资本结构与战略贸易政策选择

在竞争日益激烈的国际商品贸易市场，越来越多的国家将自己视为一个竞争者，希望通过提高竞争力扩大市场份额、获取超额利润并在长期中获取产业发展优势。在这种现实基础上，经济学家布兰德从理论上证明了政府可以通过单方面提供出口补贴的战略贸易政策来取得竞争优势。本文以布兰德的理论模型为基础，通过拓展模型假设条件发现，倘若考虑该国出口竞争产业国内资本构成的变化，则布兰德的结论将有所松动。从而，本文推翻了布兰德的结论，证明了单方面提供出口补贴不一定是出口国的最佳贸易战略，当该出口产业的资本构成发生改变时，征收出口税或支持自由贸易可能成为最优策略选择，这取决于该出口竞争产业的结构特征。     

绿色贸易范式下补贴政策择优研究

本文着重讨论在绿色贸易范式下，一国政府如何选择最佳的补贴政策去推动本国绿色贸易发展的问题。现实中大量存在的非绿色产品生产与贸易行为对传统的贸易理论提出饶有趣味而又有待创新与拓展的问题。一方面，补贴政策在各国经济政策中均占重要地位，各国都会不同程度地运用各种补贴形式提升本国产品的国际竞争力，促进本国“优势”产业的快速发展；另一方面，本文试图通过建立一个三国空间竞争模型，在绿色贸易范式下，分析政府实施补贴政策对国内外绿色产品FOB价格的影响，并提出发展绿色贸易的最佳补贴政策。     

出口补贴的福利分析及其对反补贴的含义

本文通过建立相应的福利函数，结合市场结构的特点和补贴报复现象，分别对外国和本国出口补贴的福利效应及其反补贴含义进行了分析。得出的结论是：(1)在国内存在垄断的情况下，如果垄断程度非常高，外国出口补贴会降低本国的总体福利水平；如果垄断程度低，外国补贴有可能提高本国的总体福利水平，而在国内市场近乎完全竞争的情况下，外国补贴可以提高本国的总体福利水平。(2)在外国不实施报复或报复力度较小的情况下，本国所实施的出口补贴可以提高本国的福利水平；但若外国的反补贴措施为百分之百抵消性的，出口补贴不会提高本国的福利水平，即无效。(3)本国最优补贴率取决于补贴对国外企业的影响程度，即如果补贴可以有效地帮助本国企业扩大国外市场份额，较大程度地影响外国企业，则更高的出口补贴率会提高本国的总体福利水平。本国政府可以根据福利水平的变化决定是否采取反补贴措施。     

政府基金政策下电器电子产品再制造闭环供应链决策

为分析我国现有废弃电器电子产品回收处理相关政策对其闭环供应链决策的影响,分别构建有政府基金政策、无政府基金政策两种情况下废弃电器电子产品回收再制造闭环供应链决策模型,探讨政府基金政策设置的环境税和回收处理补贴力度对闭环供应链各成员最优决策和利润的影响。结果表明:政府征收环境税越高,新产品批发价格和零售价格越高,市场需求量越低。政府补贴力度越大,废弃电器电子产品回收价格越高,回收量越高。     

对中国政府大豆产业补贴的博弈分析

加入WTO后,中国减少对进口征收关税和壁垒,大豆产业将面临进口大豆的冲击。大豆的比较优势较弱,进口贸易依存度逐年增长。建立博弈模型来分析政府对我国大豆产业补贴的策略选择,通过分析发现,中国政府的补贴对中国大豆产量起了促进作用,而对美国大豆产量起到了抑制的作用。而且当美国大豆生产商选择高价格策略时,中国政府选择补贴国内高技术大豆生产商;当美国大豆生产商选择低价格时,中国政府选择补贴普通豆农。     

对外贸易中低价竞争的思考

一、低价竞争在外贸中的正反作用 在市场经济中，商品的价格是通过竞争形成的，价格竞争是市场竞争最主要的形式。经营者通过加强经营管理、降低单位产品的消耗，以最小的成本投入获取最大的利润，这一目标的实现必须通过价格才能实现。价格是市场经济竞争中不可缺少的手段。20多年来，中国对外贸易成倍增长，得益于物美价廉的中国外贸产品。但是中国低成本的比较优势是暂时的，产品的出口价格如果低于正常价值时则可能被指控为倾销，近年来国外对我国的反倾销诉讼有愈演愈烈之势。     

企业核心竞争力的构建与扩散——一种战略协同的过程

一、核心竞争力：企业持续竞争优势之源 当今世界，开放和竞争已经成为经济发展的主流，特别是全球经济的一体化和Ｉｎｔｅｒｎｅｔ技术的广泛应用，企业之间的竞争将日趋加剧。企业要在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地并不断发展，唯有确立自己的竞争优势才行。传统上，企业往往习惯于通过提高现有产品的价格／性能比的方式来确立自己的竞争优势，或者是通过产品的低成本，或者是通过产品的高质量（性能）来赢得竞争。然而，当众多企业都热衷于这一标准方式时，这种方式作为企业获取差异化竞争优势之源的重要性便会大打折扣，而且其实现的难…     

“邮政普遍服务基金”对物流业的影响

目前，我国快递企业数以千计，并保持高速发展，而近几年我国的快递业面临转型升级和生存发展的双重压力。即“随之发展，快递企业正陷入同质化竞争下惨烈的价格战时期，盈利水平普遍不高。”本文从当前邮政企业与快递企业在市场上的发展现状出发，根据双方现有的竞争趋势，分析了即将要征收的“邮政普遍服务基金”的标准，评论了征收邮政“份子钱”的不合理性及对市场的影响。同时，进一步根据双方各自的观点总结并提出相应的建议。     

产品异质性、市场竞争强度与公司债务融资选择

本文基于拓展的Bertrand异质产品价格竞争模型，将产品异质程度（r）作为公司间潜在竞争强度的度量指标，考察了内生性产品替代程度对公司长期杠杆决策的影响效应，以及与公司最终产品市场战略选择的关系。研究发现：长期负债选择将引致企业提高其产品价格，更高的负债水平将弱化产品市场价格竞争程度。债务的战略价值明显地依赖于企业产品的特征：产品战略替代时（r〉0），债务将提升企业的价值；当产品战略互补（r〈0）时，负债则会导致企业价值的降低。     

零售企业的成本领先战略

成本领先战略是企业竞争战略的三大战略选择之一。著名竞争战略专家波特认为：如果一个企业能够取得并保持全面的成本领先地位，那么它只要能使价格相等或低于该产业的平均价格水平就会成为所在产业中高于平均水平的超群之辈。当成本领先的企业的价格相当于或低于其竞争厂商时，     

Franchise bidding,regulation and investment costs

This paper analyzes the design of an optimal monopoly franchise policy when firms incur investment costs. We show how this policy depends on the timing of entry. When the investment cost is a fixed cost or a sunk cost paid after knowing the marginal cost parameter, the optimal policy consists of a Baron-Myerson type pricing rule and a lowest cost awarding rule. When the investment cost is a sunk cost paid before knowing the marginal cost parameter, auctioning the right to serve the market eliminates the need for an incentive regulation: the price is given by the complete information Ramsey formula and the subsidy is a Loeb-Magat type subsidy, while an entry fee yields first best entry.     

Inter-jurisdiction subsidy competition for a new production plant: What is the central government optimal policy?

This paper models inter-jurisdiction competition for foreign direct investment and optimal government policy intervention to protect the national interest. The inter-jurisdiction competition for a multinational has the potential of favouring the multinational and of becoming detrimental for the host country. The central government wants to limit such competition but it cannot tax-discriminate between different types of multinationals. We find that the central government would use tax policy to create asymmetries even when the underlying structure is symmetrical. This offers a novel explanation for the creation of ‘Special Economic Zones’ in many countries, which are well known to be aimed at the attraction of foreign direct investment.     

Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.     

Reprint to: Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.     

Macroeconomic conditions and investment stimuli

Based on a calibrated real options model, this paper examines a tax-subsidy program offered by a government to stimulate corporate investment under business cycles. We derive and discuss optimal incentive policies for different states of the economy. We find that it is optimal for the government to offer a combination of tax cuts and lump-sum subsidy for stimulating levered firms’ investment under business cycles. Furthermore, the government should adopt counter-cyclical tax-subsidy policy, namely a higher (lower) tax cuts and a larger (smaller) lump-sum subsidy during recessions (booms). In particular, we provide a possible explanation why many governments around the world have reduced and even implemented negative interest rates to stimulate the economy during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Finally, our conclusions also predict that the break-even tax-subsidy program always provides effective investment stimulus under business cycles.     

Environmental regulations in private and mixed duopolies: Taxes on emissions versus green R&D subsidies

In this article, we compare two kinds of environmental regulations—emissions taxes and green R&D subsidies—in private and mixed-duopoly markets in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that a green R&D subsidy is better (worse) than an emissions tax when the green R&D is efficient (inefficient), irrespective of R&D spillovers, whereas the existence of a publicly owned firm encourages the government to adopt a subsidy policy. We also show that the optimal policy choice depends on R&D efficiency and spillovers. In particular, when green R&D is inefficient and the spillover rate is low (high), the government should choose an emissions tax and (not) privatize the state-owned firm. When green R&D is efficient, however, an R&D subsidy is better, but a privatization policy is not desirable for society, irrespective of spillovers.     

Optimal fiscal policy with robust control

This paper analyzes how consumer uncertainty affects optimal fiscal policy in the Lucas and Stokey (1983) framework. The consumers, lacking confidence in their knowledge of the stochastic environment, endogenously tilt their subjective probability model away from an approximating probability model. The government, though, is confident that the approximating probability model characterizes the stochastic environment. This confidence dichotomy reveals a range of possible objective functions for an altruistic government. I assume that the government maximizes the consumers' expected utility under the consumers' own subjective probability model. It is found that this government relies less heavily on labor taxes to absorb the fiscal shock than would be optimal if consumers were fully confident in their probability model. This policy helps mitigate the direct welfare cost associated with consumer uncertainty. I compare this policy to the one implemented by a government that maximizes the consumers' expected utility under the approximating probability model.     

Ambiguity in Electoral Competition

The paper proposes an explanation to why electoral competition induces parties to state ambiguous platforms even if voters dislike ambiguity. A platform is ambiguous if different voters may interpret it as different policy proposals. An ambiguous platform puts more or less emphasis on alternative policies so that it is more or less easily interpreted as one policy or the other. I suppose that a party can monitor exactly this platform design but cannot target its communications to individuals one by one. Each individual votes according to her understanding of the parties’ platforms but dislikes ambiguity. It is shown that this electoral competition has no Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless its max–min strategies are the optimal strategies of the Downsian game in mixed strategies. Furthermore, if parties behave prudently enough and if the voters aversion to ambiguity is small enough, these strategies do form an equilibrium.     

Spatial discrimination: Bertrand vs. Cournot with asymmetric demands

This paper develops a barbell model a la Hwang and Mai [Hwang, H., and C.C. Mai, 1990, Effects of spatial price discrimination on output, welfare, and location, American Economic Review 80, 567–575.] with homogeneous product and asymmetric demands to compare prices, aggregate profits and social welfare between Cournot and Bertrand competition, and to analyze the firms' equilibrium locations. It focuses on the impacts of the spatial barrier generated from transport costs, and the market size effect resulting from asymmetric demands. It shows that the market-size effect is crucial in determining firms' locations under Cournot competition, but insignificant under Bertrand competition. Moreover, the equilibrium price of the large market and the aggregate profits are lower but the social welfare is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition if one of the markets is sufficiently large and the transport cost is high.     

Green supply chain decision modeling under financial policy,with or without uniform government emission reduction policy

This paper investigates green supply chain decision making under different government policies. The problem is explored under centralized and decentralized scenarios. We verified the advantages of simultaneous government implementation of financial and uniform manufacturing policies and found that, with increased public awareness of environmental protection, government subsidy also increases: when environmental protection awareness is sufficiently strong, the government does not have to set uniform policy. Finally, by parametric and numerical analyses, our research identified the conditions under which social welfare is maximized. The results facilitate scientific policy development and provide a reference for promoting green supply chain operations.