DuPont Analysis,Earnings Persistence,and Return on Equity: Evidence from Mandatory IFRS Adoption in Canada

This paper proposes four new models to forecast one‐year‐ahead return on equity (ROE) and change in ROE based on prior research in the DuPont analysis and earnings persistence, and also examines whether the persistence of ROE has improved upon mandatory IFRS adoption in Canada. Using the Granger causality test to establish the usefulness of additional explanatory variables in forecasting future earnings, I show that the DuPont components are useful in predicting one‐year‐ahead ROE, and that the persistence of ROE has decreased since Canadian firms adopted IFRS in 2011. This paper contributes to accounting research in two ways. First, it introduces a new approach to forecasting one‐year‐ahead ROE. Second, it sheds some light on the impact of IFRS adoption on reporting quality in Canada.     

Thunder Bay Transportation: A Case of Business Valuation and Negotiation*

Thunder Bay Transportation (TBT) is a very versatile case that can be used in several milieus and at various levels of difficulty. The case describes the process involved in the purchase and sale of a private business. Mr. Getzko, owner/manager of TBT, is attempting to sell his business to pursue retirement. Sudbury Systems (SS) is pursuing an acquisition of TBT. Students are required to assume the role of either Mr. Getzko’s accountants (seller) or Sudbury Systems’ accountants (buyer) to: (1) develop a preliminary business value, (2) negotiate adjustments, and (3) arrive at an agreed‐upon business value to finalize the sale. Students will explore both business valuation approaches (earnings based and asset based) and various business valuation concepts (e.g., normalized earnings, sustaining capital reinvestment, earnings multiple, redundant assets, etc.).     

Accounting Standards and Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This article examines the effect of an asset impairment–related regulatory reform on earnings management in China. Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8), which prohibits the reversal of long‐lived asset impairments, was promulgated to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long‐lived asset impairment losses only, while allowing the reversal of short‐term asset impairment losses. Based on a sample of China's A‐share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2008, we reveal that managers use less current asset write‐downs and more reversals in the post–CAS No. 8 period. However, such reporting practices do not appear to be influenced by managerial incentives to avoid reporting losses and/or for “big bath” accounting purposes.     

Entebbe Ltd.: A Tax Case

This case is designed to integrate two major tax issues—wind‐up of a company versus sale of shares—with business valuations. Thus, it is designed to incorporate key tax and finance CPA competency areas. There are two valuations required in this case. One is the valuation of shares; the other is the valuation of an intangible asset (a patent). Students have to recognize that before they can decide whether a wind‐up or sale of shares is preferred, they first need to determine the fair market value (FMV) of the shares. However, to determine the FMV of the shares, the valuation of a patent must be done first, as its value will impact the FMV of the shares. Thus, this case requires students to sequence their analysis. Residency issues (“departure tax”) upon leaving Canada permanently are also indirectly identified in the case.     

The Impact of Better‐than‐Average Bias and Relative Performance Pay on Performance Outcome Satisfaction

Drawing on equity and expectancy theories, we hypothesize that the perception of accountants about their ability to contribute relative to a peer (operationalized as the better‐than‐average [BTA] bias) negatively influences their satisfaction with the outcomes of the performance evaluation process (operationalized as performance outcome satisfaction [POS]). We hypothesize further that this negative influence is mitigated by the amount of relative performance pay. We test these hypotheses using data collected from a survey of and an experiment involving 164 entry‐level accountants. We found that in general our participants rated themselves better than the average audit professional and their immediate work associate; that is, they displayed a BTA bias. Moreover, we found that both the BTA bias and performance pay individually influenced POS; we also found a moderately significant interaction effect. In their entirety, the results indicate that the greater an entry‐level accountant believes that she or he is better than average the more likely her or his performance outcome satisfaction will fall.     

Audit Quality and the Market Valuation of Banks’ Allowance for Loan Losses*

The recent banking crisis has led market participants to focus on the adequacy and quality of banks’ balance sheet items such as the allowance for loan losses. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that the capital market prices the nondiscretionary component of loan loss allowance negatively and the discretionary component less negatively. Using data from the pre‐crisis period and three measures of audit quality, auditor type (i.e., Big 5 versus non–Big 5), auditor industry specialization/expertise, and audit and nonaudit fees paid to auditors, we examine the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses. We find that, relative to the nondiscretionary component, the market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is higher for banks audited by Big 5 auditors than for banks audited by non–Big 5 auditors. We also find that the relative market valuation of the discretionary component of loan loss allowance is increasing in auditor expertise. Regarding the impact of fees paid to auditors, we find that banks paying higher audit fees have higher relative market valuation of the discretionary component of the allowance for loan losses, but banks that pay higher nonaudit fees do not.     

Audit Committee Financial Expertise,Litigation Risk,and Auditor‐Provided Tax Services*

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) greatly expanded audit committees' oversight responsibilities by requiring that they preapprove all non‐prohibited non‐audit services (NAS). Using data from 2003 to 2011, we find that tax NAS are significantly lower when accounting financial experts (ACT‐FEs) serve on the audit committee, suggesting that ACT‐FEs consider auditor independence risk, perceived and/or real, more than other members, including supervisory experts, to the point of not accepting any tax NAS, not even compliance. However, in firms with higher ex ante litigation risk, ACT‐FEs approve relatively more tax NAS than other members, suggesting that they accept the costs of a perceived lack of auditor independence from tax NAS in return for the potential benefits of increased financial reporting quality arising from tax NAS. Our analysis by subperiod (2003–2006 vs. 2007–2011) shows that this result is significant only in the second period. ACT‐FEs' differential evaluation of the trade‐off between the benefits and costs of joint audit and tax NAS provision between the two periods suggests the need for additional research in later post‐SOX years.