获益不对称情景下的群体间合作行为研究

掌握获益不对称群体间合作行为规律可为大量的此类合作实践提供指导。在群体内和群体间过程不能割裂的认识下,群体间自发合作本质上是个体、个体所在群体、群体间所形成嵌套社会困境下的全局公共品贡献行为。通过行为经济学理论、嵌套社会困境多公共品实验室实验对获益不对称群体间合作行为进行分析和检验发现:（1）合作环境具有宽归集、内群体偏向行为特点;（2）在交互中,不公平厌恶和互惠两类条件合作的出现和叠加使此类合作从开始到持续不同于获益对称情形;（3）高水平、更稳定的群体间合作可出现于温和程度的不对称情形。该结果表明行为因素可为促进获益不对称群体间合作实践提供新途径。     

Motivation of Parent–Child Co‐residence Behavior: Evidence from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study

This paper examines the motivations of parent‐child co‐residence behavior in China using data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study. We test three possible motives: social norms, self‐interest and altruism. We find that social norms play an important role in household co‐residence behavior, showing that the belief that “sons take care of parents” is strong, and children in different birth orders take different responsibilities. Taking the one‐child policy as a natural experiment, we compared co‐residence behavior between only‐child and multi‐child families. This allowed us to test whether children in multi‐child families with wealthier parents more often co‐reside in order to compete for a bequest. We find that parents' wealth is more appealing to children in multi‐child families. The results support the life cycle theory that co‐residence decisions are motivated by self‐interest. We also find some evidence of altruism when parents and children make co‐residence decisions. These findings provide some insights for designing future elder‐support policies in China.     

INCOME INEQUALITY, RECIPROCITY AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

This paper analyses the impact of income inequality on public good provision in an experimental setting. A sample of secondary school students were recruited to participate in a simple linear public goods game where income heterogeneity was introduced by providing participants with unequal token endowments. The results show that endowment heterogeneity does not have any significant impact on contributions to the public good, and that consistent with models of reciprocity, low and high endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the public pool. Moreover, individuals appear to adjust their contributions in order to maintain a fair share rule.     

Private Goods,Public Goods,and Common Pools with Homo Reciprocans

Familiar inefficiencies arise with competing interests over private goods in Stackelberg and investment games. Private good experiments reveal whether reciprocity enhances cooperative outcomes. Familiar social dilemmas arise with voluntary provision of public goods and voluntary appropriation from common pools. Experiments with pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games reveal whether reciprocity is more or less effective in ameliorating under‐provision or over‐appropriation. Experiments with asymmetric provision and appropriation games also yield insight into the effects of the Indian caste system on inefficiency from social dilemmas. Experiments with three types of games, with a private good, public good or common pool, provide diagnostic tests of the homo reciprocans model.     

Mind the gaps: a political economy of the multiple dimensions of China's rural–urban divide

China's impressive growth has been accompanied by high inequality and a wide rural–urban divide. This paper identifies and examines some of the major dimensions of this divide: income, consumption, education, employment, health care, pensions, access to public services, and the environment. The paper attributes the main causes of the divide to China's urban‐biased development strategies and the resulting lack of social provision of public goods in rural areas. It also highlights the severe and multidimensional constraints on the Chinese peasantry and argues that increased equality and efficiency can now be pursued simultaneously.     

An Analysis of the Determinants of Tipping Behavior: A Laboratory Experiment and Evidence from Restaurant Tipping

This paper explores several determinants of tipping behavior. First, I consider two social norms explanations—reciprocity and letdown (guilt) aversion—of why consumers tip in restaurants. Second, I examine three aspects of the tipping situation that influence how much consumers tip in restaurants: table size, sex, and method of bill payment. I address these issues using two data sources: a field survey and laboratory experiments. Customers were surveyed individually as they left a set of restaurants in Richmond, Virginia. The laboratory experiments vary service quality, table size, and information about others' tips in a controlled setting. Results from both data sets show support for reciprocity and letdown aversion, and that tip size decreases with table size. Sex differences, which exist only in the experimental data, show that men tip more than women. Finally, the size of the tip does not depend on the method of bill payment.     

农村公共产品供给的基础：公共权威——对重庆东北部四季村的调查

长期以来,我们将农村公共产品供给不足归咎于外部制度环境的不平等,而忽略了村庄公共产品的自我供给能力。文章通过对村庄内部不同层面公共产品供给状况的定性考察,发现公共权威力量是保障村庄共产品供给的前提。公共权威力量能够整合村庄内外的资源,从而有效的为村庄供给公共产品,而单一的市场化供给则难以取得成功。     

Controls and Cooperation in Interactive and Non‐Interactive Settings

Prior research finds that controls that induce cooperation among collaborators on a project increase trust, and that this increased trust increases subsequent cooperation among collaborators. We extend this work by investigating how controls influence cooperative behavior in two settings. The first is an interactive setting where people work together and can benefit from each other's work. The second is a non‐interactive setting where people do not work together directly but where behavior can be observed. We propose that because controls are likely to engender greater trust and reciprocity in interactive settings than in non‐interactive settings, the effect of controls on future cooperative behavior will be greater for controls in interactive settings than for controls in non‐interactive settings. We find that controls in both settings increase future cooperative behavior, but the effect is significantly greater in interactive settings (where reciprocity and trust are more likely to develop). Furthermore, this increased cooperation is observed in an uncontrolled task, suggesting that the control fosters trust in others rather than trust in the control. These findings suggest that the benefits of controls are more substantial in work environments characterized by extensive teamwork and where employees benefit from each other's work.     

Incentivising the Social Discounting Task: A Laboratory Experiment

Incentivising the social discounting task impacts the measurement of altruism in a student population. Incentivised subjects are more altruistic at close social distances, especially subjects who are less altruistic, thus providing evidence of reciprocal altruism. There is also some evidence of hypothetical bias among more altruistically inclined subjects. Making payments real also influences the subject's choice of recipient. Paid subjects select more geographically distant, but psychologically closer subjects, because of prospects for increased anonymity and enforced reciprocity, respectively. Further research is required to verify the robustness of these results, in the laboratory and especially in the field.     

Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers

This paper develops a noncooperative Nash model in which two siblings compete for their parents' financial transfers. Treating sibling rivalry as a “rent-seeking contest” and using a Tullock-Skaperdas contest success function, we derive the conditions under which more financial resources are transferred to the sibling with lower earnings. We find that parental transfers are compensatory and that the family as an institution serves as an “income equalizer.” Within a sequential game framework, we characterize the endogeneity of parental transfers and link it to parents' income, altruism, and children's supply of merit goods (e.g., parent-child companionship or child services). We show that merit goods are subject to a “moral hazard” problem from the parents' perspective.     

基于两种不同动机的组织公民行为研究

文章将组织公民行为（OCB）的动机区分为理性利己和社会利他,以他人取向不同水平和回报的不同情境为切入点,运用情感事件理论和他人取向理论,结合问卷与实验心理学方法,对基于两种不同动机的OCB产生的机制进行了深入研究。结果表明：当存在回报期望,他人取向低的员工更有可能基于理性利己的动机而产生高水平OCB;当不存在回报或存在回报责任时,他人取向高的个体更有可能基于社会利他的动机产生高水平OCB。     

ARE PRIVATE TRANSFERS CROWDED OUT BY PUBLIC TRANSFERS? THE CASE OF NEPAL

Using household data from Nepal for 1995/96, this paper investigates the motives underlying private transfers and examines whether or not public transfers crowded out private transfers and the resultant effects on income inequality. The estimation results of Probit and Tobit models show that the private transfers received were altruistically motivated while public transfers exerted no crowding‐out effect. Although the probability of receiving private transfers decreases with household size, having more children or more elderly members of the family increases the probability as well as the amount of transfers. By contrast, the age of the household head does not appear to be a significant factor. Furthermore, the study shows that public transfers did not contribute to a lowering of income inequalities among households. These findings suggest that the Government of Nepal should design its public transfer schemes in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its social safety net programs.     

The impact of bequest motives on labor supply and retirement behavior in Japan: A theoretical and empirical analysis

Do individuals who want to leave a bequest work more and retire later than other individuals? Does the reason for wanting to leave a bequest (altruism vs. exchange) matter? In this paper, we conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of bequest motives on the labor supply and retirement behavior of households in Japan, and to the best of our knowledge, it is virtually the first paper to do so. We conduct an empirical analysis using micro data from a unique survey—the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University—and show that respondents with an altruistic or strategic/exchange bequest motive work more at the intensive margin than those without any bequest motive but that respondents with a strategic or exchange bequest motive work less at the extensive margin (i.e., retire earlier) than those without any bequest motive. Our findings for the strategic or exchange motive suggest that respondents with such a motive tend to work more than others before they retire so that they can earn more, leave a larger bequest to their children, and elicit more care from them but that they tend to retire earlier than others so that they can start receiving care for themselves and their spouses from their children sooner. Our findings have important policy implications because they imply that inheritance taxes may affect people's labor supply and retirement behavior by influencing the strength of their bequest motives and that these effects may differ by the type of bequest motive.     

Reciprocity information and wage personalization

This paper considers a modified principal-agent environment, where principals can use personalized offers based on agents' reciprocity-related information. With such information, principals can either impose stronger financial incentives or try to “trigger” agents' positive reciprocity by offering a higher fixed rate. Theory suggests that principals who believe in agents' reciprocity would personalize offers so that reciprocal agents increase their effort beyond the self-regarding benchmark. Using a lab experiment, we test the behavior of principals and agents. Our experimental market witnesses significant wage personalization when reciprocity information is available. However, agents' effort levels and principals' payoffs are lower under wage personalization, compared with the sessions where principals cannot personalize offers. Our structural analysis shows that, under wage personalization, agents expect higher fixed wages and reciprocate higher wages less. Information about agents' individual reciprocity is more correlated with the expected wages, rather than the strength of reciprocity toward higher or lower wages. Principals grant higher fixed wages to workers with lower wage expectations, but because principals cannot personalize offers effectively according to the strength of reciprocity, the performance of wage personalization is limited.     

Selecting public goods institutions: Who likes to punish and reward?

We study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand, and preferences over, as well as behavior within, various public goods institutions on the other hand. We incentive‐compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions. We find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment. Somewhat surprisingly, preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics. Conversely, individual characteristics, including institutional preferences, are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game. For instance, risk‐averse individuals preemptively punish more often. This suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards, it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty—although they may not affect the original selection into institutions.     

留守儿童的公平感与幸福度:来自实地实验与调查的依据

文章利用实地实验与调查相结合的方法,研究父母双方均外出的留守儿童与非留守儿童在公平感和幸福度上的差异。根据儿童在独裁者游戏、最后通牒游戏和问卷调查中的结果,我们发现两类儿童对优势和弱势不公平的厌恶方面不存在显著差异,但留守儿童主观汇报的幸福度显著低于非留守儿童。机制探究显示父母陪伴缺失是导致留守儿童幸福度较低的原因。若将留守儿童的定义扩大至父母一方在外务工者,以上差异均消失,说明双留守儿童是我们更应关注的群体。文章研究对补充现有留守儿童行为研究以及相应公共政策均具有重要的启示意义。     

Development of Public Housing in Post‐reform China

This paper explores the dynamic nature of the transformation of public housing regimes in urban China since the abolishment of the urban welfare housing system in the late 1990s. We summarize the latest progress in the development of public housing in post‐reform China and investigate the driving forces behind these developments. A close examination of the public rental housing program in Shanghai helps to show that the recent revival of public housing in Chinese cities is mostly driven by the desire for economic growth. We conclude that the state provision of housing could be a short‐run state remedy to alleviate economic imbalance and social inequality. However, in the long run China needs to seek more effective solutions to solve the low‐income population's housing affordability problems.     

The Effects of Incentive Scheme and Task Difficulty on Employees' Altruistic Behavior Outside the Firm

Employer-sponsored opportunities for altruism outside the workplace can improve employee engagement and passion within the firm, enhance the firm's corporate visibility, and improve its recruitment. There is limited understanding of whether and how a firm's management control system on employees' daily tasks can influence employee willingness to engage in altruism outside the workplace. In this study, we investigate via an experiment how the incentive scheme (tournament vs. piece rate) on employees' daily tasks interacts with the difficulty level of these tasks (low vs. high) to affect employees' altruistic behavior outside the firm. Our results indicate that, compared to a piece-rate scheme, a tournament scheme leads to a greater decrease in non-winning participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm when the original, incentivized task is more difficult compared to when it is less difficult. Consistent with our theory, participants' feelings of excessive entitlement partially mediate the interaction effect of incentive scheme and task difficulty on participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm. This study informs firms about how the design of its incentive scheme on employees' daily task inside the firm and the nature of that task can influence employee willingness to act altruistically outside the firm.     

Testing Oil Refiners' Conduct in Korea: A Differentiated Product Approach

This paper investigates oil refiners' conduct in the Korean gasoline market. Specifically, I examine which of two modes of conduct, Bertrand–Nash competition or collusion, better fits the data. Unlike previous literature, this paper employs a differentiated product approach to address the stylized discrepancy in refiners' brands' prices: stable stratification of prices among refiners, but an unlikely equilibrium outcome in the homogenous goods market. Correct understanding of refiners' conduct is important because appropriate policy responses to collusion differ significantly from appropriate responses to competition‐driven outcomes. The results of this paper support the hypothesis that Bertrand–Nash competition better explains refiners' conduct.     

Immigrant Specificity and the Relationship between Trade and Immigration: Theory and Evidence

Studies routinely document that immigrant employment concentrates in non‐traded goods sectors and that many immigrants have low inter‐sectoral mobility. We consider these observed characteristics of immigrant employment with regard to the question of how immigration affects a nation's pattern of production and trade. We model an economy producing three goods; one is non‐traded. Domestic labor and capital are domestically mobile but internationally immobile. Allowing that some new immigrants will become specific to the non‐traded goods sector, the model indicates that the effects of immigration on output and trade depend importantly on the sectoral pattern of employment of both new and existing immigrants. Empirical investigation in a panel data set of OECD countries supports the model's prediction that immigration raises the output of non‐traded goods. Consistent with the model, we also find that immigration and trade are complements. Given its empirical support, the model's implications for immigration policy are then discussed.