Money: Capital Good,Consumers’ Good,or (Media of) Exchange Good?

Is money a producers’ good or a capital good, or is it sui generus, as Mises, Rothbard, and other Austrians have maintained? We argue that all action is either consumption or production, and that exchange is but a form of production. Consequently, all goods are either consumers’ goods or producers’ goods; there is no third possibility. And that among these two money is a producers’ good, not a consumer good.     

Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development: 100 years of development

This article sheds light on the impact of Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development over the last 100?years, and identifies insights from that work that are less well-known, but that have the potential for informing current developments in evolutionary economics. We identify these insights by tracing the development of Schumpeter’s ideas in Theory of Economic Development, which he revised heavily between the first and second German and the English editions. We not only report material lost in the process and developments in Schumpeter’s thinking that can be read off of the revisions, but also indicate how the newfound material can inform and inspire evolutionary economics today.     

Degrees of Connection: A Critique of Rawls’s Theory of Mutual Disinterest

John Rawls's solution to the problem of justice between generations is premised on the idea that “a generation cares for its immediate descendants, as fathers say care for their sons” (John Rawls 1971: 288, emphasis added). This paper brings mothers into the Rawlsian social contract. I argue that, when children have more than one parent, there is a contradiction between the assumption of concern for descendants, which underpins Rawls's account of justice between generations, and the mutual disinterest assumption, which characterizes parties negotiating in the “original position.” Concern for descendants creates connections within generations as well as across generations. The critique is internal and nonradical, but its implications are subversive. It demonstrates that an “add women and stir” liberal feminist reworking of Rawls's theory cannot be successful; bringing sexual reproduction out of the realm of nature and into the social contract necessitates a radical reconstruction of Rawls's theory.     

Britain’s Industrial Evolution: The Structuring Role of Economic Theory

We trace the coevolution of industrial organization and the ideas and policies that have influenced Britain’s industrial development from Alfred Marshall’s pioneering work on the English industrial districts to the present. Then, we examine four contemporary districts — in footwear, motorsport, sparkling wine, and cyber security — that are internationally competitive, despite decades of ill-informed policy choices, if not neglect. We also investigate the case of British elite sport as a high-performance industrial cluster with potentially transferrable institutional arrangements, particularly with regard to the nature and role of the strategic lead body and the state, as well as relationships within the system. We conclude that Marshall’s methodological and theoretical approach to understanding industrial organization — and his belief that industrial districts would coexist with other forms of industrial organization (rather than be superseded by them) — helps to explain the dynamism of contemporary British industrial districts, with important implications for Britain’s industrial revitalization.     

Entrepreneurship and second-best institutions: going beyond Baumol’s typology

This paper reconsiders the predominant typology pioneered by Baumol (J Polit Econ 98(5):893–921, 1990) among productive, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship. It is shown that the foundation of Baumol’s classification scheme is the restrictive concept of first-best outcomes, and therefore it easily fails to appreciate the true impact of entrepreneurship in real-world circumstances characterized by suboptimal institutions. We present an alternative way of generalizing the notion of entrepreneurship and show how and why it encompasses the Baumol typology as a special case. Our main distinction is between business and institutional entrepreneurship. We draw on Schumpeter and introduce the entrepreneur in an additional function: as a potential disturber of an institutional equilibrium. Various subsets of institutional entrepreneurship are posited and discussed. It is shown that changing the workings of institutions constitutes an important set of entrepreneurial profit opportunities. An implication of this is that entrepreneurial efforts to reform or offset inefficient institutions can, in many cases, be welfare-improving.     

Clarence Ayres’s Critique of Orthodox Economic Theory

Mainstream economists and liberal politicians are criticizing the Third Way as it is being applied in the Netherlands. They argue that mutual consultation precludes an efficient adaptation to disturbances. The present study analyzes changes in wage and income policy in the Netherlands until 2005. It finds that wage and income policy has proven to be flexible enough to address “new” challenges in the Netherlands. The flexibility is rooted in a culture of tolerance that allows for some breaking of working rules. The latter arises from bounded socialization, that is, the imperfect transmission of information with respect to social working rules that result in similar but not identical copies of institutions.     

Wealth,Capital and the Theory of Distribution: Some Implications for Piketty’s Analysis

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) has been spectacularly successful. One reason for this is that while it often challenges received views and supports a non-apologetic interpretation of capitalism, at the same time it relies on mainstream economics. This theoretical framework, however, is not always conducive to consistency and interpretative accuracy. This paper points out some of the book’s analytical weaknesses and shows that some empirical evidence, a clearer distinction between wealth and capital, and a different theoretical perspective, could lead to questioning some of the book’s claims. In particular, it argues that the increase in the wealth-to-output ratio (but not the capital-to-output ratio) cannot explain the observed changes in income shares. It also contends that non-mainstream perspectives on income distribution and growth suggest that changes in income distribution are due more to policy and power relations than to the factors Piketty identifies.     

Integrating Schumpeter and Keynes: Hyman Minsky’s Theory of Capitalist Development

Taking the idea that institutional reproduction is not obvious and that institutions are vulnerable has significant conceptual implications. Institutional vulnerability can arise through communication between actors in a common language. To apprehend this requires an elaboration of John Searle's (1995, 2005) argument that language is the fundamental institution. Ontologically, language delineates and circumscribes a community. A community cannot function without a common language, and language at the same time constitutes a community's boundaries, allowing for focused and effective communication within a community. Communication through language introduces ambiguity as well, however, and so institutional reproduction, mediated by language, is a deeply contentious process. Communication across boundaries may particularly "irritate" a system, as Niklas Luhmann has argued. How can institutions then be re-identified through change? Searle's general form for institutions is in need of elaboration. We develop arguments by drawing upon Luhmann's (1995) systems analysis and notion of communication.     

Karl Marx’s Theory of Socio-Institutional Transformation in Late-Stage Capitalism

This article is in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen’s organized-intelligence-in-action definition of technology¹. It intends to identify the social technology necessary for organizing knowledge in order to get a grip on social change. Social change is seldom directed by discretionary policy; its rate is too fast for most to comprehend, and it has consequences that too often are neither desirable nor just. Since the last century scholars have “accepted the idea that the circumstances of existence were continually changing, that society was necessarily in the process of making adaptions to the changing circumstances, and that intelligent adaptation would result in human progress.“² Yet most of our social science models have yet to incorporate these dynamics. To further our understanding, scientific modeling must be developed to reflect social change as the norm, not as the exception to equilibrium.     

Say’s Law,Marxian Crisis Theory and the Interconnectedness of the Capitalist Economy

ABSTRACT

Scholars have long debated exactly why Marx felt that general gluts were not just possible, but inevitable. This article argues that Theories of Surplus Value anchored that necessity in the complex interconnectedness that characterizes capitalist production. There, Marx’s criticism of Say’s Law builds on a version of crisis theory that begins with raw material shortages in a leading sector. The disturbance is then transmitted through the many inter-industry linkages in the capitalist economy. What starts as a supply-side shock in a leading sector is transformed into a broad crisis of aggregate demand as workers are laid off and businesses fall into insolvency. This article argues that Marx’s later discussion of other types of crises in Capital can be read as consistent with this approach. A severe profit squeeze in a leading sector (whether originating in intermediate good prices, market demand, rising wages or rising use of fixed capital) necessarily turns into a general glut. In this context, Say’s Law becomes an irrelevant theorem concerning an imaginary economy. What Marx sees as fundamentally new under capitalism is not the use of money and the separation of sale and purchase, but massive interconnectedness.     

Collective Action,Marx’s Class Theory,and the Union Movement

Research on establishment size-wage effects has consistently shown a positive relationship between the number of employees and workers' wages. While several theories have been offered to explain these outcomes, the use of data with limited employer characteristics make for a dubious connection between theory and results. This study examines the firm size-wage effect using a dataset that captures typical worker demographics, but also contains employer information not typically captured in larger datasets. The results provide strong evidence that these wage effects are the result of several forces, including worker sorting/matching, efficiency wages, internal labor markets, and, to a lesser degree, working conditions.