CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data

This paper examines the link between CEO pay and performance employing a unique, hand‐collected panel data set of 390 UK non‐financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999–2005. We include both cash (salary and bonus) and equity‐based (stock options and long‐term incentive plans) components of CEO compensation, and CEO wealth based on share holdings, stock option and stock awards holdings in our analysis. In addition, we control for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. The empirical results show that in comparison to the previous findings for US CEOs, pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs seems to be lower; pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs is 0.075 (0.095) for cash compensation (total direct compensation), indicating that a ten percentage increase in shareholder return corresponds to an increase of 0.75% (0.95%) in cash (total direct) compensation. We also find that both the median share holdings and stock‐based pay‐performance sensitivity are lower for UK CEOs when we compare our findings with the previous findings for US CEOs. Thus, our results suggest that corporate governance reports in the UK, such as the Greenbury Report (1995) that proposed CEO compensation be more closely linked to performance, have not been totally effective. Our findings also indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and significant influence on CEO pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants. Finally, we find that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure.     

Executive performance-based remuneration, performance change and board structures

This paper examines CEO performance-based remuneration in companies that experience improvement in financial performance but have different board structures. It analyzes how such payment relates to change in financial performance and board structures by comparing the cases between Australian and Singaporean companies. The results highlight that performance pay in both countries is likely to be linked to change in performance. However, the proportion of CEO performance-based payment in both countries does not seem to be related to board structure. Larger firms in both countries appear to make great use of performance-based remuneration. Sales revenue is likely to be used by companies in both countries as a yardstick for determining CEO performance pay.     

Remuneration committees,shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link

We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.     

Australian chief executive officer remuneration: pay and performance

International studies document strong evidence that chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration is positively correlated with corporate performance. Prior Australian studies, however, find no positive link between CEO pay and market performance. In the present paper we re‐examine the association between Australian CEO remuneration and firm performance using standard empirical models from the international literature. We find that in every respect the Australian evidence is consistent with international findings for firms of the USA, UK and Canada. In particular, we document CEO pay–performance association as positive and statistically significant.     

Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non‐binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book‐to‐market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non‐strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.     

How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?

We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity‐linked pay and exhibit higher pay‐performance (delta) and pay‐risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity‐linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost.     

The impact of bank merger growth on CEO compensation

We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.     

Disclosure,shareholder oversight and the pay–performance link

This paper investigates the effect of increased shareholder oversight and disclosure about executive remuneration on the pay–performance relation, while controlling for contemporaneous changes in corporate governance practice. Our sample consists of 240 ASX-listed firms with annual reports available for each year over the period 2001–2009, a period which straddles the timing of regulatory change. We initially document the conjectured improvements in remuneration disclosure and shareholder oversight in the form of the advisory vote on the remuneration report. Following, we find as predicted a general strengthening of the pay–performance relation over the study period, with the increased sensitivity of reported CEO remuneration to firm performance being primarily related to enhanced remuneration disclosure and the non-binding shareholder vote on the remuneration report. Our results lead us to conclude that enhanced oversight over executive remuneration arrangements brought about by regulatory change has positively impacted the executive remuneration process by strengthening the pay–performance relation and making the process appear more accountable.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

Components of CEO Remuneration and Non‐GAAP Disclosure

This paper provides evidence of the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration on decisions to disclose voluntary non‐generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP) financial measures. We investigate profit announcements that focus on the most emphasised part, which includes mandatorily identified information (results for the announcement to the market) and the least emphasised part, which incorporates other sections. By reading the profit announcements and manually collecting non‐GAAP financial measures (NGFM) data, there is no reliance on keyword search strings and as such we uncover the pervasiveness of the use of NGFM. Results show that the base component of CEOs’ remuneration plays a significant role in reporting NGFM in the most emphasised part of the profit announcement. Conversely, all three (base, short‐term and long‐term incentives) components of the remuneration package have a significant relationship with the reporting decisions in the least emphasised part of the statement. We find that, depending on the regulatory imposition and the emphasis assigned to the section of the profit announcement, the motive for voluntary disclosure of NGFM can be explained as altruistic (informative) or opportunistic (misleading). We contribute evidence on ‘pay–action’ rather than ‘pay–performance’ by incorporating all three components simultaneously into the framework to maintain the assumption of correspondence and internal consistency among those components.     

Structure and Level of Remuneration Across the Top Executive Team

This paper details the level and structure of executive remuneration across the executive team from 2006 to 2009. Results indicate that the level and structure of executive pay varies across the executive team. There is a clear delineation between the level and structure of all components of pay for the CEO and Executive 1, and for other executives. Employees of finance firms receive higher levels of pay and greater proportions of bonus than do employees in other sectors. Pay structure in 2009 is different from other years in the study, indicating that the economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 has led to differences in executive pay.     

THE GOVERNANCE OF CEO INCENTIVES IN ENGLISH NHS HOSPITAL TRUSTS

Institutional arrangements for the governance of CEO pay and turnover in English NHS Hospital Trusts replicate best practice for listed companies but with the additional feature of centrally imposed performance measurement. In this paper we investigate the impact of this unique combination of incentives on the relationship between CEO pay/turnover and Trust financial and operating performance in the period 1998–2005. We identify a strong association between poor Trust performance and CEO turnover but find little evidence that remuneration committees relate pay to performance in the best performing Trusts. Our findings raise questions about the economic rationale for remuneration committees in the governance of NHS Hospital Trusts.     

Which came first,CEO compensation or firm performance? The causality dilemma in European companies

This study uses both a functionalist paradigm of social theory and agency theory assumptions to examine whether CEO remuneration is performance sensitive and, vice versa, whether companies that pay their CEOs more perform better. Our analysis is based on the sample of 330 large European firms for the period from 2009 to 2013. The findings of panel data analysis confirm that CEO compensation is positively associated with corporate performance, and vice versa. The simultaneous estimation, in which we treat both compensation and firm performance as endogenous using a two-stage least squares method, shows that companies tie bonuses to accounting-based measures and this incentive pay enhances corporate internal performance. However, compensation linked to market-based measures does not improve firm performance.     

Equity‐based incentives and shareholder say‐on‐pay

We study the relationship between CEO pay‐performance sensitivity, pay‐risk sensitivity, and shareholder voting outcomes as part of the “say‐on‐pay” provision of the 2010 US Dodd‐Frank Act. Consistent with our hypothesis, we provide evidence that shareholders tend to approve of compensation packages that are more sensitive to changes in stock price (pay‐performance sensitivity). Our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions that outside owners approve of equity incentives as a means of aligning managers' interests with those of shareholders. We also document that future changes to equity‐based incentives are related to voting outcomes and that shareholders incorporate CFO incentives into their votes. Collectively, these results provide evidence of the importance of equity‐based incentives from the perspective of those most concerned with firm value and of the effectiveness of say‐on‐pay as a governance mechanism.     

Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?

This paper examines whether the presence of interlocked directors on a board is associated with weak governance. For a sample of 3,566 firm‐years spanning 2001 to 2003, we find that firms with lower industry‐adjusted firm performance are more likely to have interlocked directors. We document that shareholders react negatively to the formation of director interlocks and find that the presence of interlocked directors is associated with lower than optimal pay‐performance sensitivity of CEO incentive compensation and reduced sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Collectively, our results suggest that the presence of interlocked directors is indicative of weak governance.     

CEO Risk‐taking Incentives and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure

This paper investigates the effects of a borrowing firm's CEO risk‐taking incentives on the structure of the firm's syndicated loans. When CEO risk‐taking incentives are high, syndicates are structured to facilitate better due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates have a smaller number of total lenders and are more concentrated, and lead arrangers will retain a greater portion of the loan. Moreover, CEO risk‐taking incentives have a lesser effect on the syndicate structure when lead arrangers have a good reputation and a prior lending relationship with a borrowing firm, while they have a greater effect on the syndicate structure when borrowing firms have low information transparency, are financially distressed or have low growth prospects.     

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.     

Duration of Executive Compensation

Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.     

CEO inside debt and investment‐cash flow sensitivity

This paper provides a new explanation for investment‐cash flow sensitivity from the perspective of CEO inside debt holdings. We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on investment‐cash flow sensitivity for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012. We find that the firms with higher relative CEO leverage ratios (CEO's debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm's debt/equity ratio) generate higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the relative CEO leverage ratio enlarges investment‐cash flow sensitivity by 50 per cent. This positive relationship still holds even after we take account of endogeneity and financial constraints.     

GOLF TOURNAMENTS AND CEO PAY—UNRAVELING THE MYSTERIES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Leading financial economists and activist institutional investors have long argued that the proper alignment of manager and shareholder interests requires the use of performance based compensation. Partly in response to these pressures, and in combination with a change in the tax code that encourages performance-based pay, corporate boards have dramatically increased their use of stock grants and executive stock options. Combine this development with the longest bull market in U.S. financial history, and the result is unprecedented levels of CEO pay at the close of the 20th century. This review of executive compensation reveals that the economic theory of tournaments may provide a rationale for the pattern, if not the level, of executive pay. Specifically it finds that the total compensation of the five highestpaid executives in a cross-section of new and old-economy firms is very similar to the pattern of payouts to players in a golf tournament. The author also reports that recent studies show a significant increase in the pay-for-performance correlation throughout the 1990s. But whether that correlation is as high as it should be, and whether current levels of CEO pay are socially "optimal," are questions that remain unanswered.