Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.     

What are the Trade Spill-Overs from Fiscal Shocks in Europe? An Empirical Analysis***

We use a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) analysis to explore the (trade spill-over) effects of fiscal policy shocks in Europe. To enhance comparability with the existing literature, we first analyse the effects of these shocks at the national level. Here, we employ identification based on Choleski decomposition and a structural VAR, both of which lead to the same results. Then, we turn to study the cross-border spill-overs of fiscal shocks via the trade channel. Fiscal expansions in Germany, France and Italy lead to significant increases in imports from a number of European countries. In order to mimic the case of monetary union, we also shut off the effects via the short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate and find a slight strengthening on average of the cross-country spill-overs from a fiscal expansion. These results suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the possibility of enhanced fiscal coordination.*** This research is part of the RTN project ‘Macroeconomic Policy Design for Monetary Unions’, funded by the European Commission (contract number HPRN-CT-2002-00237). We thank two anonymous referees, a referee for the ECB Working Paper series, Peter Claeys, David-Jan Jansen, Franc Klaassen, Roberto Perotti and audiences at the Dutch Central Bank and the CEPR/CREI Conference ‘Designing a Macroeconomic Policy Framework for Europe’ (Barcelona, 2004) for many helpful comments. A large part of this paper was written while Beetsma was visiting the Directorate-General for Research of the ECB. He thanks the ECB for the stimulating research environment. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not commit any of.cial institution. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?

This paper surveys the literature that uses two-country models to analyze monetary and fiscal policy issues faced in interdependent economies. We discuss sources of structural interdependence that researchers typically include in these models. We describe many of the types of policy interactions that researchers have considered and summarize the key results that they have obtained. Finally, we briefly explain the limitations of two-country models and outline directions that this literature might usefully be extended.     

Cohesion Policy in the eu: Going Beyond Fiscal Transfers?

Should cohesion policy in the EU be reformed? This question becomes pressing in light of the coming enlargement of the EU. Indeed, without reform enlargement will involve an increase in the budget for cohesion policies, as well as a reallocation of funds across regions. Furthermore, it is an appropriate occasion to rethink the various rules and criteria associated with cohesion policies. Recently, the European Commission published its Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (henceforth SRESC, (2001)). The report praises the effectiveness of current cohesion policies and suggests a mere continuation of current practices in the future. This paper challenges this conclusion and discusses some options for reform. The paper starts with a brief introduction to the current cohesion policy and the changes that will occur in light of EU enlargement. Subsequently, we address two questions. Is there a need for cohesion policy reform? And if so, how should it be reformed?     

Fiscal Policy in Emu: Towards a Sustainability and Growth Pact?

This paper takes stock of the academic and policy discussionson the fiscal institutions of EMU, confronts the framework inplace with what is known of the desirable properties of fiscalpolicy in a monetary union, and discusses possible improvements.We start with a discussion of three requirements for the fiscalframework of a monetary union: it should be conducive to publicfinance sustainability, leave room for stabilization at thenational level, and encourage structural reform. We then examinehow the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) measures up to theserequirements and find that it has mostly failed on all threeaccounts. Whether the 2005 reform of the SGP fixes those deficienciesremains an open issue. To this end, we propose five buildingblocks towards an effective SGP: a better concept of sustainability;harmonized general government balance sheets; appropriate targets;refined procedures; and better institutions. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: benoit.coeure{at}free.fr; jpf{at}bruegel.org     

Unemployment Insurance and the Business Cycle: What Adjustments are Needed?

During the 2007–2011 economic downturn, the duration that one could collect unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States increased to an unprecedented 99 weeks, and the UI benefit amount increased by $25. This article explores the policy of increasing the generosity of UI during recessions using a model that accounts for the insurance and moral hazard implications of UI as well as the program's impact on job creation. When limited to adjusting the duration of benefits, a more generous UI system is optimal. However, due to UI's negative impact on job creation and the increased cost of providing benefits when unemployment is high, the optimal extension is just 1.3 months. When the government adjusts both the benefit amount and its duration, the optimal policy during downturns is a reduction in the replacement rate. This mitigates the decline in job creation and funds a UI extension of 4.3 months.     

Shall the New EU Members Introduce the Euro? Some Macroeconomic Policy Effects

After the EU enlargement in 2004, there is a clear commitment of the EU and the new member states to aim at an enlargement of the euro zone within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well. This might have significant effects on the old EMU, the new members, and even on the global economy. The present paper analyzes some macroeconomic effects and particularly the impact on the effects of stabilization policies when switching to an enlarged euro zone under different assumptions about fiscal and monetary policy regimes in Europe and under alternative types of economic shocks. Also, the implications for the US of different European monetary regimes are evaluated. The results suggest that economic benefits for all countries are rather small. For the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), even disadvantages may dominate.     

Current Account and Fiscal Policy in Japan: 1885–1991

This paper explores the empirical relationship between the current account balance and macroeconomic series for the Japanese economy over the years 1885–1991. The long-run equilibrium depends on which series (public debt or budget deficits) affects assets relative to a capital stock rate. Departing from the Ricardian Equivalence structure (no bequest motives), fiscal policy in Japan is shown to be more related to the current account when policy is introduced by shifts in tax revenues rather than by changes in national debt.     

Is Fiscal Policy Poised for a Comeback?

For several decades, discretionary fiscal policy has been indisrepute. Most economists viewed it as unnecessary, becausemonetary policy was up to the job of stabilizing the economy.Economists also viewed fiscal policy as too clumsy to deal withthe relatively short recessions that became the post-war norm.But the experience of Japan and the near-Japan experience ofthe United States in 2001–3 have renewed some of the oldcase for fiscal policy. Low-interest environments in which monetarypolicy becomes ineffective turn out to be a real danger, nota myth. Economic slumps that last for a number of years, offeringample time to implement fiscal expansion, also turn out to bepossible. As a result, the case for fiscal policy made by thefirst generation of Keynesians has experienced a real revival. Footnotes ¹ E-mail address: pkrugman{at}princeton.edu     

Fiscal policy and growth forecasts in the EU: are official forecasters still misestimating fiscal multipliers?

Review of World Economics - Blanchard and Leigh (Am Econ Rev 103(3):117–120, 2013; IMF Econ Rev 62(2):179–212, 2014) find fiscal multipliers to be underestimated in the EU in the deep...     

Macroeconomic Policy, Exchange Rate Regimes and Economic Growth

China has been keeping high economic growth rate since it carried out managed floating exchange rate regimes in 1994, while now begins to face retrenchment pressure brought by the depression of internal and external economy. The establishment of RMB exchange rate regime should take account of the validity of macroeconomic policy, macroeconomic growth and the regional internationalization of RMB.     

Nonlinear Effects of Fiscal Policy on Private Consumption： Evidence from China

In the present paper, we use the Markov‐switching model to test the nonlinear effects of government expenditure and taxes on private consumption in China. The results show that fiscal policy in China has a significantly nonlinear effect. In years 1978–1980 and 1984–1997, the effect of government consumption on private consumption is non‐Keynesian. During the same periods, the effect of taxes is also non‐Keynesian, but the effect is not significant. The effect of government investment is linear but asymmetric. After retesting the reasons for the existence of nonlinear effects, we find that in China initial fiscal conditions and the magnitude of fiscal consolidations are not related to the nonlinear effects of fiscal policy. The government should pay close attention to the characteristics of commodity and labor markets to identify the conditions and regimes associated with nonlinear effects.     

Analysis of China＇s Overheated Economy and Macroeconomic Policy Options

Based on macroeconomic analysis since 2003, this article holds mat a trena towaras overheating has surfaced in China‘s economy. China‘s rapid economic expansion has affected the quality of its growth, with rising material and energy consumption and imbalanced economic structure as the main manifestations. Regarding macroeconomic policy options in 2004, decision-makers should shift the policy focus from control of deflation to prevention of inflation; the pace of economic growth should be properly set; a balance between consumption and investment should be strengthened by controlling excessive expansion of investment, and industrial restructuring should be conducted in a coordinated manner on the basis of properly controlling the overly rapid indastrial growth; policies should be continued to boost exports and sustainable growth of foreign investment; and more efforts should be made to accelerate the change in the mode of economic growth.     

How Useful are DSGE Macroeconomic Models for Forecasting?

A review of the literature shows that forecasts from DSGE models are not more accurate than either times series models or official forecasts, but neither are they any worse. Further, all three types of forecast failed to predict the recession that started in 2007 and continued to forecast poorly even after the recession was known to have begun. The aim of this paper is to investigate why these results occur by examining the structure of the solution of DSGE models and compare this with pure time series models. The main factor seems to be the dynamic structure of DSGE models. Their backward-looking dynamics gives them a similar forecasting structure to time series models and their forward-looking dynamics, which consists of expected values of future exogenous variables, is difficult to forecast accurately. This suggests that DSGE models should not be tested through their forecasting ability.     

Effort and Performance: What Distinguishes Interacting and Noninteracting Groups from Individuals?

We study how group membership affects behavior both when group members can and cannot interact with each other. Our goal is to isolate the contrasting forces that spring from group membership: a free‐riding incentive leading to reduced effort and a sense of social responsibility that increases effort. In an environment with varying task difficulty and individual decision making as the benchmark, we show that the free‐riding effect is stronger. Group members significantly reduce their effort in situations where they share the outcome but are unable to communicate. When group members share outcomes and can interact, they outperform groups without communication and individuals. We show that these groups do as well as the best constituent member would have done on his or her own.     

Bank Capital Regulation,Economic Stability,and Monetary Policy: What Does the Academic Literature Tell Us?

This paper surveys academic research exploring the macroeconomic and monetary policy implications of the Basel I and Basel II systems of risk-based capital requirements. This research indicates that regulatory tightening of capital ratios can generate aggregate shocks, that capital regulation can enhance the procyclicality already inherent in banking, and that capital requirements can influence macroeconomic outcomes and alter the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The paper offers suggestions for future avenues of research on the interplay between bank capital regulation, the economy, and monetary policymaking. Although any errors are my own, I received very helpful comments on earlier versions from Kenneth Kopecky, John Pattison, and Jack Tatom. I am grateful for research support from Networks Financial Institute.