Sharing the wealth: social comparisons and pay dispersion in the CEO's top team

The antecedents and consequences of pay dispersion are studied using theory that focuses on the social comparisons that occur among members of the CEO's top team. Results from a sample of large public firms indicate that when members of this elite group were similar on a variety of dimensions, and thus likely to compare their pay, the board allowed less dispersion. In addition, pay dispersion was negatively related to company performance, particularly when it exceeded what could be justified by characteristics of the industry, firm, or team. But the strength of that relationship depended on how uniformly members of the team would benefit from subsequent performance gains. Specifically, the negative effect was particularly strong in firms where major differences in compensation—that is, some executives were given significantly more stock options—combined with a volatile stock price to provide only a few team members with the opportunity to realize very large financial gains in the future. The study demonstrates that the social‐psychological factors that affect comparisons among members of the CEO's top team impact the board's pay setting process, which in turn affects pay dispersion, and ultimately firm performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

股份流动性、股权制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应--来自1999-2003年中国上市公司的证据

本文基于国内外的相关研究，从公司治理的角度提出六个研究假设，然后构建回归模型研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的股权分置现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应”，具体探讨非流通股和流通股流动性、股权监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响。实证结果显示．非流通股股东（通常为控股股东）和流通股股东（通常为中小股东）之间的确存在严重的利益冲突。各类非流通股和流通股股东的持股比例、所持股份类型以及他们之问的监督制衡作用对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出六点建议试图限制非流通股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利．     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.