POST-BUDGET ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF OIL PRICE CHANGES

In this Forecast Release we update our February forecast to take account of the Budget and other new information, particularly about oil prices and the exchange rate. This updated forecast is then used as the basis for a set of three simulations in which we explore the consequences of lower oil prices, a fall in the exchange rate and a tightening of fical and monetary policy. The main conclusions are first that the Budget (the contentr of which we broadly anticipated) has not significantly changed our assessment of the short-term prospects for output and inflation. However, a detailed examination of the Government's revenue and expenditure estimates suggests that fiscal policy in 1983-4, though broadly in line with the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, has been loosened compared with 1982-3 by rather more than appears from the PSBR projections. We ako believe that there is a risk that the PSBR will be significantly higher than officially forecast in 1983-4.
Our simulations show the size of the PSBR overshoot in the event of a further sharp fall in the oil price. I f this were accompanied by a fall in the exchange rate, inflation would quickly be back in double figures. Whether the exchange rate falls or not a lower oil price gives significant output gains. However, if the authorities reacted by tightening fiscal and monetary policy, inflation would be broadly the same as in the Post Budget forecast, but there would still be output gains from the lower oil price.     

The MTFS or the EMS: Which Way for Credible Monetary Policy?

Since the latter part of 1988, the primary policy objective has been to head off a rise to double digit inflation. To this end, interest rates have been raised from 7112 per cent to 14per cent, while the public sector is running a large fiscal surplus. Despite this apparently very tight policy stance, policy is deficient in a crucial respect: it lacks credibility. The all too public divisions within government have weakened the efficacy of monetary policy, especially in financial markets. The ongoing uncertainty over who is in charge of the conduct of policy - No. 10 or No. 11 - further undermines confidence. The most urgent priority must be to reassert clear priorities and guidelines. In this Viewpoint, we consider how best to restore the credibility of monetary policy. There are two main possibilities: first, to reassert the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) in an appropriate form; or to join the (Exchange Rate Mechanism of the) European Monetary System (EMS). We argue that it will be very hard to derive credibility benefits from a reassertion of the MTFS: because of the inflation record of the past decade and the twists and turns of past versions of the MTFS, a mere restatement will not resolve the uncertainties that result from known differences within the government. In particular, any restatement will rely on discretion and judgement in its implementation and this will weaken its beneficial effects on expectations. Instead we argue that entry into the EMS offers a tougher and more credible commitment for monetary policy. The Chancellor has been pushed to rule out UK entry until the second half of 1990 at the earliest, but the government should make a virtue of this by announcing a firm dale for entry next year. In the interim, it should encourage a debate about the appropriate rate for entry, a debate which will increasingly guide the foreign exchange market. The government should make it clear that in choosing this rate it will do so with the commitment to low inflation very much in mind, favouring a high exchange rate. Once in the EMS, the government should rule out the possibility of devaluing the pound in an EMS realignment. This provides a firm non- discretionary anchor for both monetary policy and inflation expectations. With this commitment, the principal gain from EMS entry will be establishing a regime of low inflation for the next decade: in this, choice of the exchange rate will be less crucial than the fact of entry.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy: A Progress Report

The recent changes in the value of the dollar and the talk of an interest rate ‘war’ demonstrate again that the world finds it difficult to cope with rapid exchange rate movements. In some ways the experience - and the reactions to it - are similar to the events of 1978. As now, the world was in a recession (though on a milder scale) and there were fears that exchange rate problems would obstruct economic recovery. The main difference is that in 1978 it was the strength of the Deutschmark which caused concern whereas this time the problems are associated with the rise in the value of the dollar. In a Briefing Paper in Economic Outlook, February 1978, ‘Monetary Targets and the World Economy’ we suggested that the problem arose from inconsistencies between national monetary policies and exchange rate objectives. In general, countries dislike exchange rate changes - in either direction - and there were problems because countries would not accept the exchange rate consequences of their own or other countries' monetary policies. We estimated the required monetary policies for stable exchange rates and suggested specific national monetary targets for 1978 which would at least move the world economy towards consistent monetary policies. In this Economic Viewpoint we return to those ideas. We consider what happened in 1978 and we also revise the underlying monetary rules. More recent experience suggests that although there has been some progress towards the convergence of monetary policies there will continue to be trend changes in exchange rates. It is also clear that there will be short-term fluctuations around these trends. We believe that greater convergence of monetary policies would be desirable but failing that it is important that countries should avoid abrupt changes in monetary policy. It is also important that countries should become accustomed to exchange rate changes. They should direct monetary policy towards their objectives for inflation and should not be diverted from it by temporary or permanent changes in their exchange rates.     

European Monetary Union or competing currencies: which way for monetary integration in Europe?

In theAntibes in September, Mr. Laws on perplexed and irritated his fellow European finance ministers by proposing a scheme for allowing currencies to compete one against the other in Europe. It perplexed them because it was presented as a basis for proceeding towards monetary union within the European Community in accordance with the resolve of European Heads of State at the Madrid Summit, whereas it appeared as a recipe for monetary confusion, not fusion. It irritated them because it appeared to them to be yet another British manoeuvre to derail agreed progress towards greater economic and monetary integration in Europe. It especially annoyed the potential allies of the UK on this issue who regard the French and Commission attempts to push rapidly towards monetary union as ill-advised, and who saw the Chancellor's ill-thought out proposal as playing into their hands. Some political commentators have suggested that Mr. Lawson was seeking to play a clever hand. He is known to favour UK entry to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System, and on this is at odds with Mrs. Thatcher. Professor Alan Walters, adviser to the Prime Minister, is said to favour the idea of competing currencies in Europe. It may be that the Chancellor was not displeased to have this idea knocked down in the Antibes, leaving a strengthened EMS as the only realistic alternative to full monetary union in Europe. Whatever the truth of this, it seems inevitable that UK opposition to ambitious proposals for European Monetary Union will be met with less sympathy in future as a result of the Antibes meeting. This is a pity. For as we suggested in the June Economic Viewpoint, there is a serious case yet to be made in favour of the idea of competing currencies. This idea need not be in conflict with the objective of exchange rate stability, so that it is not incompatible with the EMS. Competition between currencies need not mean exchange rate instability. Rather it may mean competition over responsible monetary policies, encouraging their spread within Europe. An implication is that full monetary union may not be desirable. If the UK advanced this position in Europe, it may well carry the day. In this Viewpoint, we develop this argument about the direction for further monetary integration in Europe.     

Tariff-tax reform and exchange rate dynamics in a monetary economy

Using a dynamic monetary model, this paper analyzes the short- and long-run impacts of a tariff-tax reform on the economy, with attention being paid to short-run fluctuations in exchange rates. When a policy reform is announced and if the public believe that it will decrease excess demand, the domestic currency depreciates now to reflect its future depreciation. On the contrary, the domestic currency immediately appreciates if the public believe that it will increase excess demand. However, if there is a relatively small increase in excess demand, the public may mis-react in the exchange rate market by observing currency depreciation first and then appreciation toward the steady-state rate.     

The impact of oil price changes on selected macroeconomic indicators in Azerbaijan

We examine the relationship between oil price fluctuations and economic activity in Azerbaijan using vector autoregressive models for the period 2002Q1–2018Q4. Our key results are as follows. First, growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) decreases after oil price innovations in the oil and gas sector and in the remainder of the economy. Downturns (upswings) in the oil and gas sector also prompt downturns (upswings) in the non-oil sector as fluctuations in oil revenues affect the government's capacity to subsidize the rest of the economy. Second, oil price innovations also lead to higher inflation in Azerbaijan. In response to the required tightening of monetary policy, the manat appreciates against the US dollar. Finally, GDP effects are primarily seen after oil price increases, whereas the interest rate and the exchange rate mainly react to decreases. Inflation increases after both types of shocks, due to either the accommodative monetary policy stance in the case of oil price decreases or the shock itself in the case of increases.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The package that was announced just as we completed our June forecast has, for the time being, produced a more stable financial position. The exchange rate has stopped falling and by mid-July the Smithsonian index had reached 62, the highest level since March. Short- and long-term interest rates have stopped rising. We still emphasise, however, that control over DCE and the money supply has been achieved artificially through direct controls on the banks. The government has achieved short-run consistency between its fiscal and monetary policy, but in the longer term its fiscal policy is inconsistent with its hopes of keeping inflation in single figures. No incomes policy will succeed unless it is accompanied by policies designed to achieve a consistent exchange rate path. The issue has been given prominence by the recent proposals for a European currency system. In the June Economic Outlook we argued that the maintenance of exchange rate stability with the Deutschmark (unless West Germany can be persuaded to increase the growth of its money supply) would require major cuts in the Budget deficit over the next three years. The same monetary constraints would apply whether we joined a fixed exchange rate system or unilaterally decided to hold the exchange rate. If the government seriously wants to control inflation a reduction in the Budget deficit will be essential.     

A Jump-diffusion Model for Exchange Rates in a Target Zone

We propose a simple jump-diffusion model for an exchange rate target zone. The model captures most stylized facts from the existing target zone models while remaining analytically tractable. The model is based on a modified two-limit version of the C OX , I NGERSOLL and R OSS (1985) model. In the model the exchange rate is kept within the band because the variance decreases as the exchange rate approaches the upper or lower limits of the band. We also consider an extension of the model with parity adjustments, which are modeled as Poisson jumps. Estimation of the model is by GMM based on conditional moments. We derive prices of currency options in our model, assuming that realignment jump risk is idiosyncratic. Throughout, we apply the theory to EMS exchange rate data. We show that, after the EMS crisis of 1993, currencies remain in an implicit target zone which is narrower than the officially announced target zones.     

The Conduct of Monetary Policy Without Monetary Aggregates

A central dilemma for the monetary authorities is how to determine monetary policy. The increasing unreliability of monetary aggregates has led over the past few years to less concern for monetary targeting, both in the UK and elsewhere, and a greater influence for the exchange rate on monetary policy. But in the UK, most recently, there has been a move away from setting monetary policy in relation to the exchange rate and external considerations in favour of setting monetary policy in relation to domestic demand. Not surprisingly, this shift has occurred at a time of rising concern about domestic overheating. It illustrates the dilemma of whether monetary policy should be driven by domestic demand considerations or by external, exchange rate considerations. This dilemma is not just confined to the UK for it is a real source of conflict underlying the Louvre Accord and its successors that seek to determine G7 exchange rates in a cooperative manner. In what follows, we argue that exchange rate developments should have an appreciable influence on monetary policy, since this is helpful in attaining stable inflation. But we also suggest that this influence should not go too far, since this stability of inflation may be at the expense of stability of domestic demand and output. Targeting of exchange rates within narrow bands is unlikely to be desirable, unless fiscal policy can be used more flexibly to stabilize domestic demand. This suggests that, in the period up to the spring, the use of monetary policy to hold the £/JDM exchange rate within narrow limits may have been overdone. More seriously, international exchange rate agreements among the G7 countries are likely to founder under adverse market pressures, unless current imbalances in fiscal policy are adjusted. In the absence of greater flexibility in fiscal policy, policy makers will have to trade off domestic and exchange rate considerations in determining monetary policy. An important outstanding issue that needs further consideration is what indicators should be used for monetary policy, in a world in which monetary aggregates provide unreliable signals.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy

The dominant obsessions to watchers of the world economy at the moment are the weakness of the US dollar and the fear that the world economy is stagnating. In this ‘Briefing Paper’ we seek to put both events into the same intellectual framework, and to show that they are the consequence of monetary policies which are not logically related to each other, nor to a common objective of bringing world inflation steadily down to an acceptable level. Specifically, the US - which for reasons outlined below can warrant monetary growth rather below the world average if it is to preserve some dollar stability - is showing an above average outturn in its monetary aggregates. Germany and Japan, which can accommodate increases well above the average, are in fact adopting monetary targets which are leading to exchange rate appreciation, arid a reduction in both countries' expectations for real growth. The dangers for the world economy in this situation are very serious, particularly at a time when further dollar devaluation could be risky both from the viewpoint of US inflation wide the dollar's role as the key reserve asset. It could lead at worst to US protectionism and a monetaryled recession, rein forcing the slow growth rates already being widely predicted in 1978 for many other industrial countries. However, we show in this ‘Briefing Paper’ that this is not a necessity outcome of the present situation, given three vital perceptions. The first, required by statesmen as much as by technicians. is that the recent stagnation in European & Japanese output and exchange rate instability are essentially a monetary phenomenon, requiring essentially monetary (rather than fiscal) remedies. The second is acceptance of the need and practicability of some monetary consignation, based on reasonably common objectives among the major countries regarding inflation, bands for exchange rate movement and red rates of growth. the third, at the most practical level, is agreement on the actual monetary numbers which broadly reconcile these objectives and also take account of the very different ‘unwanted’ rates of monetary growth between countries which reflect their different underlying conditions of output, productivity and demand for money. It is the (ambitious) aim of this ‘Briefing Paper’ to substantiate these perceptions and to provide the numbers mound which a consideration of monetary policies can be framed. The numbers are necessarily based on trends established over a number of years and need to be supplemented by detailed understanding of each country's financial status But the monetary targets provided do, in our judgement, embody trade-offs between inflation, growth and exchange rate movements which should broadly satisfy national ambitions, and reset the world economy on a worthwhile growth path during 1978 or 1979.     

中国货币市场深化进程中的汇市弹性与压力分析

自21世纪以来,中国货币市场与外汇市场均发生了翻天覆地的变化。对近十年中国货币市场深化发展进程汇市弹性与压力问题的实证结果表明,更富弹性的汇制、更高市场化程度的汇市倾向于高发展水平的货币市场;同时需要政府对外汇市场的逐步放开,使得汇率的波动与调控逐步市场化。货币市场越深化发展,需要更具弹性的汇制与更具自由化的外汇市场与之相协调发展。伴随货币市场的稳步发展,中国汇制的选择更趋合理、更具弹性。     

Bond market co-movements,expected inflation and the GBP-USD equilibrium real exchange rate

Since the end of the fixed rates in 1973 and after the European Monetary System (EMS) sterling dismissal in 1992, the value of the pound has undergone large cyclical fluctuations on average. Of particular interest to policy makers is the understanding of whether such movements are consistent with the lack or not of a correction mechanism to some long-run equilibrium. The purpose of the present study is to understand those dynamics, how the external value of the British sterling (GBP) relative to the US dollar (USD) evolved during the recent floating experiences, and what have been the driving forces. In this paper we assume the real exchange rate to be determined by forces relating to the goods and capital market in a general equilibrium framework. This entails testing the purchasing power parity (PPP) and the uncovered interest parity (UIP) together. In doing so, we model inflation expectations explicitly. Our findings have two important implications, both for monetary policy. First, we show that some of the observed changes in the bilateral real exchange rate cannot be solely attributed to changes in inflation rates, but, also to capital markets. Secondly, we find a weaker behavior of the US bond rate on international markets, possibly explained by the special US dollar status of World reserve currency.     

Exchange rate bifurcation in a stochastic evolutionary finance model

This paper analyzes the stability and fluctuations of the exchange rate with a speculative bubble using the methods of evolutionary finance and stochastic differential equations. It constructs a hybrid stochastic system for the financial market involving a discrete time process and a continuous time process. The discrete process models the bubble and is meant to capture the behavior of less sophisticated investors who trade infrequently. The continuous time process is a stochastic differential equation for monetary policy together with a backward stochastic equation for the exchange rate. Monetary policy is affected by the bubble and in turn affects the exchange rate as well as speculation. The bubble and exchange rate exhibit a form of bifurcation. This means the bubble and exchange rate experience fluctuations as the propensity to chase trends or switch predictors changes.     

Managed Floating as a Monetary Policy Strategy

Although there seems to be a broad consensus among economists that purely floating or completely fixed exchange rates (the so-called corner solutions) are the only viable alternatives of exchange rate management, many countries do not behave according to this paradigm and adopt a strategy within the broad spectrum of exchange rate regimes that is limited by the two corner solutions. Many of these intermediate regimes are characterized by significant foreign exchange market interventions and a certain degree of exchange rate flexibility with non-preannounced exchange rate targets. While academic research in this area usually concentrates on some specific aspects of intermediate regimes (such as the effectiveness of interventions or institutional aspects), managed floating has rarely been analyzed as a comprehensive monetary policy strategy. In this paper, we present a monetary policy framework in which central banks simultaneously use the exchange rate and the interest rate as operating targets of monetary policy. We explain the mechanics of foreign exchange market interventions and sterilization and we explain why a central bank has an interest of controlling simultaneously the two operating targets. We derive the monetary policy rules for the two operating targets from a simple open economy macro model in which the uncovered interest parity condition and the monetary conditions index play a central role.     

What drives fluctuations in exchange rate growth in emerging markets – A multi-level dynamic factor approach

Historically, exchange rates in many emerging economies have been volatile. We use a dynamic hierarchical factor model to investigate the driving forces behind these fluctuations in exchange rate growth and find that in recent years, especially since the Great Recession, the common (world) factor has become more important. We also find that, since 2009, US monetary policy and Chinese economic growth have had much greater effects on emerging market exchange rate growth fluctuations. The historical decomposition indicates that 18.8% and 23% of the variations in the world factor after 2009 can be explained by US monetary policy shock and Chinese industrial production shock, respectively.     

A BUDGET FOR STERLING AND A BUDGET FOR JOBS

In our assessment macroeconomic policy is now tighter as consequence of the Budget than we had assumed in February. We interpret the Budget speech as indicating higher interest rates (tighter monetary policy) and, in consequence, a stronger exchange rate. On this basis we find that the prospects for inflation are slightly better than before, though output is weaker. Additionally we forecast a PSBR in 1985-6 of £ 63/4bn, below the official forecast of £7.1bn but in line with our February forecast. Of £7.1bn but in line with our February forecast. Because output is lower, however, this implies a tighter fiscal policy.
The other main change to our forecast is unemployment. The changes to National Insurance Contribution scales represent a very cheap way of reducing the cost of employing the lower paid, and we estimate that these measures, together with the extension of the Youth Training Scheme and Community Programme, will create an extra 375,000 jobs and training places by 1988. However these effects are partially offset by the effects on output of the higher interest rates and higher exchange rate that we are now forecasting. When account is also taken of the increase in labour supply that follows any increase in employment, the net effect on unemployment is to reduce it by 300,000 by 1988 compared with our February forecast.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

There are enough similarities in the performance of the British and Spanish economies in recent years to make the entry of the peseta into the EMS on 19 June an event of interest to UK observers. Faced with the problem of overheating, the Spanish authorities have chosen to use the external discipline of a fixed exchange rate as a way of fighting inflation. In similar circumstances, the UK has opted for autonomy, preferring to use internal monetary discipline to bring inflation back down to the European average - itself one of Mrs. Thatcher's conditions for EMS entry. Over the next year or two it should be possible to form a view on the relative merits of the two approaches to counter-inflation policy.     

Nonlinearities in exchange rate determination in a small open economy: Some evidence for Canada

We analyze bilateral Canadian-US dollar exchange rate movements within a Markov switching framework with two states, one in which the exchange rate is determined by the monetary model, and the other in which its behavior follows the predictions of a Taylor rule exchange rate model. There are a number of regime switches throughout the estimation period 1991:2–2008:12 which we can each relate to particular changes in Canadian monetary policy. These results imply that an active monetary policy stance may account for nonlinearities in the exchange rate-fundamentals nexus. The strong evidence of nonlinearities also confirms the notion that exchange rate movements cannot be explained exclusively in terms of any one particular exchange rate model.     

The influence of international oil price fluctuation on the exchange rate of countries along the “Belt and Road”

In recent years, the international crude oil price has become increasingly volatile. It influences the exchange rate changes of relevant countries through economic growth, price level, international balance of payments, and other channels. Such exchange rate fluctuations have caused certain risks for the development of China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative. This article analyzes the impact of oil price changes on the exchange rates of countries. Because the fluctuation of oil prices and exchange rates has shown the characteristics of multiple time scales, this study used the empirical mode decomposition (EMD) method to obtain the long-cycle and short-cycle sequences of oil prices and the exchange rates of various countries, then analyzed the impact of oil price changes on exchange rates under different time scales. The results showed that oil price fluctuations have an impact on the exchange rate changes of countries along the “Belt and Road” under different time scales. However, this effect is asymmetric between oil-producing countries and non-oil-producing countries, and the transmission path of oil prices to exchange rates varies from cycle to cycle.     

Does trade integration alter monetary policy transmission?

This paper explores the role of trade integration—or openness—for monetary policy transmission in a medium-scale new Keynesian model. Allowing for strategic complementarities in price setting, we highlight a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy directly impacts domestic inflation: a monetary contraction which appreciates the exchange rate lowers the local currency price of imported goods; this, in turn, induces domestic producers to lower their prices too. We pin down key parameters of the model by matching impulse responses obtained from a vector autoregression on time series for the US relative to the euro area. Our estimation procedure yields plausible parameter values and suggests a strong role for strategic complementarities. Counterfactual simulations show that openness alters monetary transmission significantly. While the contractionary effect of a monetary policy shock on inflation and output tends to increase in openness, we find that monetary policy's control over inflation increases, as the output decline which is necessary to bring about a given reduction of inflation is smaller in more open economies.