An Experimental Investigation of Moral Hazard in Costly Investments

Frequently, parties make sequential decisions regarding investments for which the probability of success or failure is dependent on the amount of total investment. This paper reports a series of experiments involving a costly investment game that is derived from the catalytic finance model of Morris and Shin (Global games: Theory and applications. In Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society, edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 56-114). The sequential nature of investments is such that the second investment could function as a complement to the initial investment or simply serve as a substitute to it, thereby creating moral hazard. The features of this game are similar to those of the ultimatum game. However, there are several key differences between the games that may account for the high frequency of materially self-interested behavior that we observe, particularly among second movers.     

Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products

We examine free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the Gilbert and Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that for products that are differentiated enough, when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria coexist, the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium may Pareto dominate the entry equilibrium. Hence, “coordination failure” underinvestment in entry prevention can occur. However, as claimed, the overinvestment result of Gilbert and Vives remains robust to moderate amounts of product differentiation. We also show that coordination failure underinvestment arises in a wide variety of entry deterrence models and does not rely on assumptions regarding strategic substitutability or complementarity of precommitments.     

When Identifying Contributors is Costly: An Experiment on Public Goods

Studies show that identifying contributors increases contributions to public goods. In practice, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing it. We design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay to view information about identities and contributions of group members. We compare this to a treatment in which there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are identified. Our main findings are that: (i) contributions in the treatment with costly information are as high as those in the treatment with free information, (ii) participants rarely choose to view the information, and (iii) being a high contributor is correlated with choosing to view information about others.     

The Korean Economy in Transition: In Search for a New Model

Abstract

Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean economy had based its growth policies on East Asia's economic catch-up model which was based mainly on the Japanese development experience. However, the events that lead to the 1997 crisis and the changes instituted in the Korean economy after the crisis have put to question whether the traditional East Asian growth model will continue to be viable. This paper examines two alternative models of development, namely the “Anglo-Saxon” and the “Continental European” models, and evaluates their relevance for Korea's future development challenges. Despite many common features these models share, they are also quite distinctive with regard to their treatment of the labor market system and the role of government. By focusing on the model's capacity to expand employment and to provide sustainable growth as the most important criteria, it is suggested that Korea should follow the “Anglo-Saxon model”, at least in the short- to medium-term. In comparing Korea's economy with other advanced economies when they were at the similar stage of development, it is found that Korea's growth potential lags behind that of countries such as Japan, Germany, Finland, and Ireland. The efficiency of Korea's investment is found to be only slightly better than Japan while it is inferior to all other advanced economies. Despite these challenges, Korea is apparently moving toward the “Continental European model”, with the Korean government increasing its own size and plans for further expenditures on social security and welfare. However, in order to ensure sustainable development with significant job creation, this paper argues that Korea should switch its direction and adopt the “Anglo-Saxon model” as soon as possible.     

脱硫石膏制品体积稳定性试验研究

本试验对比了不同组分的石膏试件在升温、降温及干湿循环过程中的体积变形(以伸缩率计),分析了温度、湿度对石膏制品体积稳定性的影响.结果表明,脱硫石膏制品的伸缩率较小,在0.1‰～0.2‰之间,但随环境温度的改变体积变化较大,温度变形系数在1.5×10-5/℃以上.     

Estimating a Structural Search Model for College Graduates in Taiwan

This is an empirical study of job search using Taiwanese data and based on a structural-form estimation approach. A standard discrete-time finite horizon search model is applied to describe the behaviour of college graduates on first entering the labor market, and is estimated within the maximum likelihood routine. The estimated average earnings are near the observed average earnings and the estimated reservation wages show a decreasing pattern as search duration increases. The simulation results indicate that variations in both the mean wage offer and cost of search would have little influence on the expected duration of unemployment. However, increasing the probability of a job offer to bachelor-degree graduates would significantly diminish their duration of unemployment.     

Market Interaction and Pro-Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

When actions generate negative externalities for third parties, incentives exist to pass these “morally costly” decisions to others. In laboratory experiments, we investigate how market interaction affects allocations when the right to divide a sum of money between oneself and a passive recipient is commoditized. Allocation to recipients is reduced by more than half when determined by subjects who purchase or keep the right to make the division as compared to a control where subjects are directly assigned the right. Sellers report accurate beliefs about recipient allocations and do not report feeling less responsible the more often they sell the allocation right. The market allocates the right to make divisions more frequently to buyers who allocate more to recipients, but sellers who allocate less to recipients tend to sell less often. Selection cannot solely explain the results, suggesting market interaction itself may directly impact behavior.     

Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study

We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi‐battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all‐pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous best‐of‐three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that subjects often make positive bids in only two battles. In sequential contests, theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles. Contrary to this prediction, subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles. Consequently, instead of always ending in the second battle, contests often proceed to the third battle. Finally, although the aggregate bid in simultaneous contests is similar to that in sequential contests, in both settings, subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted. The observed behavior of subjects can be rationalized by a combination of multidimensional iterative reasoning and a nonmonetary utility of winning.     

Delayed Output Response to Productivity Shocks in a Monetary Search Model

Empirical evidence suggests that positive productivity shocks diffuse slowly in the economy. In particular, aggregate output reaches its peak nearly eight quarters after a shock. I construct a micro-founded monetary search model to explain the aforementioned empirical fact by focusing on a household’s endogenous decision in forming long-term trading relationships in addition to engaging in random matching in a frictional goods market. I show that a positive productivity shock induces households to immediately break marginal trading relationships, but that goods market frictions prolong the transition of the economy to the new steady state. Calibrating with U.S. data, the model matches the empirical evidence well and predicts that there is a slight decrease in aggregate output shortly after a positive productivity shock in some parameter region after which, it converges towards the new steady state with a higher level of aggregate output.     

Strategic Export Policy in a Differentiated Duopoly: A Note

The purpose of this paper is to further explore how optimal export policies are affected by the nature of oligopolistic competition and the structure of demand. It is shown that (1) the more cost-competitive the home firm is, the higher the optimal level of export intervention becomes; (2) as the goods become better complements, the optimal level of export intervention increases; (3) the nature of the effects of strategic export policies on foreign firms depends on both the mode of competition and the structure of demand.     

An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This “holdout problem” is a common feature of the land‐assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi‐person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff‐improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi‐period bargaining treatments relative to single‐period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi‐period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single‐period treatments, both with and without delay costs.     

Skill Accumulation in the Search Unemployment Model

ABSTRACT

I analyze general skill accumulation (training) and its financing among labor market entrants in a search unemployment equilibrium. Becker's general skill finance rule is modified for a search economy: although skill accumulation is associated with a hold-up problem, since it benefits future job vacancies which workers expect to be matched with, if vacancies direct their search to workers of different skill levels, workers internalize this externality. An extended model analyzes whether to accumulate skills through training or education. Small differences in the relative cost of acquiring education can lead to large differences in skill levels in the labor market.     

【学界视点】腐败何以持续：基于社会规范视角的实验研究

为什么在各种高强度、持续性惩罚之下,腐败现象依然存在？通过一个改进的贿赂博弈实验,文章将命令性规范与描述性规范引入到实验情境中,首次在实验室中系统考察了这两类社会规范对腐败行为的影响。实验结果显示,社会规范对腐败行为的影响表现为框架效应与从众效应两个方面：一方面,避免使用明确的“腐败”语言会消解框架效应抑制腐败的积极作用,显著增加腐败行为的发生率;另一方面,当腐败成为一种流行现象之后,消极的从众效应会进一步增强个体的腐败倾向,而若不腐败是当前的流行规范,积极的从众效应则会强化框架效应。来自第三方合宜性评价的结果表明,这两种效应的作用模式完全符合一般人的预期。我们认为,腐败行为的这种规范基础可能正是现实中不管反腐力度多大、腐败行为仍持续存在的重要原因之一。这意味着,反腐制度与政策的设计需要考虑腐败的社会性基础,在发挥社会规范积极作用的同时,减少其消极作用。     

Simon Kuipers: An Economist in Search of Rigour and Relevance

At the end of 1997 and after twenty-five years of duty, Professor Simon Kuipers retired as managing editor of De Economist. As a token of indebtedness and gratitude, this article reviews Kuipers' written work. The article focuses on two topics that dominate Kuipers' endeavours. First, his contributions to macroeconomic theory, with particular emphasis on his (neo-)Keynesian approach are examined. Second, Kuipers' contributions to actual monetary and economic policy are discussed, emphasis being placed on his empirical work.     

医疗决策情景下医生利他性测量的实验经济学研究

随着实验经济学、行为博弈论的发展,传统经济学中的自利假设受到利他倾向的挑战。利他性在医疗决策中体现为医生行为偏离个人利益最大化,关注患者健康福利,被认为是医生绩效和医疗服务质量的关键决定因素之一,对公益性导向和满足社会公众利益最大化目标的落实具有重要意义。但是利他性难以测量影响了对医生利他性的研究和有效激励机制的建立。本研究基于显示偏好原理并采用独裁者博弈为基础设计的受控实验室实验模拟医生医疗决策情景,根据医生决策结果,分别基于医生效用函数计算和运用随机效用模型估算医生的利他性。结果显示医生决策过程中对患者健康效益给予了正向权重。医生的利他性存在异质性。基于医生效用函数计算的利他性均值为0.82,表明医生对患者健康效益的权重为82%。96%的医生利他性大于0.5,50%的医生利他性大于0.85。运用随机效用模型估算的利他性(患者健康效益与医生利润的边际替代率)为1.078>1,49%的医生边际替代率大于1,说明相比个人利益医生更加重视患者健康效益。两种方法下测量的利他性显著正相关(Spearman’s ρ=0.715, p<0.001)。提示本研究应用的医疗决策情景下利他性的测量方法可实现医生利他性的量化,基于两种方法测量的医生利他性可以相互印证。     

图书馆员搜商素质中的搜索能力研究

搜商素质是图书馆员在互联网时代需要具备的重要素质之一,搜索能力是图书馆员搜商素质中的重要因素。文章从图书馆员搜商素质中的搜索能力研究、利用搜索引擎搜索能力研究、搜索外文信息资源中文利用能力研究以及图书馆员搜商素质中搜索能力的分级研究等方面,对图书馆员搜商素质中的搜索能力研究进行了探讨。