Liberalizing US spectrum allocation

In the US, adjudication of wireless entry under the “public interest” standard protects incumbent service providers. Excess demand exists for access to radio spectrum, despite a common misperception that license auctions held by regulators are tantamount to selling spectrum. Would-be suppliers are slowed by the regulatory process. After discussing the financial tolls extracted, the author suggests a number of structural policy reforms, applicable both to the USA and perhaps spectrum markets elsewhere. These include: permissive airwave use (within emission limits implicitly defined by the license); endowing licensees with use of adjacent buffer zones; exhaustive allocation of remaining bandwidth to new applicants and streamlining the process for entrants to gain access to unoccupied bandwidth, using liability rules and post-entry dispute resolution mechanisms.     

Economic viability of private commons: Framework and guidelines for profitability

Ongoing regulatory reforms have led to several novel spectrum sharing models under the general umbrella of dynamic spectrum sharing. The private commons model introduced by FCC in 2004 allows spectrum licensees to provide secondary access to spectrum on an opportunistic basis while retaining ownership. Since wireless communication systems are typically overprovisioned in order to deliver service-level guarantees to (primary) users under short-term load variations, this model bears significant potential by facilitating utilization of temporal and spatial surplus of capacity through serving secondary users at possibly different service levels. A potential barrier to adoption of the private commons model is the uncertainty about secondary price–demand relationship which is difficult to predict in an emerging market: A selected price for secondary access may be profitable for some values of secondary demand but not for others, leading to a profound uncertainty about ultimate benefit of spectrum sharing. This paper aims to eliminate such an uncertainty by devising concrete guidelines and methods for profitability. The paper establishes that the price of secondary spectrum access can be chosen to guarantee profitability for any value of secondary demand: It is shown that for both the coordinated and uncoordinated commons regimes a profitable price should exceed a threshold value, which can be calculated. Hence profitability of private commons is insensitive to the demand function. This observation has two complementary interpretations: From a business perspective it provides a constructive approach to profitability; and from a regulatory perspective it provides reassurance that private commons is a healthy model. The paper also leverages the insensitivity property and outlines a technique to further enhance revenue via iterative spectrum offerings.     

Spectrum use and carrier costs: a critical trade-off

In making spectrum allocation and assignment decisions, national officials may wish to consider how these decisions will affect the costs experienced by licensees and the prices ultimately paid by customers. With low tier wireless systems as an illustration, this paper uses an engineering-economic model to describe the relationship between the amount of spectrum allocated and the per subscriber investment required of carriers/licensees. This relationship is explored under a variety of assumptions relating to service provision. The paper concludes with the public policy implications of the work and recommendations for policymakers and regulators involved with spectrum allocation. The analysis presented here seems particularly appropriate for extending service to unserved areas.     

Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management

This paper offers a detailed analysis of selected regulatory parameters used as instruments to promote efficiency with fairness for all stakeholders (in the legal sense of equity) in 5G spectrum auctions. Data were collected from sixteen auctions for the C-band that took place in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2017 and 2020 for the introduction of the fifth generation (5G) of mobile communication technology. The selected instruments of intervention are: spectrum packaging, spectrum caps, set-asides, geographical scope of the license, license duration, various forms of license obligations, reserve prices and auction format.Significant differences were observed in national approaches to spectrum packaging, license obligations and reserve prices for efficiency purposes. Our analysis also shows that European national regulators are paying increasing attention to concerns over fairness of decisions on spectrum, or equity, especially by creating opportunities for local private networks to access the spectrum and by imposing requirements on network operators to guarantee more uniform population coverage of newly created 5G networks.     

Royalties vs. upfront lump-sum fees in data communication environments

Mobile communications markets worldwide, today, are saturated, the number of mobile network operators (MNOs) in market is declining, mobile revenues are stagnant or falling, MNOs are becoming wireless Internet service providers, and economies of scope are strengthening. This paper challenges existing dominant views on spectrum assignment and license fee payments, estimates spectrum fees that MNOs would have paid under royalties and then compares them with upfront lump-sum fees actually paid by 3G licensees. This paper further proposes that governments need to consider assigning additional spectrum to incumbents as needs arise without using auctions and adopting royalties as a way of collecting spectrum fees should they collect them.     

Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission, 2012–2013

Pointing to the role of economic analysis, this article reviews major Federal Communications Commission actions and initiatives that are related to universal service support in high-cost areas that are served by price-cap incumbent local exchange carriers, special access policy, secondary market spectrum transactions, spectrum reassignments, and rules that govern interoperability among certain licensees in the 700 MHz band and spectrum ownership. Also discussed are activities of the recently created Technology Transitions Policy Task Force and challenges to communications policy that are posed by the transition to voice over internet protocol interconnection.     

Licensing‐in fosters rapid invention! the effect of the grant‐back clause and technological unfamiliarity

Drawing on contractual economics and innovation management, licensing‐in is hypothesized to accelerate licensees' invention process. Studying a matched dataset of licensees and non‐licensees, licensees are shown to be faster at inventing, but the effect is negated if the license includes a grant‐back clause, shifting incentives from licensee to licensor. Also, the effect is significantly reduced if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology. The effect of the grant‐back clause is offset if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology, suggesting that the licensee retains the incentives to invent under these circumstances. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The spectrum policy reform paving the way to cognitive radio enabled spectrum sharing

The increasing amount of data and video traffic carried by mobile networks has recently risen the demand for enhanced network capacity, more efficient use and more effective management of spectrum. Cognitive radio technologies candidate to respond to these urgent needs by allowing a near simultaneous band sharing. The regulation plays a crucial role in promoting the adoption of these technologies, in order to overcome the traditional paradigms of authorizations for exclusive spectrum usage. The article outlines spectrum management regimes where the implementation of frequency sharing technologies, including cognitive technologies, is foreseeable and brings them back to a comprehensive taxonomy of dynamic spectrum access and sharing models, in the effort to reconcile partially diverging approaches and nomenclatures suggested in literature. Theoretic analysis is supported by a number of illustrations and practical experiments with shared spectrum usage. Based on suggested taxonomy, the research aims at showing the evolutionary path toward the introduction and spreading of cognitive and other spectrum sharing technologies, pointing out relevant trends and instruments made available by the reform of EU Telecom Package, as well as at outlining the status of regulation, policy and standardization in Europe.     

Spectrum sharing in the gray space

There has been considerable effort to let more wireless devices operate in white space spectrum, that is within frequency bands and geographic areas where no wireless devices are active. Making white space available is certainly useful, but there are other sharing opportunities as well, some of which have been obscured by dangerous misconceptions about the concept of unused spectrum. This paper discusses allowing more devices to operate safely in gray space spectrum, that is spectrum that is actively being used in that transmissions are underway—something many economic models assume is impossible. The paper focuses on primary–secondary sharing, so devices gaining access to spectrum operate on a secondary basis in a way that never causes harmful interference to primary systems. Examples of primary–secondary gray space sharing mechanisms are described in which devices are allowed to share spectrum with broadcasting, radar, and cellular systems. Quantitative analysis shows that it is technically possible to support significant communications among secondary devices in spectrum that is already heavily used by cellular or radar. However, gray space sharing generally causes primary and secondary systems to be more technically interdependent than white space sharing, so different policy and governance structures are needed. Secondary market rules can support gray space sharing in cases where there is a single primary spectrum user, such as a cellular carrier. In cases where technology is static, the regulator may be able to control access for secondary devices. However, in cases with multiple primary users and multiple secondary users of spectrum, as might be seen in bands with radar for example, a new kind of governance body will be needed to facilitate spectrum sharing.     

FDA’s regulation of genetically engineered foods: Scientific, legal and political dimensions

The controversy over genetically engineered (GE) food during the southern Africa drought in 2002/03 raised questions concerning the safety of GE foods and the basis for the safety assurances issued by national and international agencies. In the case of foods grown in the US, these assurances must be interpreted in relation to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 1992 policy, which remains in effect today. This paper provides a detailed examination of the roles of scientific, legal and political considerations in the development of that policy.This paper reveals that the FDA responded to political pressure for a permissive regulatory approach by exploiting gaps in scientific knowledge, creatively interpreting existing food law and limiting public involvement in the policy’s development. Common statements by the government and other proponents concerning sound science, rigorous testing, no evidence of harm and “as safe as conventional foods” are found to be misleading unless the scientific, legal and political basis for the US policy is taken into account.While this paper finds that the evidence for the safety of GE foods has been exaggerated by government agencies and other parties, nothing in this paper suggests that GE foods currently on the market are harmful to human health. To the contrary, the situation is one of great uncertainty. Repeated recommendations that this issue be the topic of a major public research effort have yet to be acted upon.     

Spectrum auctions: Distortionary input tax or efficient revenue instrument?

Spectrum license auctions are widely recognized by economists as more efficient than lotteries or administrative approaches to allocate exclusive rights to spectrum. But whether spectrum auctions are the most efficient spectrum policy still generates debate, in part because the answer may vary depending on exactly what is being optimized, what else is assumed or held constant, and the policies to which one is comparing spectrum auctions. This paper examines the complex confluence of US spectrum policy and fiscal policy. It concludes that economically efficient spectrum policy requires several distinct optimizations, including devolvement of an efficient set spectrum rights and the optimal approach to raising and recycling government revenue in that devolvement process. It also requires allocation policies that take into account possible distortions of the secondary market for spectrum via the capital gains tax. The paper argues that there is no compelling theoretical case or empirical evidence that spectrum auctions are distortionary, and examines cases in which the most efficient policy is to auction spectrum and “recycle” the revenue to offset more distortionary revenue instruments. This paper also examines cases in which it is most efficient to allocate spectrum rights without raising revenue, for example when transactions costs are high or distributional concerns can prevent or delay efficiency-enhancing reforms.     

Licensing Essential Patents: The Non‐Discriminatory Commitment and Hold‐Up

Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non‐discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard‐conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non‐discriminatory commitment alleviates the hold‐up problem. Moreover, it improves consumer and social welfare, and promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased. In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the commitment, all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.     

Regulation and innovation in 5G markets

This article examines the roles and consequences of different approaches to 5G market design for innovation. The analysis is grounded in a conceptual framework that explicitly considers the complementarities among networks, applications, and services. Good policy arrangements align the legal and regulatory framework with the technical and economic characteristics of the sector and the broader, social visions for new technologies. Because the future development of 5G technology and markets is open-ended, policy has to be developed with incomplete knowledge and under conditions of uncertainty. These circumstances call for adaptive forms of policy and a focus on the creation of guardrails for market players, backed up by regulatory powers to intervene more directly if necessary. In the technologically dynamic 5G system, multiple stable policy constellations are feasible, but they likely will result in divergent outcomes and performance characteristics. Monitoring of the experience with different national and international developments will facilitate global learning and the incremental improvement of policy frameworks.     

Effective competition and ineffective mobile industry regulation in South Africa

The most striking feature of South Africa’s mobile market is the skewed allocation of spectrum and a seemingly endless sequence of failed attempts to hold an auction for it. A shortage of spectrum (or the inefficient assignment of it) is blamed, among other things, for South Africa’s relatively slow LTE 4G speeds. Through historical accident, the country has two mobile data networks in addition to the four licensed mobile operators. The response of operators has been to innovate using roaming and network sharing agreements; as we explore in this paper, these have become the de facto spectrum allocation process.This paper looks at how the de facto industry structure has been moulded by spectrum holdings and sharing arrangements and asks how spectrum management could be improved. We observe that, although the number of mobile operators has effectively been reduced to 3 (a number which would raise concern in some circles), there exist a variety of arrangements between those three and other spectrum and network operators. The smallest of the current three mobile operators is still not able to offer a nationwide mobile service without a roaming agreement but, at the same time, the two larger operators depend critically on spectrum and roaming agreements themselves, mainly with the two physical data network operators that function as wholesale providers.The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) was established as a consequence of a new constitution that was adopted in 1996 and it helped to create new institutional arrangements for the burgeoning mobile industry. The authority has nevertheless continued to be hampered, as we shall demonstrate, by political imperatives. This has been pointed out by other authors over the past twenty years and we add to this body of evidence by considering the spectrum auction planned (again) for 2021.The “2021” auction is in fact an iteration of the auction originally announced in May 2010 and then abandoned (Song, 2011). The same thing happened again in 2016 (Paelo & Robb, 2020). Late in 2020, the regulator again announced an auction, due to take place during 2021 but by the second quarter of the year, two of the four national operators had already obtained a court injunction to stop it. The process is intertwined with a political imperative to establish a public wireless open-access network, which we discuss in detail.We describe how the industry has navigated around policy and regulatory dysfunction and how competitive interaction among the South African operators has managed to prevail. Following Hausman & Taylor’s (2013) lead in their work on the United States, in this paper we provide a commentary on apparently perverse outcomes from significant regulatory, judicial and legislative actions (or, perhaps more accurately, inactions) governing the South African mobile telecommunications industry from the commencement of the current constitutional arrangements in 1996 to the present.     

A mixed spectrum management framework for the future wireless service based on techno-economic analysis: The Korean spectrum policy study

The evolution of radio technology and various services has increased the world's dependence on wireless communications. The demand for and value of spectrum resources therefore are also increasing. Spectrum efficiency is the most important factor in managing spectrum scarcity. However, under the current spectrum management approach, it is difficult to adopt innovative technologies that improve spectrum efficiency and flexible usage in the current dynamic wireless market. Recently, there have been several approaches to improve efficient use of spectrum resources, and each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, this research first discusses current issues and analyzes relative social welfare based on the different characteristics of technology and market conditions to compare various attributes of each approach. Based on the techno-economic simulation results, this paper introduces a mixed spectrum management framework for the future wireless service and support policy makers’ decision making. Furthermore, the mixed spectrum policy to spectrum management in Korea is proposed to find a more realistic and efficient spectrum management policy.     

Toward new guardrails for the information society

Increasing interdependencies and deepening uncertainty change how the information society can be governed sustainably. In response, policy approaches worldwide are being reconsidered and new approaches developed that are more appropriate to these conditions. This article explores the conditions under which policies that worked in the past remain appropriate and when they will likely fail. It explores the role of dynamic analytical frames and a reconsideration of the normative principles of information society policies in overcoming these weaknesses. New instruments and policy arrangements that are considered include the establishment of boundary conditions (“guardrails”) for players, reliance on adaptive forms of policy, and reliance on ethics across all layers of governance. Driven by the global heterogeneity of values and the diversity of historical, economic, political, and cultural conditions, national and global governance arrangements will likely become more multi-centric. To avoid regulatory drift and fragmentation, policy must strive to create dynamic learning systems that help to continuously improve information society governance.     

Spectrum auctions in India: lessons from experience

Spectrum auctions have been used with significant success in many developed countries. From a regulatory and policy perspective, spectrum auctions ensure the efficient use of spectrum by allocating it to those entities that value it most, while also generating revenues for governments. But auctions may lead to unexpected outcomes due to unanticipated problems with their design leading to unexpected bidder behavior such as collusion and over-bidding. The key challenge before regulatory agencies is to design auctions in such a way as to meet the objective of fostering competition while at the same time ensuring that bidders can effectively use the spectrum for their business. While India was one of the early adopters of spectrum auctions, its success in service provision has been low. This paper critically examines issues in auction design that contributed to this delay and reviews the key elements in the design process namely a coherent regulatory framework, choice of service areas, flexibility for service area consolidation, standards and their role, convergence, managing public service regulation and managing defaults. The paper compares the handling of these elements in auctions in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Australia with the objective of drawing lessons for Indian policy makers.     

Dynamic usage of narrowband spectrum

We examine the potential for expansion of the white space spectrum sharing model in the 400 MHz band. As opposed to UHF broadcast spectrum, which contains unassigned or idle segments known as white spaces, the 400 MHz band is characterised by intensive licence usage. However, productive spectrum usage does not guarantee allocative efficiency, which would require knowledge of the highest value service for each licence. 400 MHz frequencies are not priced on opportunity cost. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the economically efficient mix of services to deploy in the 400 MHz band. Drawing parallels with the high-economic value revealed and generated through the operations of unlicensed white space devices in UHF broadcast spectrum, we identify untapped 400 MHz spectrum capacity, which we refer to as narrowband spaces. Encouraging dynamic spectrum usage of narrowband spaces could, similarly to TV white space usage help realise the efficient allocation of the 400 MHz band. However, the narrowband nature of the 400 MHz licences and high licensing turnover imply a significantly different concept of dynamic spectrum access than that considered for TV Bands. The paper discusses regulatory implications and the type of services suited to exploit narrowband spaces.     

Licensing Strategies in the Presence of Patent Thickets

Many key industries (e.g., biomedical, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and information technologies) are characterized by cumulative innovations, where the introduction of a new product or service often requires many complementary technologies. When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firms, patent thickets exist, which researchers have argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, patent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, which is called “royalty stacking,” and if such costs are passed on to consumers, prices of products based on cumulative technologies will be driven up, dubbed as “double marginalization.” The literature, however, does not address these issues under different forms of licensing contracts. This article develops a game‐theoretic model where a downstream firm seeks to license N patents that read on its product from upstream firms. It discusses a variety of licensing forms widely used in practice and attempts to discover whether royalty stacking and double marginalization occur under these forms of licenses. It also studies the impact of bargaining power between parties. It is found that when patent ownership becomes more fragmented, neither royalty stacking nor double marginalization occurs under profit‐based royalty, fixed fee, and hybrid licenses. Such problems occur only under pure quantity‐based or pure revenue‐based royalty licenses when the downstream firm's bargaining power is low. It is also shown that no matter how fragmented the ownership structure of patent is, hybrid licenses consisting of a fixed fee and a quantity‐ or revenue‐based royalty rate lead to the same market outcomes as a fully integrated firm that owns all the patents and the downstream market. This article has interesting implications for both research and practice. First, the results show that even under the same patent ownership structure, different forms of licenses lead to quite different market outcomes. Therefore, it is suggested that firms and policy makers pay more attention to contractual forms of licenses when trying to minimize the negative impact of patent thickets. Second, the extant literature has largely assumed that quantity‐based royalties are used, where double marginalization is the most severe. In practice, revenue‐based royalties are most common, under which double marginalization is much milder. Third, the results show that patent pools can be most effective in mitigating royalty stacking and double marginalization when quantity‐based or revenue‐based royalties are the sole or primary payment form, especially when downstream firms have low bargaining power.     

Spectrum allocation and its relevance for competition

Spectrum is one of the most important production factors for mobile telecommunications operators. Spectrum policy is paramount as spectrum is a scarce resource allocated by regulatory authorities. Hence, when allocating spectrum and determining the potential use of spectrum, the regulatory authorities have a significant influence on the competitive situation in mobile markets.