Markets for ideas: prize structure,entry limits,and the design of ideation contests

I develop an empirical model of idea generation contests with heterogeneous participants and endogenous entry, fit the model to data from a platform used by major advertisers, and simulate counterfactual contest designs. The empirical model resolves ambiguous predictions yielded by contest theory about the effects of different prize structures on contest outcomes. Simulations reveal the impact of strategies that hold fixed total award and balance competition by handicapping advantaged participants. Increasing the number of prizes while restricting the number of prizes per participant can improve outcomes for the platform. The results provide guidance for the design of large contests.     

Creativity and the role of the leader

In today's innovation-driven economy, understanding how to generate great ideas has become an urgent managerial priority. Suddenly, the spotlight has turned on the academics who've studied creativity for decades. How relevant is their research to the practical challenges leaders face? To connect theory and practice, Harvard Business School professors Amabile and Khaire convened a two-day colloquium of leading creativity scholars and executives from companies such as Google, IDEO, Novartis, Intuit, and E Ink. In this article, the authors present highlights of the research presented and the discussion of its implications. At the event, a new leadership agenda began to take shape, one rooted in the awareness that you can't manage creativity--you can only manage for creativity. A number of themes emerged: The leader's job is not to be the source of ideas but to encourage and champion ideas. Leaders must tap the imagination of employees at all ranks and ask inspiring questions. They also need to help their organizations incorporate diverse perspectives, which spur creative insights, and facilitate creative collaboration by, for instance, harnessing new technologies. The participants shared tactics for enabling discoveries, as well as thoughts on how to bring process to bear on creativity without straitjacketing it. They pointed out that process management isn't appropriate in all stages of creative work; leaders should apply it thoughtfully and manage the handoff from idea generators to commercializers deftly. The discussion also examined the need to clear paths through bureaucracy, weed out weak ideas, and maximize the organization's learning from failure. Though points of view varied, the theories and frameworks explored advance the understanding of creativity in business and offer executives a playbook for increasing innovation.     

Creativity, the corporate curriculum and the future: a case study

This paper explores the proposition that the successful companies of the future will be those that find the means to help their employees to think and act creatively. Based on a case study of British managers’ perceptions of creativity and how it can be nurtured in a large US-based manufacturing company, the study shows that prevailing models of creativity in the organization are inadequate. Firstly, the structure of management in the organization and many features of the culture and corporate curriculum of the company, inhibit creative thinking and action. It is not the intention of the company to do this. The company has developed many methods of problem-solving and team-working intended to release the creative energy of employees. The organizational culture of the company is not, however, as supportive of creative endeavour as it needs to be. Secondly, the models of creativity in the minds of managers and supervisors reflect a wider cultural misunderstanding of the phenomenon. Creativity is perceived in highly individual terms. It is thought of as something which expresses itself fully in non-work areas and it is not seen as a process that can be facilitated through new ways of working and thinking within the organization. To have a successful future, this company, like many others, must change the ways in which its managers perceive the creative potential of their employees.     

Managing for creativity

A company's most important asset isn't raw materials, transportation systems, or political influence. It's creative capital--simply put, an arsenal of creative thinkers whose ideas can be turned into valuable products and services. Creative employees pioneer new technologies, birth new industries, and power economic growth. If you want your company to succeed, these are the people you entrust it to. But how do you accommodate the complex and chaotic nature of the creative process while increasing efficiency, improving quality, and raising productivity? Most businesses haven't figured this out. A notable exception is SAS Institute, the world's largest privately held software company. SAS makes Fortune's 100 Best Companies to Work For list every year. The company has enjoyed low employee turnover, high customer satisfaction, and 28 straight years of revenue growth. What's the secret to all this success? The authors, an academic and a CEO, approach this question differently, but they've come to the same conclusion: SAS has learned how to harness the creative energies of all its stakeholders, including its customers, software developers, managers, and support staff. Its framework for managing creativity rests on three guiding principles. First, help employees do their best work by keeping them intellectually engaged and by removing distractions. Second, make managers responsible for sparking creativity and eliminate arbitrary distinctions between "suits" and "creatives". And third, engage customers as creative partners so you can deliver superior products. Underlying all three principles is a mandate to foster interaction--not just to collect individuals' ideas. By nurturing relationships among developers, salespeople, and customers, SAS is investing in its future creative capital. Within a management framework like SAS's, creativity and productivity flourish, flexibility and profitability go hand in hand, and work/life balance and hard work aren't mutually exclusive.     

Competition among contests

When several contests compete for the participation of a common set of players, a contest's allocation of prizes not only induces incentive effects but also participation effects. Our model predicts that an increase in the sensitivity with which contest outcomes depend on players' efforts makes flatter prize structures more attractive to participants. In equilibrium, contests that aim to maximize the number of participants will award multiple prizes if and only if this sensitivity is sufficiently high. Moreover, the prize awarded to the winner is decreasing in the contests' sensitivity. We provide empirical evidence from professional road running using race–distance as a measure of sensitivity. We show that steeper prize structures are more attractive to top‐ranked runners in longer, that is, less sensitive, races. In line with our theory, longer races do in fact offer steeper prize structures.     

Measuring and Motivating Quantity, Creativity, or Both

We examine how worker productivity differs when compensation is based on quantity, creativity, or the product of both measures. In an experiment in which participants design “rebus puzzles,” we find that combining quantity and creativity measures in a creativity‐weighted pay scheme results in creativity‐weighted productivity scores that are significantly lower than those generated by participants with quantity incentives alone. Follow‐up analysis indicates that relative to participants in the quantity‐only condition, participants in the creativity‐weighted condition produce approximately the same number of high‐creativity puzzles, but produce significantly fewer puzzles overall. Thus, while participants rewarded for creativity‐weighted output tend to restrict their production to high‐creativity efforts, they are unable to translate this focus into a greater volume of high‐creativity output. Implications address a possible explanation for firms' reluctance to incorporate creativity measures within multidimensional performance measurement systems, notwithstanding published suggestions to do so.     

Effects of an Information Sharing System on Employee Creativity,Engagement, and Performance

Many service organizations rely on information sharing systems to boost employee creativity to meet customer needs. We conducted a field experiment in a retail chain, based on a registered report accepted by JAR, to test whether an information sharing system recording employees’ creative work affected the quality of creative work, job engagement, and financial performance. We found that, on average, this system did not have a significant effect on any of these outcomes. However, it significantly improved the quality of creative work in stores that had accessed the system more frequently and in stores with fewer same‐company nearby stores. It also improved creative work and job engagement in stores in divergent markets, where customers needed more customization. We found weak evidence of better financial results where salespeople had lower creative talent before the system was introduced. Our findings shed light on those conditions in which information sharing systems affect employees’ creative work.     

Employee turnover likelihood and earnings management: evidence from the inevitable disclosure doctrine

We present evidence that managers consider employee turnover likelihood in their accounting choices. Our tests exploit U.S. state courts’ staggered recognition of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD), which reduces employees’ ability to switch employers. We find a significant decrease in upward earnings management for firms headquartered in states that recognize the IDD, relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. The effect of the IDD is stronger for firms relying more on human capital and for firms whose employees have higher ex-ante turnover likelihood, confirming the employee retention channel. Overall, our results support the view that retaining employees is an important motive for corporate earnings management.     

Creativity under the gun

If you're like most managers, you've worked with people who swear they do their most creative work under tight deadlines. You may use pressure as a management technique, believing it will spur people on to great leaps of insight. You may even manage yourself this way. If so, are you right? Not necessarily, these researchers say. There are instances where ingenuity flourishes under extreme time pressure--for instance, a NASA team within hours comes up with a primitive but effective fix for the failing air filtration system aboard Apollo 13. But when creativity is under the gun, it usually ends up getting killed, the authors say. They recently took a close look at how people experience time pressure, collecting and analyzing more than 9,000 daily diary entries from individuals who were working on projects that required high levels of creativity and measuring their ability to innovate under varying levels of time pressure. The authors describe common characteristics of time pressure and outline four working environments under which creativity may or may not flourish. High-pressure days that still yield creativity are full of focus and meaningful urgency--people feel like they are on a mission. High-pressure days that yield no creativity lack such focus--people feel like they are on a treadmill, forced to switch gears often. On low-pressure days that yield creativity, people feel like they are on an expedition--exploring ideas rather than just identifying problems. And on low-pressure days that yield no creative thinking, people work on autopilot--doing their jobs without engaging too deeply. Managers should avoid extreme time pressure when possible; after all, complex cognitive processing takes time. For when they can't, the authors suggest ways to mollify its effects.     

Creativity and dysfunction in strategic processes: The case of scenario planning

This paper attempts to open up a new line of enquiry into the dysfunctions of creativity within strategic processes. Generally, the impact and results of introducing creativity (and innovation) into organisational life are perceived to be wholesome and beneficial. But recent research in the area of organisational psychology has documented a ‘dark’ side to its introduction, e.g., low employee morale, stress, theft, sabotage, destructive conflict. Learning from this work and shifting the domain to strategic management, this paper focuses on scenario planning—a strategy process widely regarded by participants and facilitators as creative and innovative in structure, content and output. First, the creative credentials of the process are established with reference to the literature and definitions from the creative and cultural industries. Second, the process is deconstructed into activities and each is examined for the extent of its embedded creativity. Third, informed by case evidence, four dysfunctions of the scenario planning process are conjectured: creativity layered on fantasy; heightened expectations and confusion; pride and passion; and creativity leading to excess. The paper concludes by suggesting four options for handling these potential dysfunctional effects and, in the light of the dialogue presented, re-interprets the definition of scenario planning presented earlier in the text.     

How to kill creativity

In today's knowledge economy, creativity is more important than ever. But many companies unwittingly employ managerial practices that kill it. How? By crushing their employees' intrinsic motivation--the strong internal desire to do something based on interests and passions. Managers don't kill creativity on purpose. Yet in the pursuit of productivity, efficiency, and control--all worthy business imperatives--they undermine creativity. It doesn't have to be that way, says Teresa Amabile. Business imperatives can comfortably coexist with creativity. But managers will have to change their thinking first. Specifically, managers will need to understand that creativity has three parts: expertise, the ability to think flexibly and imaginatively, and motivation. Managers can influence the first two, but doing so is costly and slow. It would be far more effective to increase employees' intrinsic motivation. To that end, managers have five levers to pull: the amount of challenge they give employees, the degree of freedom they grant around process, the way they design work groups, the level of encouragement they give, and the nature of organizational support. Take challenge as an example. Intrinsic motivation is high when employees feel challenged but not overwhelmed by their work. The task for managers, therefore, becomes matching people to the right assignments. Consider also freedom. Intrinsic motivation--and thus creativity--soars when managers let people decide how to achieve goals, not what goals to achieve. Managers can make a difference when it comes to employee creativity. The result can be truly innovative companies in which creativity doesn't just survive but actually thrives.     

Learning from Coworkers: Peer Effects on Individual Investment Decisions

Using unique data on employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs), we examine the influence of networks on investment decisions. Comparing employees within a firm during the same election window with metro area fixed effects, we find that the choices of coworkers in the firm's ESPP exert a significant influence on employees’ own decisions to participate and trade. Moreover, we find that the presence of high-information employees magnifies the effects of peer networks. Given participation in an ESPP is value-maximizing, our analysis suggests the potential of networks and targeted investor education to improve financial decision-making.     

Proxy contests and debt contracting behavior: The interplay of managerial,shareholder and creditor incentives

We evaluate how heterogeneity in the strategic interplay among shareholder, creditor and manager incentives influences debt contracting behavior around proxy contests. We find that, after proxy contests, new loan originations have significantly higher spreads and more stringent non-pricing contracting terms. The effect, however, occurs largely in contest firms where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are provided with risk-taking incentives. Further, creditors’ simultaneous equity holdings and credit default swaps (CDS) trading attenuate the impact of proxy contests on debt contracting costs. Finally, proxy contests that culminate in voting and dissident victory experience the largest increase in loan pricing. Overall, our results suggest an increase in the agency cost of debt occurs after proxy contests, particularly when managerial risk-taking incentives are high, and when creditors do not simultaneously hold target firms’ equity or CDS.     

Promote Internally or Hire Externally? The Role of Gift Exchange and Performance Measurement Precision

Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally.     

Employee representation and financial leverage

We analyze how direct employee voice affects financial leverage. German law mandates that firms’ supervisory boards consist of an equal number of employees’ and owners’ representatives. This requirement, however, applies only to firms with more than two thousand domestic employees. We exploit this discontinuity and the law’s introduction in 1976 for identification and find that direct employee power increases financial leverage. This is explained by a supply side effect: as banks’ interests are similar to those of employees, higher employee power reduces agency conflicts with debt providers, leading to better financing conditions. These findings reveal a novel mechanism of direct employee influence.     

Do companies compare employees’ salaries? Evidence from stated-owned enterprise group

The mechanism by which enterprises set salaries is vitally important to employees and is especially relevant to the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper investigates the effect of comparing employee compensation based on a sample of A-share SOE groups from 2008 to 2018. We find that when employee compensation at one company sharply increases, the employee compensation of other companies controlled by the same group will increase sharply in the following year. Further analysis shows that when employees’ sense of unfair compensation is stronger, when employees are less replaceable and when enterprises’ ability to pay is stronger, the effect of employee pay comparison is stronger. Increased employee salary does not improve enterprise performance, however, suggesting that such salary adjustment is ineffective. This paper expands the research on employee compensation and provides useful insights for optimizing the design of compensation contracts and promoting compensation reform in SOEs.     

Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories

Many firms issue stock options to all employees. We consider three potential economic justifications for this practice: providing incentives to employees, inducing employees to sort, and employee retention. We gather data from three sources on firms’ stock option grants to middle managers. First, we directly calibrate models of incentives, sorting and retention, and ask whether observed magnitudes of option grants are consistent with each potential explanation. We also conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis of firms’ option-granting choices. We reject an incentives-based explanation for broad-based stock option plans, and conclude that sorting and retention explanations appear consistent with the data.     

Proprietary Costs and the Disclosure of Information About Customers

In deciding how much information about their firms’ customers to disclose, managers face a trade off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry with capital market participants and the costs of aiding competitors by revealing proprietary information. This paper investigates the determinants of managers’ choices to disclose information about their firms’ customers using a comprehensive data set of customer‐information disclosures over the period 1976–2006. We find robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that proprietary costs are an important factor in firms’ disclosure choices regarding information about large customers.     

Labor mobility and antitakeover provisions

How do firms protect their human capital? We test whether firms facing an increased threat of being acquired strengthen their antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in order to bond with their employees. We use the adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts, which exogenously decreases knowledge-worker mobility, thus elevating takeover risk and reducing employee incentives to innovate. Firms respond to the IDD adoption by strengthening ATPs that defend against hostile takeovers, especially when they have greater ex-ante employee mobility and human capital and place greater importance on employee relations. We find no evidence that managers strengthen ATPs for entrenchment or takeover bargaining purposes in this setting. Our findings show that ATPs can be used to credibly commit to employees in order to protect long-term value creation.     

How to pitch a brilliant idea

Coming up with creative ideas is easy; selling them to strangers is hard. Entrepreneurs, sales executives, and marketing managers often go to great lengths to demonstrate how their new concepts are practical and profitable--only to be rejected by corporate decision makers who don't seem to understand the value of the ideas. Why does this happen? Having studied Hollywood executives who assess screenplay pitches, the author says the person on the receiving end--the "catcher"--tends to gauge the pitcher's creativity as well as the proposal itself. An impression of the pitcher's ability to come up with workable ideas can quickly and permanently overshadow the catcher's feelings about an idea's worth. To determine whether these observations apply to business settings beyond Hollywood, the author attended product design, marketing, and venture-capital pitch sessions and conducted interviews with executives responsible for judging new ideas. The results in those environments were similar to her observations in Hollywood, she says. Catchers subconsciously categorize successful pitchers as showrunners (smooth and professional), artists (quirky and unpolished), or neophytes (inexperienced and naive). The research also reveals that catchers tend to respond well when they believe they are participating in an idea's development. As Oscar-winning writer, director, and producer Oliver Stone puts it, screen-writers pitching an idea should "pull back and project what he needs onto your idea in order to make the story whole for him." To become a successful pitcher, portray yourself as one of the three creative types and engage your catchers in the creative process. By finding ways to give your catchers a chance to shine, you sell yourself as a likable collaborator.