Roy Cordato's “Austrian” Critique of Coase on Social Cost

In his book on Austrian welfare economics, Roy Cordato presents a scathing criticism of the Coasean approach to making judgments in tort cases. His criticism claims that the Coasean approach is both unrealistic and normative. Moreover, it would introduce uncertainty, thereby reducing individuals' freedom in pursuing their goals through the exchange process. To avoid all of these problems or at least to better deal with them, the economist who is interested in giving advice to judges ought to advocate a rule of strict liability regarding invasions of real (i.e., material) property. He claims that this rule is derived from Austrian economics.This paper, which takes a different Austrian perspective, makes several arguments against Cordato. First, it argues that his recommended rule would not achieve the goal that he sets for it. It would increase the freedom of some people while reducing the freedom of others in pursuing their goals. Second, it argues that his criticism of Coase is misplaced. Contrary to Cordato's claim, Coase has not advocated day-to-day interventions in the market system based on benefit-cost calculations that assume general competitive equilibrium. On the contrary, like the Austrians, he has emphasized the difficult knowledge and calculation problems associated with this. Also, he has pointed out the preponderance of empirical evidence against such interventions. Moreover, Coase's recommendations do not concern day-to-day interventions at all. Rather, he has been concerned with the institutional structure, most especially with the initial delimitation of rights. This concern, which implicitly takes account of uncertainty, immunizes Coase's analysis from Cordato's uncertainty critique.     

Network Access Regulation and Competition Policy: An Assessment of the “Direct-Plus-Opportunity Cost” Regime and Policy Options

A fundamental issue when determining competition policy, especially in vertically integrated industries, is the formulation of interconnection charges. Recently an influential set of theories on network access price has been put forward under the broad heading of direct-plus-opportunity cost regime (DOCR). This paper deals with two distinct but related aspects of DOCR. The first part of the paper considers the policy implications of an access regime determined by DOCR. Its compatibility in attaining contestable outcomes in the final goods market and its effect on welfare gains, especially producer's surplus, are evaluated. Secondly, the paper empirically applies a version of DOCR to the UK contract gas market, and the simulated outcomes and possible scenarios are considered.     

What Drives Corporate Tax Rates Down? A Reassessment of Globalization,Tax Competition,and Dynamic Adjustment to Shocks*

We reassess the driving forces behind the recent decline of corporate tax rates in Europe. Using data for up to 32 countries from 1983 to 2006, we analyze the roles of economic and financial openness as well as tax competition, while allowing for dynamic adjustment to shocks and period‐specific and country‐specific effects. While there is no evidence that countries that have become more open have reduced their tax rates more, our findings suggest that countries strongly compete over statutory tax rates. A simulation of tax rates in a scenario with no cross‐sectional dependence in tax setting suggests that, in the absence of tax competition, the mean statutory tax rate of Western European countries in 2006 would have been about 12.5 percentage points above its actual level. We conclude that the recent downward trend in corporate taxes is mainly a result of tax competition.     

A Critical Analysis of Peltzman’s “The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation”

Karl Polanyi considered that the relationship between the markets and their societies was a central feature of any social order. He studied what he called "ancient societies," to compare them with his own times, in an effort to understand that subject. This paper aims to show, following Polanyi's work on Classical Greece, that it is possible to make a clear analogy between the Athenian state and economy with the modern Welfare State. First, we present Polanyi's study of the early Athenian economy, focusing on the coexistence of a kind of state economic planning and a market. Second, we show how this relates to Polanyi's emphasis in the comparison of different societies and times. Third, we characterize the contemporary Welfare State to make an analogy between these two forms of economic organization. We conclude by underlining the relevance of this analogy in understanding the societies of today.     

Higher Taxes for Fiscal Consolidation? Expected and Unexpected Effects of Municipal Tax Policy

International Advances in Economic Research - During episodes of fiscal consolidation in public budgets, there are different instruments to choose from. The literature shows broad consensus that...     

Empirical Examination of the Effects of Competition and Regulation on Public Universities and Colleges＇ Performance in China

Competition and regulation are indispensable entities for a university＇s improved performance. Using university rating as an index to performance, empirical analyses with the data from 145 public universities and colleges in China show that increased competition in the education service market is associated with higher university＇s （college＇s） performance. And increased competition in R＆D may make a quadratic effect on university＇s （college＇s） performance. University＇s performance improves when a university is directed as a branch of the central government because they enjoy some degree of management flexibility more than the local government controlled ones. A major implication of the study is the need to reform competition and regulation for improving universities and colleges＇ operating performance in China.     

Environmental Regulation and Substitution Between Sources of Pollution: An Empirical Analysis of Florida’s Storage Tanks

Stringent and very specific environmental regulations may spur behavioral responses by the regulated entities that can offset the intended pollution control goals. I empirically examine the effects of regulating underground storage tanks for petroleum products and hazardous substances, focusing on their possible substitution or complementarity with a less stringently regulated alternative, aboveground tanks. Longitudinal county-level tank data from Florida reveal that the relationship between underground and aboveground tanks changed, from one of complementarity to one of substitution, after the regulations were issued. Tank installations are affected by resident characteristics that enter in the firms calculus of the damages from leaks.     

“The Social and Instuitional Economics of the Original Schumpeter”

ASSA Paper. ASA Session on Schumpeter     

Awash in a Sea of Confusion: Benefit Corporations,Social Enterprise,and the Fear of “Greenwashing”

In the last five years, the majority of U.S. states enacted benefit corporation legislation, creating a new legal form of business that embraces the “triple-bottom line” of people, planet, and profit. Benefit corporation status provides legal protections for directors and officers, who may now balance social and environmental impact with shareholder returns. It also creates rich opportunities for social entrepreneurs, gives investors more socially responsible options, and offers a helpful designation for consumers. I describe the history and purpose of benefit corporations, evaluate their pros and cons, and argue that safeguards against “greenwashing” make benefit corporations a valuable business form of social enterprise.     

“Bad” Decisions,Poverty, and Economic Theory: The Individualist and Social Perspectives in Light of “The American Myth”

Social outcomes are analyzed either by placing responsibility for those outcomes on the individual or to locate the cause in a specific social factor – discrimination. Here, I argue that individual decision-making cannot be the cause of poverty, illustrative of one outcome, and that commentary specifying a particular social factor is insufficient to address the fundamental, underlying cause of poverty. Rather, one must examine the nature of the economic system that lies at the root of such issues. In the process of developing the argument, it is shown that the individualist explanation of poverty is linked to the neoclassical framework, and that this individualist explanation is a product of the (capitalist) economic system itself which then induces an ideology both privileging such an explanation and preventing the development of satisfactory theory that would inform proper policy. An example of this point is drawn from the 1960’s “war on poverty” program.

Comments on “The Corporate State,Economic Performance,and Social Policy”

This paper provides an introduction to the Minsky-Veblen Cycles as a specific example of pluralist economic thinking in the context of the recent global economic crisis. It illustrates how pluralism can be applied to economic research. Specifically, the Minsky-Veblen Cycles combine three elements of institutional and post-Keynesian thought to explain key features of the current crisis. These elements are (1) John Maynard Keynes's postulate of effective demand, (2) Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, and (3) Thorstein Veblen's concept of conspicuous consumption. In this paper, we have a two-fold approach to them: First, we systematize the connection between the Minsky-Veblen Cycles as a theoretical argument and the epistemological rationale of a pluralist approach to economics. Second, we contrast the implications of our approach for incorporating behavioral assumptions in macroeconomic arguments to mainstream claims for a "microfoundation" of macroeconomic theory.     

Environmental regulations and the problem of sustainability: Moving beyond “market failure”

The standard metaphor of market failure is an impediment to the crafting of environmental policy that can escape policy lock in. Sustainability requires a policy process that can avoid this lock in. Sustainability concerns the creation of dynamic human processes that can respond to—indeed anticipate—unanticipated feedback from biological processes.     

Environmental crises’ regulations,tradable permits and the adoption of new technologies

There are many situations where environmental authorities use a mix of environmental policy instruments, rather than one single instrument, to address environmental concerns. For example, one instrument may be used to reduce overall emissions of a pollutant while another is used to address environmental crises that arise when meteorological conditions affect the capability of the environment to assimilate pollution. This paper looks at the effects of the interaction of a tradable permits scheme with environmental crises’ regulations on the rate of adoption of advanced abatement technologies.     

Trade,GMOs and Environmental Risk: Are Current Policies Likely to Improve Welfare?

Food with inputs from genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has met considerable skepticism among European Union (EU) consumers. The EU import ban on GM food has triggered a great deal of controversy and has been partly replaced by a mandatory labeling scheme. Although there is no measure in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that directly addresses the use of product labeling, WTO and others have been skeptical to mandatory product labeling on the grounds that they may be used as hidden protectionism hampering global welfare. This study has two foci. First, we examine how different policies for the production and use of GMOs might influence the market outcome in consumer food markets. Second, we evaluate the welfare effects of the policy measures. We find that mandatory labeling often increases domestic welfare and, may also enhance global welfare. On the other hand, a trade ban is more likely to decrease global welfare.     

Stanfield’s Concepts of Social and Political Economy: Introduction to the Special Issue

This paper examines the contributions of James Ronald Stanfield to social and political economy. We start the analysis with Stanfield’s contribution to institution building through his education of PhD students, building a graduate program in political economy, and through the associations of social and political economy. Then we go on to scrutinise his creative developments and applications of the notions of economic surplus and social reproduction. This is followed by his extensive work on Karl Polanyi and the disembedded economy. Finally we explore his path-breaking analysis of the great capitalist restoration, the nurturance gap and love. Stanfield was one of the greatest institutionalists and social economists of the last hundred years, and these four areas of energetic creativity are his prime achievements in the area.     

Why Meso? On “Aggregation” and “Emergence”, and Why and How the Meso Level is Essential in Social Economics

Simplistic aggregation in idealized “markets” versus structural emergence in complex and path-dependent processes have always marked a “continental divide” between neoclassical mainstream economics and all kinds of evolutionary and institutional social economics. This paper deals with institutional, or structural, emergence and argues that the meso level (to be specific) is the proper aggregate level for social economic analyses of complex systems and processes. Also, neo-Schumpeterian economists have stressed recently the issue of an “institutional trajectory” taking place on the meso economic level. This paper argues that the creative ideas of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur are not a sufficient explanation in this case. Using an evolutionary interpretation of a simple game-theoretic formalism (the Folk Theorem), the paper strives to demonstrate that the meso level, as the proper level of institutional emergence, must and can be endogenously explained from a process of interactive problem-solving of interdependent agents, in their struggle for coordination under strong uncertainty. It will be illustrated that a meso-sized socio-economic group co-evolves, and is constituted, together with the institution that in turn serves as the solution to the coordination problem. The practical and policy implications of the argument are discussed.