Pricing Shares on a Nascent Market: The Nepal Stock Exchange 1994–96

Stimulated by their ability to facilitate privatization and to attract portfolio inflows, recent literature on less-developed country (LDC) stock exchanges has focused on relatively well-established “emerging markets.” Wide international variations in the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, however, confirm that an important role for equity markets in economic development is not assured. This study of early equity pricing in Nepal therefore addresses the initial difficulties of establishing a viable exchange. It investigates equity pricing in the absence of a trading history, identifies favored equity characteristics and provides tentative evidence on the market valuation of liquidity before discussing policy inferences.     

Salience and the Disposition Effect: Evidence from the Introduction of “Cash‐Outs” in Betting Markets

The disposition effect describes the tendency of investors to sell assets that have increased in value since purchase, and hold those that have not. We analyze the introduction of betting market “Cash‐Outs,” which provide a continual update—and therefore increase the salience—of bettors' paper profits/losses on each bet. We find that the introduction of Cash‐Out increased the disposition effect in this market, as punters sold their profitable bets with greater frequency than before. We do not, however, find that the disposition effect has any impact on asset prices, either before or after this intervention.     

Insider Trading Restrictions and Insiders’ Supply of Information: Evidence from Earnings Smoothing

We exploit the setting of first‐time enforcement of insider trading laws to investigate the relationship between insider trading opportunities and insiders’ supply of information. Insider trading opportunities motivate insiders to reduce their supply of information by concealing firm performance, thereby increasing their information advantage over outsiders, resulting in higher insider trading profits. Using data from 40 countries over the 1988–2004 period, we find that reporting opacity, as captured by earnings smoothness, decreases significantly after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws in countries with strong legal institutions. The decrease in earnings smoothness is positively related to the strictness of insider trading laws. The decrease in earnings smoothness is also more pronounced for countries that have more persistent insider trading law enforcement and for countries that impose more severe penalties on insider trading cases. Further analyses show that the decrease in earnings smoothness following insider trading enforcement is concentrated among firms that are not closely held and among high‐growth firms. In addition to uncovering a channel through which insider trading restrictions affect the information environment, our evidence highlights the importance of country‐ and firm‐level governance structures in determining the consequences of insider trading restrictions.     

An Economic Analysis of Audit and Nonaudit Services: The Trade‐off between Competition Crossovers and Knowledge Spillovers*

In this paper, I present a model in which both markets for audit services and nonaudit services (NAS) are oligopolistic. Accounting firms providing both audit services and NAS will employ oligopolistic competition in each of these markets. In addition to auditors' gaining “knowledge spillovers” from auditing to consulting or vice versa, oligopolistic competition in one market will influence the counterpart in the other market ‐ what I call “competition crossovers”. Although scope economies due to knowledge spillovers (for example, cost savings) are always beneficial to auditors, such benefits can entice accounting firms to adopt strategies (for example, price reductions) to compete aggressively in the audit market so that some, or all, firms become worse off. A trade‐off arises between these two economic forces in the two oligopolistic markets. Given the trade‐off between competition crossovers and knowledge spillovers, accounting firms may not reduce their audit prices, even though supplying NAS enables firms to decrease auditing costs — a nontrivial impact of oligopolistic competition in two markets on audit pricing. The empirical implication of my results is that because of competition‐crossover effects between the auditing and consulting service markets, finding empirical evidence for knowledge‐spillover benefits is likely to be difficult. Control variables for “audit‐market concentration” concerned with competition‐crossover effects and “auditor expertise” concerned with knowledge‐spillover benefits should be included in audit‐fee regressions to increase the power of empirical tests. With regard to policy implications, my analyses help explain the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on “market segmentation” and, hence, the profitability of accounting firms.     

Magnitudes of Market Inefficiency: Theory and Application

This paper conceptually distinguishes the intrinsic value from the fundamental value, though most of previous literatures have implicitly deemed them to be identical. The distinction of the two concepts clarifies the relation between the market efficiency in the sense of Fama (1970) and the over- (under-) valuation for evaluating the stock market. Then, this study proposes an alternative measure of ‘magnitude of market inefficiency’ for accessing the trading systems and applies this measure to the nine stock markets during the two sub-periods. The trading systems of three markets improve in the second period, while the others become worse. This study also proposes an alternative measure of a fundamental value of stock price based on a macroeconomic model and makes clear the relation of the over- (under-) valuation of the market to the magnitudes of market inefficiency. Thus, the application to the Japanese stock market indicates that the magnitudes of inefficiency are small compared with the net over- (under-) valuations. It is because the magnitude of inefficiency is stationary while the net over- (under-) valuation is non-stationary.     

The Paris financial market in the nineteenth century: complementarities and competition in microstructures1

This article sets out to explain why the Paris Bourse was highly successful in the nineteenth century in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly of the official market, the Parquet. The literature argues that the official monopoly was sidelined by a free, innovative market known as the Coulisse, but it fails to explain how the Coulisse emerged despite the monopoly and how the two markets persisted alongside each other during the entire century. We provide a detailed history of how these two markets emerged and interacted. The Parquet increasingly developed as a high‐end market, providing security, transparency, and effective settlement‐delivery to unsophisticated investors trading on the spot market. The Coulisse provided liquidity, immediacy, and opacity to professional investors trading mostly forward. In line with recent theoretical developments, we argue that the juxtaposition of heterogeneous organizations had important virtues for market participants, since it allowed the exchanges to specialize in different investors and services and made the exchanges complementary to each other. We demonstrate our claim by looking at both the formal rules and the actual functioning of the Parquet, drawing on its archives which we have recently classified.     

“Exports‐at‐Risk”: The Effect of Multimarket Contact in International Trade

Despite a well‐established literature examining possible impacts on competition in oligopolistic markets from multimarket contact (MMC) among diversified firms, only recently have trade theorists considered the possible effects of MMC among exporters in limiting the anticipated procompetitive role of imports. This article presents a first effort to test the empirical importance of a measure of this MMC, called “exports‐at‐risk,” on import prices (unit‐values). Suggestive evidence of anticompetitive impacts of MMC among exporters is obtained for highly traded four‐digit harmonized system (HS) products within the broad category of “fats and oils.” Exporters in fats and oils seem to price higher in markets where they meet rivals with the ability to retaliate against their “exports at risk.”     

Four‐G Episode and the elevated risks

Complacency and a false perception that markets will correct imbalances during two decades of ‘Great Moderation’ led to ‘Global Imbalances’. The low interest rates and a lack of proper oversight, combined with a perception that housing prices will always move north, brought the sub‐prime crisis in the USA and the subsequent ‘Global Financial Crisis’ and European crisis. The Quantitative Easing policy in advanced economies (AE) created an even more permissive global liquidity. The externality affecting emerging markets (EM) took the form of massive capital inflows, first channelled through banks where the global banks‐mostly headquartered in Europe‐played a significant role and then through capital market with fund managers being the protagonist. The augmented liquidity spurred growth in EM but also elevated the risk of financial instability. Capital flows reversal, slower growth and less benign external conditions have put EM in a quandary. The uncertainty is heightened by a non‐synchronised monetary policy in AE (‘Great Divergence’). To the extent that standard policies have become ineffective, and to defend from externality caused by AE's unilateral policy (financial nationalism), it is argued that EM can put a damper on the dangerous component of capital inflows. As part of macroprudential policy, such a measure is equivalent with discouraging risky behaviour to prevent financial instability and worsening income inequality.     

Asymmetric Mispricing and Regime‐dependent Dynamics in Futures and Options Markets

We examine regime‐dependent price dynamics and mispricing adjustments within the KOSPI200 spot, futures and options markets through an analysis of data from January 2000 to December 2014. Investors exploit mispricing between derivatives and spot markets only if mispricing is sufficiently large. The futures traders take long, rather than short, positions to adjust for mispricing. Mispricing between spot and options markets is adjusted by trading options and not by trading spots. We find the bidirectional information flows between spot and futures markets when the futures‐implied index is sufficiently larger than the spot index. In contrast, no significant lead–lag relationship between spot and options markets exists. Significant asymmetric transaction costs exist in the spot market and this asymmetry has decreased over time.     

Market Efficiency and Profitable Wagering in the National Hockey League: Can Bettors Score on Longshots?

Sports betting and racetrack markets continue to provide researchers with opportunities to test the efficient market hypothesis. This paper investigates the efficiency of a relatively new sports betting market, the National Hockey League, for 1990-1996. The market is found to be somewhat inefficient and simple wagering strategies are identified that result in profitable returns. Consistent with previous research for football and baseball, bettors in hockey are inclined to overbet favorites relative to their observed chance of winning. Interestingly, the market does not appear to be converging to efficiency.     

The Persistence of Dominant‐Firm Market Share: Raising Rivals' Cost on the New York Stock Exchange

To explain the persistence of dominant New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) market share in stock trading of listed securities from 1992 to 2002, we develop a dominant‐firm price leadership model and hypothesize that NYSE specialists raised the costs of rival market makers. The model predicts that natural and induced cost advantages will determine the NYSE's market share vis‐à‐vis the regional exchanges, electronic trading systems, and NASDAQ dealers. Empirically, NYSE market share increases with economies of scale and scope, abnormal price volatility, high asymmetric information, and with trading practices that raise rivals' costs, such as failure to display limit orders that bettered the existing quotes.     

Financing Alternatives for Chinese Small and Medium Enterprises： The Case for a Small and Medium Enterprise Stock Market

Financing alternatives for small and medium enterprises in China are discussed in the present study. In particular, we analyze the significant changes and developments in China s “second board” stock market. China s extensive network of regional assets and equity exchanges, which were set up to facilitate private equity transfer, and non‐performing loan transactions seem to partially fill the void for small and medium enterprises, which cannot easily obtain approval for listing on the stock exchanges. Foreign investors can identify investment opportunities in non‐listed domestic state‐owned and private businesses through these regional assets and equity exchanges. At the same time, foreign stock markets are now attracting the young Chinese enterprises to list their stocks on their exchanges. (Edited by Zhinan Zhang)     

机构投资者持股与内部人交易——基于中国A股市场的证据

作为证券监管机构的监管重点与难点，内部人交易一直以来备受关注。如何有效监督内部人交易，维护证券市场秩序与公平，保护中小投资者利益，是一个重要且具有现实意义的问题。基于2007-2015年中国A股上市公司内部人交易数据，文章探究了机构投资者持股对内部人交易获利能力的影响，发现：（1）机构投资者的存在会提高内部人买入行为的获利能力，会抑制内部人卖出行为的获利能力；（2）机构投资者对内部人交易的影响在卖出样本中存在截面差异，具体表现为在国有企业样本组和非两职合一样本组更显著；（3）机构投资者异质性分析发现，基金投资者会提升内部人买入交易的获利能力，合格的境外投资者会抑制内部人交易的总体获利能力，其他机构投资者一方面会促进买入行为的获利能力，一方面会抑制卖出行为的获利能力；（4）机制路径检验发现，机构投资者对内部人卖出交易的抑制作用存在提高公司盈余质量、提升治理水平和改善信息披露水平三种机制路径。总之，文章验证了机构投资者影响内部人交易的研究推论。     

Efficiency in Pari-Mutuel Betting Markets across Wagering Pools in the Simulcast Era

Simulcast wagering, where bets from across the country are taken at tracks, off-track betting facilities, casinos, by phone or online and incorporated into the same mutuel pool, has contributed to a large increase in betting volume on American horse races since the mid-1990s. This article investigates betting-market efficiency in the simulcast era focusing on whether the interrelated betting markets comprised of win, place (finishing in the top two), and show (finishing in the top three) wagering are efficiently priced. We find that the increased accessibility and betting volume associated with simulcasting has reduced, but not eliminated, the inefficiencies seen in prior studies. Despite the inefficiencies in these markets, arbitrage is not profitable because market closing prices are unknown when bets are placed.     

The impact of opportunity factors on fraudulent behavior in the Vietnamese stock market

This study examines the opportunity factors on fraudulent behavior in Vietnam’s stock market by employing mixed methodology. In this regard, data were obtained from 20 in-depth interviews and 568 questionnaire survey responses of securities companies, fund management companies, stock exchanges and the State Securities Commission in Vietnam. Using the exploratory factor analysis, the study discovered that the following groups of opportunity factors result in fraudulent behavior: (i) influences of the internal person and issuer, which include (person whose internal information has not been published by the company), collusion of the issuer and securities company, abuse of power by influential person in the company, complex organizational structure of the issuer (one person handling multiple positions) and failure of an issuer to properly control internal information; (ii) investors’ factors, which include investors’ trade of securities based on the insider’s suggestion, framework of foreign investors, brokerage company recommendations, and advisory information on securities forums; and (iii) factors associated with market management and supervision, such as use of lenient penalty with no deterrent effect, untimely market management and limited authority of the securities committee. Using regression analysis, the order of the impact of each group of factors was found as follows: factors due to internal person and the issuing organization, the market management and supervision, and investors.     

Why We Should Stop Being Surprised that Lightly Regulated Markets Fall Short of the SEC's Goals for Market Quality: A Discussion of “Private Intermediary Innovation and Market Liquidity”

The stated goals of the SEC are to protect investors, maintain orderly markets and facilitate capital formation. These goals can be achieved with very light regulation if, as assumed by traditional economic theory, investors process information costlessly and protect themselves from informational disadvantages, and firms optimally balance the costs and benefits of committing to make their reports reliable. A growing body of research demonstrates that light regulation fails to achieve the SEC's goals, because investors find information processing costly and fail to protect themselves. After reviewing theory and prior evidence, I discuss new lessons learned from Jiang, Petroni, and Wang ( 2016 ), who show that Pink Sheets^® reduced the liquidity of firms with low reporting quality and increased the liquidity of firms with high reporting quality, merely by highlighting the quality of their listed firms’ disclosure. While the Pink Sheets^® innovation might have occurred through many causal channels, all of them entail a violation of costless processing and self‐protection, and lead to the conclusion that this lightly regulated market did not initially meet the stated goals of the SEC. I conclude by arguing that markets can achieve the SEC's goals only if they exhibit a particularly strong version of “dynamic” market efficiency, which requires that each individual trade on the path to even incomplete revelation occurs at the then‐optimal price. Because dynamic efficiency is unlikely, we should stop being surprised to see evidence that lightly regulated markets fall short on key dimensions. Instead, we should use our well‐developed understanding of market inefficiency to guide regulation.     

Institutional Investors' Trading in Speculation: Evidence from China

The trading behaviour of institutional investors has attracted much attention. However, many issues related to their trading behaviour cannot be addressed without high‐frequency changes in institutional ownership. Based on a measure of the trading behaviour of institutional investors by using an institutional account dataset from China, we find that (i) active institutions trade speculatively by taking advantage of individual investors; (ii) individuals buying high and selling low offer liquidity only on average; (iii) foreign investors do not show significant patterns in speculation; and (iv) trading of active institutions significantly affects price. This study casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that institutional or sophisticated investors improve market efficiency by correcting mispricing, and provides direct evidence for institutional investors' speculation behaviour and their destabilising effect on the stock market. Results suggest that regulators in emerging markets should monitor institutions' speculation to bring fairness and justice to the stock market.     

Trading Prior to the Disclosure of Material Information: Evidence from Regulation Fair Disclosure Form 8‐Ks*

Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) Form 8‐K filings provide a venue where managers release information to the market as a whole that they designate as being material. Using this setting, we study trading patterns immediately prior to the public disclosure of material information. We offer three main results. First, using both intraday and daily trading data, we find abnormal trading volume of 21 percent (13 percent) in the hour (day) prior to the public disclosure, respectively. Second, we find that this pre‐disclosure abnormal trading volume is concentrated in firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, issue fewer voluntary disclosures, and have weaker external monitoring. Finally, we find that this pre‐disclosure volume is concentrated in subsamples in which the information relates to a firm's material contracts, a firm holds investor/analyst conferences, and there is insider trading activity in a firm's shares. Our results do not concentrate in a small number of firms or industries, and do not appear to be explained by the form through which managers first release the material information (e.g., Form 8‐K, press release, website posting, or social media). Our results are also robust to controlling for the firm's other filings and peer filings that occur around the disclosure. Overall, the trading patterns we document may show that, inconsistent with the spirit of Reg FD, a subset of investors trade on information managers deem material prior to its broad, public release.     

Labour Market Flexibility,Wages and Incomes in Sub‐Saharan Africa in the 1990s

Abstract: This paper provides an overview of how African labour markets have performed in the 1990s. It is argued that the failure of African labour markets to create good paying jobs has resulted in excess labour supply in the form of either open unemployment or a growing self‐employment sector. One explanation for this outcome is a lack of labour market ‘flexibility’ keeping formal sector wages above their equilibrium level and restricting job creation. We identify three attributes of labour market flexibility. First, whether real wages decline over time; secondly, the tendency for wages to adjust in the face of unemployment; and thirdly, the extent of wage differentials between sectors and/or firms of various size. Recent research shows that real wages in Africa during the 1990s may have been more downwardly flexible than previously thought and have been surprisingly responsive to unemployment rates, yet large wage differentials between formal and informal sector firms remain. This third sense of the term ‘inflexibility’ can explain a common factor across diverse African economies — the high income divide between those working in large firms and those not. Those working in the thriving self‐employment sector in Ghana have something in common with the unemployed in South Africa — both have very low income opportunities relative to those in large firms.     

Reorganization of Intra‐ASEAN 5 Trade Flows: The ‘China Factor’*

There are claims that China's influence on ASEAN is direct in that she has encouraged more exports to flow into her huge markets and changed trade flows among member countries. Demand and supply are thus deemed to have become more China‐centered. This study therefore explores the plausibility of China as a ‘factor’ that influences bilateral intra‐ASEAN 5 trade flows through demand (exporting country) and supply (importing country). The results imply that China's integration in the region increases the size of the key ASEAN member economies export market. There is also no indication that import sourcing from China by ASEAN 5 countries reduces export expansion within the latter. The results accord with the fact that although China has become an important export destination and an import source for individual ASEAN 5 countries, this has not reduced intra‐ASEAN 5 trade.