Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

Explaining M&A Success in European Banks

We study 98 large M&As of European bidding banks from 1985 to 2000 in order to investigate drivers of excess returns to the shareholders of the targets, the bidders, and to the combined entity of the bidder and the target. Our findings show that many of 13 drivers identified mostly from prior, US‐focused research have significant explanatory power, indicating that the stock market reaction to M&A announcements of European bidding banks can be at least partly forecast. Our results are largely consistent with the US‐experience and confirm the preference of stock markets for focused transactions and against diversification. Moreover, we find that less active bidders create more value than more active/experienced bidders. This stands in contrast to some US research and may indicate that managers of frequent European bidding banks may be motivated by other objectives than creating shareholder value.     

Shareholder litigation rights and corporate payout policy: Evidence from universal demand laws

This study exploits the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws, which place significant obstacles to derivative lawsuits and thus, undermine shareholders’ rights by 23 states in the United States (U.S.) from 1989 to 2005 as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the effects of shareholder litigation rights on corporate payout policy. Weakened litigation rights for shareholders materially increase firms’ payout ratios. The effect is more pronounced for firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex-ante, firms with higher institutional holdings, and ones financially unconstrained. Overall, the findings are consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase dividend payouts.     

Insider trading and shareholder investment horizons

This paper examines the effects of shareholder investment horizons on insider trading. We find that insiders are less likely to trade on private information and the profitability of insider trades is lower when shareholder investment horizons are longer. We further examine two channels through which shareholders with longer investment horizons can impede insider trading: direct monitoring and better information environment. Consistent with the direct monitoring channel, we show that insiders in firms with longer shareholder investment horizons are more likely to shift trades from the month right before earnings announcements to the month right after earnings announcements. Moreover, the impact of investment horizons are stronger in firms with higher ex ante litigation risk, with lower corporate governance quality, and that are not targets of hedge fund activists. Consistent with the information environment channel, we show that longer shareholder investment horizons increase the frequencies of information disclosure and insiders in firms with longer shareholder investment horizons are more likely to trade in an isolated manner rather than in sequences.     

Do Transparent Firms Pay out More Cash to Shareholders? Evidence from International Cross‐Listings

This paper examines the relation between agency costs and payout policy using a sample of 755 firms that cross‐list shares abroad. Firms increase cash payouts to shareholders by about 9% of earnings after cross‐listing on exchanges with high standards of transparency and shareholder protection. The shift in payout policy is more pronounced in firms controlled by management. No shift is observed if shareholder protection in the country of incorporation is already strong, or if the host exchange does not mandate additional disclosure. The findings support the theory that high corporate payouts are the outcome of transparency and shareholder protection.     

Large shareholders and disclosure strategies: Evidence from IPO lockup expirations

We examine the effect of large shareholders? ex ante selling incentives on firms? voluntary disclosure choices in the setting of IPO lockup expirations. We find evidence that managers delay disclosures of bad news, not for their own benefit, but to enable influential pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares at more favorable prices. Delays are more pronounced when aggregate selling incentives are greater, when uncertainty is high, and when venture capitalists, influential investors with strong selling incentives, own more shares. Simultaneously, managers? disclosure decisions reflect litigation concerns; no significant delays occur when litigation risk is high or when managers trade themselves.     

Investment,Idiosyncratic Risk,and Ownership

High‐powered incentives may induce higher managerial effort, but they also expose managers to idiosyncratic risk. If managers are risk averse, they might underinvest when firm‐specific uncertainty increases, leading to suboptimal investment decisions from the perspective of well‐diversified shareholders. We empirically document that, when idiosyncratic risk rises, firm investment falls, and more so when managers own a larger fraction of the firm. This negative effect of managerial risk aversion on investment is mitigated if executives are compensated with options rather than with shares or if institutional investors form a large part of the shareholder base.     

The consequences of limiting shareholder litigation: Evidence from exclusive forum provisions

In response to an explosion of shareholder litigation, many firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to courts in a firm's state of incorporation. This paper examines the consequences of a required venue for shareholder litigation. Delaware-incorporated companies experience significant increases in firm value around exogenous events that confirmed the use of a specified forum. Reduced legal costs and the designation of the domicile court as the sole forum to hear shareholder claims contribute to the increase in firm value. Overall, these findings suggest that a required venue for shareholder litigation benefits firms by eliminating multi-jurisdictional lawsuits and reducing the threat of claims with little merit.     

Federal Judge Ideology: A New Measure of Ex Ante Litigation Risk

Drawing on the political theory of judicial decision making, our paper proposes a new and parsimonious ex ante litigation risk measure: federal judge ideology. We find that judge ideology complements existing measures of litigation risk based on industry membership and firm characteristics. Firms in liberal circuits (the third quartile in ideology) are 33.5% more likely to be sued in securities class action lawsuits than those in conservative circuits (the first quartile in ideology). This result is stronger after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the Tellabs case. We next show that the effect of judge ideology on litigation risk is greater for firms with more sophisticated shareholders and with higher expected litigation costs. Furthermore, judicial appointments affect litigation risk and the value of firms in the circuit, highlighting the economic consequences of political appointments of judges. Finally, using our new measure, we document that litigation risk deters managers from providing long‐term earnings guidance, a result that existing measures of litigation risk cannot show.     

On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd‐) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access

We use events related to a proxy access rule passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 as natural experiments to study the valuation effects of changes in shareholder control. We find that valuations increase (decrease) following increases (decreases) in perceived control, especially for firms that are poorly performing, have shareholders likely to exercise control, and where acquiring a stake is relatively inexpensive. These results suggest that an increase in shareholder control from its current level would generally benefit shareholders. However, we find that the benefits of increased control are muted for firms with shareholders whose interests may deviate from value maximization.     

Shareholder litigation in mergers and acquisitions

Using hand-collected data, we examine the targeting of shareholder class action lawsuits in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, and the associations of these lawsuits with offer completion rates and takeover premia. We find that M&A offers subject to shareholder lawsuits are completed at a significantly lower rate than offers not subject to litigation, after controlling for selection bias, different judicial standards, major offer characteristics, M&A financial and legal advisor reputations as well as industry and year fixed effects. M&A offers subject to shareholder lawsuits have significantly higher takeover premia in completed deals, after controlling for the same factors. Economically, the expected rise in takeover premia more than offsets the fall in the probability of deal completion, resulting in a positive expected gain to target shareholders. However, in general, target stock price reactions to bid announcements do not appear to fully anticipate the positive expected gain from potential litigation. We find that during a merger wave characterized by friendly single-bidder offers, shareholder litigation substitutes for the presence of a rival bidder by policing low-ball bids and forcing offer price improvement by the bidder.     

Loyalty‐Shares: Rewarding Long‐term Investors

In the face of growing concern about investors' excessive focus on quarterly earnings, recent research has found new evidence of the benefits of a committed long‐term shareholder base, whether in terms of higher profitability, R&D investment, greater integration of ESG factors, or a reduced cost of capital. In light of this evidence, this article takes up the challenge of proposing a market solution to this problem. Although much has already been done in the financial industry to lengthen the outlook of executives by imposing longer vesting periods for stock options, a significant fraction of institutional shareholders continues to have a short‐term orientation. The authors propose that companies try to attract a more long‐term‐oriented shareholder base by modifying the form of the common share contract to include a special reward for buy‐and‐hold investors. The type of contract proposed—called a “loyalty share”—is a call‐warrant attached to each share that is exercisable at a specified time‐horizon—say, three years—and exercise price, but is nontransferable and hence has value only if the share is held for the entire length of the specified “loyalty period.” Such a reward is expected to encourage a longer‐term valuation outlook, since those shareholders seeking the loyalty reward are likely to be those who are most confident about the company's ability to increase its value through the expiration of the loyalty period.     

Law and Executive Compensation: A Cross‐Country Study

Companies outside the U.S. use substantially less equity in their compensation mix than U.S. firms. But despite this consistent “cross‐sectional” difference, the pattern of changes in equity‐based pay of non‐U.S. companies over time appears to mirror changes in the pay of U.S. companies. The authors provide persuasive evidence that features of a nation's legal environment help explain major differences in compensation structure across countries. As a general rule, companies in countries that provide greater protection of shareholder rights use larger amounts of equity‐based compensation. And the equity mix also tends to be higher when a country's legal system ensures strict enforcement of the laws that are on the books. At the same time, since the equity mix varies considerably over time within the same legal environment, it is clear that factors other than the legal environment affect compensation structure. The authors report that, after controlling for legal factors, company‐specific variables that proxy for “agency” conflicts—not only between managers and shareholders, but between controlling and minority shareholders as well—also affect the compensation mix in fairly predictable ways. The bottom line of this study is that, although we may have a global market for talent, compensation structures across countries are not likely to converge unless and until the underlying legal protections afforded shareholders converge. At the same time, the effect of agency costs in compensation design for non‐U.S. firms appears to be partly conditioned by the nation's legal system and the entire set of regulatory and other institutions that are affected by it.     

EVA AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”—that is, reductions in firm value that stem from conflicts of interest between various corporate constituencies. This article views TQM programs as corporate investments designed to increase value by reducing potential conflicts among non-investor stakeholders such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers. EVA, by contrast, focuses on reducing conflicts between managers and shareholders by aligning the incentives of the two groups. Besides encouraging managers to make the most efficient possible use of investor capital, EVA reinforces the goal of shareholder value maximization in two other ways: (1) by eliminating the incentive for corporate overinvestment provided by more conventional accounting measures such as EPS and earnings growth; and (2) by reducing the incentive for corporate underinvestment provided by ROE and other rate-of-return measures. At a superficial level, EVA and TQM seem to be in direct conflict with each other. Because of its focus on multiple, non-investor stakeholders, TQM does not address the issue of how to make value-maximizing trade-offs among different stakeholder groups. It fails to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value to shareholders of the increase in employees' human capital created by corporate investments in quality-training programs? And, given that a higherquality product generally costs more to produce, what is the value-maximizing quality-cost combination for the company? The failure of TQM to address such questions may be one of the main reasons why the adoption of TQM does not necessarily lead to improvements in EVA. Because a financial management tool like EVA has the ability to guide managers in making trade-offs among different corporate stakeholders, it can be used to complement and reinforce a TQM program. By subjecting TQM to the discipline of EVA, management is in a better position to ensure that its investment in TQM is translating into increased shareholder value. At the same time, a TQM program tempered by EVA can help managers ensure that they are not under investing in their non-shareholder stakeholders.     

Shareholder litigation rights and ESG controversies: A quasi-natural experiment

Leveraging as a quasi-natural experiment the staggered passage of universal demand laws, which raise the difficulty of shareholder lawsuits, we examine the effect of shareholder litigation rights on ESG controversies. Our difference-in-differences estimates show that an exogenous decline in shareholder litigation risk results in a significant drop in ESG controversies. Specifically, ESG controversies fall by 40.85% in response to an exogenous reduction in litigation risk. When more insulated from shareholder litigation, managers prefer to live a quiet life, intentionally avoiding risky and contentious activities, which require more managerial time and effort. Additional analysis validates the results, including propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and Oster's (2019) testing of coefficient stability. Finally, we find that ESG controversies erode firm profitability considerably, consistent with the theoretical expectations.     

Minority Protection and Dividend Policy in Finland

This paper highlights some theoretical arguments and empirical results on whether legal‐based minority protection affects corporate cash dividends in Finland. The Company Act in Finland states that shareholders having one tenth of all shares can demand a so‐called minority dividend, which is half of the profit of the fiscal year, yet not more than 8% of the equity. Minority dividend, as in Finland, is rarely used in EU countries. I find, that minority protection is a better influence over managerial control than controlling shareholders having absolute voting power. When there is no controlling shareholder and coalition costs are lowest, minority protection in Finland is better than minority protection in mandatory dividend countries. Combining strong shareholder rights (as in the USA) and minority dividend (as in Finland) could decrease agency costs both vertically and horizontally.     

The Paradox of Transparency,Short‐Termism and the Institutionalisation of Australian Capital Markets

As the ultimate corporate decision‐makers, directors have an impact on the investment time horizons of the corporations they govern. How they make investment decisions has been profoundly influenced by the expansion of the investment chain and the increasing concentration of share ownership in institutional hands. By examining agency in light of legal theory, we highlight that the board is in fact sui generis and not an agent of shareholders. Consequently, transparency can lead to directors being ‘captured’ by institutional investor objectives and timeframes, potentially to the detriment of the corporation as a whole. The counter‐intuitive conclusion is that transparency may, under certain conditions, undermine good corporate governance and lead to excessive short‐termism.     

Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions? The Case of the United Kingdom

A large number of studies have shown that many companies have made large acquisitions that their own shareholders probably would not have approved if given the opportunity to do so. In this article, which summarizes the findings of their study published recently in the Review of Financial Studies, the authors present evidence that suggests the effectiveness of shareholder voting as a corporate governance mechanism designed to prevent such value‐reducing acquisitions from taking place. The authors' study focused on acquisitions in the U.K. where proposed transactions that exceed a series of 25% relative size (target's as a percentage of the acquirer's) thresholds are defined as “Class 1” transactions and require shareholder approval. The authors found strikingly positive stock market reactions to the announcements of such Class 1 acquisitions—as compared to zero if not negative average announcement returns for Class 2 transactions that were not subject to a shareholder vote. And when the authors extended their analysis to U.S. M&A markets, they found that the larger (again, in relative size) U.S. deals—large enough that they would have required a shareholder vote in the U.K.—provided returns to their shareholders that were negative, and thus significantly lower than those of their U.K counterparts. In terms of the economic significance of their findings, the authors found that Class 1 transactions were associated with aggregate gains to acquirer shareholders of $13.6 billion. By contrast, U.S. transactions of similar size, which again were not subject to shareholder approval, were associated with aggregate losses of $210 billion for acquirer shareholders; and Class 2 U.K. transactions, also not subject to shareholder approval, were associated with aggregate losses of $3 billion. In a further series of tests designed to shed light on how mandatory shareholder voting generates such substantial value improvements for acquirer shareholders, the authors also found evidence suggesting that when faced with the requirement of a shareholder vote, CEOs and boards are more likely to resist the temptation to overpay to close a deal. And the fact that the shareholders of the Class 1 acquirers did not end up blocking a single transaction that was submitted to a vote suggests that this mechanism works without the need for shareholders to actually vote down a deal. In other words, mandatory shareholder voting on acquisitions is a powerful deterrent to “bad deals” because, first of all, the vote is triggered automatically by the relative size tests and, second, CEOs and boards, with the help of their bankers, have a pretty good idea well in advance of the vote whether their shareholders are going to vote “no”—and such a vote would be viewed by top management as a major rejection, a strong vote of no confidence.     

Shareholders’ requirements for corporate environmental disclosures: A cross country comparison

We survey individual shareholders in Australia, the UK and the US regarding corporate environmental disclosures. In general, respondents in the three countries are interested in, and positively disposed towards, these disclosures. We observe country and gender differences with Australian and female respondents more in favour of environmental reporting than others. Specifically, respondents require disclosure of an overview of environmental risks and impacts, the environmental policy, performance against measurable environmental targets and information on a range of environmental costs. Most shareholders require environmental disclosures to be audited. Shareholders call for environmental information because they believe managers should be accountable to shareholders for their companies’ environmental impacts. Furthermore, shareholders have indicated the uses for specific types of environmental information. Our results imply that legislators, standard setters and companies have to consider the policy implications of these shareholder views.     

It's Showtime: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meetings?

Annual shareholder meetings provide an opportunity for shareholders to express their concerns with corporate performance, pressuring managers to demonstrate good performance. We show that managers respond to the shareholder pressure by reporting positive corporate news before the annual shareholder meetings. Specifically, we find significantly positive average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the 40 days before the annual meeting date. The premeeting returns are significantly higher when shareholder discontent with managerial performance is likely to be stronger. The decile of companies with the worst past stock price performance exhibits average CARs of 3.4% and buy‐and‐hold returns of 7.0% during the 40‐day premeeting period. Companies with poor past performance exhibit even higher premeeting returns when shareholder pressure on management is greater, such as when institutional ownership is high, when CEO compensation is high, and when shareholders submit proxy proposals on corporate governance. We complement the evidence based on CARs by showing how managers of poorly performing firms manage the timing and content of earnings announcements and management forecast announcements before the annual shareholder meetings. Overall, the results suggest that managers attempt to influence shareholders before annual shareholder meetings through positive news.