Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting

This paper examines whether fraud allegations affect firms’ contracting with the government. Using a data set of whistleblower allegations brought under the False Claims Act against firms accused of defrauding the government, we find that federal agencies do not reduce the total dollar volume of contracts with accused firms; however, they substitute approximately 14% of the harder‐to‐monitor cost‐plus contracts for fixed‐price contracts. This effect is concentrated in the procurement of services and explained by contract and service substitution. Finally, we find that after the conclusion of the investigation, the government reduces the contract dollar volume by approximately 15% for cases that resulted in a settlement. Our findings indicate that contract‐design changes are used to mitigate uncertainty in suppliers’ reputation.     

Contract Type and the Cost of Provision: Evidence from Maintenance Service Contracts*

More than half a billion dollars are spent each year on the maintenance of Australia's urban water and sewerage networks. Expenditure is governed through a mix of in‐house and outsourced maintenance service contracts. We re‐examine issues relating to the relationship between the cost of maintenance service provision and the type of contract used. We take advantage of the fact that water retailers in Melbourne use a mix of contract types – including fixed‐price (FP) and cost‐plus (C+) contracts – for the provision of water and sewerage network maintenance services. Our results suggest that the C+ contract results in substantial savings.     

Corporate Hedging: The Relevance of Contract Specifications and Banking Relationships

This article examines the contribution of hedging to firm value and the cost of hedging in a unified framework. Optimal hedging and firm value are explicitly linked to firm risk, the type of debt covenants and the relative priority of the hedging contract. It is shown that in some cases hedging is possible only if the counterparty to the forward contract also holds a significant portion of the debt. Also, the spread in the hedging contract reduces the optimal amount of hedging to less than the minimum-variance hedge ratio. Among other results this article elucidates why some firms hedge using forward contracts while other firms hedge in the futures markets, as well as why higher priority forward contracts are more efficient hedging vehicles.     

Risk,partner selection and contractual control in interfirm relationships

This study examines firms’ use of partner selection and formal contracts as key approaches to manage transaction risk in interfirm relationships. We specifically examine the impact of transaction characteristics that generate transaction risk on (1) the importance placed on different selection criteria in the choice of collaboration partner, and (2) the complexity of contracts used to manage the collaboration. Survey data support that when confronted with greater risk from the transaction context, firms place more emphasis on trust-based and reputation-based selection criteria for partner choice and develop more complex (i.e., more inclusive and specific) contracts to manage the collaboration. Furthermore, our results show that partner selection mediates the effects of transaction characteristics on contract complexity, consistent with the argument that the information acquired during the partner selection process in response to risk facilitates the design of contracts to manage risk.     

Why and how firms use operating cash flow in compensation**

This study considers the choice of operating cash flow (OCF) in contracts and further examines the sensitivity of the CFO's and CEO's compensation to OCF performance, conditional on our stylized indicator of the importance of working capital management (WCM). The analysis depicts OCF as conveying distinct information about WCM, and predicts that firms for which WCM is an important source of value are more likely to contract on OCF. The importance of WCM is instrumented by firm conditions that create strong demand for WCM, including large working capital, rapid growth in working capital, highly volatile working capital, and large debt relative to total assets. Using a sample of firms whose incentive plans explicitly include OCF measures and a control sample of firms without such plans, we show that all four indicators of the importance of WCM have positive association with the likelihood of contracting upon OCF, individually and collectively. In compensation regressions, we find that WCM importance has a pronounced positive effect on the weight of OCF, but muted effect on the weight of accrual earnings. The results suggest that firms include measures of OCF performance in contracts largely to provide incentives for WCM and internal cash generation.     

External social networks and earnings management

Using a sample of U.S. listed firms for the 2000–2017 period, we examine how external social networks of top executives and directors affect earnings management in their firms. We find that well-connected firms are more aggressive in managing earnings through both accruals and real activities and that the results are robust after controlling for internal executive social ties. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that earnings management decreases after a socially connected executive or director dies. Additional analysis shows that connections forged by past professional working experiences have a greater impact on earnings management than connections forged by education and other social activities. Moreover, CFO social networks have a greater influence on earnings management than CEO social networks. Finally, we explore the underlying mechanisms, finding that 1) firms that are socially connected to each other show more similarities in their earnings management than firms that do not share a connection, and 2) more connected firms are less likely to incur accounting restatements. Collectively, our findings indicate that the external social networks of top executives and directors are important determinants of both their accrual- and real activity-based earnings management.     

Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements

Using a large sample of private credit agreements between U.S. publicly traded firms and financial institutions, we show that over 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. Renegotiations result in large changes to the amount, maturity, and pricing of the contract, occur relatively early in the life of the contract, and are rarely a consequence of distress or default. The accrual of new information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, are the primary determinants of renegotiation and its outcomes. The terms of the initial contract (e.g., contingencies) also play an important role in renegotiations; by altering the structure of the contract in a state contingent manner, renegotiation is partially controlled by the contractual assignment of bargaining power.     

Pricing Double-Trigger Reinsurance Contracts: Financial Versus Actuarial Approach

This article discusses various approaches to pricing double‐trigger reinsurance contracts—a new type of contract that has emerged in the area of ‘‘alternative risk transfer.’’ The potential coverage from this type of contract depends on both underwriting and financial risk. We determine the reinsurer's reservation price if it wants to retain the firm's same safety level after signing the contract, in which case the contract typically must be backed by large amounts of equity capital (if equity capital is the risk management measure to be taken). We contrast the financial insurance pricing models with an actuarial pricing model that has as its objective no lessening of the reinsurance company's expected profits and no worsening of its safety level. We show that actuarial pricing can lead the reinsurer into a trap that results in the failure to close reinsurance contracts that would have a positive net present value because typical actuarial pricing dictates the type of risk management measure that must be taken, namely, the insertion of additional capital. Additionally, this type of pricing structure forces the reinsurance buyer to provide this safety capital as a debtholder. Finally, we discuss conditions leading to a market for double‐trigger reinsurance contracts.     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

金融服务、外资政策调整与企业出口——基于中国微观数据的验证

基于金融服务是制造业的重要中间品投入,本文研究我国金融服务业外资政策动态变化对下游企业出口行为的影响。理论上,金融服务业外资准入放松有助于提升金融服务中间品的技术和管理水平,直接效果是有助于提升出口企业使用金融服务的多样化和便捷化,促进企业出口。本文采用国家发改委公布的《外商投资产业指导目录》,首次度量了我国金融服务业外资准入政策的动态变化,并使用投入产出表将其与我国制造业企业数据进行上下游关联,有效检验了金融服务业外资政策调整对下游制造业企业出口的作用。结果表明:金融服务业外资政策调整放开有助于提高下游制造业企业出口倾向和收益,存在出口促进作用;管理效率高、出口非技术密集型及资本密集型产品的企业出口对金融服务业外资政策调整的反应更为灵敏;金融服务业外资政策调整放开通过缓解企业融资约束促进企业出口。本文研究显示我国金融服务业外资政策调整放开是推动我国贸易提升的一个重要支撑点。     

Corporate Insurance as a Necessary Form of Consultant–Investigator Contract

Existing literature argues that corporate insurance is purchased because the insurance company produces risk management information for publicly held corporations. In this article, we address a fundamental question as to why other financial intermediaries cannot perform the same information production function as the insurance company. We argue that when the risk manager of the firm performs multiple tasks and needs consulting and investigation services from an outside agent for efficient risk management, the optimal contract with the agent has to be in the form of an insurance contract. Other types of contracts, such as flat-fee contracts, cannot be optimal. Therefore, the insurance company is ideally suited to provides these services.     

Accounting quality,bank monitoring,and performance pricing loans

We provide new evidence on the determinants of performance pricing provisions in bank loan contracts. We find that firms that are easier to monitor, such as those with better accounting quality, lower information opacity, or a stronger relationship with the lender are more likely to have performance pricing loans. The use of performance pricing is less likely after financial restatement events. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of using accounting-based (as opposed to credit-rating-based) pricing provisions increases as the firm’s accounting quality increases, and as the strength of the prior lending relation increases. Our results are robust to alternative measures of accounting quality, information opacity, and bank monitoring, and suggest that monitoring costs have a significant impact on the design of debt contracts.     

公共服务合同外包中的交易成本及其控制

公共服务合同外包作为一项交易,不可避免地存在不少交易成本变量,公共服务合同外包不一定能降低交易成本、公共服务合同外包中存在不确定性成本、公共服务合同外包难以合理界定交易成本等都是这些变量的体现。基于这些交易成本变量,大胆而细致地选择公共服务合同外包,建立公共服务合同外包风险防范机制,建立较为公平、合理的风险分担机制,提高政府对公共服务合同外包的控制能力等应是降低公共服务合同外包交易成本的可行路径。     

It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting

We examine whether political connections measured by political contributions influence the choice of terms included in government contracts awarded to firms. We construct an index of four “sweetheart” contract terms and find that firms making larger political contributions more frequently have these favorable terms included in their contracts. We also find that political contributions have explanatory power for contract design after controlling for lobbying, negotiation power, and the employment of former government employees. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, different estimation techniques, various variable measurements, and adjustments for possible endogeneity.     

Expertise and Knowledge Management in Public Accounting Professional Services Firms: A North American Perspective

This article identifies significant knowledge management issues experienced by North American professional services firms, obtained from a review of the literature and from interviews conducted with senior partners in three of the Big 5 firms. Professional services firms face demanding client needs in a rapidly changing global business envimnment. They must have a talented, diverse professional staff and be able to share and leverage the knowledge of this staff. The critical resource that the firms sell is knowledge. Knowledge management is at the core of this process.     

The volatility effect of futures trading: Evidence from LSE traded stocks listed as individual equity futures contracts on LIFFE

This study investigates the impact of LIFFE's introduction of individual equity futures contracts on the risk characteristics of the underlying stocks trading on the LSE. We employ the Fama and French three-factor model (TFM) to measure the change in the systematic risk of the underlying stocks which arises subsequent to the introduction of futures contracts. A GJR-GARCH(1,1) specification is used to test whether the futures contract listing affects the permanent and/or the transitory component of the residual variance of returns, and a control sample methodology isolates changes in the risk components that may be caused by factors other than futures contract innovation. The observed increase (decrease) in the impact of current (old) news on the residual variance implies that futures contract listing enhances stock market efficiency. There is no evidence that futures innovation impacts on either the systematic risk or the permanent component of the residual variance of returns.     

Negotiating contract types and contract clauses in the German construction industry during the Third Reich

This article examines the determinants of contractual form and renegotiations in the German construction industry during the Third Reich. At the beginning of World War II, firms dealt with growing uncertainty by convincing procurement agencies either to use cost‐plus contracts or to include an additional risk premium in fixed‐price contracts. In the later years of the war, procurement agencies initiated renegotiations over contract clauses to reduce the extraordinary profits resulting from information rents and high‐risk premiums. This regulatory course undermined the credibility of the regulatory commitment, thereby weakening the incentives of the fixed‐price contracts still in use.     

The effect of non-audit services on client risk, acceptance and staffing decisions

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibited auditing firms from providing certain non-audit services to audit clients and left open the possibility that other currently non-prohibited services could also be banned. This prohibition hinges, in part, on regulatory concerns that auditors were willing to accept prospective higher risk clients in order to obtain more profitable non-audit service engagements. Accounting firms rejected this claim. Given the prospect that more non-audit services could be prohibited, we revisit this debate by examining these competing claims in an experiment in which we manipulate risk and the potential to sell non-audit services and then observe the impact of these variables on auditors’ client acceptance and subsequent staffing decisions. Specifically, audit partners received client information and were asked to make an acceptance decision and propose a staffing plan for a potential engagement. We find that a higher (lower) level of risk decreased (increased) the likelihood of acceptance and this relation did not vary with the potential to provide non-audit services. These results do not support the regulators’ claims but are consistent with the firms’ claims. Further, we found that more experienced auditors were assigned to the prospective client whose management had lower integrity. This staffing plan is consistent with a risk adaptation strategy for the client with lower integrity. The prohibition of certain non-audit services has been justified on the grounds that auditors might engage in systematic opportunistic behavior. However, our results do not find such behavior which should inform the current PCAOB deliberation over whether additional services should be banned. Alternatively, different justification must be found for the prohibitions.     

Accelerated share repurchase and other buyback programs: what neural networks can bring

When firms want to buy back their own shares, they have a choice between several alternatives. If they often carry out open market repurchase, they also increasingly rely on banks through complex buyback contracts involving option components, e.g. accelerated share repurchase contracts, VWAP-minus profit-sharing contracts, etc. The entanglement between the execution problem and the option hedging problem makes the management of these contracts a difficult task that should not boil down to simple Greek-based risk hedging, contrary to what happens with classical books of options. In this paper, we propose a machine learning method to optimally manage several types of buyback contract. In particular, we recover strategies similar to those obtained in the literature with partial differential equation and recombinant tree methods and show that our new method, which does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality, enables to address types of contract that could not be addressed with grid or tree methods.