate the degree to which wealth inequality in the United States is affected by the preferential tax treatment of home-ownership. Favorable tax treatment of owner occupied housing in the form of home mortgage interest and property tax deductibility, and the untaxed nature of imputed rents, provides a financial incentive for home-ownership over renting as well as an incentive to “over-consume” housing since houses are not fungible. Since the favorable tax treatment of housing disproportionately creates tax savings for the upper quantiles of the income distribution, we quantify how it contributes to the heavily right skewed distribution of wealth in the United States using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We consider a revenue-neutral government response to the counter factual experiments of removing the current tax structure on housing. Our quantitative analysis shows that, in terms of distributional effects, removing all of the preferential tax treatments results in an aggregate increase in welfare. However, we do not find any reduction in inequality. We also find that while some re-allocation toward financial assets occurs, households primarily increase their consumption when imputed housing rents are taxed and the property tax deduction is removed. Thus housing tax policy may be effective at encouraging more overall saving through housing assets.     

Continuing Vocational Training Forms and Establishment Productivity in Germany

Abstract. This paper provides evidence of the productivity effects of different continuing vocational training forms in Germany. Using the waves 1997–2001 of the IAB establishment panel, it is found that formal external courses have the largest positive impact on productivity. Formal internal courses and quality circles have a smaller positive impact. Self‐induced learning, participation at seminars and talks and job rotation do not enhance productivity while training on the job has a negative productivity impact. Establishments with an inefficient production structure decide to offer training in order to boost productivity. This paper also shows that taking into account selectivity of the training decision, unobserved time‐invariant heterogeneity, human resource practices, as well as establishment and employee characteristics has an important impact on the measurement results.     

The endowment effect and intertemporal choice: a laboratory investigation

We present a laboratory investigation of intertemporal choice (i.e., elicited discount rates) allowing for the influence of the endowment effect. Consistent with the previous literature, we hypothesize that the endowment effect in an intertemporal choice setting results in substantially higher discount rates relative to when individuals treat the resources in question as found money. Our results support this hypothesis and our experimental design provides a new protocol for conducting choice experiments wherein the endowment effect is an important determinant of behaviour.     

Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability

We study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal. We observe that in the absence of accountability, agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account. Accountability mitigates the observed decrease in risk aversion. Differences are observed between situations where agents are accountable for their decision (“ex-ante”) and where they are accountable for the outcome (“ex-post”).     

When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests

This paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy. We consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest where all bidders value the prize equally. We show that, whenever a Tullock contest yields under-dissipation, the auctioneer?s revenue can be increased by optimally fixing the number of tickets. In particular, in a stochastic contest with proportional probabilities, it is possible to obtain (almost) full rent dissipation. We test this hypothesis with a laboratory experiment. The results indicate that, as predicted, revenue is significantly higher in a lottery with rationing than in a standard lottery. On the other hand, an alternative rationing mechanism that does not limit total expenditures fails to increase revenue relative to a standard lottery.     

Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: Theory and experiments

This study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values, where the distribution of bidder valuations may be unknown. In our experimental setting, in first price auctions, bids are lower with the presence of ambiguity. This result is consistent with ambiguity loving in a model that allows for different ambiguity attitudes. We also find that the first price auction generates significantly higher revenue than the second price auction with and without ambiguity.     

Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (Int. J. Game Theory 20 (1992) 393) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which first-order stochastically dominates the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong, and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.     

Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study

We present evidence from laboratory experiments of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load that spread across strategic contexts. In the experiments, subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that the strategies chosen and the efficiency of outcomes in one game depends on the other game that the subject plays, and that play is altered in predictable directions. We develop a measure of behavioral variation in a normal form game, outcome entropy, and find that prevalent strategies in games with low outcome entropy are more likely to be used in the games with high outcome entropy, but not vice versa. Taken together, these findings suggest that people do not treat strategic situations in isolation, but may instead develop heuristics that they apply across games.     

Inequality, cooperation, and growth: An experimental study

In a three player dynamic public goods experiment, social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow. In each period, players choose to sabotage, to cooperate, or to play best response. Sabotage harms social output and growth. Mutual cooperation maximises both. The property rights to social output are distributed unequally. Extent and skew of inequality are varied. We observe equilibrium play in most cases. There is also substantial cooperation, but little sabotage. Our exogenous variations of inequality are neutral to growth, neither negatively correlated to cooperation, nor positively correlated to sabotage. The neutrality result is shown to be sensitive to the dynamic nature of the employed game.     

An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction

Pervasive overbidding represents a well-documented feature of all-pay auctions. Aggregate bids exceed Nash predictions in laboratory experiments, and individuals often submit bids that guarantee negative profits. This paper examines three factors that may reduce pervasive overbidding: (a) repetition (experience), (b) reputation (strangers vs. partners), and (c) active participation. Reputation and repetition reduce aggregate overdissipation, but they eliminate it only in conjunction with active participation.     

Risk attitudes and the stag-hunt game

A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent’s action. Both players may want to obtain high payoff but uncertainty about the opponent’s action may prevent them to take such strategic risk. This paper investigates how information about the risk attitude of an opponent affects a player’s action choice in the stag-hunt game. I find that although a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent’s risk attitude, it does not depend on her own risk attitude.     

Income inequality in the trust game

This paper presents an experiment measuring how lab-induced income inequality affects trust and trustworthiness. Low endowment subjects paired with high endowment subjects showed more trust than subjects in other pairs; this trust was reciprocated with high trustworthiness.     

On Okun’s law in OECD countries: An analysis by age cohorts

This study investigates Okun’s law in OECD countries by examining estimates for male and female age cohorts for the period 1998–2012. We find that the estimated Okun coefficients are not always statistically significant for each subgroup of the population. Our results also highlight a general common pattern of higher Okun coefficients for the youngest cohorts. This suggests that the young population, and particularly the young male population, tends to be most exposed to the business cycle in both developed and emerging OECD countries.     

The effect of education subsidies on regional economic growth and disparities in China

This paper examines the impact of education subsidies on regional economic growth and the disparities between two Chinese regions, Jiangsu and Liaoning, by simulating their economies in a six-period overlapping generations model in which individuals decide their length of education. This study estimates the long-run growth rates, that is, the steady growth paths of the regional economies based on current education subsidies, and explores their effect on human capital accumulation, namely in terms of economic growth while considering the increase in education subsidies. Because greater government subsidies in education induce individuals to invest in human capital, both regions achieve higher economic growth. Moreover, because of the large differences in productivity between the regions, the growth gap widens with evenly raised education subsidy rates.     

Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups

Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 × 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.     

Overconfidence as a social bias: Experimental evidence

The overconfidence bias is discussed extensively in economic studies, yet fails to hold experimentally once monetary incentives and feedback are implemented. We consider overconfidence as a social bias. For a simple real effort task, we show that, individually, economic conditions effectively prevent overconfidence. By contrast, the introduction of a very basic, purely observational social setting fosters overconfident self-assessments. Additionally, observing others’ actions effectively eliminates underconfidence compared to the individual setting.