Brokers and Order Flow Leakage: Evidence from Fire Sales

Using trade‐level data, we study whether brokers play a role in spreading order flow information in the stock market. We focus on large portfolio liquidations that result in temporary price drops, and identify the brokers who intermediate these trades. These brokers’ clients are more likely to predate on the liquidating funds than to provide liquidity. Predation leads to profits of about 25 basis points over 10 days and increases the liquidation costs of the distressed fund by 40%. This evidence suggests a role of information leakage in exacerbating fire sales.     

Herding and the information content of trades in the Australian dollar market

This study shows that the information content of FX transactions depends on the identity of market participants. Using spot FX transactions of a major Australian bank, we find that central banks have the greatest price impact, followed by non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as hedge funds and mutual funds. Trades by non-financial corporations have the least impact on dealer pricing. In the interbank market, dealers with greater private information tend to choose direct trading which has lower post-trade transparency. Indirect trading via brokers is partially revealed to the market and has little price impact. The price impact largely comes from institutions in the top quartile of the trading volume. Furthermore, NBFIs have the greatest propensity for herding, followed by interbank dealers. Non-financial corporations do not herd in their trades. Except for central banks, the differential impact of market participants can largely be explained by their propensity for herding.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York Stock Exchange

Theory suggests that reputations allow nonanonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in trading. We identify instances in which New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks experience trading floor relocations. Although specialists follow the stocks to their new locations, most brokers do not. We find a discernable increase in liquidity costs around a stock's relocation that is larger for stocks with higher adverse selection and greater broker turnover. We also find that floor brokers relocating with the stock obtain lower trading costs than brokers not moving and brokers beginning trading post‐move. Our results suggest that reputation plays an important role in the NYSE's liquidity provision process.     

Buying a house and the decision to use a real estate broker

This study examines the factors that affect the decision by home buyers to use real estate brokers and the subsequent effect this decision has on home prices. Buyers with high opportunity costs and the least amount of information about local market conditions are the most likely to use brokers; a finding consistent with the role of the real estate broker as a market intermediary. Not surprisingly, these were some of the same factors that also have a positive impact on selling price. An important finding of this study is that when selection bias is adequately controlled, the real estate broker has no appreciable, independent impact on selling price. This, in turn, suggests a nonsegmented, highly competitive housing market.     

Minimum Service Requirements, Limited Brokers and Menuing of Services

In the past few years, many states have responded to the increasing number of limited service brokers by passing minimum service requirements. Limited service brokers can be viewed as those brokers who are offering their marketing and representative services A La Carte as opposed to the more traditional full-services brokers offering of a Table D??h?te (one size fits all) for their services. Supporters claim the legislation is necessary to protect consumers who are otherwise hurt by limited service brokers, but critics assert that this legislation is anti-competitive and not necessary. This study provides empirical evidence that sellers using limited service brokers experience a trade-off between a higher selling price and longer marketing spans with accompanying lower probabilities of finding a buyer during a given marketing period.     

The Role of Agents and Brokers in the Market for Health Insurance

Health insurance markets in the United States are characterized by imperfect information, complex products, and substantial search frictions. Insurance agents and brokers play a significant role in helping employers navigate these problems. However, little is known about the relations between the structure of the agent/broker market and access and affordability of insurance. This article aims to fill this gap by investigating the influence of agents/brokers on health insurance offering decisions of small firms, which are particularly vulnerable to problems of financing health insurance. Using a unique membership database from the National Association of Health Underwriters together with a nationally representative survey of employers, we find that small firms in more competitive agent/broker markets are more likely to offer health insurance and at lower premiums. Moreover, premiums are less dispersed in more competitive agent/broker markets.     

Financial Economists' Roundtable Statement on THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES MARKETS

Market practitioners, regulators, and economists are now debating the merits of a national market system—a single, fully integrated securities market that would be coordinated by a central computer and mandated by the SEC. This brief statement, signed by 29 distinguished financial economists, argues that such a system is a badidea. The multiplicity of U.S. markets is a sign of innovation and vibrant competition, not a problem that requires regulatory intervention. As a variety of markets with different technologies and trading procedures vie for somewhat different groups of customers with different needs, the result is competing market centers—registered exchanges (such as NYSE and AMEX) with designated specialists; NASDAQ with competing dealers; third market dealers in listed securities; and alternative trading systems (regulated as brokers) serving institutional investors or providing on-line trading to individual investors. Moreover, the fact that the different U.S. markets are linked in various ways and degrees—for example, by information and by private order routing systems of brokers and markets—should caution us against viewing market "fragmentation" as a public policy problem in need of a solution     

Strategic distortions in analyst forecasts in the presence of short-term institutional investors

We document that analysts cater to short-term investors by issuing optimistic target prices. Catering dominates among analysts at brokers without an investment banking arm as they face lower reputational cost. The market does not see through the analyst catering activity and their forecasts lead to temporary stock overpricing that short-term institutional investors exploit to offload their holdings to retail traders. We also report evidence consistent with catering brokers being rewarded with more future trades channelled through them. Our study identifies a new source of conflicts of interest in analyst research originating from the ownership composition of a stock.     

The effects of regulation on industry structure and trade generation in the US securities industry

This study investigates the effects of Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement on market share within the US securities industry as well as the determinants of market share during 1996–2004. We find that these regulations did not cause top brokers to lose market share in spite of their reduction of information asymmetries existing within the brokerage industry. They did, however, significantly reduce the quarterly variability in market share changes. We find that Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement reduce the importance of an all-star analyst, issuer affiliation, and analyst optimism for gaining brokerage market share. We further discover that the Global Research Analyst Settlement increases the importance of coverage as a market share determinant while reducing the value of analyst experience for non-top brokers. We find that our results remain robust even when we limit our analysis to a set of pure brokerage firms.     

Analyst coverage and earnings management

What is the role of information intermediaries in corporate governance? This paper examines equity analysts’ influence on managers’ earnings management decisions. Do analysts serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? Using multiple measures of earnings management, I find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. To address the potential endogeneity problem of analyst coverage, I use two instrumental variables based on change in broker size and on firm's inclusion in the Standard & Poor's 500 index, and I find that the results are robust. Finally, given the number of covering analysts, analysts from top brokers and more experienced analysts have stronger effects against earnings management.     

How Insurance Brokers Create Value—A Functional Approach

Fundamental changes in the market make it necessary for insurance intermediaries to continuously redefine their roles. This study concentrates on a customer perspective of the future role of insurance brokers, using the theoretical foundations of the customer value approach. Findings from 20 in-depth interviews with leading managers of various types of multinational companies are supplemented with the results from interviews conducted with representatives of intermediaries and insurers. From this study it can be concluded that, depending on the customer's individual situation, brokers will assume one of four functions, the choice of which will be highly dependent on the degree of innovation and individualization desired. The investigation shows that although traditional transaction-oriented services will continue to be important, there will be a shift toward tailor-made solutions with an emphasis on consulting services, a situation that will require brokers to acquire new skills so as to be able to meet customer needs.     

Arbitrage crashes and the speed of capital

The imminent failure of prime brokers during the 2008 financial crisis caused a sudden decrease in the leverage afforded hedge funds. This decrease resulted from the asymmetrical payoff to rehypothecation lenders—the ultimate financiers, through prime brokers, to hedge funds. Seemingly long-term debt capital became short-term capital creating a duration mismatch between left-hand side arbitrage opportunities and right-hand side liabilities. Consequently, arbitrageurs became unable to maintain similar prices of similar assets. Mispricing magnitudes, and the time required to correct them, reflect the role of arbitrageurs in maintaining accurate prices during normal times and offer an estimate of discounts at which assets transact during crises.     

Information Asymmetries and Security Market Design: An Empirical Study of the Secondary Market for U.S. Government Securities

This paper examines the empirical implications of an information asymmetry between primary and secondary dealers in the U.S. Government Securities market. This asymmetry arises because primary dealers are permitted to trade through all brokers operating in the marketplace while secondary dealers are restricted to trade through only a subset of brokers. Brokers distribute valuable information over video screens to their trading clients including dealers' up-to-date bid-ask spreads and recent transaction prices. As such, all brokers' video screen information is available to primary dealers, while only a subset of brokers' information is available to secondary dealers. Empirical analyses detect the resulting information asymmetry.     

Observing and Shaping the Market: The Dilemma of Central Banks

While the central bank observes market activity to assess economic fundamentals, it shapes the market outcome through the conduct of monetary policy. A dilemma arises from this dual role because the more the central bank shapes the market, the more it influences the informational content of market outcomes. This paper analyzes how accounting for the endogeneity of information affects optimal monetary policy. By reducing the accuracy of central bank information, endogenous information calls for a higher degree of opacity, weakens accommodation policy to shocks, and broadens the range of parameters for which taking a signaling action is detrimental to welfare.     

How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection

This paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise customers regarding the suitability of financial products. Our model explains why brokers are commonly compensated indirectly through contingent commissions paid by product providers, even though this compensation structure could lead to biased advice. When customers are wary of the adviser's incentives, contingent commissions can be an effective incentive tool to induce the adviser to learn which specialized product is most suitable for the specific needs of customers. If, instead, customers naively believe they receive unbiased advice, high product prices and correspondingly high commissions become a tool of exploitation. Policy intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions can protect naive consumers and increase welfare. However, prohibiting or capping commissions could have the unintended consequence of stifling the adviser's incentive to acquire information. More vigorous competition benefits consumers and reduces exploitation, but firms have limited incentives to educate naive customers.     

Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

Risk Management by Securities Settlement Agents

As developing countries search for ways to promote capital formation through the establishment of organized exchanges, they will need to pay more attention to the role of risk management in the securities settlement process. The delivery-versus-payment (DVP) agents that facilitate the process of exchanging securities for funds in most world markets have both the incentive and comparative informational advantage to monitor, measure, and manage risks inherent in the securities settlement system.
Unfortunately, most DVP agents have accomplished this task to date through the cumbersome use of position and net debit limits, capital requirements, and collateral requirements. Such limits and requirements are almost everywhere based on relatively arbitrary criteria that may have no relation to the actual replacement cost, principal, or liquidity risk of the transaction, portfolio, or participant on which they are imposed.
To remedy this shortcoming in the current state of risk management at DVP agents, this article holds out the possibility of integrated, comprehensive risk management processes that emphasize and rely on forward-looking measures of risk for individual brokers and across brokers. Many risk measures could serve the settlement agent's purposes, including "value at risk" (or "VaR"), "below target risk,""below-target probability," and "downside semi-variance." The actual summary risk measure used for risk monitoring and control is not as important as the methodology used to generate that risk measure. "The goal of such a process," as the authors put it, "is to ensure that the risks to which a settlement agent and its residual claimants are exposed are those risks to which the agent's shareholders think they are and want to be exposed."     

The trades of NYSE floor brokers

This paper studies the contribution of NYSE floor brokers to the Exchange's agency auction market. Floor brokers represent 44%, specialists 11%, and system orders 45% of the value of all executed orders in our sample. We analyze how the cross-sectional distribution of floor broker trading depends on liquidity, block volume, on- and off-exchange competition, volatility, and order flow internalization. Floor brokers participate in large trades, primarily in liquid stocks, and they trade more when volatility is high. They provide two-sided liquidity to the market and often provide liquidity that would otherwise have been supplied by NYSE specialists.     

THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR

In this paper I address several phenomena that arise from the limited information possessed by individual investors. This limitation focuses attention on the channels by which investors receive information about securities. I find this perspective to have implications for the marketing of financial products, the dissemination of information by brokers, the commissions of brokerages, the role of investment analysis in the pricing of securities, the pricing of the services provided by financial intermediaries, and the equilibrium of pricing of capital assets.