Fiscal Decentralization or Centralization: Diverging Paths of Chinese Cities

If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy‐liberalizing effect entail significant short‐term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city's tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro‐level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities.     

Has Fiscal Federalism Worked for Macroeconomic Purposes？ The Chinese Experience 1994-2003

China＇s central government undertook major tax regime reform in 1994 that was characterized by fiscal federalism. In hindsight, this reform might be viewed as being more emphatic towards the revenue side than the expenditure side. The reform has resulted in certain success both for revenue shifting and inflation fighting purposes. However, the reform and its subsequent follow-ups have not addressed some fundamental issues pertaining to China＇s government finance system, such as the overhauling of the function of government finance and redrawing lines between the central and regional governments with regard to their fiscal responsibilities and duties. Moreover, fiscal federalism might have actually increased fiscal burden on the economy, especially on domestic sectors of the economy. However, coupled with enhanced policy support for China＇ s external development, fiscal federalism might have helped to further accelerate resource shifts toward the external sector, thus resulting in an unprecedented rapid expansion in China＇ s exports since the mid1990s.     

Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China

Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, the Chinese fiscal system has exhibited a marked vertical fiscal imbalance—a mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignments—at the local levels, which may cause the common-pool problem in local governments' behavior. Using a large fiscal dataset at the county level from 1997 to 2006, this paper studies the effects of fiscal decentralization on local expenditure policy and analyzes how the vertical fiscal imbalance shapes these effects. The estimation results show that expenditure decentralization increases government spending and leads to a fund allocation with a larger weight on capital construction and smaller weights on education and administration. In contrast, revenue decentralization has little influence on local government expenditures. We show that the differences in the effects of expenditure and revenue decentralization can be attributed to the distortionary effects caused by the vertical fiscal imbalance and, thus, offer support to the importance of the common-pool problem at the county level of China's fiscal system.     

Fiscal decentralization,fiscal reform,and economic growth in china

In 1994, after a period of substantial fiscal decentralization that has been credited with leading to historically unprecedented growth rates but significant fiscal decline, China introduced a new fiscal system that recentralized the collection of tax revenues. The economic and political consequences of this new Tax Sharing System (TSS) have been debated extensively in the literature, especially because of the renewed interest in fiscal federalism and its interaction with political institutions and economic outcomes. The question central to this debate has been whether the TSS constitutes a significant departure from decentralization with adverse effects on fiscal federalism or whether the recentralization of revenues under the TSS corrects for the overshooting in decentralization with beneficial economic outcomes. This paper exploits the staggered introduction of the TSS across regions and over time for econometric identification purposes and finds robust causal evidence that the TSS had a positive impact on economic outcomes.     

Fiscal decentralization, revenue and expenditure assignments, and growth in China

Theory suggests that a close match between revenue and expenditure assignments at sub-national levels benefits allocative efficiency, and hence economic growth. That is, a convergence of revenue and expenditure assignments at sub-national levels of government should, according to the theory, be positively associated with a higher growth rate. In the case of China, this paper shows, divergence, rather than convergence, in revenue and expenditures at the sub-national level of government is associated with higher rates of growth. A panel dataset for 30 provinces in China is used to examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth over two phases of fiscal decentralization in China: (1) 1979–1993 under the fiscal contract system, and (2) 1994–1999 under the tax assignment system. The seeming contradiction between the theory and evidence in the China case is reconciled by taking into account the institutional arrangements that prevailed during the two phases of fiscal decentralization, in particular the inconsistency between the assumptions of the theory of fiscal decentralization and the institutional reality of China.     

财政分权体制下地方政府的自利性行为研究

财政分权体制是我国经济转轨和社会转型的出发点和重要保障。新中国成立60多年来，我国的财政体制先后经历了由统收统支的财政体制到财政包干制再到分税制的演化过程，文章系统地阐述了在财政分权体制背景下地方政府的自利性行为的内涵及特征，并分析了其具体影响的表现形式。通过研究得出克服政府自利性的三大路径的结论：一是构建约束政府自利性的制度安排，二是合理界定政府职能，三是加强政府官员行政伦理素质的改造。     

财政分权，省级官员特征与地方政府债务规模——基于2010-2014年省级政府数据的实证分析

政府债务规模和风险是一级政府关注的重点问题。从财政分权和省级官员特征两个维度,本文考察了地方政府债务规模的影响因素,并在此基础上进一步研究财政分权程度和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的交互影响作用。通过2010-2014年30个省级政府的实证数据进行混合OLS回归,研究发现财政分权程度越高,地方政府债务规模越小。省级官员的年龄过大或过小都会使地方政府债务规模的减小,同时具有企业工作背景的省长和省委书记也会抑制地方政府债务规模的扩张,并且财政分权和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的影响是相互促进的。据此提出建议,合理控制地方政府债务膨胀。     

财政分权、空间外溢与区域经济增长

分税制改革以后,税收体系被划分为中央与地方两大部分,正式建立起以分税制为中心的财政分权体制。各地区的财政分权程度不仅对本地经济增长有直接影响,还对其他地区的经济增长有间接影响,即存在空间溢出效应。利用我国2005年至2018年31个省（市、自治区）的面板数据,运用空间面板模型,估计和检验财政分权对经济增长的空间效应。研究结果表明：各地区的财政分权不仅促进本地经济增长,还对其他地区的经济增长有显著正向溢出效应。     

财政自主与公共支出效率:自地方政府实践维度观察

公共支出效率主要受相对财政自主——地方政府自有收入在支出中的比例——的正面影响。这表明了分权确立独立主体的激励型好处,但更受绝对财政自主——地方政府自有收入——的负面影响,意味着我国分权缺乏相应的控制和问责机制,所谓的财政自主还没有达到规范意义上的要求。因此,我国地方分权应坚持,但配套的公共财政包括公共预算制度更应尽快建立和健全。     

Can Fiscal Decentralization Alleviate Government Consumption Volatility?

This paper assesses the effect of fiscal decentralization on government consumption volatility using data for 97 developed and developing countries from 1971 to 2010. The results suggest that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization leads to lower government consumption volatility. This result holds for the sub-sample of advanced economies, while it is not confirmed for those less-developed. This mechanism seems to work mainly through a lower volatility of the non-discretionary spending, which typically belongs to the central government’s policy. We also confirm existing findings according to which country size lowers government spending volatility. Thus, given a minimum level of development, fiscal decentralization reforms can reduce spending volatility by distributing power to sub-central governments, particularly in smaller countries which are usually more prone to volatility.     

Fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution: Evidence from Chinese panel data

China's environmental pollution casts a shadow on its economic success. Concerning fiscal decentralization, China introduced the rule-based tax assignment system in 1994. To avoid the structural change in underlying fiscal regimes, we use the provincial panel data during the period 1995–2010. We find that fiscal decentralization has no significant effect on environmental pollution as it is measured per capita emission of wastewater, waste gas or solid waste in system GMM (Generalized method of moments) estimation. Our results are robust when we use different measures of fiscal decentralization. We further find that fiscal decentralization has a significant, positive effect on pollution abatement spending and pollutant discharge fees, which indicates possible mechanisms for fiscal decentralization to help protect the environment.     

分税制改革20年对民族地区社会经济的影响

我国从1994年开始实行的分税制改革增强了中央政府的宏观调控能力,但却使地方政府承担了更多的支出责任。虽然分税制改革增强了民族地区地方政府的财力,增加了民生支出,使得民族地区基本公共服务均等化功能不断增强,居民收入水平不断提高,但同时民族地区仍然存在财力不足、中央与地方政府财权与事权划分不合理、转移支付制度不完善等问题。因此,本文认为应转变政府和财政职能,优化财政支出结构;合理划分各级政府事权范围,进一步明确各级财政支出职责;建立转移支付的激励约束机制;加强县级政府提供基本公共服务的财力保障。     

财政分权、金融分权与科技创新

央地间分权改革是我国调节不同层级政府间权责关系的一项制度探索,对于强化地方政府创新职能具有重要意义。文章基于我国城市面板数据,实证分析了财政与金融分权制度改革对科技创新的影响。研究发现,财政分权与金融分权均能有效促进城市创新,并且这种影响具有显著的时空异质性特征。动态分析发现,随着城市创新水平的提升,两种分权制度对城市创新的影响也存在着差异化的动态变化轨迹。此外,实证分析结果也表明,我国财政分权制度改革与金融分权制度改革的匹配性较差,两类分权制度缺乏有效协同。因此,在有序推动分权制度改革的同时,要提高财政与金融两个领域分权制度的匹配性,最大化分权制度改革对创新型经济发展的促进作用。     

Indonesian Local Government Spending,Taxing and Saving: An Explanation of Pre‐ and Post‐decentralization Fiscal Outcomes*

As a result of Indonesia's decentralization program, local governments have gained significantly more responsibility for service delivery, considerably larger fiscal resources, and much greater authority over the use of those resources than before. The present paper develops a simple budget model to describe and explain the substantial differences in pre‐ and post‐decentralization local government fiscal behavior related to spending, taxing and saving. During the post‐decentralization period special attention is paid to the fiscal behavior of natural resource rich regions. Among other things, the evidence suggests that: post‐decentralization local government spending is partly responsive to increasing needs and partly the subject of elite capture; local government taxation has become more aggressive under decentralization and appears to be mostly driven by local bureaucratic expectations related to routine overhead budgets; and the increased savings of local governments during the post‐decentralization period is determined to a large degree by delayed central government transfer payments.     

Fiscal stress in local government: A case study of the tri-cities in the Commonwealth of Virginia

Ability to raise sufficient revenue to satisfy expenditure needs is the most important concern in local government financing. Local governments under fiscal stress often need to dig deep into their tax base to generate enough financing because of inflexible revenue resources. This paper examines the factors that determine the level of tax effort, particularly the influences of fiscal stress on the tax effort of three adjacent small cities in Virginia. An ordinary least squared model was formulated for this purpose. Our findings indicate that, together with fiscal stress, retail sales, state aid, the joint effect of unemployment and welfare expenditures are important factors in predicting the tax effort. The difference in response among the cities in question is also established as a result of the analysis.     

分税制、转移支付与地方政府财政努力

本文实证检验了分税制和转移支付对地方政府财政努力的影响,通过引入空间效应,将总效应分解为直接效应和间接效应。我们发现,地方财政收入分成比例的提高会提高地方政府财政努力程度,财政转移支付依赖越高则地方政府财政努力程度越低,并且地方政府会依据过去的分成比例和财政转移支付来决定其财政努力水平。利用空间计量模型,我们还发现,地方政府之间存在横向模仿行为,横向政府间财政策略存在空间外溢性。     

Local Governance: Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization on Government Size and Spending Composition in Vietnam*

The study provides an understanding of the impacts of fiscal decentralization and local governance on government size and spending composition. We use a balanced panel data set of 63 provinces of Vietnam over the 2006–2015 period. By estimating the spatial Durbin model, we find that local public spending and government size grow over time and have spatial spillovers. Fiscal decentralization significantly reduces public spending and government size, which supports the Leviathan hypothesis. More interestingly, combining local governance, the marginal spatial spillover effects of the fiscal decentralization on public spending and government size are intensified. Our findings imply that local governments should enhance interregional collaboration in fiscal management to limit duplicate public spending and promote regional sustainable development.     

减税万亿势在必行

一家年营业额不到300万的服务业小企业,按当前的税费征收标准,需缴纳的核定税费为营业额的8．2％。其中营业税5％,城建税是营业税的7％,教育附加是营业税的3％,地方教育附加为营业税的2％,税务局认定行业利润率为10％,所得税足利润的25％。     

分税制改革与我国财政分权经济增长效应的跨区差异

在Bazm（1990）、Davoodi和Zou（1998）模型的基础上,文章构造了一个财政分权与经济增长关系的模型,并利用相关省级面板数据,实证研究了分税制改革对我国经济增长跨区差异的影响。结果发现,1994年分税制改革后,我国财政分权的经济增长效应呈现出显著的跨区差异,并且财政分权总体上扩大了地区差距。笔者认为,分税制改革后不同地区产业结构与所有制结构的差异所导致的地方政府行为的差异是造成我国财政分权经济增长效应跨区差异与地区差距扩大的重要原因。     

Intra‐provincial Revenue Sharing and the Subnational Government's Fiscal Capacity in China: The Case of Zhejiang Province

This study investigates whether the tax‐sharing system has deteriorated the fiscal capacity of subnational governments by analyzing how fiscal revenues are divided between provincial and sub‐provincial governments. Our study of county‐level fiscal data from Zhejiang Province in China during 1994–2007 shows that intra‐provincial revenue‐sharing rules favor county governments in two ways: (i) they improve county governments ‘fiscal autonomy in terms of using their own revenues; and (ii) they enhance county governments ‘fiscal capacity through province‐to‐county general transfers. In addition, we find that intra‐provincial fiscal revenue‐sharing rules and transfers reduce fiscal disparity between counties.