R&D Subsidies,Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.     

Do R&D tax incentives work? Firm-level evidence from China

Tax incentives have been used worldwide to encourage firm R&D, but there is little evidence on their effectiveness as a policy tool in developing countries. We use a panel dataset of Chinese listed companies covering 2007 to 2013 to assess the effects of tax incentives on firm R&D expenditures and analyze how institutional conditions shape these effects. Our results show that tax incentives motivate R&D expenditures for our sample firms. A 10% reduction in R&D user costs leads firms to increase R&D expenditures by 3.97% in the short run. We also find considerable effect heterogeneity: Tax incentives significantly stimulate R&D in private firms but have little influence on state-owned enterprises' R&D expenditures. Moreover, the effects of tax incentives are more pronounced for private firms without political connections. Hence, reducing political intervention complements tax incentives' capacity to foster firm R&D in developing countries.     

Local land supply and fiscal incentives for R&D: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Whereas numerous studies have evaluated the effects of public research and development (R&D) support programs and R&D tax incentives on private R&D, little is known about local governments' fiscal incentives for R&D. In this study, we build a conceptual framework to clarify the critical role of local land supply in relation to fiscal expenditure on R&D. We treat the establishment of China's nine Land Supervision Bureaus in 2006 as a quasi-natural experiment, and run a difference-in-differences regression to identify causality. The results show that local governments allocate more fiscal expenditure to R&D in response to land-use supervision, which monitors illegal land granting behaviors, and this effect is stronger in cities where leaders have higher political career incentives and cities with greater fiscal decentralization. Moreover, we find that land-use supervision increases the probability and scale of firms' access to government subsidies for R&D; thus, enhancing regional innovation capacity. Our findings document that China's land resource is a curse for its innovation-driven growth as it impedes local governments' fiscal incentives for R&D.     

技术创新价值与政府资源支持对科技民企研发支出的影响研究

企业研发支出可以反映其研发行为的过程和结果.分析技术创新的市场价值与政府资源支持对科技民企研发支出总规模和各阶段规模的影响,有助于明晰市场和制度因素影响技术创新的机制和效果.对中小板297家高科技民企的检验表明:技术创新价值对企业资本性和费用性研发支出均有显著正向影响;财政补贴显著正向调节技术创新价值分别与资本性和费用性研发支出的正向关系,且对前者的调节效应大于对后者的调节效应;税收激励对技术创新价值与资本性和费用性研发支出关系的调节效应均不显著;财政补贴对高科技民企的研发支出规模有更好的驱动效果.     

Advertising, in-house R&D, and growth

This paper develops a quality-ladder model of endogenous growthto study the interplay between in-house R&D and combativeadvertising expenditure, and its implications for economic growth,firm size, and welfare. The analysis shows that, somewhat surprisingly,higher incentives to engage in advertising, although combative,unambiguously foster innovation activity of firms. This, possibly,leads to faster growth and even higher welfare. These resultsrest on two features of the model which are well-supported byempirical evidence. First, if firms incur higher sunk costsfor marketing, concentration and firm size rise. Second, firmsize and R&D expenditure are positively related as largerfirms are able to spread R&D costs over higher sales. Theanalysis also suggests that R&D subsidies are conduciveto R&D and growth without inducing firms to raise advertisingoutlays.     

政府补助、金融化与制造业创新——基于上市公司的实证研究

选取2011—2020年制造业上市公司数据,以信号理论为视角研究政府补助、金融化与制造业创新之间的关系。研究发现：研发补助、非研发补助对创新产出的作用具有非对称性,金融化在信号传递的过程中发挥了调节效应;研发补助和创新产出存在倒“U”型关系,非研发补助和创新产出呈正相关;金融化可以正向调节研发补助、非研发补助和创新产出的关系,与其他制造企业相比,金融化的调节作用在民营制造企业表现得最为明显。     

雪中送炭还是过犹不及：政府补贴对企业研发的影响

基于2013—2018年沪深A股制造业民营企业上市公司的数据，实证探讨了政府补贴与企业研发的关系。研究发现政府补贴与研发强度之间并不是简单的线性关系，而是呈显著的倒U型关系。这意味着，适当的政府补贴能够激励企业进行研发投入，但过高的政府补贴反而对企业研发投入产生了挤出效应，是无效率的政府干预行为。研究结论有助于政府重新考虑对制造业民营企业的研发补贴支持力度，以期更有效地激发企业的创新积极性，加快建设创新型国家的步伐。     

R&D Investments and Tax Incentives: The Role of Intra-Firm Cross-Border Collaboration*

U.S. multinational corporations increasingly use intra-firm, cross-border research collaboration to disperse R&D across different countries. This paper investigates the implications of such collaboration on the abilities of firms to garner benefits from R&D tax incentives. We find that the association between R&D intensity and tax incentives is three to five times larger when firms have extensive cross-border collaboration connected to a country. We also find that the effect is stronger when local intellectual property protection is weaker and when local innovation resources are higher. Our results suggest that cross-border collaboration helps firms achieve more tax-efficient R&D investments both by reducing the nontax frictions posed by weak intellectual property protection and by increasing the nontax benefits of foreign R&D.     

Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under R&D competition: Output versus R&D subsidies

We compare Cournot and Bertrand competitions with R&D investment under output versus R&D subsidy policies. We demonstrate that Cournot firms invest more (less) in R&D and the government grants more (less) subsidies than for Bertrand firms with output (R&D) subsidies. We also find that both competition modes yield the same welfare with output subsidy, while Bertrand yields higher welfare than Cournot with R&D subsidy. Finally, firms' profits and welfare in Cournot are higher under output subsidies, while they can be higher in Bertrand under R&D subsidies if the product substitutability is high and the firm's R&D investment is efficient.     

政府科技资助对企业研发投入的直接和空间溢出效应研究

基于中国30个省域2011—2019年规模以上工业企业面板数据,采用空间计量模型分析政府科技资助对企业研发投入的直接和空间溢出效应,并进一步探讨企业异质因素的调节作用。结果表明：政府科技资助除了对企业研发投入具有直接正向激励效应外,而且具有空间溢出效应;企业规模、技术水平和盈利能力对企业研发投入具有正向影响,而产权性质对企业研发投入具有负向影响;企业规模与技术水平在政府科技资助与企业研发投入间的关系具有正向调节作用,而产权性质在两者间关系不具有显著的调节作用。     

Subsidizing R&D Cooperatives

A framework is developed with which the implementation of two commonly used R&D-stimulating policies can be evaluated: providing R&D subsidies and sustaining the formation of R&D cooperatives. Subsidized R&D cooperatives can also be analyzed. The analysis shows that providing R&D subsidies is more effective in raising private R&D investments than sustaining R&D cooperatives. Moreover, optimally subsidizing cooperative R&D or noncooperative R&D leads to the same level of R&D activity. Sustaining R&D cooperatives thus appears to be a redundant industrial policy, all else equal.     

Investment in transport and communication technology in a Cournot duopoly with trade

We investigate the role of R&D investment in transport and communication (TCRD) in a Cournot duopoly with trade. We consider countries of different size and show that the firm located in the smaller country has a higher incentive to invest than the rival in the larger country. We also prove that social incentives are aligned with private ones. As for the terms of trade, any improvement of TC technology favours the smaller country, all else equal.     

Effectiveness of industrial policy on firm productivity: evidence from Thai manufacturing

This paper examines the effects of industrial policy on firm productivity, using a three-year panel data set of Thai manufacturing as a case study. A range of industrial policy tools is defined, including tariff measures, subsidies, and investment incentives through the Board of Investment (BOI), which represent the main industrial policy tools used in Thailand. The effect of ‘water in the tariffs’ and partial trade liberalisation undertaken through free trade agreements (FTAs) signed between Thailand and her trading partners is also examined. The key findings concern the role traditional tools, that is trade openness, R&D, and skills upgrading, play in fostering firm productivity. Promoting a conducive environment, especially within domestic competition, is crucial in encouraging firm productivity. Some industrial policy tools are effective in promoting firm productivity, that is providing investment incentives via the BOI and lowering tariff protection. Subsidies, by contrast, tend to degrade firm productivity. Among trade protection measures, the effective rate of protection, which includes water in the tariffs encountered by exporting firms, has the greatest effect on firm productivity. The FTA-led trade liberalisation fails to add substantial competitive pressure and induce firms to improve productivity. Such statistical insignificance reflects the nature of FTA commitments that Thailand has made so far.     

Understanding Agreements on TRIPS and Subsidies in Tandem

We provide a theoretical framework to explain why governments seek stronger protection of IPRs and allow R&D subsidies through multilateral trade agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies. Our analysis indicates that it is globally optimal to disseminate knowledge without IPR protection and to subsidize inventive firms when issues of IPR protection and R&D subsidies are considered in tandem. R&D subsidies are a means of amending for damages to investors’ incentives by weak IPR protection. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement is understood as a victory of the interests of exporting countries over those of importing countries.

Pharmaceutical Patents: Incentives for Research and Development or Marketing?

We analyze how a patent‐holding pharmaceutical firm may strategically use advertising of existing drugs to affect research and development (R&D) investments in new (differentiated) drugs, and thereby affect the probability distribution of future market structures in the industry. Within a fairly general model framework, we derive exact conditions for advertising and R&D being substitute strategies for the incumbent firm and show that it may overinvest in advertising to reduce the incentive for an entrant to invest in R&D, thereby reducing the probability of a new product on the market. In a more specific setting of informative advertising, we show that such overinvestment incentives are always present and that more generous patent protection implies that a larger share of the patent rent is spent on marketing, relative to R&D.     

Mixed duopoly,location choice,and shadow cost of public funds

We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare.     

Product Reliability,R&D,and Manufacturing Cost Shocks

Suppose a firm’s research and development (R&D) improves product reliability which in turn decreases the cost of product failure for both the firm and its customers. The primary research question of the paper is how a firm with market power optimally adjusts its R&D if it experiences a manufacturing cost shock. Our model suggests that a manufacturing cost shock prompts the firm to do less R&D in the cases where the replacement cost is low or the marginal manufacturing cost is high. Conversely, if the replacement cost is high and the marginal manufacturing cost is low, then the firm increases R&D, mitigating some of the increase in the manufacturing cost. The paper also compares the outcomes for reliability, profits, consumer surplus, and social surplus for the optimal R&D case as compared to the case of doing no R&D, paying particular attention to how exogenous changes in the marginal manufacturing cost affect this comparison.     

Mixed oligopoly,endogenous timing and mergers

The present paper discusses endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly model, comprising one public firm and two private firms, assuming both a merger between the two private firms and between one private and one public firm. The paper proves that although a merger between the two private firms does not change the timing of the game, a merger between the public firm and the private firm into a mixed firm could change the market structure from Stackelberg to Cournot competition.     

Corporate Social Responsibility or Payoff Asymmetry? A Study of an Endogenous Timing Game

We revisit an endogenous timing game by introducing corporate social responsibility into firms' payoffs. Previous research investigates an endogenous timing game in a mixed oligopoly, wherein one welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firms. It shows that the outcome is completely different from that of private oligopoly. In contrast to its result, we find that this change in payoff does not matter as long as the payoffs are symmetric. Our result indicates that asymmetry, and not welfare‐concerning objectives, yields specific results in the literature on mixed oligopoly.     

基于技术风险的研发联盟政府补贴政策研究

文章考虑研发存在技术风险,建立了合作研发博弈模型,研究了政府不同财政补贴方式（研发投入补贴和产品补贴）下的企业研发和生产策略。通过理论和数值仿真分析找出了不同补贴政策下的企业最优策略和相应的社会福利,并就政府的研发补贴政策提出了相应建议。研究表明,两种补贴政策均无法实现社会福利的最优解,研发难度较小的情况下宜采用研发投入补贴,研发难度较大的情况下应采用产品补贴,以此提高企业研发投入和社会福利。