Tests for bounded rationality with a linear dynamic model distorted by heterogeneous expectations

The purpose of this paper is to develop a methodology which will use economic data to detect the existence of boundedly rational economic agents. The bounded rationality model presented in this paper generalizes a linear dynamic rational expectations model by nesting two types of expectations. In this paper, it is claimed that the bounded rationality model as presented can be transformed into an optimal regulator problem with distortions. As a result, the methodologies developed by the optimal control theory can be used to solve the model. The likelihood function for the model is constructed by the Kalman filtering using the solution of the model. Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is performed to test for bounded rationality in the U.S. cattle market for the period from 1900 to 1990. The empirical results indicate that some fraction of economic agents in the market are boundedly rational.     

Bounded rationality,anchoring-and-adjustment sentiment,and asset pricing

This paper presents a framework that incorporates an investor’s limited attention and anchoring and adjustment sentiment and their joint effects on asset pricing, with endogenous cost of neglecting part of the dividends and the asymmetric rationality levels of investors. We find that the combined effect of the two bounded rationality factors is often embodied in the “loss”, and the retail investors are insensitive to market sentiment and forced to pay more cognitive loss. A higher level of investor rationality and bullish market sentiment will jointly increase demand and then prices, while the effects of different bounded rationality factors are asymmetric.     

Behavioral equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics in asset markets

This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evolutionary game theory. Its key characteristic feature is that it relies only on objectively observable market data and does not use hidden individual agents’ characteristics (such as their utilities and beliefs). A central goal of the study is to identify an investment strategy that allows an investor to survive in the market selection process, i.e., to keep with probability one a strictly positive, bounded away from zero share of market wealth over an infinite time horizon, irrespective of the strategies used by the other players. The main results show that under very general assumptions, such a strategy exists, is asymptotically unique and easily computable.     

考虑社会责任的异质有限理性制造商产量博弈均衡复杂动力学分析

通过考虑消费者剩余,企业利润中引入承担社会责任参数,建立了具有异质性有限理性的古诺寡头博弈竞争模型,分析利润相关参数对系统博弈均衡稳定性的影响,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明单方有限理性系统比双方有限理性系统稳定。产品成本超过一定阈值应避免产量竞争,可以通过承担社会责任,提升产品价格来增加利润,但当企业承担社会责任增加时,系统稳定性降低。此时降低调整产量的速度,观察竞争对手产量调整速度,避免系统进入混沌状态,失去最优产量优势。     

基于演化博弈的钢铁企业环境污染问题研究

本文应用演化博弈理论,从钢铁企业和环保部门都只存在有限理性的角度出发,研究两者之间相互作用的策略选择行为,结果表明:长期而言,两个博弈方的策略选择取决于他们所处的初始状态的影响。     

Arbitrage,speculation and futures price fluctuations with boundedly rational and heterogeneous agents

This paper proposes a dynamic model for the futures market with three types of investors. The bounded rationality and heterogeneity of investors are taken into consideration. The equilibrium of the system and its stability conditions are derived with mathematical analysis. In the equilibrium, the futures price and the spot price converge to the equilibrium simultaneously. The equilibrium is determined by many factors, including the risk appetite and the rationality of investors, the trading costs, the arbitrage basis price and the fundamental price. When the stability conditions are violated, complex dynamics will emerge in the market. As shown by the simulations, the arbitrage is likely to destabilize the market. Moreover, when investors have the high degree of rationality, the equilibrium will become unstable and the futures market is inefficient. Statistical analysis indicates that the model can reproduce the stylized facts observed in the futures market, such as long memory, volatility clustering and fat tail of returns.

     

有限理性视角下超市参与“农超对接”行为研究

通过对超市管理人理性认知模式和决议选择的分析,探讨在有限理性视角下的超市管理人的行为机理,得出,有限理性视角下的超市管理人的博弈行为对我国能否有效顺利实施"农超对接"起着关键作用,本文从有限理性经济人的角度出发,通过博弈模型剖析超市参与"农超对接"行为,发现"农超对接"实施中存在的根本问题,为促进我国"农超对接"快速发展提供理论依据。     

基于三方进化博弈的药品回收逆向物流分析

文章在考察了我国药品回收逆向物流的发展情况及特点的基础上,对其三个主体(政府、药品生产企业和消费者)的行为和收益做出分析,建立了基于不完全信息和主体有限理性假设下的三方博弈模型。博弈分析结果表明:政府首先应采取较强烈的推进政策以迅速提高药品生产企业和消费者参与的比例以免陷入各方均消极对待的窘境;在短期内政府对于药品生产企业应以惩罚为主、奖励为辅,而在长期中应以奖励为主、惩罚为辅;药品回收逆向物流最终会达到无需政府干预,而药品生产企业积极完善,消费者积极参与的状态。     

房地产商与购房者的博弈分析

房价是一个关系社会民生的问题,而作为市场经济中的一部分,房地产商与消费者之间进行的是买卖交易,从而存在双方买卖博弈。从2007年至今的房价下调,是在政府干预下的房地产商与消费者的博弈结果。在继续对峙的时期,房地产商与购房者各自该如何决策,怎样达到双赢及社会福利的最大化,文中采用买卖博弈,找出纳什均衡策略。     

餐饮业网络团购定价研究——以某寿司餐厅为例

文章以广州某寿司餐厅为例,经过实地调研和问卷调查,获得消费者对于该类商品的消费期望,识别影响消费者选择餐饮团购的关键因素,再根据区分需求定价法对团购定价进行建模计算,以期对商家网络团购定价决策做出有益尝试。     

Price stickiness and markup variations in market games

In this paper, we show that the Shapley–Shubik market game model with production naturally generates an equilibration mechanism that can accommodate price stickiness arising from strategic interactions of firms. Unlike New Keynesian models that show similar price stickiness results, the market game model does not require enforcing menu costs or other additional restraints on price adjustment mechanisms in order to generate price stickiness. As such, we suggest that the market game model can provide a good micro-foundation for macroeconomic analysis. We then explicitly show the relationship between a typical firm’s markup of price over marginal cost and its market share.     

Consumer Search Ability,Price Dispersion and the Digital Divide

The ‘digital divide’ in online activities is believed to arise from differences in Internet access, but this paper advances an alternative explanation that is related to consumer search ability. It argues that this leads to greater price dispersion, causing some consumers to be discriminated against. It analyses price data for the UK Internet motor insurance market, collecting data on 32,255 prices for 110 sub‐markets, where differences in price dispersion across these by age, occupation and sex of the driver are argued to reflect differences in search ability. Allowing for price dispersion to also depend on the insurance risk, it finds greater price dispersion for consumers with weaker search abilities, i.e. older, unemployed, retired or female consumers. As this is not explained by alternative hypotheses, the paper concludes that improved Internet access alone will not close the ‘digital divide’. The implication is that policymakers should address the online search abilities of individuals as well as Internet access.     

基于因子分析的我国网络游戏产业竞争力实证研究

目前我国网络游戏市场规模已达到300多亿元,网络游戏行业已然成为中国网络经济的核心产业。随着网络游戏行业的发展,网络游戏产业竞争力逐渐成为人们关注的焦点。通过因子分析法构建产业竞争力得分模型,提炼出影响我国网游产业竞争力的主要指标,进而对我国网络游戏产业竞争力进行实证分析。结果显示,我国网络游戏产业竞争力虽然逐年保持增长,但总体水平较低。政府应继续加大对游戏出版业的扶持力度,全面提升我国网络游戏产业竞争力。     

BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF SIMPLICITY AMIDST COMPLEXITY

Abstract The purpose of this essay is to explore the relationship between the simple and the complex in economics by anchoring our analysis on bounded rationality. Much of the conventional literature focuses on ‘un‐bounded rationality’ of the rationality‐as‐consistency variety. Theorizing of bounded rationality tends to assume that the problem to be solved is independent of the nature of bounded rationality. Following the insights from the works of Herbert Simon and contributions from outside economics, both bounded rationality and the environment are inextricably linked. The boundaries between bounded rationality and its environment can shift. The form in which bounded rationality is found depends on the complexity of the environment. Furthermore, if local interactions between bounded rational agents result in the formation of hierarchies – the complexity of the collective system will change. Whether this will occur depends on the nature of bounded rationality at the individual level.     

虚假广告治理模式的三方博弈分析

随着我国市场经济的不断完善,广告逐渐成为消费者了解商品的性能、价格与种类的重要途径。但目前虚假广告充斥市场,部分商品经营者通过虚假广告获取超额利润,扰乱市场的正常秩序。本文利用博弈论理论,建立虚假广告主、政府及寻租者的三方博弈模型,对虚假广告的治理模式进行分析,提出了改进虚假广告治理的建议,以期能对完善虚假广告的治理模式有所启示。     

An evolutionary game theory model for the inter-relationships between financial regulation and financial innovation

Financial regulation and financial innovation tend to show a dynamic game process of ‘regulation-innovation-re-regulation-re-innovation’. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model to simulate the above phenomena for analyzing the stable equilibrium strategies between financial institutions and regulation institutions. Previous studies mainly stay in a theoretical perspective; instead, this study uses the financial and macroeconomic data of the U.S. during 1947–2007 to numerically demonstrate the dynamic evolution paths of financial regulation and financial innovation. This study finds that the financial regulation and financial innovation of the U.S. presents a dynamic adjustment process by promoting the development of each other. Both regulatory and innovative strategies should be coordinated in the evolutionary progress in a timely and coordinated reason. This study has great referential value for policy makers to balance regulation and innovation in the financial industry and for avoiding financial crises.     

中国移动通信市场价格博弈影响因素分析及对策

价格竞争作为一种信号传递机制,体现了市场主体之间相互学习并调整各自行动,根据变化的条件和环境采取有效率的行为。本文基于中国移动通信市场价格博弈本质解析的基础上,分析了不对称管制、经济租金、转移成本和产品差异化等要素对中国移动通信市场价格博弈的影响机制,提出了增进中国移动通信市场有效竞争程度以及缓解行业价格博弈的若干对策建议。     

Arbitrage, strategic inefficiency and self-regulation

This paper develops a multi-period strategic market game in two different settings, one of a finite-period finance economy, and its extension to infinite periods but with overlapping term of traders. Under these two different contexts, we address the possibility of strategies that Pareto improve the outcome of the game. In this effort, both the introduction of a regulation scheme and the innovative role of provision of traders with incentives to self-police these designated strategies play an important role.     

模块化与知识员工激励——一个博弈分析

知识员工的激励是企业知识管理的根本问题,但由于知识活动难以监控和测度的特点,传统的激励机制对知识员工而言效果不佳。模块化是广泛应用于欧美制造业的产品设计方法,应用于KM中的主要作用是将大型的复杂的知识体系分解相对简单、小型的独立模块,从而使小型长期的合作团队成为独立的企业基本知识活动单位。这种分解有利于产生一种基于利他合作的知识员工激励机制。本文构建了三个博弈模型:完全信息静态博弈模型、完全信息动态博弈模型和不完全信息动态博弈模型分别解释了没有激励的情况下知识员工的理性选择是不提供知识;小型团体中,只要参与者具有一定的耐心,依靠非正式的规则就可以理性地实现难以移植到大型群体的利他主义合作;长期合作的团队比短期的团队更容易实现合作。     

Experimental Study of Firm Bounded Rationality and the Pattern of Trade

This paper describes an experiment and simulation with features of a spatially explicit trading environment. Decision makers repeatedly make decisions about firm headquarters, input demands, and export patterns. A goal of this research is to determine if subjects’ management decisions reflect profit maximization, learning, or heuristic decision making. It also considers what impact decision makers’ bounded rationality has on the aggregate pattern of trade. Results indicate that bounded rationality in the form of learning and heuristic decision making are ubiquitous features of subjects’ decisions. This manifests as under‐reaction to trade‐driver stimuli and produces Trefler's missing trade, suggesting a behavioral basis for this anomaly.