经济转轨、跨国公司进入与国有企业改革

任何转轨国家向市场经济过渡都要面临改革与开放的问题.因此,本文在经济开放的背景下,着重突出跨国公司与转轨国家之间经济的紧密联系,建立跨国公司、转轨国家政府、国内企业三者之间的混合寡占博弈模型,并以市场开放、自由化、私有化等政策变量作为影响转轨进程的外生变量,分析开放程度和经济调控手段以及跨国企业的投资策略等对转轨国家国有企业民营化进程和转轨国家国有企业竞争力的影响.研究表明,转轨国家在经济开放的条件下,对国有企业完全民营化并非是改革的最优方案,而对国有企业的部分民营化效果反而会更好,也符合社会福利最大化的原则.而税率、技术、转移价格等也是影响转轨国家社会福利和转轨国家企业产量和竞争能力的重要因素.     

Transgressing rights: La Via Campesina's call for food sovereignty / Exploring collaborations: Heterodox economics and an economic social rights framework / Workers in the informal sector: Special challenges for economic human rights

Abstract

The notion of rights is a powerful one, but the channels through which they have been promoted and enforced since World War II have militated against the more radical promise of rights. These explorations examine the question of economic rights with an international focus. The contributions touch on such diverse topics as the international peasant federation called La Vía Campesina, heterodox and social economic analyses, and the informal sector. The authors address the question of human rights with respect to the conditions that delimit and enforce these rights, the connections between macroeconomics and human rights, social movements that strive to protect these rights, and the different theoretical approaches to incorporating rights into an academic framework. Though each contribution's methodology and focus are different, the composite takes an important step in evaluating this very critical question of economic rights that greatly affects individual lives, social conditions, economic policies, and the study of economics.     

Group interaction, heterogeneity, rules, and co-operative behaviour: Evidence from a common-pool resource experiment in South Africa and Namibia

We present econometric evidence of how sociodemographic characteristics, economic background, group effects, and dynamic personal and group interactions influence the co-operative behaviour of individuals in a social dilemma situation. The data are from a framed common-pool resource experiment conducted in Namibian and South African farming communities. Our estimates suggest complex but stable social dynamics within groups over the course of the game. We conclude that group interactions may be significantly influenced by the degree of sociodemographic heterogeneity. Our study shows that the introduction of rules matters, as it improves co-operation, but that the concrete shape of such rules may be less important than the underlying social interaction.     

Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples

We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advantage of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players, may be repeated infinitely often. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We demonstrate existence of equilibrium and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43.     

金融生态环境视角的非正规金融生态状况研究

运用金融生态理论,从金融生态环境角度分析非正规金融存在的经济基础、非正式制度的作用、法制环境以及金融生态的自我调节机制.可以认为中小企业和个私经济是非正规金融存在的经济基础;善于利用社会传统和习俗等非正式制度进行有效的风险控制是相对正规金融的优势;非正规金融没有合法地位,经营方式隐蔽,处于监管之外,导致金融风险隐患的形成;非正规金融市场化的利率机制会产生某些负效应.针对非正规金融生态上述现状,提出相应政策建议.     

董事会非正式层级与企业创新——关系契约理论视角

创新既是企业获取长期竞争优势的关键行动,也是我国经济高质量发展的内生动力。董事会作为战略决策机构与治理核心,其内部运作机制必然会影响企业创新水平。基于关系契约理论,以2008—2019年沪深A股上市公司为数据样本,实证研究董事会非正式层级对企业创新的影响。结果发现,董事会非正式层级越清晰,企业创新水平越高,而当股权集中度较高、CEO处于非正式层级最高位时,董事会非正式层级与企业创新间的正相关关系会被削弱。进一步研究发现,董事会非正式层级可以通过降低企业环境不确定性和抑制管理层短视行为提升企业创新水平;区分创新类型后,相比于策略性创新,董事会非正式层级更能够显著提升企业实质性创新水平;董事会非正式层级能够提升企业价值。结论基于新的研究视角从微观动态交互层面理解董事会结构特征对企业创新的影响,对企业加强董事会建设、提升创新水平具有重要借鉴意义。     

我国“宅基地换房”利益主体博弈分析

以"宅基地换房"模式中相关利益主体为着眼点,如果运用案例分析、博弈分析等方法对"宅基地换房"过程中政府(包括中央政府和地方政府)、开发企业、村集体、农民个人"权利与利益"的博弈策略和过程、博弈的不对等利益分配结果展开研究即会发现,公平、规范的博弈平台的缺失导致相对弱势的农民群体在博弈中损失部分利益。应该重视农民享有经济发展带来的利益分配的权利,构建一整套公平、透明的博弈规则,更多地考虑农民个人利益,实现各方利益均衡,以利于我国社会经济的稳定与和谐发展。     

Institutional individualism and institutional change: the search for a middle way mode of explanation

After noting the lack of enthusiasm of several well-known scholarsconcerning the adoption of both methodological holism and methodologicalindividualism in its several versions, this paper shows thatinstitutional individualism is a different mode of explanationfrom both of these and also that it is not the same thing asthe so-called Popperian programme of situational analysis. Institutionalindividualism is a mode of explanation that yields non-systemicand non-reductionist explanations at the same time as it allowsfor the incorporation into economic theories and models of themany formal and informal institutional aspects surrounding allhuman interactions, whether these interactions take place withinstable structures of legal rules and social norms or whetherthey attempt to change the said rules and norms. Finally, thepaper shows that it is possible for old institutionalists tomake institutional individualist analyses of institutional changeswhile retaining the remaining methodological assumptions ofthe school. The same is true for new institutionalists. Someexamples are offered from both camps.     

Conditional cooperation in a sequential move game

Cooperation is a pervasive social phenomenon, but more often than not economic theories have little to say about its causes and consequences. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that cooperative behaviour might be motivated by pure self-interest when the “social” payoff in a game is increasing. We report the results of a series of experiments on the Centipede game. The experiments are organised in two subsequent steps. Subjects first participate in a 2-period trust game, randomly matched with unknown partners. We apply the strategy method in order to elicit their social preferences. On the basis of their pre-game behaviour, individuals are divided into three main social groups: selfish individuals, pure altruists and reciprocators. At the second step of the experiment, subjects play a repeated 6-move Centipede game with an increasing final payoff. Each subject plays twice, in a low and in a high-stake Centipede game, and he/she is informed about his/her co-player social preferences. We provide statistical evidence to identify the origin of cooperation within homogeneous and heterogeneous social groups. We construct a Poisson regression model to assess the determinants of the duration of conditional cooperation in the Centipede.     

Welfare Measures in Dynamic Firm R&D Games

The present paper examines the welfare effects of a dynamic Research and Development (R&D) game at the firm level in a two-country, two-firm, intra-industry trade context. Economists do not use the trade balance as a measure of economic welfare, but it is often used in the public arena. The primary result of the paper is that the dynamic time path of social surplus and the trade balance do not track well together. This paper suggests that economists thinking about dynamic R&D games will have to defend imports as having a positive effect on social surplus regardless of trade balance effects.     

人情社会中的制度安排——基于互动行为的博弈分析

在人情社会中,制度安排要适应文化环境。非正式制度安排的自发性、非强制性和广泛性特征体现了这种制度安排在自发形成过程中社会伦理文化的决定性作用。正式制度安排具有强制性,但是,也必须与文化环境兼容,否则这种制度安排就将是无效的,或者是不可持续的。本文基于行为互动的博弈方法,以监考制度为例,以说明人情与制度的冲突,以及如何设计制度以实现集体理性与个体理性兼容,制度与人情兼容问题。     

员工地位竞争动机、知识分享行为与创新绩效——基于嵌入性悖论视角

组织中个体创新常常面临嵌入性悖论。相对于传统地位竞争的反功能视角，人们日益认识到地位竞争尤其是威望型地位竞争，可以为个体提供创新资源和动力。有效化解这一悖论，关键在于明晰何种类型的地位竞争以及何种程度的嵌入性可以促进个体创新。对一家大型多业务单元传媒集团227名员工进行实证调查，分析结果表明：威望型地位竞争可以通过促进个体知识分享行为提升个体创新绩效；非正式地位较低的个体更有可能具有威望型地位竞争动机；正式地位与非正式地位对个体地位竞争动机有交互影响，处于高正式地位的成员如果在非正式网络中处于边缘位置，则更可能在地位竞争中表现出威望型地位竞争动机。     

Formal and informal norms: their relationships in society and in the economic sphere

The thesis put forward in this paper is that in social life in general, and in the economic sphere in particular, the relationships between formal norms and informal social norms can be interpreted in terms of either reciprocal complementarity or conflict. The concept of complementarity illustrates how the two kinds of norms cooperate with and reinforce each other, and describes under what circumstances formal norms can or cannot replace informal rules. Conversely, the notion of conflict between different kinds of norms distinguishes two forms of antagonism: prohibition (which occurs when one type of norm prohibits enforcement of the other), and mutual exclusiveness (which occurs when one type of norm crowds out the other, without this entailing prohibition).     

Naive Adaptive Behavior and the Observability of Gambles

This paper considers a class of naive adaptive learning rules in a social setting. They generalize biological selection and have become relevant in economic theory as a consequence of their use in evolutionary game models. The environment considered here is nonstrategic but includes gambles which are more or less completely observed in each period. In the long run, individuals are more averse to a gamble which is less observable, other things being equal, and may violate first-order stochastic dominance. Thus these rules need not be consistent with rational behavior in the usual sense.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D83, C72.     

Socio-economic typologies of bureaucratic corruption and implications

Corruption all over the world is an ancient, but it seems very topical too, concern in politics and in the media. This paper investigates spatial and dynamic aspects of corruption using cellular automata. Although cellular automata are very simple, deterministic machines and thus crude approximations of real, economic situations, they are capable of describing self organization and complex patterns (of corruption). It is shown that neither social pressure nor pure economic incentives allow for complex patterns, although social pressure may lead to clusters of corrupt and uncorrupt segments within a bureaucracy. However, blending both above characteristics is capable explaining complex behavior. Extending the concept of cellular automata through mixing rules – across space (= bureaucrats) and time (accounting for global effects) – does not affect the fundamental properties.     

中国被忽视的非正规经济：现实与理论

中国的“非正规经济”就业人员（即没有工作保障,缺少福利和不受国家劳动法保护的劳工）已占今天2．83亿城镇就业人员总数中的1．68亿,比正规就业人员要多出一倍半。但是,今目的中国国家统计机构尚未真正正视非正规经济就业人员统计。其部分原因是当前的主流经济（以及社会）理论——即主要来自20世纪60年代在美国盛行的“二元经济”理论、“三部门理论”和“橄榄型”社会结构理论——的误导。这些理论共同构成了50年代和60年代风行美国的“现代化”模式。本文扼要论述该模式的关键论点,进而回顾70年代和80年代发展经济学“革命”中有关学者对其所作的批评,以及后来新古典经济学在美国新保守主义领导下进行的“反革命”辩驳,重在揭示论争双方的意识形态化偏颇,并突出各自的洞见,提倡适当结合双方正确的见解,由此建立去意识形态化的理论观点,以助于理解今天非正规经济的现实。     

Capitalism and evolution

In this paper I to ask an old fashioned question, “Why do capitalist economies evolve in the way that they do?” The answer will lie, in the nature of human curiosity and the corresponding growth of knowledge and in the particular instituted rules of the game that induce the self transformation of each particular economic order. The essential idea is this; the manner of self transforming is contingent on the manner of self-ordering, so that different instituting frames have different dynamic consequences. The notion of order provides the bridge to the systemic properties of the economy, the nature of its parts and the manner of their interconnection, while the notion of transformation provides the link with evolution and the open-ended, essentially unpredictable, development of capitalism. From my perspective capitalist economies are ignorance economies, in which highly specialised individuals and teams know a great deal about very little, so that the productive strength of the system, its collective knowing, depends on how the pools of specialised, narrow understandings are connected. Connectivity requires organisation and organisation depends on rules of the game and on belief and trust so that we can rely upon the testimony and actions of others. Failure of trust leads to failure of connectivity and a corresponding loss of system coherence. Order is central to the notion of economic evolution and, in practice, economic configurations demonstrate immense richness and subtlety but order is not equilibrium. Systems in equilibrium do not evolve. That the day to day structures of capitalism are the product of ordering processes in the epistemic as well as the material realm seems to me self evident and it is equally self evident that these structures are restless, that their development is open-ended and unpredictable.     

Internalizing the Social Costs of a Small Number of Powerful,Overindebted Firms

Extraordinary debt-to-capital ratios (leverage) and the compression of markets to very few, large companies (concentration) are economic risk factors. They have contributed to vast social costs during the current economic crisis in the USA and in Europe. This theoretical study internalizes these social costs via two market-based policy instruments for the first time in a real-economy Dixit–Stiglitz framework: a tax on firms' debt capital use and a subsidy for market entrants. It helps understand the complex real-economic mechanisms that these policy instruments cause, it derives intuitive rules of thumb for setting the tax rate and the subsidy level so that they elevate welfare, and it suggests ways to practically implement the policies.     

Measuring the Labor Income Share of Developing Countries: Lessons From Social Accounting Matrices

This paper addresses the challenges of measuring the labor income share of developing countries. The poor availability and reliability of national account data as well as the fact that self-employed—whose labor income is hard to capture—account for a major share of the workforce and often work in the informal sector render its computation difficult. Consequently, measuring the labor share requires assumptions. I consult social accounting matrices in addition to national account data to gain information on the production structure and self-employed incomes in developing countries. The final data set covers about 90 developing countries from 1990 to 2011. The data suggest that the finding of declining labor shares of previous studies also applies to the sample of low and middle-income countries. Furthermore, I find the labor share in developing countries to be about one-half in size and hence less than the standard “two-thirds” in economic literature.