The impact of directors’ and officers’ insurance on audit pricing: Evidence from UK companies

This paper examines the impact of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance on audit pricing in a large sample of UK companies. The existence of D&O insurance is expected to exert a dual impact on auditors’ pricing decisions. The presence of an additional source of funds to satisfy stakeholder claims in the event of audit client failure suggests that audit fees in insured companies should be lower. Alternatively, recent research has identified a positive link between the presence of D&O insurance and a number of characteristics traditionally associated with more expensive audits. The main objective of this study is to ascertain which of these influences pre-dominates. Analysing a sample of 753 UK listed companies in the early 1990s, when companies were obliged to disclose the presence of D&O insurance, this study shows that D&O insurance is associated with higher audit fees. It also confirms that insured companies are larger, more complex and present a greater audit risk (using a range of measures) than uninsured companies. Further analysis suggests that the impact of D&O insurance on audit fees may be influenced by company size, auditor size, and the extent of non-executive presence on the company's board.     

Officers’ fiduciary duties and acquisition outcomes

Using a Delaware case law that recognized officers’ distinct fiduciary duties for the first time in 2009, I examine the effect of officers' fiduciary duties (OFDs) on corporate acquisitions. I find that firms with entrenched officers prior to 2009 experienced increased announcement-period abnormal stock returns, mainly because their acquisitions created more synergies and reduced officers’ incentives to preserve control. These firms increased liability insurance premium expenditures, but reduced value-decreasing acquisition frequencies. Furthermore, the effect of OFDs is more pronounced in firms where officers are not directors, have wealth risk, face less product market competition, are insulated from the market for corporate control, or are able to avoid board monitoring. Overall, OFDs are a critical corporate governance mechanism that works in tandem with other disciplinary mechanisms.     

Shareholders’ tax incentives and changes in the organizational form of foreign operations

This study examines whether the tax incentives of home-country shareholders influence the organizational form changes of foreign operations. While a corporation and a limited company (LC) in South Korea are treated the same for Korean tax purposes, an LC can be treated as a pass-through entity for U.S. tax purposes. This tax treatment of LCs can create incentives for U.S. owners to convert their Korean corporations to LCs. We find that private corporations owned by U.S. shareholders are more likely to convert to LCs than those owned by non-U.S. shareholders. We also find that the tax costs and benefits of conversion affect the likelihood of LC conversion for U.S.-owned firms. Overall, our results suggest that multinational corporations use organizational form changes as a tool for international tax strategies.     

Antecedents and outcomes relating to public and private nurses’ use of intuition in England

This paper examines public and private sector nurses’ use of intuition in England using structural equation modeling. Leader–member exchange (LMX) and perceived organizational support (POS) correlated positively with nurses’ perception of discretionary power and use of intuition. Nurses’ perception of discretionary power and use of intuition were positively correlated with their engagement. Further, differences were identified between private sector and public sector nurses in relation to the impact of workplace relationships (POS and LMX) and intuition onto perceived discretionary power and employee engagement. The results are important for all hospital managers seeking to foster employees’ use of intuition, perception of discretionary power, and engagement.     

Underwriters’ price support regulation and institutional investors’ trading: The case of the putback option

We examine a period in Korea during which a price supporting regulation called the putback option was imposed on the IPO underwriter. Under the regulation, individual investors of IPO had put options which can be exercised at 90% of IPO price. We find that during the regulation period, institutional investors’ flipping activity is evident not on the days following the IPO but on the days following the expiration of putback option. Our study shows that the regulation results in merely delaying the institutional investors’ documented trading behavior and provides evidence that the relationship between the underwriter and the institutional investors affects the trading of institutional investors.     

The effect of chief financial officers’ accounting expertise on corporate tax avoidance: the role of compensation design

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Accounting expertise is closely related to corporate tax planning, and hence, corporate chief financial officers (CFOs) with accounting expertise may...     

The impact of consolidation and safety-net support on Canadian,US and UK banks: 1893–1992

This study investigates bank consolidation and safety-net support provision in Canada, the UK and the US over a 100-year historical period, and the impact of these policy variables on bank capital and risk-taking choices. The study finds that consolidation and strengthened safety nets have largely supplanted the historical role of high bank capital levels in providing protection to risk-adverse depositors. Furthermore, despite strengthened safety-net guarantees, the study finds that bank asset-risk choices in the 1980s are comparable to those observed in the 1890s, while bank equity volatilities have shown approximately a 10-fold increase over this period. Finally, the study finds that bank capital ratios are as asset-risk sensitive in the 1980s as those in the 1890s, perhaps reflecting residual market discipline or regulatory moral-suasion effects.     

The association between individual audit partners’ risk preferences and the composition of their client portfolios

We explore whether audit partners’ attitude towards risk, as measured by their personal criminal convictions, are reflected in the composition of their client portfolios. Analyzing a unique dataset of Swedish audit partners’ criminal convictions, we find that the clients of audit partners with criminal convictions are characterized by greater financial, governance, and reporting risk than those of audit partners without criminal convictions. Also, clients of audit partners with criminal convictions pay larger audit fees, on average, than those of auditors without criminal convictions.     

Re-theorizing the configuration of organizational fields: the IIRC and the pursuit of ‘Enlightened’ corporate reporting

This paper studies the emergence of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) and its attempts to institutionalize integrated reporting as a practice that is critical to the relevance and value of corporate reporting. Informed by Suddaby and Viale’s [(2011). Professionals and field-level change: institutional work and the professional project. Current Sociology, 59, 423–442] theorization of how professionals reconfigure organizational fields, the paper delineates the strategies and mechanisms through which the IIRC has sought to enroll the support of a wide range of stakeholder groups for the idea of integrated reporting in order to deliver a fundamental reconfiguration of the corporate reporting field. The paper’s analysis reinforces the significance to any such field reconfiguration of the reciprocal and mutual arrangements between influential professionals and other powerful actors but does so in a way that (a) refines Suddaby and Viale’s theorization of processes of field-level change and (b) pinpoints the fundamental policy challenges facing the IIRC. Gieryn’s [(1983). Boundary work and the demarcation of science from non-science: strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. American Sociological Review, 48 (6), 781–795] notion of boundary work is operationalized to capture some of the complexity and dynamism of the change process that is not sufficiently represented by Suddaby and Viale’s more sequentialist theorization. From a policy perspective, the paper demonstrates just how much the IIRC’s prospects for success in reconfiguring the corporate reporting field depend on its ability to reconfigure the mainstream investment field. Ultimately, this serves to question whether the IIRC’s conceptualization of ‘enlightened’ corporate reporting is sufficiently powerful and persuasive to stimulate ‘enlightened’ investment behavior focused on the medium and long term – and, more generally stresses the theoretical significance of considering connections across related organizational fields in institutional analyses of field reconfiguration efforts.     

Commentary on Roy Suddaby,Yves Gendron and Helen Lam “the organizational context of professionalism in accounting”

The paper by Suddaby et al. (Suddaby, R., Gendron, Y., & Lam, H. (2009). The organizational context of professionalism in accounting. Accounting Organizations and Society, 34(3–4), 409–427.) advances our understanding of the erosion, or otherwise, of traditional professional values by locating the debates in organisational and work contexts. This commentary seeks to extend the debate by posing questions about the theory and evidence of the paper. In particular, it argues that changes in professional attitudes and values cannot easily be understood without a consideration of the broader social and political contexts.     

Discussion of “The effects of multimedia-induced affective states on recall and decision making by individual investors”

Rose (this issue) presents the results of two experiments designed to examine the effects of information presentation characteristics, specifically the use of multimedia, on decision making. Recent advances in information technology make this is an important and timely topic. Rose's study provides useful insights and should stimulate additional research. As with any experiment, however, there are important limitations that should be addressed and corrected in future studies.     

A note on foreigners’ trading and price effects across firms

We study the investment behavior of foreign investors in association with an equity market liberalization, and find a strong link between foreigners’ trading and local market returns. In the period following the liberalization, net purchases by foreign investors induced a permanent increase in stock prices, suggesting that local firms reduced their cost of equity capital. We also find a strong link between a firm’s fraction of foreign ownership and the magnitude of the cost reduction. Foreign investors seem to prefer large and well-known firms, and these firms realize the largest reduction in capital cost. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that foreigners increase their net holding in firms that have recently performed well. Analyzing foreigners’ performance, we find very little evidence of informed trading, suggesting that risk sharing is the most plausible explanation for the reduction of the cost of equity capital.     

The joint impact of accountability and transparency on managers’ reporting choices and owners’ reaction to those choices

We report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the fundamental conflict of interest between managers and owners in a financial reporting setting. In our setting, owners seek accurate reports of financial performance whereas managers have incentives to distort performance reports in a self-serving fashion. Regulatory responses to such conflicts often call for improved disclosure, including more accountability and transparency (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Dodd-Frank Act). We use the term accountability to imply answerability—wherein managers are required to reconcile the difference between reported and actual performance. We predict and find that when managers’ incentives are transparently disclosed, accountability does not rein in managers’ opportunistic reporting. By comparison, when managers’ incentives are less transparently disclosed (opaque), accountability dampens managers’ propensity to misreport. However, this reduction in opportunistic reporting due to accountability comes about because managers offset higher reporting bias in compensation periods with lower reporting bias in other periods. Therefore, not only are the benefits of accountability restricted to the setting where managers’ incentives are opaque, but the reduced reporting bias might arise due to window-dressing. Although managers seem to care enough about accountability to engage in window-dressing, financial incentives seem to dominate accountability, at least in our setting. We also find that managers’ payoffs are higher when their incentives are opaque, but owners’ payoffs are invariant regardless of whether incentives are transparent or opaque. Our analyses suggest that owners may be relying on accountability to curb opportunistic reporting by managers—a reliance that may be misplaced. Our findings have implications for regulatory responses aimed at addressing conflicts of interest.     

The Impact of Owner’s Identity on Banks’ Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Risk

In this article, we test the potential impact of the owner’s identity on banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity risk as defined by the Basel III regulatory framework. Using a unique dataset on a sample of banks domiciled in the Middle East and North Africa region, we find that the ownership structure is an important driver of banks’ regulatory capital and liquidity risk. Private and foreign investors exhibit a stronger preference for higher levels of capital, whereas the impact of government ownership on banks’ risk remains inconclusive. Moreover, privately-owned banks evidenced lower levels of liquidity risk compared to the other groups during the last financial crisis because of tighter budget constraints and more compelling liquidity needs.