Derivative trading by utility firms

This paper examines the use of derivatives by a utility company. The hedging problem for utilities is atypical; the goal is not strictly to minimize average costs. Rather, the objectives are to minimize the upside risk associated with extreme bills, volatility of bills, and average expected bills for consumers. We characterize the optimal positions on futures contracts and options on futures that a utility company should assume. The results indicate that the use of derivatives (both futures and options on futures) is an efficient means of optimizing the objective functions without exposing consumers to speculative risk.     

Higher moment exchange rate exposure of S&P500 firms

We examine the impact of higher order moments of changes in the exchange rate on stock returns of U.S. large-cap companies in the S&P500. We find a robust negative effect of exchange rate volatility on S&P500 company returns. The consumer discretionary and the consumer staples sectors have significant negative exposure to exchange rate volatility suggesting that exchange rate volatility affects stock returns through the channel of international operations. In terms of industries, the household products and personal products industries have significant negative exposure as well. The impact in the financial sector suggests that derivatives and hedging activity can mitigate exposure to exchange rate volatility. We find weak evidence that exchange rate skewness has an effect on S&P500 stock returns, but, find evidence that exchange rate kurtosis affects returns of companies that are more exposed to exchange rate volatility.     

The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing

We examine the influence of firms’ ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two‐to‐one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three‐to‐two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.     

Equal risk pricing under convex trading constraints

In an incomplete market model where convex trading constraints are imposed upon the underlying assets, it is no longer possible to obtain unique arbitrage-free prices for derivatives using standard replication arguments. Most existing derivative pricing approaches involve the selection of a suitable martingale measure or the optimisation of utility functions as well as risk measures from the perspective of a single trader.We propose a new and effective derivative pricing method, referred to as the equal risk pricing approach, for markets with convex trading constraints. The approach analyses the risk exposure of both the buyer and seller of the derivative, and seeks an equal risk price which evenly distributes the expected loss for both parties under optimal hedging. The existence and uniqueness of the equal risk price are established for both European and American options. Furthermore, if the trading constraints are removed, the equal risk price agrees with the standard arbitrage-free price.Finally, the equal risk pricing approach is applied to a constrained Black–Scholes market model where short-selling is banned. In particular, simple pricing formulas are derived for European calls, European puts and American puts.     

Use prices as sales agents

We use a monopoly model with consumer heterogeneity to study the profitability of group buying, in which the discounted price is offered to consumers if more than a certain number of them agree to make purchases. We find that group buying generally outperforms intertemporal pricing but is outperformed by a referral reward program. The optimal minimum requirement depends on parameters. If a consumer and her invitee have homogeneous preference and there is no discount of future utility, a pricing strategy characterized by the low (medium) minimum requirement is always dominated by high minimum requirement, whose profit coincides with one-person group buying.     

Some Unintended Consequences of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals

It is widely argued that international arbitrage, or parallel trade (PT), in patented drugs may increase consumer surplus in the relevant countries but at the expense of R&D investment. We show how the effects of PT depend on the vertical contract (linear pricing or dual pricing) between the manufacturer and the foreign licensee or distributor and on whether and how drug prices are regulated and reimbursed. We find that, contrary to what policy makers generally predict, we should be more concerned with the impact of PT on aggregate consumer surplus than on R&D investment. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Robust firm pricing with panel data

Firms often have imperfect information about demand for their products. We develop an integrated econometric and theoretical framework to model firm demand assessment and subsequent pricing decisions with limited information. We introduce a panel data discrete choice model whose realistic assumptions about consumer behavior deliver partially identified preferences and thus generate ambiguity in the firm pricing problem. We use the minimax-regret criterion as a decision-making rule for firms facing this ambiguity. We illustrate the framework’s benefits relative to the most common discrete choice analysis approach through simulations and empirical examples with field data.     

The Impact of Consumption Hassle on Pricing Schedules

A curious phenomenon in the retail pricing of many product categories (e.g., tuna, frozen orange juice, and tomato paste) is the existence of quantity surcharges. A related curiosity is the existence of both discounts and surcharges within the same product category. To explain the former phenomenon, extant research invokes heterogeneity in consumption parameters, heterogeneity in search costs, or concern for retail price image. To the best of our knowledge, there is no received explanation for the latter phenomenon. We add to this rich stream of work by proposing a novel explanation for quantity surcharges. Our explanation is based on the notion of consumption hassle. We analyze a market that is heterogeneous in a hedonic parameter that influences valuations as well as the effective cost of the consumption hassle. We then derive consumer choices (small pack, large pack, or two small packs) taking into account Individual Rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints. In the absence of consumption hassle, we obtain two segments with one purchasing the small pack and the other purchasing the large pack. Moreover, the optimal pricing for the seller involves quantity discounts. However, with the introduction of consumption hassle, the market potentially splits into three segments: one purchasing the small pack, another purchasing two small packs, and the third purchasing the large pack. Moreover, the optimal pricing for the seller involves quantity surcharges. Overall, our analytical findings offer an additional explanation for the phenomenon of quantity surcharges. More importantly, they offer a rationale for the existence of multiple pricing schedules within the same product category by explicitly recognizing variations in consumption hassle. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment

In a two‐period model of nondurable experience goods, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD) and price commitment (PC) (relative to time‐consistent pricing) in a monopoly. We find that when the static, full‐information monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean consumer valuation, PC yields higher (lower) profits and social welfare than BBPD. We also identify the market conditions under which BBPD does not increase firm profits and provide an explanation as to when the firm should discriminate against its first‐time and repeat customers, respectively.     

Behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination

We develop a model of behavior‐ and characteristic‐based discriminatory pricing where consumers are heterogeneous both in tastes and in price sensitivity. Each firm is able to distinguish between the consumers that have bought from it and those that have bought from the rival. Furthermore, each firm learns the price sensitivity of their own consumers. We show that using this additional information may yield higher profits than uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with respect to price sensitivity. We also discuss consumer surplus implications of such behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination, and we show that the impact of price discrimination depends on both the consumer type and the level of consumers’ heterogeneity.     

Evaluating asset‐pricing models using the Hansen–Jagannathan bound: a Monte Carlo investigation

We use recent statistical tests, based on a ‘distance’ between the model and the Hansen–Jagannathan bound, to compute the rejection rates of true models. For asset‐pricing models with time‐separable preferences, the finite‐sample distribution of the test statistic associated with the risk‐neutral case is extreme, in the sense that critical values based on this distribution deliver type I errors no larger than intended—regardless of risk aversion or the rate of time preference. We also show that these maximal‐type‐I‐error critical values are appropriate for both time and state non‐separable preferences and that they yield acceptably small type II error rates. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Problems in Launching the Mobile Internet: Evidence From a Pricing Experiment

Commercialization of innovations frequently stumbles. A prominent recent example are the early (i.e., pre‐3G) mobile phone‐enabled Internet services, whose European take‐up was slower than expected. To determine why, we build a structural model of demand for such services and estimate it using consumer‐level panel data from a pricing experiment. The experiment allows a decomposition of the number of wireless connections into the number of needs—instances where a consumer would establish a connection if the price were zero—and the conditional probability of establishing a connection. We find that needs were plenty and potential consumer surplus several magnitudes higher than that attained. We find that pricing reduced usage substantially and explore potential reasons for the high prices.     

A note on two‐part pricing under uncertainty

In his classic article, Walter Oi (Oi, Q. J. Econ. 2005; 85 : 77–96) analyzed the optimal structure of a two‐part tariff. He showed that identical consumer demands result in user fees equal to marginal cost and a lump‐sum entry fee equal to the consumer surplus that marginal cost pricing generates. This result appears in managerial economics texts (Managerial Economics (6th edn). W. W. Norton: New York; 472–475; Managerial Economics and Business Strategy (5th edn). McGraw Hill/Irwin: New York; 410–412) and intermediate microeconomics texts (Intermediate Microeconomics (6th edn). W. W. Norton: New York; 451–453). In this note, we extend Oi's analysis to the case of uncertainty. We show that attitudes toward risk influence the optimal two‐part tariff. The results from our model describe the two‐part tariff that emerges from expected utility maximization. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personalized Pricing and Quality Customization

We embed the principal–agent model in a model of spatial differentiation with correlated consumer preferences to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby duopoly firms charge different prices and offer different qualities to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. Our model sheds light on the equilibrium product-line pricing and quality schedules offered by firms, given that none, one, or both firms implement PPQ. The adoption of PPQ has three effects in our model: it enables firms to extract higher rents from loyal customers, intensifies price competition for nonloyal customers, and eliminates cannibalization from customer self-selection. Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing and price discrimination, we show that even symmetric firms can avoid the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem when they engage in personalized pricing and quality customization. When both firms have PPQ, consumer surplus is nonmonotonic in valuations such that some low-valuation consumers get higher surplus than high-valuation consumers. The adoption of PPQ can reduce information asymmetry, and therefore sellers offer higher-quality products after the adoption of PPQ. Overall, we find that while the simultaneous adoption of PPQ generally improves total social welfare and firm profits, it decreases total consumer surplus.     

Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly

We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entry.     

Forecasting temperature to price CME temperature derivatives

This paper seeks to forecast temperatures in US cities in order to price temperature derivatives on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The CME defines the average daily temperature underlying its contracts as the average of the maximum and minimum daily temperatures, yet all published work on temperature forecasting for pricing purposes has ignored this peculiar definition of the average and sought to model the average temperature directly. This paper is the first to look at the average temperature forecasting problem as an analysis of extreme values. The theory of extreme values guides model selection for temperature maxima and minima, and a forecast distribution for the CME’s daily average temperature is found through convolution. While univariate time series AR-GARCH and regression models generally yield superior point forecasts of temperatures, our extreme-value-based model consistently outperforms these models in density forecasting, the most important risk management tool.     

Measure preserving derivatives and the pricing kernel puzzle

Recent empirical studies have found evidence of nonmonotonicity in the pricing kernels for a variety of market indices. This phenomenon is known as the pricing kernel puzzle. The payoff distribution pricing model of Dybvig predicts that the payoff distribution of a direct investment of $1 in a market index may be replicated by investing less than $1 in some derivative written on that market index whenever the associated pricing kernel is nondecreasing. Using the Hardy–Littlewood rearrangement inequality, we obtain an explicit solution for the cheapest replicating derivative, which we refer to as the optimal measure preserving derivative. The optimal measure preserving derivative is the permutation appearing in Ryff’s decomposition of the pricing kernel with respect to the market payoff measure. We compute optimal measure preserving derivatives corresponding to the estimated physical and risk neutral distributions in the paper by Jackwerth (2000) that first brought attention to the pricing kernel puzzle.     

Option pricing: a yet simpler approach

Decisions in Economics and Finance - We provide a lean, non-technical exposition on the pricing of path-dependent and European-style derivatives in the Cox–Ross–Rubinstein (CRR) pricing...     

Nonparametric state price density estimation using constrained least squares and the bootstrap

The economic theory of option pricing imposes constraints on the structure of call functions and state price densities. Except in a few polar cases, it does not prescribe functional forms. This paper proposes a nonparametric estimator of option pricing models which incorporates various restrictions (such as monotonicity and convexity) within a single least squares procedure. The bootstrap is used to produce confidence intervals for the call function and its first two derivatives and to calibrate a residual regression test of shape constraints. We apply the techniques to option pricing data on the DAX.     

Randal Heeb Innovation and Vertical Integration in Complementary Markets

This paper studies vertical integration by an essential-good monopolist into complementary markets. Unlike previous studies of complementary products, consumers are allowed to purchase some components of a complementary basket, but not others. Two different pricing strategies by the integrated firm may emerge. In mass-market equilibria, the price of the complement under integration is zero and it is given away with the essential good. Niche-market equilibria have more conventional pricing. This dichotomy is consistent with consumer software pricing. Integration enhances consumer and total surplus, unless it leads to exit by the higher-quality rival, in which case welfare is reduced. Exit is most likely when it is least damaging to consumer welfare. Integration reduces innovation by the rival firm. The effect on innovation by the integrated firm is ambiguous, but numerical computation of an extended model indicates that integration increases the innovation of the integrated firm and enhances welfare.