The Influence of Nonaudit Service Revenues and Client Pressure on External Auditors' Decisions to Rely on Internal Audit*

This paper investigates how external auditor provision of significant nonaudit services and client pressure to use the work of internal audit influence external auditors' use of internal auditors' work. More specifically, we study how external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressure. Our research is motivated by an observation that the magnitude of nonaudit services provided to audit clients introduces the risk that client management may leverage its position with the external auditor and potentially affect the audit process. We address this issue by extending prior research and focusing on the importance of various explanatory variables, including nonaudit service revenues, client pressure, internal audit quality, and coordination, to the external auditor's decision to rely on the work of internal audit. We use data primarily obtained through surveys completed by internal and external auditors. The survey responses represent 74 separate audit engagements. Our findings reveal that when significant nonaudit services are not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the level of internal‐external auditor coordination positively affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. However, when the auditor provides significant nonaudit services to the client, internal audit quality and the extent of internal ‐ external auditor coordination do not significantly affect auditors' reliance decisions. Furthermore, when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly increases the extent of internal audit reliance. Thus, external auditors appear to be more affected by client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality and coordination when making internal audit reliance decisions at clients for whom significant nonaudit services are also provided.     

The Impact of Internal Auditor Compensation and Role on External Auditors' Planning Judgments and Decisions*

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy‐six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.     

Do Clients Get What They Pay For? Evidence from Auditor and Engagement Fee Premiums

Despite the intuitive appeal, prior research finds mixed evidence on whether higher audit fees translate to superior audit quality. Under the assumption that product differentiation between auditors is based, in large part, on the level of financial statement assurance, we propose more refined measures of excess audit fees that separate auditor premiums from other fee premiums. Consistent with our conjecture, we identify significant variation in audit pricing across auditors (i.e., auditor premiums) that relates positively to audit quality. Conversely, we find no evidence that higher engagement‐specific fee premiums (i.e., fee model residuals) are positively related to proxies for audit quality. Additional tests indicate that our results do not simply reflect premiums attributable to auditor characteristics evaluated in prior research (e.g., Big 4 membership, office size, and industry expertise). In fact, our findings suggest that the positive association between auditor premiums and audit quality is better captured at the auditor level than it is at the auditor “tier,” office, auditor‐industry, or engagement levels. In sum, our results suggest that auditors charging higher fees, on average, deliver superior levels of financial statement assurance, but engagement‐specific fee premiums do not reflect quality‐enhancing audit effort. These contrasting results provide a possible explanation for the mixed findings in prior research.     

Debt Covenant Violations,Firm Financial Distress,and Auditor Actions

We conduct a comprehensive study on the associations between debt covenant violations (“violations”) and auditor actions for financially distressed and nondistressed firms. Our study is motivated by a lack of research on the consequences of violations resulting from auditors' actions. We find that firms with violations have significantly higher audit fees, a greater likelihood of receiving a going‐concern opinion, and a greater likelihood of experiencing an auditor resignation. Importantly, the positive associations hold for all types of firms, including financially nondistressed firms. In fact, we find that, after controlling for other financial information, the relation between violations and an increased likelihood of a going‐concern opinion is stronger for nondistressed versus distressed firms. Our evidence is consistent with belief‐revision research in auditing that finds auditors react more strongly to information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs. This study provides further evidence on the indirect yet significant consequences of covenant violations on firms resulting from auditor actions.     

制度背景、审计师特征与审计质量研究

利用2011-2015年的A股上市公司财务数据,以及中国注册会计师协会网站手工收集的注册会计师的信息,采用固定效应回归模型,考察审计师特征对审计质量的影响。研究发现,女性、高学历、合伙人和接受过会计专业教育的注册会计师主持项目的审计质量高。进一步研究发现,政府监管和媒体监督在审计师特征影响审计质量中发挥着正向调节作用,主要研究结论在一系列稳健性测试后依然成立。研究表明,审计师特征和制度背景是影响审计质量的重要因素,研究对会计师事务所、政府监管部门具有重要启发意义。     

An Experimental Investigation of Approaches to Audit Decision Making: An Evaluation Using Systems‐Mediated Mental Models*

The objective of this research is to articulate a decision‐making foundation for the systems audit approach. Under this audit approach, the auditor first gains an understanding of the auditee's economic environment, strategy, and business processes and then forms expectations about its performance and financial reporting. Proponents of this audit approach argue that decision making is enhanced because the knowledge of the system allows the auditor to focus on the most important risks. However, there has not been an explicit framework to explain how systems knowledge can enhance decision making. To provide such a framework, we combine mental model theory with general systems theory to produce a hypothesis we refer to as a systems‐mediated mental model hypothesis. We test this hypothesis using experimental economics methods. We find that (1) subjects make systematic errors under the setting without an organizing framework provided by the systems information, and (2) the presence of an organizing framework results in lower reporting errors. Importantly, the organizing framework significantly enhances decision making in the settings where the environment changed. Establishing a decision‐making foundation for systems audits can provide an important building block that, in part, can contribute to the development of a more effective and efficient audit technology ‐ an important objective now when audits are facing a credibility crisis.     

The Impact of R&D Intensity on Demand for Specialist Auditor Services*

The audit fee research literature argues that auditors' costs of developing brand name reputations, including top‐tier designation and recognition for industry specialization, are compensated through audit fee premiums. Audited firms reduce agency costs by engaging high‐quality auditors who monitor the levels and reporting of discretionary expenditures and accruals. In this study we examine whether specialist auditor choice is associated with a particular discretionary expenditure ‐ research and development (R&D). For a large sample of U.S. companies from a range of industries, we find strong evidence that R&D intensity is positively associated with firms' choices of auditors who specialize in auditing R&D contracts. Additionally, we find that R&D intensive firms tend to appoint top‐tier auditors. We use simultaneous equations to control for interrelationships between dependent variables in addition to single‐equation ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression models. Our results are particularly strong in tests using samples of small firms whose auditor choice is not constrained by the need to appoint a top‐tier auditor to ensure the auditor's financial independence from the client.     

The Interrelation between Audit Quality and Managerial Reporting Choices and Its Effects on Financial Reporting Quality

Two distinct lines of research have been dedicated to empirically testing how financial reporting quality (measured as the earnings response coefficient or ERC) is associated with management's choice of reporting bias and with audit quality. However, researchers have yet to consider how ERCs are affected by either the auditor's reaction to changes in the manager's reporting bias or the manager's reaction to changes in audit quality. Our study provides theoretical guidance on these interrelations and how changes in the manager's or the auditor's incentives affect both reporting bias and audit quality. Specifically, when the manager's cost (benefit) of reporting bias increases (decreases), we find that expected bias decreases, inducing the auditor to react by reducing audit quality. Because we also find that the association between expected audit quality and ERCs is always positive, changes in managerial incentives for biased reporting lead to a positive association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. When the cost of auditing decreases or the cost of auditor liability increases, we find that expected audit quality increases, inducing the manager to react by decreasing reporting bias. In this case, changes in the costs of audit quality lead to a negative association between ERCs and expected reporting bias. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of our theoretical findings by focusing on the empirical observations documented in the extant literature on managerial ownership and accounting expertise on the audit committee. In light of our framework, we provide new interpretations of these empirical observations and new predictions for future research.     

The Joint Effects of Multiple Legal System Characteristics on Auditing Standards and Auditor Behavior

This paper derives the impacts of legal system characteristics and auditing standards on auditor behavior (audit quality), and analyzes the determination of optimal auditing standards under different legal regimes. Legal regimes are characterized by differences in the uncertainty concerning the outcome of legal proceedings (termed vagueness of legal systems) and differences in the average size of damage awards. Auditing standards as determined by standard setters can vary in both toughness and vagueness. Our analysis provides implications for the adoption of International Standards on Auditing (ISA). Countries, such as the United States, where auditor legal liability is significantly more onerous than the global norm are not likely to adopt ISA, since these standards may not induce auditors to provide the optimal level of audit quality. Conversely, the adoption of ISA by countries, such as China, where the legal system makes the recovery of damages from auditors quite difficult, is not by itself likely to result in a high level of audit quality. Furthermore, our model suggests that auditor rotation can help improve audit quality, but only in certain circumstances.     

Future Nonaudit Service Fees and Audit Quality

Prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, audit partners experienced economic pressure to grow revenue from the sale of nonaudit services to their audit clients. To an auditor who is highly rewarded for revenue generation and growth, nonaudit services may represent a particularly strengthened economic bond with the client. Prior research shows that, in general, nonaudit service fees received in the current period do not impair audit quality. We examine a different setting. We propose that auditor independence can become impaired, and audit quality compromised, when clients that currently purchase relatively low amounts of nonaudit services, increase their purchases of nonaudit services from the auditor in the subsequent period. We test our prediction in the context of earnings management as a proxy for audit quality, measured by (a) performance‐adjusted discretionary accruals and (b) classification shifting of core expenses. Our results indicate that prior to the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, rewards to the auditor in the form of future additional nonaudit service fees from current‐year high fee‐growth‐opportunity clients adversely affects audit quality. This effect is particularly strong among companies with powerful incentives to manage earnings. Our findings indicate that regulators should consider the multiperiod nature of the client–auditor relationship when contemplating policies that restrict nonaudit services, as well as the overall environment in which audit partners operate. This might include partner compensation arrangements that put pressure on audit partners to focus on increasing revenue at the expense of audit quality.     

The Effects of Accounting Standard Precision,Auditor Task Expertise,and Judgment Frameworks on Audit Firm Litigation Exposure

Recent research suggests that adopting imprecise accounting standards elevates audit firm litigation exposure and could undermine auditor objectivity if audit firms respond by herding to industry norms. This paper reports the results of two experiments that demonstrate how audit firms can effectively mitigate the elevated litigation exposure without herding to industry norms by staffing engagements with recognized technical experts, using judgment frameworks and automated decision aids, and providing persuasive evidence of adherence to auditing standards. We find that judgment frameworks are particularly well‐suited for defending judgments under imprecise standards, and represent a cost‐effective alternative to using technical experts. However, our results also indicate that judgment frameworks may provide a safe harbor for relatively low‐quality judgments when those frameworks are used under precise standards. We discuss implications for audit firms, courts, and regulators that currently conduct or evaluate audits within and across jurisdictions where the precision of accounting standards varies considerably.     

Can Audit Committee Expertise Increase External Auditors' Litigation Risk? The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence

This study examines whether the perceived independence and financial expertise of audit committee members affect external auditors' exposure to legal liability. We use an experiment in which potential jurors make judgments about auditor independence and legal liability for a case involving an audit failure. We find that perceptions of audit committee independence from management are positively associated with judgments of auditor independence and negatively associated with auditor liability. However, financial expertise of audit committee members can be a double-edged sword. Our experiment finds that judgments of auditor liability are higher when the audit committee is perceived to have higher financial expertise but lower independence from management. In assessing litigation risk of current and prospective clients, auditors may want to carefully consider the independence of audit committee members from management, particularly when audit committee members have financial expertise. In the event of an audit failure, the financial expertise of nonindependent audit committee members can negatively affect jurors' perceptions of auditor independence and liability.     

Mind the Gap: Why Do Experts Have Differences of Opinion Regarding the Sufficiency of Audit Evidence Supporting Complex Fair Value Measurements?

Reported deficiencies continue to persist in audits of fair value measurements and other complex accounting estimates (hereafter, “FVMs”), despite improvements in auditor performance observed by regulators. The persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs suggests that factors underlying this trend may be more complicated and multidimensional than previously suggested by regulators and academic research, which has focused largely on auditors' unsatisfactory performance as the principal source of reported deficiencies. Drawing from the judgment and decision‐making expertise literature, we gather field‐based data from audit experts to identify additional factors that are likely to be contributing to differences of opinion between audit and inspection experts and the persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs. We find evidence that audit experts interpret standards and evaluate audit evidence differently than inspectors, and thus perceive there to be a gap between what auditors and inspectors regard as sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support audits of FVMs (hereafter, “FVM gap”). Moreover, results highlight several areas in audits of FVMs where differences of opinion exist between auditor and inspector experts regarding what constitutes a reported deficiency. Within the contexts we examine, our results identify additional factors, beyond deficient auditor performance, that may contribute to the FVM gap. We also report audit partners' recommendations for ways to reduce the FVM gap and suggest avenues for future research. Gaining a more complete understanding of sources contributing to reported deficiencies will help regulators, standard setters, audit firms, and academics to identify ways to reduce the FVM gap and reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs.     

Auditors’ Response to Assessments of High Control Risk: Further Insights

Auditing standards prescribe a risk‐based approach where auditors assess the risk of material misstatement and then design and perform audit procedures to reduce audit risk to an appropriately low level. Prior research suggests that auditors are responsive to high control‐risk assessment (CRA), but that this response is, perhaps, only partially effective at reducing audit risk, with relatively little insight into where and why this occurs. By refining analyses to more detailed levels of the audit, I extend this research by providing further insight into auditors’ response to high CRA. I examine and find that audit fees are significantly higher for high CRA in revenue relative to high CRA in other accounts, suggesting that auditor effort in response to high CRA is more pronounced in audit areas of particular interest and concern to investors and regulators. Despite this, I find evidence suggesting that revenue is the only audit area examined where auditor effort in response to high CRA does not attenuate the likelihood of misstatement. Finally, because auditors face time constraints, I examine whether increased effort in response to high CRA in certain audit areas diverts auditors’ attention from other areas with lower risk, thus contributing to the overall association between misstatements and internal control deficiencies documented in prior research. I find a greater likelihood of misstatement in non‐core operating accounts with lower CRA as audit effort increases in response to high CRA in revenue, consistent with the explanation that high CRA in revenue may divert auditors’ attention from other areas of the audit with lower CRA.     

Understanding Audit Quality: Insights from Audit Professionals and Investors

Projects seeking to define, measure, and evaluate audit quality are on the agendas of auditing standards setters as well as audit firms. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) currently provides information regarding audit quality through the release of inspection reports, and the Board intends to establish and report audit quality indicators. To provide additional perspective on audit quality, we obtain auditors' and investors' views, definitions, and indicators of audit quality. We find that investors' definitions of audit quality focus more on inputs to the audit process than do auditors', and that investors view the number of PCAOB deficiencies as an indicator of overall firm quality. We find a consensus that auditor characteristics may be the most important determinants of audit quality, and that restatements may be the most readily available signal of low audit quality. We relate responses to a general audit quality framework, provide support for archival audit research, and identify additional disclosures that participants suggest could signal audit quality. Taken together, we provide evidence regarding the construct of audit quality in the post‐SOX environment, evaluate many of the audit quality indicators proposed by the PCAOB, and suggest avenues for future research.     

Do Investors Care about the Auditor's Economic Dependence on the Client?*

In this study, we investigate whether investor perceptions of the financial reporting credibility of Big 5 audits are related to the auditor's economic dependence on the client as measured by nonaudit as well as total (audit and nonaudit) fees paid to the incumbent auditor. We use the client‐specific ex ante cost of equity capital as a proxy for investor perceptions of financial reporting credibility and examine auditor fees both as a proportion of the revenues of the audit firm and as a proportion of the revenues of the audit firm's practice office through which the audit was conducted. Our findings suggest that both nonaudit and total fees are perceived negatively by investors' that is, the higher the fees paid to the auditor, the greater the implied threat to auditor independence, and the lower the financial reporting credibility of a Big 5 audit. Furthermore, our findings appear to be largely unrelated to corporate governance: investors do not perceive the auditor as compensating for weak governance. Separately, recent anecdotal evidence suggests that declining revenues from nonaudit services' as a result of recent regulatory restrictions” are being offset by substantial increases in audit fees. Other things being equal, rising audit fees imply higher profit margins for audit services, indicating that the audit function may no longer be a loss leader. Thus, to the extent that investors perceive total fees negatively, recent regulatory initiatives to limit nonaudit fees may not have adequately addressed the perceived, if not the actual, threat to auditor independence posed by fees.     

审计师行业专长、客户重要性与审计质量

本文以中国上市公司2006--2009年数据为样本,检验了审计师行业专长、客户重要性对审计质量的影响以及审计师行业专长对审计质量的影响是否受制于客户重要性。研究结果发现,总体而言,审计师行业专长能够抑制客户的盈余管理行为,提高审计质量,审计师对客户的经济依赖性并不会影响到独立审计判断。但行业专长审计师只针对大客户提供高质量审计服务,而对小客户这种效应则并未体现,这是具有行业专长审计师基于中国审计市场环境作出的最优选择。进一步研究发现,上述研究结论仅存在于“十大”样本组中。     

Auditor Sensitivity to Real Earnings Management: The Importance of Ambiguity and Earnings Context

Differentiating real earnings management (REM) from normal business decisions poses a unique challenge for auditors, researchers, and investors. The ambiguity associated with REM, and the fact that REM does not violate GAAP, may explain why its use is on the rise. While some assert that auditors are not, and should not be, concerned with REM, recent research suggests that REM may influence some auditor judgments. Using Correspondent Inference Theory (CIT) as our theoretical framework, we extend REM research by investigating the ways in which auditors respond to REM and how auditors deal with the intrinsic ambiguity associated with REM. We administer a 3×2 between‐subjects experiment to 113 highly‐experienced auditors, manipulating the level of ambiguity surrounding the observed REM (Explicit REM, Potential REM, or No REM) and the earnings context in which the client engages in REM (the client beat or missed the consensus earnings forecast). We find that auditors respond to REM by lowering assessments of management tone (i.e., management's commitment to a culture of high ethical standards), being more likely to discuss the issue with the audit committee, and being less likely to retain the client. Auditors respond to Explicit REM regardless of the earnings context, but respond to Potential (i.e., ambiguous) REM only when the client beats the forecast. Finally, we find that management tone mediates the relation between REM and auditor responses, even after controlling for various audit‐related risks. Thus, for auditors, REM appears to be primarily a “people” issue, as REM provides a negative signal about management.     

The Role of Auditor Narcissism in Auditor-Client Negotiations: Evidence from China

This paper reports the results of three studies (archival, experimental, and qualitative) designed to examine the effects of auditor narcissism on auditor-client negotiations in China. We contend that narcissistic characteristics fuel auditors' competitiveness and embolden them to stand firm in negotiations, potentially lengthening the negotiation process but leading to more conservative negotiation outcomes. As predicted, our archival results suggest that auditor narcissism is positively associated with audit delay and negatively associated with clients' absolute and positive discretionary accruals. Our experimental results document that narcissistic auditors are more likely to be involved in negotiations that reach an impasse or take longer to resolve and that narcissistic auditors negotiate reported asset values that reflect less aggressive reporting choices. Our qualitative results from field interviews with practicing audit partners corroborate our archival and experimental findings. Overall, the data collected using three different research methods yield consistent results in support of our theory. Our findings shed light on factors that influence audit efficiency and quality in China. We discuss the key cultural and contextual differences between China and the West as well as the implications of these differences for future research.     

Do Investors Respond to Explanatory Language Included in Unqualified Audit Reports?

This article investigates whether investors respond to explanatory language (EL) added to unqualified audit reports. Although prior research finds an association between auditor EL and lower financial reporting quality, surveys suggest that many investors limit their attention to the unqualified nature of the opinion. We use three‐day abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume to measure investor response to EL in unqualified audit reports issued from 2000 to 2014. We find little evidence to indicate that investors respond to auditor EL at the audit report release date. In further analyses, we find that the lack of investor response is attributable both to incomplete investor reactions (55 percent of EL occurrences) and previous incorporation of EL (40 percent of EL occurrences). Overall, the results support policymakers’ initiatives to improve the usefulness of unqualified audit reports.