Profitability of time series momentum

We propose a continuous-time heterogeneous agent model consisting of fundamental, momentum, and contrarian traders to explain the significant time series momentum. We show that the performance of momentum strategy is determined by both time horizon and the market dominance of momentum traders. Specifically, when momentum traders are more active in the market, momentum strategies with short (long) time horizons stabilize (destabilize) the market, and meanwhile the market under-reacts (over-reacts) in short-run (long-run). This provides profit opportunity for time series momentum strategies with short horizons and reversal with long horizons. When momentum traders are less active in the market, they always lose. The results provide an insight into the profitability of time series momentum documented in recent empirical studies.     

Beliefs Aggregation and Return Predictability

We study return predictability using a model of speculative trading among competitive traders who agree to disagree about the precision of private information. Although traders apply Bayes' Law consistently, returns are predictable. In addition to trading on long-term fundamental value, traders also trade on perceived short-term opportunities arising from foreseen future disagreement, as in a Keynesian beauty contest. Contradicting conventional wisdom, this short-term speculation dampens price fluctuations and generates time-series momentum. Model calibration shows quantitatively realistic patterns of return dynamics. Consistent with empirical evidence, our model predicts more pronounced momentum for stocks with higher trading volume.     

Limit-order submission strategies under asymmetric information

This paper provides evidence that informed traders dominate the response of limit-order submissions to shocks in a pure limit-order market. In the market we study, informed traders are highly sensitive to spreads, volatility, momentum and depth. By contrast, uninformed traders are relatively insensitive to all these market conditions. The dominance of the informed over limit-order submissions is magnified by contrasts between them and the uninformed in the use of aggressively-priced limit orders.     

Momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift anomalies: The role of liquidity risk

This paper investigates the components of liquidity risk that are important for understanding asset-pricing anomalies. Firm-level liquidity is decomposed into variable and fixed price effects and estimated using intraday data for the period 1983–2001. Unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations of the variable component rather than the fixed component of liquidity are shown to be priced within the context of momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) portfolio returns. As the variable component is typically associated with private information [e.g., Kyle, 1985. Econometrica 53, 1315–1335], the results suggest that a substantial part of momentum and PEAD returns can be viewed as compensation for the unexpected variations in the aggregate ratio of informed traders to noise traders.     

Momentum Strategies: Evidence from Pacific Basin Stock Markets

We investigate the profitability of momentum investment strategy in six Asian stock markets. Unrestricted momentum investment strategies do not yield significant momentum profits. Although we find that a diversified country‐neutral strategy generates small but statistically significant returns during 1981–1994, when we control for size and turnover effects we find that the country‐neutral profits dissipate. Our evidence suggests that the factors that contribute to the momentum phenomenon in the United States are not prevalent in the Asian markets.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets

We model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: "newswatchers" and "momentum traders." Each newswatcher observes some private information, but fails to extract other newswatchers' information from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that the momentum traders can profit by trend-chasing. However, if they can only implement simple (i.e., univariate) strategies, their attempts at arbitrage must inevitably lead to overreaction at long horizons. In addition to providing a unified account of under- and overreactions, the model generates several other distinctive implications.     

A dynamic limit order market with fast and slow traders

This paper considers the role of high-frequency trading in a dynamic limit order market. Fast traders? ability to revise their quotes quickly after news arrivals helps to reduce the inefficiency that is rooted in the risk of being picked off, which increases trade. However, their presence induces slow traders to strategically submit limit orders with a lower execution probability, thereby reducing trade. Because speed is a source of market power, it enables fast traders to extract rents from other market participants and triggers a costly arms race that reduces social welfare. The model generates a number of testable implications concerning the effects of high-frequency trading in limit order markets.     

Style investing,comovement and return predictability

Barberis and Shleifer (2003) argue that style investing generates momentum and reversals in style and individual asset returns, as well as comovement between individual assets and their styles. Consistent with these predictions, in some specifications, past style returns help explain future stock returns after controlling for size, book-to-market and past stock returns. We also use comovement to identify style investing and assess its impact on momentum. High comovement momentum portfolios have significantly higher future returns than low comovement momentum portfolios. Overall, our results suggest that style investing plays a role in the predictability of asset returns.     

Behavioral asset pricing under expected feedback mode

We develop an enhanced DSSW model of behavior asset pricing by introducing the expected feedback mode. Through numerical simulation, it has been theoretically proved that risky asset price is jointly determined by trend extrapolated effect of expected feedback traders and the creating space effect of noise traders, and that price fluctuation depends on the expected feedback coefficient. As expected feedback traders' expectation return has been realized and the above two effects are obviously imbalance, their confidence will deteriorate prior to price collapse, and eventually achieve self-fulfilling expectation of price reversal in the process of price momentum. This model sheds lights on financial anomalies of trade size clustering and the formation of stock bubble, besides it provides a new perspective for avoiding the “bewitching” trading and reducing market volatility.     

Slow diffusion of information and price momentum in stocks: Evidence from options markets

This paper investigates the source of price momentum in the stock market using information from options markets. We provide direct evidence of the gradual information diffusion model in Hong and Stein (1999): momentum profits are larger for stocks whose information diffuses slowly into the stock market. We exploit the options markets to identify stocks with slow information diffusion speed. As informed traders trade options to realize the information that has not been fully incorporated in the stock price, we are able to enhance the momentum strategy by selecting winner/loser stocks with high growth/large drop in call option implied volatility. Our empirical strategy generates a risk-adjusted alpha of 1.8% per month over the 1996–2011 period, during which the simple momentum strategy fails to perform. The results are robust to the impact of earnings announcement, transaction costs, industry concentration, and choice of options’ moneyness and time-to-maturity. Finally, our finding is not driven by existing stock- or option-related characteristics that are known to improve momentum.     

Investor type trading behavior and trade performance: Evidence from the Thai stock market

This paper examines the trading behavior and decomposes the trading performance of foreign, individual and institutional investors as well as proprietary traders in a dynamic emerging stock market, the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Foreign investors follow a positive feedback, momentum strategy and are good short term market timers but have poor security selection performance in poor markets, thus suggesting that they have a macro (market timing) but not a micro (security selection) informational advantage relative to local investors. Institutions and proprietary traders have poor security selection trading performance. Individuals display herding behavior and have fairly good security selection performance, but individual investors appear to compensate proprietary traders for the provision of short term liquidity by proprietary traders, so individuals' security selection gains are canceled out by market timing losses.     

Investor Sentiment,Trading Behavior and Informational Efficiency in Index Futures Markets

This paper shows that traders in index futures markets are positive feedback traders—they buy when prices increase and sell when prices decline. Positive feedback trading appears to be more active in periods of high investor sentiment. This finding is consistent with the notion that feedback trading is driven by expectations of noise traders. Consistent with the noise trading hypothesis, order flow in index futures markets is less informative when investors are optimistic. Transitory volatility measured at high frequencies also appears to decline in periods of bullish sentiment, suggesting that sentiment‐driven trading increases market liquidity.     

Disclosure Risk and Price Drift

Disclosures play an apparently critical role in the empirical regularity of the short‐run momentum and long‐run reversal in stock returns. Motivated by this evidence, this paper integrates an analysis of disclosures within an asset pricing model to arrive at a framework in which disclosures and asset returns are jointly determined. Disclosures resolve uncertainty, but the increased information flow also raises the risks during the disclosure period. When disclosures and asset returns are modeled jointly, apparently good news is associated with the upward revision of future disclosure risks. The model generates predictions that have the outward appearance of short‐run momentum and long‐run reversal.     

Different momentum effects across countries: An explanation based on investors' behavior

We establish a model in which speculators use feedback trading characteristics to infer the behavior of irrational investors and induce them to trade. We also discuss the stability and time series of asset prices. Our results show that: (1) speculators have speculation and arbitrage demands and make “noise” to induce irrational investors to trade, (2) the time series of asset prices show stable momentum and a reversal effect when fundamental traders dominate the market, and (3) momentums are unstable and perform poorly under extreme circumstances. Our article offers a unique approach to understanding the micro mechanism of different momentum effects in various markets and suggests a plausible theoretical framework to illustrate such differences.     

Reversal of 3‐day losers and continuation of 3‐day winners on the NASDAQ

Using only the 200 large-cap securities that make up the NYSE 100 and NASDAQ 100, this study investigates 130 randomly selected formation periods from January 2000 through December 2012. During these formation periods, the three worst and three best performing stocks (based on excess return) are flagged. Once flagged, the subsequent 10-day holding period excess returns are calculated. Results indicate that NYSE securities demonstrate significant return reversal, but not return momentum. Conversely, the worst performing NASDAQ securities demonstrate return reversal, whereas the best performing NASDAQ securities demonstrate return momentum. Results are robust to the number of best and worst stocks that are flagged. Results are also robust to other combinations of formation and holding period lengths.     

On the sources of private information in FX markets

We investigate the source of information advantage in inter-dealer FX trading using data on trades and counter-party identities. In liquid dollar exchange rates, information is concentrated among dealers that trade most frequently and specialize their activity in a particular rate. In cross-rates, traders that engage in triangular arbitrage are best informed. Better-informed traders are also located on larger trading floors. In cross-rates, the ability to forecast flows explains all of the advantage of the triangular arbitrageurs. In liquid dollar rates, specialist traders can forecast both order-flow and the component of exchange rate changes that is uncorrelated with flow.     

Momentum,Reversal, and Uninformed Traders in Laboratory Markets

We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999) . Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long‐term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior observed among individual investors, and that uninformed traders may be responsible for long‐term price reversals but play little role in driving short‐term momentum.     

WHO ARE THE NOISE TRADERS?

Closed‐end funds often trade at a discount to net asset value. Previous research suggests that the positive correlation in discounts is associated with investor sentiment that causes systematic mispricing by noise traders. We use a newly available sample of daily fund valuations to examine the relation between intraday trading activity and discount changes. Contrary to the assumption that retail investors are noise traders, we find no relation between discount changes and the order‐flow imbalances of individual investors. Large daily discount changes are associated with institutional trading, and this may reflect the price inelasticity of closed‐end fund shares.     

Hidden liquidity: An analysis of order exposure strategies in electronic stock markets

Many stock exchanges choose to reduce market transparency by allowing traders to hide some or all of their order size. We study the costs and benefits of order exposure and test hypotheses regarding hidden order usage using a sample of Euronext-Paris stocks, where hidden orders represent 44% of the sample order volume. Our results support the hypothesis that hidden orders are associated with a decreased probability of full execution and increased average time to completion, and fail to support the alternate hypothesis that order exposure causes defensive traders to withdraw from the market. However, exposing rather than hiding order size increases average execution costs. We assess the extent to which non-displayed size is truly hidden and document that the presence and magnitude of hidden orders can be predicted to a significant, but imperfect, degree based on observable order attributes, firm characteristics, and market conditions. Overall, the results indicate that the option to hide order size is valuable, in particular, to patient traders.