论公司的债权人治理

由于环境的变化和理论的发展,债权人的公司治理角色正在发生实质性的变化,它不但参与了公司治理,而且越来越成为未来公司治理结构的重要力量。本文在介绍债权人权利和债权人参与公司治理实践的基础上,对债权人公司治理的原因和治理效应进行了较深入的探讨。     

浅谈公司治理结构下的债权人治理

本文突破传统的股东至上的公司治理理论,以利益相关者理论为基础,论述了债权人治理的必要性,我国公司法中债权人保护制度设计上存在的一些问题,随后就如何完善债权人治理问题进行探讨。     

债权人保护：公司治理结构优化的一个重要领域

到中国资本市场的结构问题,我们都知道债券品种偏少是一个严重的表现。成熟市场经济国家债券与股票的比例,一般是75%比25%,我们国家刚好倒过来,这就造成我国资本市场经常性的剧烈波动和投机气氛严重。因此,发展债券市场是各界的共识。但债券市场的发展有一个着力点的选择问题。我觉得,这个着力点应该放在市场主体的责任能力和诚信建设上。没有责任能力,债权的清偿失去了保障,投资人就不会来;不讲诚信,市场就难以有持续的繁荣。其中责任能力说到底取决于发行主体的经营增长性,诚信状况则依赖于公司治理结构的科学和完善程度。如果深入思考一…     

论公司债债权人对公司治理的参与

现代公司法理论在公司治理中引入了债权人参与机制。公司债债权人作为一种证券投资者,数量众多,力量分散,决定了其参与公司治理的途径不同于一般债权人对公司治理的参与。公司债债权人参与公司治理的制度设计有:公司债债权人会议是参与公司治理的主体,债券受托人董事、监事制度,公司债债权人派生诉讼制度。     

债权人与公司治理——猴王破产案分析

一、案例介绍猴王集团是由原猴王焊接公司改组,吸收境内法人股和内部职工参股定向募集的股份有限公司,于1992年11月18日成立,是原国家机械部定点生产焊接材料和焊接设备的大型骨干企业。1993年9月经证监会批准,猴王集团以其部分资产发起上市,同时向社会公开发行流通A股3000万股,成立猴王股份有限公司(即现在的ST猴王,股票代码000535),并于当年12月在深圳证券交易所挂牌。ST猴王上市时的股权结构为:国家股占37.84%,法人股占25.92%,流通股占36.24%。其中占总股本37.84%的国家股由宜昌市国有资产管理局所有,由猴王集团代为经营,一直到1997年。在此期间,没有进入股东名单的猴王集团实际控制着ST猴王。1997年4月,宜昌市国有资产管理     

我国上市公司债权人治理弱化及其对策

我国公司治理准则的指导思想是利益相关者共同治理,它涉及股东、债权人、顾客、供应两等共同治理。但我国债权人作为公司外部治理的主要力量并没有发挥其应有的作用,特别是银行在公司治理中的作用非常有限。为此,重点研究我国上市公司债权人治理的现状,以及治理弱化的原因,并对完善上市公司债权人治理提出若干建议。     

公司治理与财务治理

我国上市公司治理结构存在着先天性的制度缺陷, 表现在委托代理关系的严重失衡。在完善公司治理的过程中, 应逐步理顺财务报表审计关系和独立董事制度引入中的代理关系, 强化财务治理, 以促使上市公司持续健康的向前发展。     

管理会计与公司治理

党的十五届四中全会首次明确提出了"公司治理"的概念,即在对国有大中型企业实行公司制改革时,要以建立规范的公司法人治理结构为核心。据统计,自党的十五大以来,监管部门先后共出台了200多部法规条文,对提升公司治理水平发挥了根本性作用。党的十六大报告明确提出,要按照现代企业制度的要求,对国有大中型企业继续实行规范的公司制改革,完善法人治理结构。要完成这一任务,除进一步完善法律法规外,健全公司内部管理制度,特别是从管理会计的角度探讨公司治理结构     

公司分立中的债权人利益保护

当今社会,经济发展迅速,公司分立是公司提高竞争力的重要方式之一.本文主要通过对国外和我国《公司法》对债权人利益的保护的考察,发现我国《公司法》对债权人保护存在的问题,并借鉴国外经验完善我国公司分立中的债权人利益保护的相关制度,使公司在实现自由顺利分立的同时对债权人利益加以保护.     

Alliances and corporate governance

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.     

Contractual corporate governance

Companies have the choice to deviate from their national corporate governance standards by opting into another system. They can do so via contractual devices – such as cross-border mergers and acquisitions, (re)incorporations, and cross-listings – which enable them to choose their preferred level of investor protection and regulation. This paper reviews these three main contractual governance devices, their effect on value, and whether their adoption by firms induces a race to the bottom or a race to the top. Indeed, firms may opt for less shareholder-orientation or investor protection (shareholder-expropriation hypothesis) rather than for more stringent rules that require firms to focus on shareholder value (bonding hypothesis).     

Accounting conservatism and corporate governance

We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance will exhibit a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Governance level is assessed using a composite measure that incorporates several internal and external characteristics. Consistent with our prediction, strong governance firms show significantly higher levels of conditional accounting conservatism. Our tests take into account the endogenous nature of corporate governance, and the results are robust to the use of several measures of conservatism (market-based and nonmarket-based). Our evidence is consistent with the direction of causality flowing from governance to conservatism, and not vice versa, indicating that governance and conservatism are not substitutes. Finally, we study the impact of earnings discretion on the sensitivity of earnings to bad news across governance structures. We find that, on average, strong-governance firms appear to use discretionary accruals to inform investors about bad news in a timelier manner.

Corporate governance and corporate agility

This paper suggests the topic of corporate agility as a fruitful area for corporate governance research. Corporate agility, which refers to a firms ability to adapt to changes in its environment, is likely to be a critical, yet understudied, determinant of firm performance and survival. This paper proposes an inverse relation between the centralization of decision-making in firms and agility. It also proposes that certain governance structures often viewed as increasing agency costs, such as insider-controlled boards and dual class stock, may actually increase agility and thereby improve firm performance and the chances of survival. The paper concludes with a discussion of specific ways in which agility might be incorporated into the corporate governance literature.     

Board governance and corporate performance

We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world.     

Underwriter syndication and corporate governance

The main purpose of this paper is to examine underwriters’ response to issuers’ ineffective corporate governance. Given the growing importance of corporate governance for the success of equity offerings, we examine this response using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Previous studies suggest various rationales behind underwriter syndication, such as risk sharing, market-making, information production, certification, and monitoring. We offer an information-asymmetry-reduction hypothesis for the persistence of underwriter syndication. We argue that less effective corporate governance decreases information credibility, which, in turn, increases information asymmetry, leading underwriters to increase syndicate size to mitigate subsequent agency problems. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the size of the underwriter syndication is inversely related to proxies that measure the effectiveness of corporate governance. Results remain robust even after controlling for other confounding factors.     

Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.     

Equity market liberalization and corporate governance

Equity market liberalizations open up domestic stock markets to foreign investors. A puzzle in the literature is why developing countries exhibit relatively small financial impacts associated with liberalizations. We use cross-firm variation in corporate governance at the time of the official liberalization of the equity market in Korea to test whether governance can explain the extent to which firms benefit when countries liberalize. The results show that better-governed firms experience significantly greater stock price increases upon equity market liberalization. Following the liberalization in Korea, foreign ownership in firms with strong corporate governance was significantly higher than that in firms with weak governance. Better-governed firms also exhibit higher rates of physical capital accumulation after liberalization.     

KKR、杠杆收购与公司治理

LBO将成为富有商业价值的投资银行业务，下市企业将不仅仅是ST或PT企业，主业竞争地位稳固、自由现金流充裕但缺乏成长机会的绩优上市公司，也可以通过LBO方式下市。